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AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW

CONTENTS

ARTICLES

Advocacy Politics in Presidential Parties
John M. Bruce, John A. Clark & John H. Kessel 1089

Issues and Party Support in Multiparty Systems
Stuart Elaine Macdonald, Ola Listhaug & George Rabinowitz 1107

Managing Blame: An Experimental Test of the Effects of Political Accounts
Kathleen M. McGraw 1133

Black Political Participation in the 1984 and 1988 Presidential Elections
Katherine Tate 1159

The President, Referendum Voting, and Subnational Elections in the United States
Dennis M. Simon, Charles W. Ostrom, Jr. & Robin F. Marra 1177

Eschewing Obfuscation? Campaigns and the Perception of U.S. Senate Incumbents
Charles H. Franklin 1193

Information, Values, and Opinion
John Zaller 1215

Roles, Rules, and Rationality in the New Institutionalism
Donald D. Searing 1239

Discontent and the Expected Utility of Rebellion: The Case of Peru
Edward N. Muller, Henry A. Dietz & Steven E. Finkel 1261

Transitions by Agreement: Modeling the Spanish Way
Josep M. Colomer 1283

Absolute and Relative Gains in International Relations Theory
Robert Powell 1303

James Madison on Religion and Politics: Rhetoric and Reality
Thomas Lindsay 1321

SYMPOSIUM

Where Is the Schema? Going Beyond the "S" Word in Political Psychology
James H. Kuklinski, Robert C. Luskin & John Bolland 1341

Where Is the Schema? Critiques
Milton Lodge, Kathleen M. McGraw, Pamela Johnston Conover, Stanley Feldman & Arthur H. Miller 1357
RESEARCH NOTES
Counting the Number of Parties: An Alternative Index
Juan Molinar 1383
The Effect of Registration Laws and Education on U.S. Voter Turnout
Jonathan Nagler 1393
Measuring Internal Political Efficacy in the 1988 National Election Study
Richard G. Niemi, Stephen C. Craig & Franco Mattei 1407
CONTROVERSY
What Should Rational Cognitive Misers Do?
Iain McLean, John M. Orbell & Robyn M. Dawes 1417
BOOK REVIEWS
New Politics in the Soviet Union 1427
Political Theory 1437
American Politics 1456
Comparative Politics 1477
International Relations 1492
INDEX TO VOL. 85 1504

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ARTICLES

ADVOCACY POLITICS IN PRESIDENTIAL PARTIES

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Analysis of data from a 1988 survey of presidential parties demonstrates that campaign leaders are better understood as true believers than as either representatives or vote maximizers. Analysis of leaders' attitudes reveals four issue groups in both the Republican and Democratic parties. The dominant coalition in the Republican party is slightly more conservative, and that in the Democratic party is slightly more liberal, than the party median. Comparison with similar 1972 data shows stable patterns of issue advocacy and intraparty cohesion over this time period but somewhat increased issue distance between the parties in 1988.

Political parties in the United States have a variety of institutional forms. On the national level, presidential parties, congressional parties, and the national committees immediately come to mind. Presidential parties, such as the Dukakis/Bentsen Committee and the Bush-Quayle '88 Committee,[1] are organized on national, regional, state, and local levels. They are by no means the only party organization; but at the very least, presidential parties are important components of the organizational aggregate that now makes up our national parties. Further, they are the only national party that is organized from the top down. The national chair picks a (national) political director, who in turn selects regional and state chairs; and the state chairs appoint local chairs. As a consequence of this appointment process, the network tying local, state, regional, and national levels together is a good deal stronger than in other types of parties.

On the local level, the presidential campaign organization is a significant unit of the county party, along with organizations supporting candidates for governor, state senator, county auditor, and all the other offices on the ballot. The organizational aggregate on the local level consists of the county committee and all of the campaign units. There is a good deal of overlap in membership, especially over time; and there is substantial communication between them.[2] Thus, the local presidential campaign organization is associated with the other local units in a framework of horizontal integration, just as it is connected to its state and national presidential organization through vertical integration (cf. Schwartz 1990, chap. 3).

Three Party Images

While the multiplicity of campaign organizations is a development of recent decades, scholars have long viewed parties as having a variety of functions (see, e.g., Eldersveld 1964, 22; Sorauf and Beck 1988, 15–17). In this study of presidential parties, we compare three images drawn from this extensive literature: parties as representatives, parties as vote maximizers, and parties as advocates. These can be differentiated by considering the relationship between a party's issue positions and the voters' policy preferences.

Representation

One traditional scholarly view of parties sees them representing the public. They serve as "mediating institutions" and "as links between the community and the larger political world" (Price 1984, 112). Issue positions taken by the party reflect those held by its constituents. Almond and Powell write, "The political party is the specialized interest aggregation structure of contemporary societies. . . . Its organization thus involves arrangements for ascertaining voter preference" (1978, 205-6). If the party ascertains and aggregates, then the partisan banner becomes a rallying point for those being represented.

Jeane Kirkpatrick is equally interested in representation but follows Hanna Pitkin in distinguishing between *representativeness* and *representation.* The former requires only similar distributions—in a smaller representative group and a larger population—"of personal characteristics, such as sex, age, color, foot size, or opinions." Representation, however, is "an emergent characteristic, the outcome of the process that includes the choice of some persons to act as representatives, their interactions and decisions, and their continuing relation to those represented" (Kirkpatrick 1976, 281). Unless party activists think of themselves as representatives and make conscientious efforts to act as such, representation will not be achieved.

Vote Maximization

A second image of parties emphasizes the goal of winning elections. As vote maximizers, the parties adopt positions in order to win public support on election day. Growing out of the writings of Schumpeter (1942) and others, this view has attracted the attention of positive theorists. If winning elections is the primary goal of the party, then maximizing votes is a rational means to achieving that goal. Anthony Downs states directly that "parties formulate policies in order to win elections, rather than win elections in order to formulate policies" (1957, 28). Given certain assumptions about the distribution of voters in a two-party system, most vote-maximizing theories predict parties to converge on moderate policies. Downs (1957, 115–22) finds this result for a normally distributed electorate in which everyone must vote. In other circumstances, differing issue stands might be rational.

The Downsian analysis has been one of the most seminal in modern political science. Many succeeding studies have modified or extended some of the original assumptions. For example, works by Davis and Hinich (1968) and Enelow and Hinich (1984) suggest that the median voter is not necessarily dominant. Shepsle (1972) provided a formal model suggesting that candidates may prefer a strategy of ambiguity; and Page and Brody (1972) present empirical evidence that this may have been the case in the 1968 campaign. Wittman (1983) has developed a model that incorporates the possibility that a candidate may have policy preferences, as well as a simple desire to win.

Advocacy Politics

A third image of parties sees issue positions arising with little regard to the positions held by voters. Kessel has written of party leaders, "They are not giving voice to their constituents' views. Rather, they are urging policies that their party colleagues think wise. Our electoral parties are not representative entities, but *advocacy parties*" (1980, 66; emphasis original). We call the activists who make up advocacy parties *true believers.*

In advocacy politics, true believers see themselves as representatives of the parties, rather than of voters. They want to win, but they are willing to lose elections if unable to convince the electorate to endorse their policies. Some may be driven by purposive incentives toward the enactment of specific policies (Clark and Wilson 1961). Wilson (1962) has labeled these activists "amateurs" because they do not seek material benefits from their involvement in politics.

Not all true believers are strictly amateurs, however. They are more accurately described by the term *purist.* Wildavsky identified purists in the 1964 Goldwater campaign by their lack of orientation toward winning, unwillingness to compromise, and strict adherence to personal beliefs (1965, 395). For them, the party "was far removed from vulgar pandering for votes. It stood on its principles. It did not change to attract votes. Voters were attracted to it when people changed" (1965, 400). Unfortunately for the Goldwater purists, their candidate was defeated long before the median preferences of voters corresponded to their principles.

Recent work by Gerber and Jackson (1989, 1990) has shown that voters' preferences on some issues change to reflect differing stands taken by the parties. In 1958 and 1960, Republican identifiers were more favorable to civil rights policies than Democratic identifiers; but by 1964, it was the other way around. Republican supporters were more hawkish on Vietnam in 1972 than they were in 1968, when the Democrats were more likely to advocate U.S. involvement in that war. Gerber and Jackson argue that voter preferences are not fixed but should be included in attitudinal models as endogenous elements that can be changed in response to party advocacy.

An Empirical Test

During the 1988 presidential campaign, we interviewed county-level leaders in the Bush–Quayle and Dukakis/Bentsen organizations. We identified our respondents in the same way they were selected—by nomination downward. National campaign leaders gave us the names of state leaders; the state leaders in turn identified our respondents as those responsible for the campaign in particular counties. This is an important point. Since the county committees were part of a national network and since the respondents were chosen in the manner just described, we had more than just a sample of activists distributed here and there throughout the country. We had samples of the two 1988 presidential parties.

It proved difficult to obtain the names of the county leaders. At a minimum, we had to obtain the cooperation of busy politicos in the middle of the campaign. And in many cases, especially in the Dukakis/Bentsen Committee, we discovered there was no organization in the counties we wished to include in our sample. But once the names were in hand, respondents were willing to cooperate. Our 230 Bush activists and 140 Dukakis activists represent response rates of 80% and 77%, respectively. (We give details in Clark et al., 1991.) Specific measures to differentiate among the three competing images of U.S. political parties were included in our survey. One allowed us to distinguish between *representatives* and true believers; the other to determine whether the activists saw themselves as *vote maximizers* or true believers.

Table 1. Groups Represented by County Leaders (%)

Type of Group	Campaign Organization	
	Dukakis	Bush
County voters	23.7	29.9
Democratic or Republican party	43.9	44.6
Dukakis or Bush campaign	18.7	14.3
All other responses	13.7	11.2

Representatives or True Believers?

To test for the possibility that party leaders might be representing some group other than voters in their counties, each Democratic leader was asked, "Do you think of yourself *primarily* as a representative of county voters or is there some other group you are representing, such as the Dukakis campaign itself, a population segment such as women or blacks, an interest group such as organized labor, an ideological cause such as liberalism, or the Democratic party as a whole?" The Republican form of the question was, "Do you think of yourself *primarily* as a representative of county voters or is there some other group you are representing, such as the Bush campaign itself, a population segment such as business or farmers, an interest group such as the chamber of commerce, an ideological cause such as conservatism, or the Republican party as a whole?"[3]

The responses, presented in Table 1, were quite similar in both parties. More than 40% said they thought of themselves primarily as representatives of their parties; roughly a quarter said they spoke for voters in their counties; the Dukakis or Bush campaigns were selected by proportions in the mid- to high teens; and no other category was chosen by more than a small fraction. If one combines those speaking for the party and the campaign organization, which is largely justified in the Democratic party and unquestionably justified in the Republican party, then the proportion of county leaders speaking for their parties clearly dominates the proportion who see themselves as representing voters. The ratio between party spokespersons and representatives of voters was better than 2.6 to 1 in the Democratic party and 2 to 1 in the Republican party.

Vote Maximizers or True Believers?

In order to discover whether party activists are best understood as vote maximizers or true believers, respondents were asked to respond to two statements about what political parties *should* be doing. One represented the vote maximizer position; the other described true believers. The vote maximizer statement was that parties should "advocate policies that will attract voters even if party members disagree with them." The true believer statement was that parties should "advocate policies that party members are strongly committed to even if they are not popular."[4]

A simple advocacy index was constructed by subtracting the respondent's vote maximizer response from the true believer response. Constituted this way, a positive score means the respondent was in stronger agreement with the true believer position, and a negative score means the respondent was in stronger agreement with the vote maximizer position. Therefore, the best way to interpret the index is to compare the ratios of positive scores to negative scores. These furnish clear evidence of the dominance of the true believer position. The ratio of true believer scores to vote maximizer scores was nearly 2 to 1 in the Democratic party and nearly 2.5 to 1 in the Republican party. Among subgroups in the two presidential parties, these ratios vary from a low of 1.5 to 1 to a high of 4.9 to 1.

This empirical evidence provides some support for all three views. Twenty-four percent of the Democrats and 30% of the Republicans thought of themselves as representing voters in their counties. Twenty-three percent of the Democrats and 19% of the Republicans were vote maximizers. But the preponderant view was that the county leaders spoke for their parties (or, equivalently, their campaign organizations) and that parties ought to advocate policies in which they believed regardless of the electoral consequences. These positions were held by majorities in both parties. Presidential parties are predominantly advocacy parties.

Issue Groups and Coalitions in 1988

The next step was to determine just what was being advocated. We assumed that activists with similar attitudes would form groups and that these issue groups would seek to form coalitions capable of controlling their party. The nature of the dominant coalition, and thus the nature of the policies advocated by the party, depend upon the feasible combinations of these issue groups.

While there are several ways of identifying issue groups, we selected a method that flows from the definitional requirement that group members share attitudes but at the same time avoids any a priori assumptions about what groups will emerge. Specifically, we calculated agreement scores for the activists in each party based on a number of issues.[5] The agreement scores were then used as input into a cluster routine that grouped respondents according to their highest average agreement scores (or left them as isolates if they failed to be related to any existing cluster in a significant way). Thus, we could be sure that there was a high rate of intragroup agreement on policy.

Many of the issue items can be combined into three rather broad policy areas. International involvement is concerned with the actions of the United States as it relates to other countries: U.S. relations with the USSR, the extent of U.S. involvement in Central America, and the amount of money spent on defense. Social welfare represents an assessment of some major domestic policy choices. Here one finds questions addressing the proper levels of taxing and spending by the government, as well as more controversial programs aimed at providing government assistance to certain individuals or classes of individuals (i.e., health insurance, guaranteed job and standard of living). The final policy area deals with questions of civil liberties. The items include the extent of police authority, the equality of women, and government aid to minorities.

The responses to questions within each of these areas were combined into seven-point scales.[6] The three scales facilitate our analysis by focusing on broad policy areas; but it should be borne in mind that the agreement scores were based on 15 specific questions.[7]

Issue Groups: The Republicans

As shown in Table 2, there were four issue groups among the Republican activists in 1988. They ranged in size from 10% to 36% of the activists. Thus, no single group comprised a majority of the party. Some 28% of the Republican respondents had unique preferences and were not placed in any cluster.

The largest issue group found in the Republican party, which included over

Table 2. Republican Issue Groups: Varieties of Moderation

	Position in Policy Area			
Group	International Involvement	Social Welfare	Civil Liberties	Percent of Activists in Group
Dominant group	moderate conservative (3.0)	moderate conservative (2.7)	moderate (4.3)	36.5
Safety-netters	moderate conservative (3.3)	moderate (4.0)	moderate (4.3)	13.5
Republican moderates	moderate (4.0)	moderate conservative (3.3)	moderate liberal (5.2)	11.3
Conservative libertarians	moderate conservative (2.8)	conservative (1.3)	moderate liberal (4.7)	10.4
Isolates	moderate conservative (3.3)	moderate conservative (3.3)	moderate (4.0)	28.3

Note: N = 230. The figures in parentheses are median positions on scales that vary between 1 and 7. In general, a high score represents a dove position in international relations and a willingness to use government power and resources in the domestic policy areas. A low score represents the opposite. The convention followed for substantive interpretation of the scale was as follows: 1–2.4, conservative; 2.5–3.4, moderate conservative; 3.5–4.5, moderate; 4.6–5.5, moderate liberal; 5.6–7, liberal. This classification is nothing more than an aid to understanding and should not be taken as a precise denotation. Note, for example, that if the lower boundary for moderate had been moved from 3.5 to 3.3, there would have been nine moderate scores, rather than five.

one-third of Republican activists, will be called the *dominant group*. The dominant group tended to be right of the Republican center.[8] On the international involvement scale, the dominant group was just a bit more conservative than the party median. On the issue of cooperation with the Soviet Union, the dominant group tended to be centrist. On the questions of U.S. involvement in Central America and defense spending, they were slightly more conservative than most Republicans. In the area of social welfare policy, the dominant group was moderately conservative. It took the middle Republican ground on the issue of government spending and services but tended to respond less favorably than most Republicans to the idea of the government's providing a guaranteed job and standard of living. The same was true for the question of government health insurance. In the final policy area, civil liberties, the dominant group was at the Republican median on each issue. This group was moderately conservative on increasing police authority, moderate on government assistance to minorities, and liberal with respect to the role of women.

As a function of its size, the dominant group is just that—dominant. While it is not a majority (and hence cannot dictate its will to the rest of the party), it may be viewed as a major force in shaping the character of the party. Other groups must be viewed with the dominant group in mind.

The distinctive aspect of the group we shall call the *safety-netters* is their more moderate position on social welfare issues. As their name implies, they represent the element of the Republican party most willing to use the government as a back-up. Despite being the most liberal Republican group on these issues, their position was not a wholesale endorsement of government action. Their views on social welfare, while more liberal than most Republicans, were not so extreme as to make them outside the party. They fit in well with the dominant group on the international involvement and civil liberties areas. As the second largest group (13% of all Republicans), the safety-netters had the potential to exert a moderating influence on the party.

The *Republican moderates* included 11% of all Republicans. The characteristic features of this group were their relatively liberal stands on international involvement and civil liberties. Compared to other Republicans, their foreign policy views were quite moderate; and their median score on civil liberties was the most liberal score of any Republican group in any policy area. While all four groups had high values on civil liberties, this group had the highest.[9] Aside from these two policy areas, the principal issue significantly distinguishing them from the rest of the pack was whether to raise taxes to reduce the deficit. The Republican moderates were the only Republican issue group to favor increasing taxes to reduce government red ink.

On two of the three issue areas, then, Republican moderates were the most liberal of all four Republican groups. This relatively "extreme" positioning may have some impact on their ability to join in the coalition process.

The *conservative libertarians* had the most conservative scores of the Republican groups on the international involvement and social welfare scales. Indeed, their score on social welfare was almost the lowest possible. The unique aspects of this group were their relatively liberal position on civil liberties and the contrast between this and their staunch conservatism in the other areas. The nearest group to them in all three areas (in terms of simple distance between the medians) was the dominant group. A possible effect of the conservative libertarians is, therefore, to pull the Republican party to a more conservative path as coalitions are formed among the issue groups.

Issue Groups: The Democrats

The four Democratic issue groups are displayed in Table 3. Each contains from 9% to 43% of the Democratic respondents. Just under 21% of the Democrats were isolates rather than members of an issue group. As with the Republicans, no single group was a majority. Thus, the various groups should be explored with the idea of coalition building in mind.

The Democratic groups were less distinctive than those found in the Republican party. While each of the Republican groups was unique in some respects, their Democratic counterparts were much more similar across areas, differing only in their degree of liberalism.

The *dominant group* in the Democratic party included 43% of the Democratic activists. This group was left of the Democratic center on two of the three policy areas. In international involvement, the dominant group had the most liberal position of all four issue groups in the Democratic party. The dominant group was always at the Democratic end point on individual questions. They were the most in favor of cutting defense spending, eliminating U.S. involvement in Central America, and cooperating with the Soviet Union. In the area of civil liberties, the dominant group once again occupied the most liberal position of the generally liberal Democratic groups. They were least inclined to support increasing police authority, most likely to feel that women should have an equal role, and among the most inclined to support government aid to minorities. The social welfare views of the dominant group, while not the most

Table 3. Democratic Issue Groups: Varieties of Liberalism

Group	International Involvement	Social Welfare	Civil Liberties	Percent of Activists in Group
	Position in Policy Area			
Dominant group	liberal (6.0)	liberal (5.7)	liberal (6.2)	42.9
Cautious liberals	moderate liberal (5.3)	liberal (5.7)	liberal (5.7)	9.3
Democratic moderates	moderate liberal (4.7)	moderate liberal (4.7)	liberal (5.7)	17.1
Selective liberals	liberal (5.7)	liberal (6.0)	liberal (6.0)	10.0
Isolates	moderate (4.5)	moderate liberal (5.3)	moderate liberal (5.3)	20.7

Note: N = 140. The figures in parentheses are median positions on scales that vary between 1 and 7. In general, a high score represents a dove position in international relations and a willingness to use government power and resources in the domestic policy areas. A low score represents the opposite. The convention followed for substantive interpretation of the scale was as follows: 1–2.4, conservative; 2.5–3.4, moderate conservative; 3.5–4.5, moderate; 4.6–5.5, moderate liberal; 5.6–7, liberal. This classification is nothing more than an aid to understanding and should not be taken as a precise denotation. Note, for example, that if the lower boundary for moderate liberal had been moved from 5.5 to 5.7, there would have been ten moderate liberal scores, rather than five.

liberal in the party, still fell into the liberal range. They were the most likely to endorse increased government spending and services, but were located at the overall Democratic median on guaranteed jobs and health insurance.

In sum, the dominant group in the Democratic party was consistently liberal. It was not too far from the remainder of the party, and its size made it a critical component in any coalition process.

The group we shall call *cautious liberals* look suspiciously like the dominant group. They shared the same score on social welfare and were just a bit less liberal on international involvement and civil liberties. They were somewhat less enthusiastic about cooperation with the USSR than the dominant group. Within the civil liberties area, the cautious liberals took the most conservative position on minority aid. The cautious liberals were opposed to raising taxes to reduce the deficit and tended to think the federal government was too powerful. Indeed, their median scores on these last two questions placed them on the conservative side of moderate. Nevertheless, the cautious liberals resemble the dominant group closely enough to play a significant role in coalition building.

The *Democratic moderates* were the group closest to the center of the scale. They were the least liberal Democratic group on each of the three broad policy areas. In international involvement, the Democratic moderates were most likely to question defense cuts and least likely to feel that cooperation with the Soviet Union was needed. They were also less likely than the dominant group to see the need for the United States to withdraw from Central America. In the area of social welfare, the Democratic moderates took the least liberal position on government spending and services, guaranteed jobs and standard of living, and government health insurance. In no case did they adopt a right-of-center position on social welfare but neither did they venture toward liberalism.

The *selective liberals* were the only group other than the dominant group that took liberal positions across all three policy areas. The distinction was in how they reached this point. The selective liberals were selective in the policies they chose to endorse. Their unique component was a hesitancy to endorse liberal views across the board. Compared to the dominant group, they were more willing to cooperate with the Soviet Union but also more willing to continue defense spending and more critical of foreign aid. The selective liberals were more in favor of adding government services, accepting government responsibility for living standards, and increasing taxes. At the same time, they opposed the ideas of guaranteed farm income and increasing social security benefits. They were more strongly in favor of minority aid than any other Democratic group but split on whether police authority should be increased. Like the cautious liberals, the selective liberals were close enough to the dominant group to be important in coalition formation.

Issue Coalitions

How do these groups combine into coalitions of sufficient size to dominate the policy areas?[10] Recall that neither the Democratic nor the Republican dominant group comprised a majority of the party. Depending on its size, this group had to enter into a coalition with one or more other groups. The dominant group was dominant in the sense that, being big, it would be involved in every coalition. This was true for both parties. The first step was to determine which groups would join to form a dominant coalition. It is crucial to remember that these coalitions need not be comprised of the same groups across the policy areas. As was true in discerning the groups, we avoided assuming, for example, that the most conservative or the most liberal coalition would form. Rather, the group with the score most proximate to that of the dominant group was first brought into a coalition with the dominant group. Then a new median was calculated; and, if necessary, another group was brought in. The process continued until the coalition constituted a majority.

Turning first to the Republicans, we find that the coalition process was controlled by a dominant group somewhat more conservative than the remainder of the party. With that in mind, we would expect the coalition that emerged would bear this conservative mark. As the results in Table 4 indicate, this trend was weakly present. In international involvement the dominant coalition had a slightly more conservative score than did the entire sample of Republican activists. In the policy areas of social welfare and civil liberties, the dominant coalition had a median score equal to that of the other Republicans. In one of the three policy areas, then, the dominant coalition had a slightly more conservative median score than the party as a whole.

Moving to the Democrats, we find that the dominant group had the most liberal median score in international involvement and civil liberties. Just as with the Republicans, we would expect the ideological character of the dominant group to have a significant impact on the shape of the resulting dominant coalition. Turning again to Table 4, we find that our expectations are met. The Democratic dominant coalition was more liberal than the overall party in the same policy areas where the dominant group was the most liberal. In the area of social welfare, the median

Table 4. Comparison of Issue Coalitions with All Party Activists

	Position in Policy Area		
Group	International Involvement	Social Welfare	Civil Liberties
Dominant Republican coalition	moderate conservative (3.0)	moderate conservative (3.0)	moderate (4.3)
All Republican activists	moderate conservative (3.3)	moderate conservative (3.0)	moderate (4.3)
Dominant Democratic coalition	liberal (6.0)	liberal (5.7)	liberal (6.0)
All Democratic activists	moderate liberal (5.3)	liberal (5.7)	liberal (5.7)

Note: The figures in parentheses are median positions on scales that vary between 1 and 7. In general, a high score represents a dove position in international relations and a willingness to use government power and resources in the domestic policy areas. A low score represents the opposite. The convention followed for substantive interpretation of the scale was as follows: 1–2.4, conservative; 2.5–3.4, moderate conservative; 3.5–4.5, moderate; 4.6–5.5, moderate liberal; 5.6–7, liberal. This classification is nothing more than an aid to understanding and should not be taken as a precise denotation.

scores of the dominant coalition and of the entire sample of Democratic activists were the same. The Democratic results indicate a coalition process resulting in a shift to the left in terms of policy preferences.

In both the Republican and Democratic cases, we found that the coalition process resulted in shifts toward an ideologically more extreme position—never the reverse. There is no intrinsic reason for such a pattern. The coalitions that emerge are products of the nature of the dominant group and of our assumptions about the coalition process, namely, that groups merge with the most ideologically proximate group. Had the dominant group of either party been more moderate than their fellow partisans, the result might well have been a shift to the center rather than to the extreme.

Consequences of Issue Preferences

Now what consequences flow from the activists' issue preferences? If activists' policy views make no difference, it is hardly worth ascertaining them—let alone aggregating them to group and coalition levels. Of course, many campaign activities (distributing literature, conducting registration drives, putting up lawn signs, etc.) are not much affected by issue preferences. At the same time, the campaign managers' views are important in other enterprises.

Many activities require local leaders to decide which issues to emphasize. When pamphlets or newspaper ads are being designed and there is room for just two issues, a decision must be made. If the campaigners include a strong defense posture and no new taxes, they cannot say anything about the candidate's desire for better schools and opposition to drugs. Similarly, time limits the number of issues that can be mentioned in a telephone campaign. This by no means implies that activists are free to adopt whatever issue stands they wish. If the presidential candidate has promised no new taxes, his supporters can hardly claim that he will raise taxes if that should be necessary. The county campaign managers decide which issues to emphasize; thus, their attitudes do have consequences in this way.

Their policy views have some limited impact on the national campaign, as well. As noted earlier, these local presidential units are not autonomous but are part of a national organization. They communicate upward to the state level, and the state organization sends reports through regional directors to national headquarters. Eighty percent of the Dukakis/Bentsen respondents reported a great deal of contact with their state organizations, and 18% of them reported a great deal of contact with the national organization. The comparable figures for the Bush–Quayle respondents were 72% and 18%. These aggregated reports end up in the hands of the national political director.[11] This person is at the same organizational level as the campaign pollster and the head of the media campaign, just below the national campaign chair. We do not claim that the views of the supporting coalition have a dominant impact on strategy decisions, only that they exercise a degree of constraint on the candidate. If coalition members cannot adopt positions of their own, neither can the candidate afford to get too far away from his supporters.

Our data allow us to examine the relationships between the national and local campaigns. Leaders at both the Dukakis and Bush national headquarters were asked where they wanted their candidate to be located on each issue scale; and both national and county leaders were asked how much they were emphasizing each issue. On issue preferences, the level of agreement was strong in the Dukakis campaign ($r = .62$) and even stronger in the Bush campaign ($r = .87$). Close agreement also existed on the emphases to be given to various issues. The correlation of Dukakis/Bentsen county leaders' emphases with those of the national leaders was .82. The local and national Bush–Quayle leaders had an identical association. The strength of these relationships suggests that similar processes are working in both parties.

The Stability of Patterns

To this point, we have presented evidence showing that presidential parties are advocacy parties; that the parties are sufficiently cohesive that issue groups can be found; and that given the nature of the issue groups, the processes of coalition formation tend to make the center–right Republican coalition a little more conservative and the center–left Democratic coalition a little more liberal. Now how stable are these patterns? Are they limited to 1988, or have they existed over a somewhat longer time period?

We have data that bear on these questions because our study was a partial replication of one conducted by Richard Hofstetter in 1972.[12] In that year, 197 county leaders of the McGovern–Shriver Committee were interviewed, as were 204 leaders of the Committee to Reelect the President (Nixon). The 1988 study interviewed Dukakis/Bentsen Committee leaders and Bush–Quayle '88 Committee leaders in the same counties.[13] We do not have a panel study, but similar data analyzed in the same way allows us to determine the extent of stability or change since 1972.

Advocacy Politics

The data concerning advocacy politics are the least comparable. Both the question whether activists represented county voters or spoke for their parties and the statements to separate vote maximizers and true believers were asked for the first time in 1988. There were, however, three pairs of questions about party norms asked in both years. The first pair dealt

Table 5. Activists' Feelings of Obligation about Party Work

	Difference Score[a]			
	1972		1988	
Activity about Which Attitude is Held	Dem.	Rep.	Dem.	Rep.
Hold strong personal beliefs about a number of different issues	72.3	54.4	51.9	48.6
Select nominee strongly committed on variety of issue positions	73.0	46.5	55.9	48.4
Weigh party service very heavily in selecting candidate for nomination	3.2	23.0	24.8	29.4
See that those who work for party get help in form of jobs and other things, if needed	6.5	23.2	18.1	19.1
Keep elected officials strictly accountable to party organization	4.4	13.2	19.6	24.7
Follow decisions of party leaders even when you disagree	-9.4	0	18.5	8.5

[a] A larger difference score means greater obligation to engage in activity (see A. Miller 1974).

with the importance of issues, the second tapped the importance of prior party service in candidate selection or patronage, and the third pair dealt with the discipline that ought to be applied if theories of party responsibility were to be put into effect.[14]

Table 5 presents difference scores—simple differences in percentages between those who thought the party had a strong obligation to engage in the behavior and those who felt strongly it should avoid it. Several things are evident in the table. The Republican patterns are relatively stable in both years. The Democratic pattern in 1988 resembles the Republican pattern in both years, so the 1972 Democratic norms are probably the exception. And both parties showed a greater willingness to accept a degree of discipline in 1988 than in 1972.

By far the most important finding relative to advocacy politics, though, is the prominence of issue-oriented norms in both parties in both years. Given the way these difference scores are calculated, this means that roughly half of both parties felt a *strong* obligation to hold strong personal beliefs and to select a nominee who was committed on a variety of issues. Without the questions that allow a comparison with representing voters in the county and with vote maximizing, this does not provide enough evidence to claim that advocacy politics was typical in 1972. But the pronounced interest in issues is certainly consistent with advocacy politics. We also know that 41% of the 1988 Democratic leaders were already active by 1972, as were 58% of the 1988 Republican leaders. In addition, there is other evidence of long-standing interest in issues (e.g., McClosky, Hoffman, and O'Hara 1960); so it seems reasonable to assume that advocacy politics is not new in the United States.

Party Cohesion

We are on much firmer ground when we turn to intraparty cohesion because we asked issue questions in both surveys. Attitudinal agreement measures have been calculated in the same way for both years. The raw agreement scores are corrected so that zero represents the value that would be expected by chance and a value of one represents complete agreement. Consequently, any value between zero and one represents the percentage improvement over chance. For example, a score of .40 would represent an agreement 40% beyond that to be expected by chance.[15]

Table 6. Attitudes of All Party Activists on Common Issues, 1972 and 1988

	Position				
Party and Year	Conservative	Moderate Conservative	Moderate	Moderate Liberal	Liberal
Democrats (Kendall's tau-c = .03)					
1972	—	7.8	27.0	51.1	14.2
1988	.8	5.6	31.0	42.1	20.6
Republicans (Kendall's tau-c = −.27)					
1972	6.3	38.2	41.0	12.5	2.1
1988	27.5	36.3	27.0	8.8	.5

Note: Entries are percentages that add across.

From this perspective, overall party cohesion was almost unchanged from 1972 to 1988. In 1972, the average agreement score among all Republican activists was .29 and among all Democratic activists was .30. In 1988, the Republican figure was an identical .29, while the Democratic figure had risen slightly to .34. Hence, intraparty agreement varies between a 29% improvement over chance and a 34% improvement, a very narrow range. We can conclude, therefore, that the level of cohesion is virtually the same in both parties and that the extent of agreement has remained stable in recent decades.

Once this has been said, however, there were some interesting microchanges in both parties. The Democrats of 1972 contained seven issue groups, but by 1988 they had only four. Examination of the intra- and intergroup agreement scores for both years shows that the Democratic party of 1972 was marked by greater internal division than in 1988. A divisive conservative bloc had disappeared from the party in the interim. The Republicans had the opposite experience. They had four issue groups in 1972, as in 1988, but the degree of tension within the party increased between 1972 and 1988. The level of intragroup agreement dropped somewhat, and the emergence of the conservative libertarians in 1988 led to low levels of intergroup agreement between the new conservative group and both the safety-netters and Republican moderates.

Ideological Positions

We are in a strong position to assess changes on a left–right continuum. First, we can look at ideological self-placement. This reveals a decline in the proportion of activists who are willing to call themselves liberal. The 8% of self-proclaimed liberals in the Republican party of 1972 had disappeared by 1988. For the Democrats, the time period saw the self-identified liberals drop from 89% to 48%. This change in responses to the self-placement question may reflect the unpopularity of the "L-word" in the 1988 campaign. In any case, subjective classification has some limits as a true indicator of ideology.

A second, more accurate way of assessing the activists' ideology is to use an issue scale. Five questions, common to both the 1972 and 1988 studies, provide the basis for such a scale.[16] Table 6, which presents data on the activists' positions by party, allows a comparison between years. The Democrats show little change over this

Table 7. Attitudes of Dominant Coalitions on Common Issues, 1972 and 1988

	Position				
Party and Year	Conservative	Moderate Conservative	Moderate	Moderate Liberal	Liberal
Democrats (Kendall's tau-c = .22)					
1972	—	1.4	18.1	66.7	13.9
1988	—	—	15.2	50.0	34.8
Republicans (Kendall's tau-c = −.38)					
1972	6.0	48.8	41.7	3.6	—
1988	33.3	46.2	20.5	—	—

Note: Entries are percentages that add across.

period (tau-c = .03). The Republicans, on the other hand, show a significant shift to the right (tau-c = −.27). An examination of the median scores reveals similar findings. The median Democratic score shifts from 4.8 to 4.6, moving just a bit closer to center by 1988. The median Republican score shifts from 3.6 to 3.2, making them more conservative in 1988. As a consequence of both these shifts, the parties were a bit more polarized in 1988 than 1972.

Considering the important role of the dominant coalitions in their parties, their ideological positions are especially revealing. Table 7 shows the distributions of the dominant coalitions by party and year. These results indicate that the parties' core elements clearly moved away from each other (tau-c = .22 for Democrats, −.38 for Republicans). Interpretation of the median scores also shows this polarization. The Democrats move from 5.0 to 5.2, while the Republicans move from 3.4 to 3.0. This indicates that the United States still has center–left and center–right presidential parties but with somewhat increased polarization.[17]

Are Presidential Parties Unique?

To recapitulate, our data demonstrate that advocacy politics is the prevailing mode in presidential parties, that cohesive issue groups can be found, that there is a moderate degree of polarization between the two dominant coalitions, and that these conditions certainly have endured from 1972 to 1988 and probably over a longer time period. The remaining question is whether these presidential parties are unique. More specifically, are there separate sets of participants in presidential parties and other party organizations, or is there substantial overlap? And is advocacy politics so much more prominent in campaign organizations that presidential parties are distinct from other types of parties?

We do not claim to speak about activists in nomination politics, executive politics, or legislative politics. It is possible, for example, that activists in nomination coalitions are more concerned with vote maximizing or that representation is the dominant mode in legislative parties. Our data simply do not reach these questions. We can, however, examine possible overlap between electoral parties and formal party organizations by inspecting the experience of the presidential campaign leaders.

The presidential campaign leaders are persons who have been active in their party organizations for a long time. Some 86% of the Bush-Quayle leaders were present or past officeholders in the Republican party, as were 57% of the Dukakis/Bentsen leaders in the Democratic party. The average Bush-Quayle campaign manager had 20 years of active political experience, and the mean political experience of Dukakis/Bentsen campaign managers was 14 years. The Bush-Quayle '88 Committee was virtually interchangeable with the Republican party, and there was substantial overlap between the Dukakis/Bentsen Committee and the Democratic party.

Data from a parallel mail survey of Republican and Democratic county chairs allows us to ascertain whether advocacy politics is unusually prominent in presidential parties.[18] The questionnaire did not include the full array of questions we have drawn on here; but it did include the true believer and vote maximizer questions, as well as the other items on party norms. In fact, the ratios of true believer scores to vote maximizer scores were higher among the county committee chairs. The ratio was 4.3 to 1 in the Republican party, and 2.6 to 1 in the Democratic party. The ordering of the party chairs' norms is the same as those of the campaign managers reported in Table 5, with the greatest agreement for the two issue items and the least for following leaders' decisions even though one disagreed.

Given the evidence on overlap, as well as the prominence of advocacy politics, we conclude that presidential parties are not unique. The relevant attitudes, shared by presidential campaign leaders and county party chairs, are consequential. They culminate in diverging Republican and Democratic visions of the public good. These advocates are not fighting for the right to represent the voters. They are contending for the privilege of imposing their own policy preferences on the public agenda.

Notes

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1. To speak more exactly, there are three kinds of presidential parties. The campaign organizations discussed here are the type of presidential parties active in electoral politics. There are also nomination coalitions supporting particular aspirants and executive parties consisting of the political appointees assisting a president in his governmental activities (Kessel 1984).

2. This follows Joseph Schlesinger's conceptualization very closely: "The basic unit of the party is the nucleus, which consists of the collective efforts to capture a single office. . . . The multinuclear party organization consists of all efforts to link nuclei together" (1985, 1153). We would differ only in regarding the Republican or Democratic county committee as another unit.

3. The name of the county (or city or town) was inserted so that both forms of the question asked about "Franklin County voters" or "Washington County voters," rather than just "county voters."

4. In both cases, respondents were asked whether they felt a strong obligation to do them, some obligation to do them, no obligation either way, some obligation to avoid them, or a strong obligation to avoid them.

5. The issues used in the agreement score calculation included defense spending, cooperation with the USSR, involvement in Central America, government services and spending, guaranteed jobs and standard of living, health insurance, minority aid, women's role (all asked in the same double-ended format as in the National Election Study), help to

countries all over the world, tax increase, social security increase, police authority, federal government too powerful, environment, and guaranteed farm income (all asked as single-stimulus questions).

6. Identifying the broad policy dimensions was facilitated by the use of factor analysis. A single partisan factor dominated when Republicans and Democrats were analyzed together. When respondents from the two parties were examined separately, the factor analyses produced similar but not identical solutions. Our seven-point scales were determined by the separate party solutions.

7. For a more extensive discussion of agreement scores and use of the cluster program to identify issue groups, see Kessel 1992, app. secs. 3.2 and 3.3.

8. Throughout this discussion, median scores will be the point of comparison between groups. The median is a better reflection of the center of each group. Identical analysis was performed with the means as a check. While minor points may vary, the overall description endures regardless of which measure is used.

9. The relatively high scores on civil liberties stem, in part, from the tendency for everyone to endorse a liberal response on the role-of-women question. The median score for Republicans on this question was 6.0. Even without this item, however, the median scores of all Republican groups would have been in the moderate range.

10. The reason for constructing issue coalitions by combining issue groups is not to study coalition formation per se. Rather, this approach reveals the issue preferences of the resulting coalitions—the issues on which they are united and the issues on which they are divided.

11. Of course, titles vary from organization to organization. This person is sometimes known as the field director or operations director.

12. The main thrust of the Hofstetter study involved television news coverage of the 1972 presidential election (Hofstetter 1976). We have replicated only the campaign activist survey, originally reported by Kessel (1980).

13. Interviews were also conducted in counties surveyed by the National Election Study. Since comparison of the data shows essentially the same results in the two sets of counties, we are reporting the full data set in order to use the better estimates.

14. In 1988, these six questions were asked along with the vote-maximizer-versus-true-believer pair.

15. One additional correction to the 1988 agreement scores was necessary because of variation in the question format. All questions asked in 1972 were of the single-stimulus format. In 1988 we utilized both single-stimulus and double-ended questions. The double-ended questions had less variance and therefore tended to produce higher levels of agreement. Comparing agreement scores calculated with questions of similar content but different question format demonstrated this empirical trend. Based on our data, the single stimulus questions had 27% more variance than the double-ended format. To compensate for this question effect, we divided the overall agreement score by 1.14. (14% equals 27% times the proportion of double-ended questions, specifically 27% times 8/15.) This correction allowed the 1988 scores to be compared to those of 1972 in spite of the changes in format.

16. Included in this scale are questions on social security benefits, police authority, guaranteed farm income, helping nations all over the world, and the federal government becoming too powerful.

17. Our findings are consistent with other studies during the same time period (W. Miller 1988; Miller and Jennings 1986; Stone, Rapoport, and Abramowitz 1990).

18. There were 53 Republican respondents and 69 Democratic respondents. The Republican response rate was 55%; the Democratic, 46%.

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ISSUES AND PARTY SUPPORT IN MULTIPARTY SYSTEMS

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We investigate the relationship between party issue position and mass evaluation of political parties in multiparty systems. In so doing, we engage two competing theories of mass–elite linkage: the directional theory and the traditional spatial theory of elections. The alternate models are evaluated with survey data gathered in Norway in 1989. The data collection is unique in providing extensive information on the issue positions of all parties with potential for achieving representation in the parliament. Results suggest that the directional theory provides a better description of the relationship. Consistent with directional theory, we find that when parties occupy a centrist position on an issue they are not evaluated on the basis of that issue. Voters neither love nor hate a party in the middle. Thus, in order to build support on the basis of issues, parties must offer some strong stands.

Democratic political systems posit an interchange between the policy preferences of the electorate and the issue positions of the elite. For representation to be meaningful, the mass must evaluate parties at least partially on the basis of policy issues. For this reason the impact of issue preferences on party support has been a central concern of empirical democratic theory. While many studies have focused on mass–elite linkage in the United States, less work has been done in multiparty systems. Since most of the world's democracies are proportional representation systems, this is an obvious shortcoming. We will consider party issue strategies in multiparty political systems. We will then analyze the impact of issues on support for political parties in Norway in 1989.

One of the reasons that the role of issues has been explored less systematically in the multiparty case has been the lack of appropriate data. In the United States since 1968 the National Election Studies have asked respondents to locate candidates and parties on a variety of political issues. Comparable questions have not generally been asked on mass attitude surveys in multiparty systems.[1] Recognizing the importance of this type of data, the 1989 Norwegian Election Study collected respondent position and perceived party position on seven issues. The perceptual information included each of the potentially viable parties. To our knowledge, this represents a unique data source in providing such extensive information about political issues in a multiparty political system.

AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW
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Norway provides an excellent case to examine, since it is reasonably typical of European multiparty systems. With the exception of the German occupation in World War II, Norway has been a stable and continuing democracy since its independence from Denmark in 1814. It has a proportional representation system of government in which parties receiving approximately 4% nationally can achieve representation in the Storting. In 1989 seven parties accounted for virtually all of the vote; two of these are relatively new parties, while five predate World War II. Norway is a moderately fragmented political system, ranking eighth of the 16 European countries on an index of party fragmentation (Lane and Ersson 1987). Competition is lively, with control of the government very much in doubt in each of the recent elections.

Theoretical Models

To understand the role of issues we need to establish an appropriate theoretical paradigm. We begin with the basic question: If we know an individual's issue position and a party's issue position, do we know how the individual will evaluate the party? For some time, the answer to this question has been seen as self-evident: the closer the individual's position to the position of the party, the more favorably the individual would rate the party. This proximity logic is the foundation of the familiar spatial model of electoral choice (Davis, Hinich, and Ordeshook 1970; Downs 1957; Enelow and Hinich 1984).

We recently criticized this answer (Rabinowitz and Macdonald 1989). Our critique centered on two concerns. The first was the assumption of the traditional model that voters had specific policy preferences along a set of issue continua. We argued that at best, voters know which side of an issue debate they favor. Our second concern was the implicit assumption of the proximity model that all parties are evaluated by the same issue criteria. We contended that a key feature of party strategy is the attempt by politicians to shape the issues used to evaluate themselves and their opponents.

We presented a directional theory to link the issue position of the voter, the position of the party, and the evaluation of the party. The key features of the theory are a dichotomous view of issues, an explicit role for parties in stimulating differential evaluation criteria, and the necessity for parties to be perceived as reasonable by the electorate or suffer diminished support.

Thus, we have two competing models of party evaluation. When the models were compared in the United States, the empirical evidence favored the directional model (Rabinowitz and Macdonald 1989). But there is reason to wonder whether these results would generalize to the multiparty context. By world standards, the political system of the United States is very unusual. Its special features include the two-party system, the separation of the executive from the legislature, the primary system of nominations, and a plethora of candidates running under the party label at local, state, and national levels with widely varying ideologies and issue stands. In the U.S. test, the directional theory may have benefited from the fact that the two parties provide only two sources for political cues. Thus, the dichotomous nature of issues posited by the directional model may not be a general phenomenon but, rather, one restricted to two-party systems. In addition, the diffuse nature of issue cues in the United States could enhance the possibility for parties to manipulate the criteria of evaluation by putting more or less emphasis on particular issues.

A multiparty system may be more congenial to proximity theory. Compared to their U.S. counterparts, Norwegian parties are much more dominant actors in the

Figure 1. A Directional Continuum



political system. As in most proportional representation systems, the parties control the nomination of candidates for elective office and enforce strong discipline on the behavior of representatives in the legislature. Thus, they can be expected to provide clearer issue cues to voters; evidence from Sweden suggests that this is the case (Granberg and Holmberg 1986; Niemi and Westholm 1984). In addition, the existence of many parties should enable the articulation of a variegated set of issue alternatives in keeping with the fundamental assumption of the traditional spatial model. Thus, the institutional structure of the Norwegian party system provides a context in which the assumptions of proximity theory are more likely to be realized.[2]

We will lay out the basic structure of the directional model and discuss its implications for multiparty competition. We will then use the two models to explain party evaluation in Norway. For the first time in a multiparty system, it will be possible to investigate directly mass–elite linkage with regard to issues; and at the same time, we can confront the two main competing theories and assess their relative merits.

Directional Theory

In directional theory, issues are perceived as a choice between two opposing alternatives. People favor one side or the other of an issue debate or are neutral. For example, with regard to abortion, individuals are basically prochoice or prolife; with regard to defense spending, individuals either favor or oppose increased spending. This contrasts with proximity theory in which each person favors a specific policy alternative along an issue continuum. In directional theory, individual position can also be represented along a continuum. However, the continuum is quite different from that of the proximity model. The directional continuum differentiates individuals based on the intensity of their views. On a directional continuum, there is a center point of neutrality where a voter favors neither side; and as one moves farther to the left or right, the voter becomes increasingly intense in favoring that side of the current debate.[3] This is illustrated in Figure 1.

Just as voters are located on one side or the other of each issue, so are the parties. And just as voters differ in intensity, so do the parties. Parties can be thought to differ in intensity based on how clearly they present their views and the extent to which they stress the issue. Party intensity serves as a means of exciting voter interest and attention.[4]

The impact of an issue on the evaluation of a party is the product of the voter's position on the directional continuum and the party's position on that continuum. For example, the impact of an issue k in directional theory is

$$I_{ik} \bullet I_{jk},$$

where I_{ik} represents the location of voter i and I_{jk} represents the location of party j. For convenience, in directional theory the center neutral point is set at zero. Thus, the sign of I_{ik} is negative if voter i is on the left side of the continuum and positive if voter i is on the right side. The magnitude of I_{ik} represents the voter's intensity level. Similarly, the sign of I_{jk} reflects the direction of policy preferred by the party and the magnitude reflects the party's intensity. The higher this product, the more the party will receive voter support with regard to the issue.

Notice how the interaction works. If the voter and party agree on the direction of policy (if both are positive or both are negative), the product is positive and the formula becomes

$$+ \ |I_{ik}| \bullet |I_{jk}|.$$

If they disagree (if one is positive and one is negative), the product is negative and the formula is

$$- \ |I_{ik}| \bullet |I_{jk}|.$$

In this form we can see that the stimulation of a voter by a party depends on three considerations: Do the party and voter agree on the direction policy should take? How intense is the voter? and How intense is the party? If the voter and party agree and both are intense, the issue will provide a stimulus for a strong positive assessment of the party. If the voter and party are on opposite sides of the issue and both are intense, the voter will have a strong negative assessment of the party. If either the voter or the party has low intensity, the product will be small and the impact of the issue will be modest. If either the voter or the party is neutral on the issue, then the issue will have no effect on the evaluation of the party.

The directional stimulation for a set of issues is simply the sum of the stimulation values of each of the issues. Mathematically, this is

$$\Sigma_k I_{ik} \bullet I_{jk}$$

over the set of relevant issues. The effect of the summing is to put greater emphasis on the issues that have larger products and less emphasis on the issues that have smaller products. The mathematical term given to a sum of products like this is the *scalar product.*

In directional theory, a second factor influencing evaluation is the requirement that a party be perceived as responsible. According to the theory, a critical aspect of the evaluation of any party is whether the voter feels the party can function effectively in government. A party that is viewed as overly intense or excessively strident on issues will be evaluated less favorably than a party regarded as responsible and more able to govern effectively. In directional theory, a penalty is assessed against parties that are *too* intense. Thus, by providing high intensity on issues, parties are potentially rewarded with support from voters who are directionally compatible with them; but they risk losing support if they go beyond a critical threshold and seem dangerous or irresponsible to voters.

The full mathematical representation of utility in directional theory, taking into account both issue stimulation and potential penalty, is

$$U_{ij} = \Sigma_k I_{ik} \bullet I_{jk} - P_{ij}$$

where U_{ij} is the utility of voter i for party j, $\Sigma_k I_{ik} \bullet I_{jk}$ is the scalar product between voter i and party j based on the issue values, and P_{ij} is the penalty imposed on party j by voter i. According to the theory, P_{ij} must equal 0 unless party j is beyond the acceptable intensity threshold.[5]

A sketch useful for illustrating the directional model and contrasting it with

Figure 2. Illustration of Directional Theory



the traditional proximity model appears in Figure 2. In the sketch are four parties (A, B, C, and D) and three voters (X, Y, and Z). The space is two-dimensional in order to keep the illustration simple. To give a substantive referent, we label the first dimension *economic left-right* and the second *social liberal-conservative.* Each party and each voter is represented as a vector (arrow) from the origin (center of the space). The location of a voter vector is determined by the voter's I_{ik} values, while the location of a party vector is determined by the set of I_{jk} values for the party. For example, in Figure 2 voter X is weakly in favor of left economic policy and liberal social policy; voter Y is strongly in favor of left economic policy and weakly in favor of conservative social policy.

For both voters and parties the length of the vector has a direct substantive interpretation as the intensity level of the actor: the longer the vector, the more intense the actor. The angular orientation of the vector is determined by the relative signs and magnitudes of the various I values. For example, party A and party B are located in the upper left quadrant of the figure because they are both in favor of socially liberal and economically left policy.[6] The parties are quite different, however, in that party A has considerably more intensity than party B. This is reflected in the fact that A's vector is longer than B's. Similar directions imply a similar set of relative preferences and priorities across the various issues of the space, while the length of the overall vector represents the general level of issue intensity of the party or the voter.

The evaluation of a party by a voter is determined by the extent to which the voter is "excited" by the party based on the issues, and whether or not a penalty is imposed on the party. In Figure 2 a circle is drawn to represent the boundary of the *region of acceptability.* This denotes the point after which a party starts to draw a penalty for being too extreme. Party C is located beyond this boundary; hence, it will have reduced utility to voters. None of the other parties will be penalized.

The amount of penalty assessed on party C will depend on the exact specification of the penalty function. For the purpose of the illustration, we will assume that every voter penalizes C in an identical fashion and that the penalty is not too stringent, since C is not far outside the region of acceptability.

Now let us consider the preferences of each of the three voters. In the case of voter X, the expected preference order is ABCD; for voter Y, CBAD; for voter Z, DABC. The scores that were used to determine these preference orderings are shown in Table 1. Notice the potency of the somewhat more extreme positions of parties A, C, and D in contrast to the more centrist position of party B. Party B is unable to generate strong support because it does not give sufficiently powerful cues. This is especially evident

Table 1. Preferences of Voters in Figure 1 under Directional and Proximity Models

Location of Parties and Voters in Issue Space

	Dimension			Dimension	
	Economic	Social		Economic	Social
Party A	-1.0	3.0	Voter X	-1.0	1.0
Party B	-0.6	1.0	Voter Y	-3.0	-1.0
Party C	-4.0	-3.0	Voter Z	2.0	1.0
Party D	3.0	-2.1			

Illustration of Calculations for Voter X

Directional Model:[a]

Party A $-1.0 \cdot -1.0 + 3.0 \cdot 1.0 = 1.0 + 3.0 = 4.0$

Party B $-0.6 \cdot -1.0 + 1.0 \cdot 1.0 = 0.6 + 1.0 = 1.6$

Party C $-4.0 \cdot -1.0 + -3.0 \cdot 1.0 - 4.0 = 4.0 + -3.0 - 4.0 = -3.0$

Party D $3.0 \cdot -1.0 + -2.1 \cdot 1.0 = -3.0 + -2.1 = -5.1$

Proximity Model:[b]

Party A $[(-1.0 - -1.0)^2 + (3.0 - 1.0)^2]^{1/2} = [0.00 + 4.00]^{1/2} = 2.0$

Party B $[(-0.6 - -1.0)^2 + (1.0 - 1.0)^2]^{1/2} = [0.16 + 0.00]^{1/2} = 0.4$

Party C $[(-4.0 - -1.0)^2 + (-3.0 - 1.0)^2]^{1/2} = [9.00 + 16.00]^{1/2} = 5.0$

Party D $[(3.0 - -1.0)^2 + (-2.1 - 1.0)^2]^{1/2} = [16.00 + 9.61]^{1/2} = 5.1$

Scores and Preference Orders of Voters

	Directional Model			Proximity Model		
	Voter X	Voter Y	Voter Z	Voter X	Voter Y	Voter Z
Party A	4.0	0.0	1.0	2.0	4.5	3.6
Party B	1.6	0.8	-0.2	0.4	3.1	2.6
Party C	-3.0	11.0	-15.0	5.0	2.2	7.2
Party D	-5.1	-6.9	3.9	5.1	6.1	3.3
Preference Order	ABCD	CBAD	DABC	BACD	CBAD	BDAC

[a] Preference is based on the adjusted scalar product with high values implying preference. The penalty function applied is $P = r(|C| - r)$, where r is the radius of the region of acceptability and $|C|$ is the length of the vector for Party C. In this case $r = 4$ and $|C| = 5$, so the penalty is $4(5 - 4) = 4$. The penalty only applies to Party C because it is the only party whose vector length exceeds 4, the radius of the region of acceptability.

[b] Preference is based on distance with low values implying preference.

in the preference order of voter X. Despite the physical proximity of party B, voter X prefers party A because of its greater intensity. In directional theory parties can be thought to play the role of issue advocates. Voters favor a party that is on their side of an issue and they prefer a party that presents a strong case rather than a weak one. Voter X agrees with both A and B, but party A is the more effective advocate.[7]

Traditional proximity theory would make quite different predictions about the preferences of the three voters. Each voter would choose among the parties according to how close the party points were to the point representing the voter. Utility is a negative function of distance and is represented mathematically as follows:

$$U_{ij} = -(\Sigma_k (\Theta_{ik} - \Theta_{jk})^2)^{1/2},$$

where Θ_{ik} is the position of voter i on issue k and Θ_{jk} is the position of party j on issue k. Table 1 also shows the distance values. In the case of voter X, the expected preference order would be BACD; in the case of voter Y, CBAD; and for voter Z, BDAC. Notice how different the preferences are, using the two models. When the proximity logic is applied, party B is the first choice of two of the voters and the second choice of the third.

In the proximity model, each voter chooses the party that he or she is closest to. It is immaterial whether the party is close to the center on the issue or not. In directional theory, parties cannot stimulate affect when they are close to the center. Whereas party B is the first choice of two of the voters in the proximity calculations, it is not the first choice of any of the three voters in the directional calculations. The example illustrates the different nature of the two theories. In directional theory, noncentrist positioning appears to be critical to generating enthusiastic support. In proximity theory, a centrist location is often an attractive strategy.

The usefulness of strong issue stimulation is a generic feature of directional theory. We have used the theory to derive a theorem about optimum party location in proportional representation systems. The theorem makes no assumptions about the nature of the penalty imposed on parties beyond the region of acceptability nor about the shape of the voter distribution. The theorem states that in a fully proportional representation system, all parties should be located at or beyond the region of acceptability. A proof appears in Appendix A.

Thus, directional theory predicts that in multiparty systems the center of the political space should be devoid of parties. Proximity-based theory makes no definitive predictions about the location of parties unless assumptions are made that constrain the strategy of parties or the distribution of voters (Austen-Smith and Banks 1988; Cox 1990; Shepsle and Cohen 1990). The absence of clear predictions from proximity theory makes it difficult to compare the theories at the systemic level. Nevertheless, it is useful to obtain some sense of how the parties are distributed spatially. Such an examination will provide a general overview of the party system. In addition, it could provide evidence against directional theory.

Issue Positions of Voters and Parties in Norway

Let us now consider how the Norwegian case fits into the theoretical debate we have outlined. How are the political parties positioned in the competitive issue space? There are many possible vehicles for determining party placement on issues. Since we are interested in mass-elite linkage, the most valuable guide is where the mass public perceives the par-

Table 2. Mean Position of Respondents and Mean Perceived Positions of Parties on Political Issues

		Parties						
Issue	Respondent	Socialist	Labor	Liberal	Center	Christian	Conservative	Progressive
Left–right	5.56	2.50	3.99	4.31	5.38	6.55	8.21	8.91
Agriculture	4.38	4.26	3.95	4.83	1.72	4.80	5.64	8.87
Environment	4.46	2.66	4.90	2.86	5.02	5.16	6.03	7.42
Immigration	6.98	3.36	5.00	4.55	5.51	4.72	6.38	9.36
Health care	5.20	2.34	2.50	4.90	5.12	5.50	7.68	9.27
Alcohol	4.98	4.49	4.53	4.43	4.84	1.47	6.65	8.96
Crime	8.49	4.94	5.41	5.92	6.46	5.98	7.10	9.17

Note: The number of cases used in calculating the respondent means ranged from 1,956 for the agriculture issue to 2,131 for the immigration issue. The number of cases used in calculating the party means ranged from 1,456 for the Center party on the crime issue to 1,999 for the Conservative party on left–right.

ties to be. In 1989 the Norwegian Election Study asked respondents to locate themselves and parties on a variety of political issues. The data were collected immediately following the parliamentary election and included seven issues and the seven parties with potential for representation in the Storting.[8]

Mass and party placements were obtained on the following issues: left–right, agricultural support, environmental protection, privatization of health care, regulation of immigration, regulation of alcohol, and punishment of violent crime. All of these issues, with the exception of the crime question, are a regular part of the political debate in Norway. With regard to each issue, respondents placed themselves and each of the seven parties on a 1-to-10 scale. The question wording appears in Appendix B.[9]

The questions follow the same general format as those asked in the American National Election Studies. The Norwegian format differs only in using a 1-to-10 scale, rather than the 1-to-7 scale commonly used in the United States. The question format was originally developed to be consistent with the proximity-based spatial model. We (Rabinowitz and Macdonald 1989) presented a fairly extensive discussion of the psychology respondents might use in placing themselves and the political parties on these issues. In essence, we argued that even though the issues are formulated to encourage proximity responses, the questions pose basic dichotomies that make it possible to use directional thinking.

In order to interpret the questions as directional responses, the scale is divided into two halves with the center point set as the neutral response. On these 10-point scales the center point is 5.5 on the scale. The magnitude of the response is indicated by how far it is to one side or the other of the neutral point. Thus, the questions allow for either a directional or proximity interpretation, which is important for the empirical work to follow.

Directional theory predicts that parties need to take fairly strong stands on issues in order to garner mass support but that parties that are perceived as too extreme will be penalized. How consistent is this image with the data? To investigate this question, we can look at the mean positions of the mass public and the mean perceived positions of the parties on the set of issues. These are shown in Table 2. For our purpose, it is helpful to divide the issue scales into thirds. The middle range of 4 to 7 reflects generally centrist responses, while the 1-to-4 positions on the

Figure 3. Graph of Mean Issue Positions



left and the 7-to-10 positions on the right are stronger, more extreme locations.

On six of the seven issue questions, the mean position of respondents is in the middle range of the scale. The public shows a slight tilt to the left on the agriculture and environment questions and a slight tilt to the right on the immigration issue. There is general agreement among the public on the crime question, and the mean is fairly extreme. The placement of the respondent means is depicted in Figure 3, panel A, where we see the strong concentration of mean positions in the middle third of the scale.

With mass opinion generally in the center, we might expect the parties to be in the center as well. But this is not entirely the case. Let us restrict our attention to the six issues on which the respondent mean position is in the central part of the scale. On those six issues, not one of the seven parties lies in the central portion of the scale across all the issues. The Socialist party is outside the middle range on four of the issues; the Labor party on

Table 3. Vector Lengths of Parties

Party	Based on Six Issues	Based on Seven Issues
Socialist	5.85	5.87
Labor	3.91	3.91
Liberal	3.35	3.38
Center	3.89	4.01
Christian	4.30	4.33
Conservative	3.81	4.13
Progressive	8.24	9.02

Note: The exact calculating formula for the vector length of a party j is

$$[\Sigma_k (X_{jk} - 5.5)^2]^{1/2}$$

where X_{jk} is the mean perceived position of party j on issue k and the sum is over six or seven issues. In the six-issue summation, the violent crime issue is omitted.

three; the Liberal, Center, and Christian parties on one; the Conservative party on two; and the Progressive party on all six. Even excluding the Progressive party, on each of the issues at least one party takes an extreme position. On the left-right dimension and health care, four of the seven parties are placed outside the central area; on the agricultural question and environmental protection, three parties are relatively extreme. The parties that are placed outside the central region are shown in Figure 3, panel B. The figure illustrates the tendency of parties to take a strong stand on some issues even though the mass public has a mean location in the middle zone.

The fact that parties take a strong stand on some issues is consistent with the prediction of directional theory. Nevertheless, it is possible that the issue strategy outside the center region represents the failure of the party to adopt a more desirable issue stand. Perhaps the party would be better served if it took a more centrist position. When we look at the issues on which the parties are extreme, however, we see that these are often the core issues of the party constituencies. For example, the Center party has a location of 1.72 on the question of protective tariffs for agriculture; and the party is known as representing the interests of farmers. The Christian party has a mean placement of 1.47 on the question of alcohol restriction, and temperance has historically been one of its defining issues. The desire to restrict immigration is widely conceded to be a key to the growth of the Progressive party, and so forth. The pattern of extreme issue positions suggests that the political parties have pursued these positions deliberately and in the belief that they contribute to the interests they represent. Based on the known proclivities of the Norwegian electorate, the extreme stands do not appear to represent the failure of the party's issue strategy but, rather, the attraction of the party to its voters.

A party's stands across many issues determine the length of the party vector. Taking a centrist position across the full set of issues would produce a short vector. A vector of medium length would result if a party took an extreme stand on a single issue or fairly strong stands on a few issues. Being extreme on several issues would produce a long vector, potentially beyond the region of acceptability from the perspective of directional theory. A party that took a centrist stand on all issues (e.g., one-half unit from the middle of the scale) would have a vector length of 1.22.

What is the general pattern that we see? The lengths of the party vectors based on the six issues are shown in Table 3, column 1; and those based on all seven issues are shown in column 2. Four of the parties—Labor, Center, Christian, and Conservative—have vectors that are approximately the same length of four units. The Socialist and the Progressive parties have longer vectors, while the Liberal party has a shorter one. Simply knowing the length of the vectors does not tell us how the parties are oriented in the issue space, but it does tell how close the parties would lie to the boundary of a sphere (technically a hypersphere) in the space. Four of the seven parties would lie quite close to the boundary of a sphere of radius four, two would lie well beyond that boundary, and one would lie well within it.

From the perspective of directional theory, the pattern of the party vectors is consistent with a region of acceptability with most of the parties positioned near the boundary. In making this assessment, however, it is important to offer two caveats. First, the region of acceptability is strictly a theoretical construct; it requires an inferential leap and the explicit introduction of directional theory to interpret the vector lengths in this way. Second, the particular length values will be sensitive to the set of issues selected. The issues asked and the exact wording of the questions on a survey are always somewhat arbitrary, and these results could simply reflect the idiosyncratic nature of the questions. Nevertheless, the picture that emerges does not contradict the expectations of directional theory.

Individual Evaluations of Political Parties

We turn now to the role of issues in the evaluation of the political parties. Of particular relevance to the theoretical debate is the fact that at the individual level we can make a direct comparison between the directional and proximity models. In contrast to the systemic level, at the individual level each model predicts a clear relationship between individual and party issue positions and party evaluation. Proximity theory posits that the distance between voter and party points determines evaluation, while directional theory posits that evaluation is a function of the scalar product.

Our first aim will be to explain attitudes toward each of the political parties. To do this we will perform two regression analyses for each party. In each analysis the dependent variable will be individual evaluation of the party as measured by a 0-to-100 thermometer rating.[10] The independent variable of primary interest will be based on the issues. We will also add a set of demographic controls to ensure that the regressions are adequately specified.[11] The regression equations will be identical except for the way in which the issue variable is operationalized. One equation will be designed to represent directional theory, and the issue variable will be the scalar product between the voter position and the party position across the seven issues. The other equation will be designed to represent the proximity model, and the issue variable will be the distance between the voter position and the party position.[12] By comparing the results of the two analyses, we will be able to observe which (if either) of the models better predicts individual evaluations of the political parties in Norway.

Table 4 presents the complete results from the regression analyses predicting affect for the Socialist party. In addition to the regression results, two other pieces of information are presented in Table 4: the upper and lower bounds for variance explained by the summary issue variable. The upper bound represents the variance explained when the issue variable is the only independent variable (i.e., when the controls are omitted). The lower bound is the amount of variance added over and above that explained by the set of demographic variables. For those familiar with stepwise regression, the upper bound is the variance explained when the issue variable is entered first; the lower bound is the change in variance explained when the issue variable is entered last.

An initial consideration is whether issues influence evaluation. In the case of the Socialist party, issues have a substantial impact. Even if we use the lower bound, the most conservative estimate of variance explained, the effect of issues

Table 4. A Comparison of Directional and Proximity Models of Issues in Explaining Evaluation of the Socialist Party

	Directional Model		Proximity Model	
Variable	Coefficient	Standardized Coefficient	Coefficient	Standardized Coefficient
Issues	4.62	.53	-10.90	-.44
Objective working class	3.26	.06	4.30	.08
Subjective working class	5.61	.11	8.02	.15
Union	1.40†	.03†	1.97†	.04†
Low education	1.24†	.02†	2.74†	.05†
Low income	1.33†	.03†	2.55†	.05†
Employed public sector	-0.85†	-.02†	-0.65†	-.01†
Farm	-3.74†	-.04†	-1.60†	-.02†
Religiously active	-4.74	-.09	-4.23	-.08
Female	4.54	.09	6.38	.12
Periphery	0.32†	.01†	0.19†	.00†
Southwest region	-4.22	-.08	-4.73	-.08
Nynorsk language	-2.92†	-.04†	-1.15†	-.01†
Teetotaler	-7.97	-.10	-4.93	-.06
Intercept	49.56	—	82.25	—
Adjusted R^2	.357		.284	
% variance explained by issues				
Upper bound	29.8		20.9	
Lower bound	25.2		17.9	

Note: N = 2,091. Many of the control variables are standard to virtually any model of voting in advanced industrial democracies. *Periphery* is similar to an urban-rural distinction; *southwest region* is included because support for the Christian and Liberal parties is generally stronger in the southwest; *Nynorsk language* distinguishes those with an attachment to Norwegian national traditions; *teetotaler* is included because of the importance of temperance in Norwegian politics.

†Not significant at the .01 level.

exceeds the combined effect of the full set of demographic factors. This is true for both models.

We can now ask which issue model better explains evaluations. For the Socialist party, the directional model clearly outperforms the traditional proximity model. Using the scalar product variable instead of the distance variable leads to a 6% increase in variance explained. This represents more than a 25% improvement compared to the proximity model. In terms of the coefficients themselves, the standardized coefficients provide the most meaningful comparison for the issue variables. The unstandardized coefficients cannot be directly compared because the variables are in different units. In this case, the standardized coefficient for the scalar product variable is .53, while that for the distance variable is .45.

How do the models compare across all the Norwegian parties? Table 5 provides a summary of the regression results for each of the seven different parties. Keep in mind that each set of results displayed in the table was obtained from an analysis exactly like that performed for the Socialist party and shown in Table 4. But rather than showing six additional tables, we report only the information relevant to comparing the two issue models.

For each of the Norwegian parties, the directional model outperforms the traditional model. Whether we compare the standardized parameter estimates or the

Table 5. A Comparison of Directional and Proximity Models of Issues in Explaining Party Evaluation

Party Evaluation Models	Standardized Coefficient	Adjusted R²	% Variance Explained by Issues: Upper Bound	% Variance Explained by Issues: Lower Bound
Socialist (N = 2,091)				
Scalar product	.53	.357	29.8	25.2
Distance[a]	.44	.284	20.9	17.9
Labor (N = 2,105)				
Scalar product	.37	.253	16.7	11.9
Distance	.29	.211	9.7	7.8
Liberal (N = 2,084)				
Scalar product	.30	.154	10.6	8.6
Distance	.26	.130	7.9	6.2
Center (N = 2,084)				
Scalar product	.35	.259	19.3	10.7
Distance	.23	.202	6.7	5.0
Christian (N = 2,097)				
Scalar product	.25	.262	16.0	5.3
Distance	.20	.236	7.9	3.6
Conservative (N = 2,102)				
Scalar product	.52	.381	33.2	23.2
Distance	.43	.306	25.2	15.7
Progressive (N = 2,103)				
Scalar product	.60	.400	38.9	31.2
Distance	.56	.349	31.9	26.0

Note: Each coefficient and adjusted R-squared value comes from a regression in which the full set of demographic variables were also included.

[a]The signs of the distance coefficients are reversed to reflect proximity.

adjusted R-squareds, the issue variable based on the scalar product has a larger value than that based on the distance. The pattern is the same for the upper and lower bounds of variance explained. The results are remarkably consistent and support the directional model over the traditional proximity model.[13]

Pooled Analysis of Party Affect

We now wish to extend the analysis to model support for the entire set of political parties simultaneously. To accomplish this, we will analyze a pooled regression model. One advantage of the pooled approach is that it will allow us to introduce a penalty for parties beyond the region of acceptability. It was not possible to do this in the previous analyses because the penalty was absorbed in the intercept of the regression equation.

As part of the study design respondents were asked, "In your opinion, is any party, or parties, too extreme to take part in a government?" and if *yes,* "Which party—or parties—is that?" This question was introduced specifically to explore at the mass level whether particular parties would be singled out as unacceptably extreme. The question was open-ended and did not ask about any party in particular. The percentage who identified each of the seven parties as too extreme to participate in government is displayed in Table 6. We have also reproduced in the

Table 6. A Comparison of "Too Extreme" Response with Party Vector Lengths

Party	*Too Extreme*[a]	Vector Length[b]
Socialist	9.5	5.85
Labor	.4	3.91
Liberal	3.0	3.35
Center	1.3	3.89
Christian	2.0	4.30
Conservative	1.1	3.81
Progressive	40.3	8.24

Note: Correlation between *too extreme* and vector length is .95. With the seventh (violent crime) issue included, it is .97.

[a] These values represent the percentage of respondents who identified the party as "too extreme" based on the open-ended question "In your opinion is any party, or parties, too extreme to take part in a government" and if *yes*, "Which party—or parties—is that?"

[b] This is the vector length based on the party mean positions across six issues. The exact calculating formula for the vector length of a party j is $[\Sigma_k (X_{jk} - 5.5)^2]^{1/2}$ where X_{jk} is the mean perceived position of party j on issue k.

table the length of the party vectors based on the six issue questions, so that we can compare the two measures.[14]

The lists are quite similar. When we examine the perceptions of being too extreme to take part in a government, we find very little difference among the responses for the five parties that appear to be within the region of acceptability. The two parties we conjectured to be outside the region draw a distinctly higher level of response. The Socialist party is identified by 9.5% of the population as too extreme, while the Progressive party draws 40.3%. The responses are consistent with the view that the Socialist party is slightly outside the region of acceptability and the Progressive party beyond the pale of normal Norwegian politics.

There are two basic choices available for operationalizing the penalty concept. One option is to use the responses to the "too extreme" survey question; the other is to base the potential penalty on the length of the party vectors. The correlation between the vector lengths and the "too extreme" responses is a very high .95, so the decision has little practical importance in the Norwegian case. The regression results we report are based on the length of the party vectors.[15]

Separate Issues. So far, we have measured the distance and scalar product variables under the assumption that every issue has an equal weight in determining support or opposition for a party. This assumption is incorporated in the summary issue variables by giving the same weight to each issue. In terms of the theories, however, there is no requirement that all potentially relevant issues be weighted equally—simply that the weight for an issue be consistent across parties. Both theories allow for the fact that different issues can have different importance. The use of a pooled approach allows us to expand the analysis to include the separate issue variables.

Results of Pooled Analyses. The results of the pooled analyses appear in Table 7. In each case, we compare the distance and scalar product versions of the issue variables. The models we estimate include the full complement of demographic controls, but we do not show any of these coefficients (available upon request).

The adjusted R-squareds continue to demonstrate the superiority of the directional model. Similarly, the values for the upper and lower bounds of variance explained have larger values when the issues are in scalar product form. The coefficients for the separate issues are very consistent across the two models. In both cases, we see differentiation in terms of the importance of issues. In particular, the punishment-of-violent-crime issue is of no consequence for the evaluation of the political parties in 1989. Among the significant effects, the left–right dimension is

Table 7. A Comparison of Directional and Proximity Models of Issues in Explaining Party Evaluation: Pooled Regression Analysis

	Directional Model		Proximity Model[a]	
Variable	Coefficient	Standardized Coefficient	Coefficient	Standardized Coefficient
Penalty	-3.67	−.21	.14†	.01†
Left-right	1.71	.30	4.37	.30
Agriculture	.46	.11	1.00	.08
Environment	.40	.07	.50	.04
Immigration	.72	.14	1.40	.11
Health care	.48	.14	1.63	.14
Alcohol	.44	.10	1.02	.08
Crime	−.05†	−.01†	−.21†	−.01†
Adjusted R^2	.398[b]		.344	
% variance explained by issues				
Upper bound	32.7		25.5	
Lower bound	22.5		17.1	
Number of cases	12,031		12,031	

Note: Demographic variables were also included in the analysis but are omitted from the table in order to save space.

[a] The signs of the distance coefficients are reversed to reflect proximity.

[b] When the penalty variable is excluded, the adjusted R^2 is .392 for the directional model and .344 for the proximity model.

†Not significant at the .01 level.

clearly the most important issue with a standardized coefficient of about .30 in both models.[16] Next in importance are immigration and health care, followed by agriculture and alcohol. The least consequential of the significant issues is the protection of the environment.

As predicted by directional theory, a penalty is applied to the two parties outside the region of acceptability. The unstandardized coefficient for the penalty variable implies a reduction in support of 3.67 thermometer units for each unit change in the length of the party vector beyond the radius of the region. Using this simple function, the penalty for the Socialists is 5.7 and for the Progressives 14.4. The proximity model does not require a penalty function; and, as anticipated, the value is not significantly different from zero. The better performance of the directional model, however, does not depend on the inclusion of the penalty variable. Excluding the penalty variable, the adjusted R-squared for the directional model is still .392 versus .344 for the traditional model.

As in the party-by-party analyses, the pooled results clearly favor the directional model. The persistent differences that appear across each of the models would seem to leave little doubt that at least in the Norwegian case, the directional model is a better reflection of the psychology underlying party evaluation. Nevertheless, one additional test is particularly useful for evaluating the fundamental implications of the two theories.

A Final Test

We have noted the absence of a purely centrist party in Norway. We have also noted that nominally centrist parties take a distinctly noncentrist stand on some

Table 8. Issue Coefficients from an Unconstrained Proximity Analysis of Party Evaluation

Issue	Socialist	Labor	Liberal	Center	Christian	Conservative	Progressive
Left–right	_6.75_*[a]	_4.13_*	1.44*	.72	1.87*	_6.87_*	_4.37_*
Agriculture	.04	_.18_	.28	_2.73_*	.05	–.28	_.93_*
Environment	_.96_*	–.11	_1.29_*	–.34	.32	.76*	_.51_
Immigration	_.99_*	.06	1.57*	.82*	.17	.56	_4.17_*
Health care	_1.57_*	_2.20_*	–.04	.42	.39	_1.25_*	_2.57_*
Alcohol	–.33	.55	.18	–.19	_2.23_*	.04	_.88_*
Crime	.02	–.30	.86	.24	.22	_–.54_	_.33_

Note: N = 1,702. Entries in each column are the unstandardized coefficients obtained from a regression in which the dependent variable is the evaluation of the party at the top of the column and the independent variables are the seven issues in proximity form along with the demographic controls.

[a]Entries are italicized when the mean party position on the issue is outside the central 4–7 range (see Table 2 and Figure 3).

*Significant at the .01 level.

issues—the agricultural support issue for the Center party, the alcohol control issue for the Christian party, and the environmental issue for the Liberal party. From these observations, however, it is impossible to tell whether the parties are judged on identical criteria or whether they are judged more on the basis of their noncentrist stands.

Yet the question of judgmental criteria lies at the core of the debate between directional and proximity theory. Proximity theory is meaningful only if all parties are judged on an identical set of criteria. A party with an extreme stand on an issue might well find that issue critical in determining who does or does not evaluate it favorably, but the issue should be no more important in judging that party than it is in judging any other party. For proximity theory to make sense, a party must be as well rewarded for its centrist stands as for its extreme ones. In contrast, directional theory would argue that the importance of an issue for evaluating a party will be partially a function of how extreme the party is. The difference between the models hinges on the fact that in a distance model the critical feature is how far the individual is from the party on the issue; it is irrelevant if the distance is from a center position or from an extreme position. In directional theory, there is an interaction between voter and party intensity that makes the issue more critical if the party is more extreme.

This suggested the logic of the test we performed. We conducted a party-by-party regression analysis in which the independent variables are the separate issues in proximity form. If the proximity model is correct, the unstandardized coefficients should be almost identical for every party. If, on the other hand, the directional model is correct, the regression coefficients should operate in a manner similar to the intensity values for the parties. The more extreme the party is on the issue, the higher the regression coefficient should be. Hence, we have a simple direct test between the theories. If the coefficients are the same across the parties, that will provide evidence in favor of the proximity model; if the coefficients are greater for extreme parties, that will favor the directional model.

How similar are the coefficients across parties? and Which ones are large and which are small? The results of the analysis are summarized in Table 8. Looking at the table, we see immediately how critical the extremeness of the party is to the size of the regression coefficient. Overall the left–right dimension is the most important of the set of issues, but its impact varies enormously across the parties. The unstandardized coefficient declines from 6.7 for the Socialist party, to 4.1 for the Labor party, to 1.4 for the Liberal party, to .7 for the Center party and then rises again. Left–right is not even a statistically significant predictor of support for the Center party, the most centrist of the parties on the left–right scale. Furthermore, as we go down the list of issues, we see that the issues that tend to be significant for a party are the issues on which that party took a stand in the extreme range and that the issues that are insignificant are those on which it took a centrist stand. Of the 20 instances when the party was perceived to be in the extreme range on the issue, 16 of the coefficients are statistically significant. Of the 29 instances when the party was in the middle, only five of the coefficients are significant.

According to traditional spatial theory, there should be no association between party extremism and the extent to which an issue is used to make judgments about the party. This is simply not the pattern we see in this analysis. Rather than being virtually the same for each party, the coefficients rise and fall, taking on higher values and significance only when a party stimulates interest based on those issues. If we correlate the extremity of the party stand on the issue and the magnitude of the coefficient, the results are striking. For the left–right continuum, the correlation is .85; for agriculture, .87; for environment, .75; for health care, .94; for immigration, .86; for alcohol, .89.[17] This is especially impressive because proximity theory implies that except for chance factors, every one of these correlations should be zero.

Soft-Core Ideology

According to proximity theory, voters will like parties that are close to them on the issues. Distance, or closeness, is the same anywhere on the issue scale. But the analytic results show that closeness to a party on an issue only counts when the party takes a fairly extreme stand. Closeness does not count when a party is centrist on an issue. This produces the pattern we shall call *soft-core ideology*, in which closeness does not predict affect for parties in the center of the ideological spectrum. Voters neither love nor hate a party that takes a centrist stand—the issue just tends to be irrelevant to their evaluation of the party.

But if centrist stands are irrelevant to a party's evaluation, then a party cannot build support based on those stands. This is precisely the logic of directional theory. In directional theory, the center is not a position of advocacy; it is a neutral zone of indifference between the two issue alternatives. Thus, in order to generate issue-based support, a party must stimulate voter interest by taking fairly strong stands on some issues. There are simply no rewards for hugging the center. This assertion sets directional theory apart from proximity theory and appears to provide greater insight into the role of issues in generating party support.

Norway

In directional theory, issue advocacy is critical to linking mass and elite. The practical successes and failures of the parties in Norway appear consistent with this view. We have seen that each of the seven political parties is perceived to be noncentrist on at least one issue. The party that is least directionally intense, in that it has the shortest vector, is the Liberal party. The Liberal party has a long and distinguished tradition in Norwegian politics. In its early years, at the turn of the century, it was the principal competitor to the Conservative party. With the rise of the Labor party, the Liberal party continued to be an effective but less important actor in Norwegian politics. In 1973 it divided internally over the common market issue; but by the 1989 election, the two wings had rejoined and presented as a coherent unit in the election.

Since World War II, the Liberal party has been the most centrist of the Norwegian parties. It started out with a formidable base of support, which has eroded over the period. In both 1985 and 1989 the party failed to achieve representation in the Storting. Of the seven parties we studied, it was the only one that failed to gain representation. The failure of the Liberal party can be attributed in part to internal tensions during the common market debate. That alone, however, would be too simplistic an explanation. Both factions of the party gained representation in the 1973 election, and the faction that retained the Liberal party label remained in the legislature through 1981.

The one issue on which the Liberal party was perceived to be noncentrist in our study was environmental protection. Yet even on that issue it was outflanked by the Socialist party.[18] The issue portrait of the Liberal party is one of moderation, without any key issues, such as the farm policies and Christian values that define the other two center parties. Over the last decade, the party has appeared to be in search of a defining issue; and while it maintains modest support in the electorate, that support is simply not sufficient to make it electorally competitive.

The Progressive party is the party that most clearly contrasts with the Liberals. It has a relatively short history, dating back only to the 1973 election, and takes distinctly noncentrist stands on a wide range of issues. The Progressive party is a populist and somewhat reactionary political party that appears to have built its support on the basis of hostility to taxation and antagonism toward Third World immigration into Norway (Aardal 1990b). It is the only party that openly challenges either the welfare state or immigration. In contrast to the Liberal party, the Progressives have done extremely well in increasing their support over the period.

In terms of directional theory, the Progressive party lies clearly outside the region of acceptability. Prior to the 1987 local elections, the party had been only a marginal contender for votes, either locally or nationally. In his analysis of the 1989 Norwegian election, Aardal traced the rise in support for the Progressives to their principled refusal to participate in the removal of a minority Labor government: "On this occasion the leader of the Progressive party, Mr. Hagen, managed to portray himself as a responsible leader who placed national interests above those of his own party. Justified or not, this impression must have been widespread among voters. In the following 12 months, the Progressive party increased its standing in the monthly opinion polls by more than four times its total share of the vote in 1985" (1990b, 152). In the narrow sense of directional theory, Hagen did not move the party within the region of acceptability by his actions. The Progressives are still perceived as extremist but perhaps less so than they were before. In the broader sense of understanding what makes for success in electoral politics, however, the event reinforces the idea that perceptions of responsibility are critical to party fortunes. In this instance, a party perceived to be quite irresponsible seems to have benefited greatly by acting responsibly.

The loss of support by the Liberals and the growth of the Progressive party in Norway fit directional theory well. It seems to us the same can be said for the other five Norwegian parties. The successful centrist parties, the Center and the Christian parties, both have very clear issue profiles. The two most dominant parties, Labor and Conservative, also fit the image of issue-distinct yet system-supportive parties. They differ from the center parties in that they define themselves more clearly on the left-right continuum, as opposed to narrower issues.

The Socialists are in some ways the least satisfying of the Norwegian parties to explain from the perspective of directional theory, yet even they fit the broad thrust of the model. The Socialist party broke off from Labor in 1961. The critical issue motivating the break was opposition to NATO nuclear policy. The Socialists never had the ideological extremism of the Communist party (which had even earlier broken away from Labor); hence, while there was some antisystem character to the party, even at its inception the party was not strongly antisystem. The NATO issue itself was a poor one on which to seek support. The vast majority of Norwegians favor (and they traditionally favored) NATO membership. The Socialists were probably best categorized as a mildly ineffectual party which, even if more extreme, so mirrored Labor on many critical issues that they provided little incentive for defection. For example, health care was the most clearly economic left-right of the issues included in the 1989 survey; and on that issue the mean perceived position of the Socialist party was 8.66, while that of Labor was 8.50—hardly any difference at all. There was only one year prior to 1989 in which the Socialists performed well electorally, 1973. The Socialists were opposed to membership in the European Common Market, while Labor favored membership. In a period of intense political conflict, the voters turned down membership in a national referendum; and the Socialist party clearly benefited from that sentiment.

In contrast to Labor, the Socialist party has taken quite distinct stands on postmaterialist issues. If, as Inglehart (1990) argues, these issues are an increasingly important part of political competition, they provide the Socialists a vehicle for generating support that is distinct from the issues underlying support for the Labor party. Hence, the increasing strength of the Socialists might well be due to a changing issue agenda on which they have a clearer identity. Of course, both Socialist and Progressive strength in the 1989 election could have been due to idiosyncratic conditions that eroded support for the Labor and Conservative parties (Aardal 1990b). That possibility notwithstanding, it is still appropriate to note how much the surge of both parties fits the thrust of directional theory.

Discussion

Democracy is often idealized as a system in which voters have clear issue positions, know where the parties stand on issues, and cast their ballots accordingly. Parties then pursue the policies expected of them by the voters. In such a system, the connection between mass issue preferences, party choice, and public policy is direct. The proximity-based spatial model is a natural representation of this classic concept.

An alternate view is that democracy is a system that provides mass input for resolving social conflicts (see Lipset and Rokkan 1967). Sources of cleavage are abundant in any society. They can be related to demographic differences, such as rich versus poor, Protestant versus Catholic, or management versus labor. They can be more directly rooted in ideological and issue divisions, such as egalitarians versus individualists, environmentalists versus materialists, or those who favor immigration versus those who oppose it. These conflicts and countless others require political intermediation. If the substance of politics is conflict, an appropriate role for parties is advocacy. Effective parties are effective advocates, and elections decide which side has greater weight in determining policy.

Directional theory is a natural vehicle for modeling conflict- or cleavage-oriented politics. In this theory, when voters choose, they do not ask, How close are your positions to mine? but Are you on my side? and Can I trust you to be responsible?

When the directional and proximity theories were compared in the United States, the comparison was made in a two-party system in which parties exert virtually no control over candidates and only two positions are advocated in any given election. Norway contrasts with the United States in being a highly disciplined multiparty system in which a wide variety of issue positions are articulated. Yet it is striking how similar the Norwegian results are to those for the U.S. case. This similarity in the findings across two very different systems suggests a potential universal quality to the role of issues in electoral politics, a quality more readily captured by directional theory.

Appendix A: Proof of Full Proportionality Theorem

We make three assumptions:

1. issue utility of voter i for party j (U_{ij}) = $\Sigma_k I_{ik} \bullet I_{jk} - P_{ij}$, where the terms are defined as in the text
2. voter points are distributed so that the probability of any specific location is zero (a standard assumption associated with any continuous distribution, included to avoid problems associated with certain contrived distributions of voter points)
3. each voter has a single vote (cast for the most preferred party), and parliamentary seats are assigned using a proportional allocation system.

OBSERVATION 1. *If two parties, A and B, located within the region of acceptability have exactly opposing strategies, every voter will have positive utility for one of the two parties.*

Proof. Let the strategy of party A be described by the intensity vector $I_A = (I_{A1}, I_{A2}, \ldots I_{An})$, where n is the number of issues on which the party takes a nonzero position. Note that n must be greater than zero because an exactly opposing strategy exists. By definition $U_{iA} = \Sigma_k I_{ik} \bullet I_{Ak}$ because party A lies within the region of acceptability. By virtue of Assumption 2, the sum cannot exactly equal zero. If U_{iA} is negative, then $-U_{iA}$ is positive.

$$\begin{aligned} -U_{iA} &= -(\Sigma_k I_{ik} \bullet I_{Ak}) \\ &= \Sigma_k I_{ik} \bullet (-I_{Ak}) \\ &= \Sigma_k I_{ik} \bullet I_{Bk} = U_{iB} \end{aligned}$$

Hence, voter i will have positive utility for one of the two parties.

POSITIVE UTILITY THEOREM. *At a minimum, (100 − 2t)% of the electorate will have positive issue utility for at least one party, where t (t > 0) is the threshold necessary for representation.*

Proof. We will prove this by assuming the converse and seeing that it leads to a fallacy. Assume that 2*t* voters have negative utility for all competing parties. Introduce any two parties, A and B, located within the region of acceptability, who have exactly opposing strategies. One of these two parties will be attractive to at least *t*% of the voters. This follows from the fact that there are 2*t* voters who have negative utility and from Observation 1. Hence, a strategy exists that will generate positive utility from *t* (or more)% of the voters who heretofore had negative utility for all parties. Such a strategy would gain representation and therefore would be utilized. Thus, it is impossible under the assumptions of the directional model and rational party strategy for more than $2t\%$ of the electorate to have negative issue utility for all competing parties.

OBSERVATION 2. *If a voter has positive issue utility for a party within the region of acceptability and the party does not lie on the boundary of the region, that voter will have a higher issue utility for a party with the same directional stance located on the boundary of the region.*

Proof. Let A be the party interior to the boundary and B the party on the boundary. Let i be a voter having positive utility for party A. Because both parties are within the region of acceptability, there is no penalty. Hence, the utility of voter i for party A and party B can be written as

$$U_{iA} = \Sigma_k I_{ik} \cdot I_{Ak} \text{ and}$$

$$U_{iB} = \Sigma_k I_{ik} \cdot I_{Bk}. \qquad \text{(A-1)}$$

Because A and B are in identical directions, we can express the location of party B on any issue k as $I_{Bk} = c(I_{Ak})$, where c is a positive constant. Because the vector representing party B is longer than that representing party A, c must be greater than 1. Substituting for I_{Bk} in equation A-1, we have

$$U_{iB} = \Sigma_k I_{ik} \cdot (cI_{Ak}) = c\, \Sigma_k I_{ik} \cdot I_{Ak} = cU_{iA}.$$

Because c is greater than 1 and U_{iA} is positive, we are assured that $U_{iB} > U_{iA}$ and that B will be preferred to A by voter i.

DEFINITION. *We use the term* fully proportional representation system *to refer to a system in which the threshold t approaches 0.*

FULL PROPORTIONALITY THEOREM. *In a fully proportional representation system, all parties should be located at or beyond the region of acceptability.*

Proof. As t approaches zero, $2t$ approaches zero, and there are an inconsequential number of voters who have negative issue utility for all parties. If a party is drawing support from voters with positive issue utility and is interior to the boundary, a competitor located exactly on the boundary would win its votes (by Observation 2). Hence, all parties should be located at or beyond the region of acceptability.

Appendix B: Wording of Ten-Point Issue Questions

1. *Left-right (full wording).* "There is so much talk about the conflict between left and right in politics. Here is a scale that goes from 1 on the left—that is, those who are placed politically furthest to the left—to 10 on the right, that is, those who are politically furthest to the right. Where would you place yourself on this scale? (5 and 6 are marked by *neither/nor.*) Where would you place the various parties on such a scale?"

2. *Agricultural policy (reverse coded).* "Some say that Norwegian agriculture should manage without government support and tariff protection against foreign competition. Let us assume that those who hold that position are placed at 1 on this scale. Others hold the opinion that the present system of government support for agriculture should be kept. Let us assume that those who hold this opinion are given the value of 10 on the scale. Of course, there are some who are located between these extremes."

3. *Environmental protection.* "Value 1 denotes the wish to give much more priority to the protection of the environment, even if it leads to a considerably lower living standard for everyone, including yourself. Value 10 denotes the position that protection of the environment should

not go so far that it hurts our standard of living."

4. *Immigration policy.* "Value 1 on the scale expresses the position that we should make it easier for immigrants to come to Norway, while the value 10 expresses the opinion that the number of immigrants should be restricted more strongly than at the present."

5. *Health care (reverse coded).* "Value 1 expresses the wish for a much greater role for private health care on a commercial basis, while the value 10 expresses a wish that health care should be a public responsibility only."

6. *Alcohol policy (reverse coded).* "Value 1 denotes the position that alcohol should be sold without restrictions and at greatly reduced prices. Value 10 means that the sale and production of alcohol should be more strongly regulated than it is today."

7. *Violent crime (reverse coded).* "Value 1 denotes that violent crime should be punished much tougher [*sic*] than it is today, while value 10 denotes the position that punishment should be milder."

Appendix C: Mixed Model Analysis

From a statistical perspective, it is desirable to compare the directional and proximity models within the same analysis.[19] The mathematical relationship between the two models provides a natural way to do this. The squared Euclidean distance between two points X and A is

$$\begin{aligned} d_{XA}^2 &= \Sigma_k (x_k - a_k)^2 \\ &= \Sigma_k x_k^2 + \Sigma_k a_k^2 - 2\,\Sigma_k x_k a_k, \end{aligned}$$

where x_k and a_k are the coordinates of X and A, respectively. If the space is appropriately centered around the directional neutral point, the value $\Sigma_k x_k^2$ is the squared length of the X vector, $\Sigma_k a_k^2$ is the squared length of the A vector, and $2\Sigma_k x_k a_k$ is twice the scalar product. Hence, the scalar product is one of the components of squared Euclidean distance.

We can reestimate each of the directional model regressions in the text with an additional variable called LENGTH, where

$$\text{LENGTH} = .5\,(\Sigma_k x_k^2 + \Sigma_k a_k^2).$$

This will provide a direct comparison between the models because scalar product minus LENGTH is exactly equal to minus one-half squared distance. Thus, if the proximity model is correct, the scalar product and length variables should have approximately the same coefficient, with the sign of the scalar product positive and that of the length negative. If this turns out to be the case, it will provide evidence in favor of the proximity model. If on the other hand the magnitude of the scalar product term is distinctly larger than the length term, it will provide evidence in favor of the directional model.

Table A-1 shows a reestimate of the pooled regression analysis reported in the text.[20] The table shows the unstandardized coefficients for the scalar product variable and the length variable and the ratio between the two. The distance model predicts a ratio of minus one in all cases. The directional model predicts a ratio with an absolute value distinctly higher than one. In only one case does the length coefficient reach significance at the .01 level when it has the correct negative sign. The largest length coefficient has an incorrect sign. Over the seven issues, the average value of the length coefficient is approximately zero.

Table A-1. A Mixed Model Analysis of Party Evaluation: Pooled Regression

Issue	Scalar Product Coefficient	Length Coefficient	Model Ratio[a]
Left-right	1.71	.24	undefined
Agriculture	.46	-.07†	-6.27
Environment	.38	.06†	undefined
Immigration	.71	-.08†	-9.17
Health care	.48	-.13	-3.55
Alcohol	.44	-.01†	-40.18
Crime	-.01†	-.02†	no effect

Note: Adjusted R^2 = .399; N = 12,031. Demographic variables were also included in the analysis but are omitted from the table in order to save space.

[a] This is the ratio between the scalar product coefficient and the length coefficient. Under the assumptions of the proximity model, the ratio should be approximately -1.0. The ratio is not meaningful when the length coefficient has a positive sign or when both the scalar product and length coefficients are statistically insignificant.

†Not significant at the .01 level.

Notes

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1. The most ambitious work on the role of issues in multiparty systems is that of Budge and Farlie (1983). In the absence of data on party issue positions, they restricted the classification of parties to either *left* or *right.*

2. A caveat, however, is in order. Our spatial mappings of European party systems have shown party configurations that are generally more consistent with the expectations of directional theory (Listhaug, Macdonald, and Rabinowitz 1990; Rabinowitz, Macdonald, and Listhaug 1991; but see Nannestad 1989 on Denmark). These studies have relied on multidimensional scaling of party affect scores.

3. Personal concern about an issue and certainty with regard to the desired policy direction are likely to be factors that contribute to different intensity levels across individuals. Factors such as media attention, length of time as part of the public debate, and *simplicity* (in the sense of Carmines and Stimson 1980) are likely to influence the more general intensity level of an issue.

4. Directional theory shares this feature with other works (see, e.g., Budge and Farlie 1983).

5. Mathematically, this can be formalized as $P_{ij} = 0$ if $\Sigma_k I_{jk}^2 \leq r^2$, where r is a constant that represents the acceptability threshold.

6. The exact orientation of the vector in the quadrant depends on the relative intensities of the party on the issues. If the intensity on the two issues is the same, the vector will bisect the angle of the quadrant. If the intensity is greater on the issue represented by the vertical dimension, the vector will have a more vertical orientation. The A vector is slightly more vertical in orientation than the B vector because party A puts relatively more emphasis on the social dimension than party B. If their relative intensities were exactly the same, the vectors of the two parties would overlay each other.

7. Perhaps the least intuitive aspect of directional theory is the idea that voters will prefer a party that is more extreme to a party at their same location. If choice involved a comparison of positions, this would surely be unreasonable. Directional theory, however, relies on the premise that the voter does not have a preference for a particular *position* on an issue but, rather, a particular *side.* Hence, the voter is attracted to the party that most effectively advocates that side.

8. As background, it is helpful to know how the parties performed in the election. The vote percentages for the seven largest vote-getting parties were as follows: Labor 34.3%, Conservative 22.2%, Progressive 13.0%, Socialist 10.1%, Christian 8.5%, Center 6.5%, Liberal 3.2%. No other party

achieved even 1% of the vote. The greatest vote gains compared to 1985 were for the Socialist and the Progressive parties. Useful references on Norwegian politics include Aardal (1990b), Converse and Valen (1971), Listhaug (1989), Valen, Aardal, and Vogt (1990), and Valen and Martinussen (1977).

9. Each of the issues seems to offer fairly distinct information. A factor analysis of the seven items showed no clear structuring in two dimensions—the maximum number of meaningful dimensions for this number of items.

10. The question wording was as follows: "Now we would like to know how you feel about the different political parties. On this card you will find a scale which we call a 'sympathy thermometer'. The scale runs from 0 to 100 degrees. The 50 degree mark in the middle is where you place the parties which you neither like nor dislike. Any party that you *like* must be placed between 50 and 100 degrees. The more you like a party, the higher you place it. If, on the other hand, there is a party that you *dislike*, it must be placed between 0 and 50 degrees, taking 0 as your expression of *least sympathy*. Let's begin with the following party: Christian People's party"—followed by Liberal party, Center party, Socialist Left party, Conservative party, Labor party, and Progressive party.

11. The control variables used were the following: objective class (*working/nonworking*), subjective class (*working/nonworking*), *union/nonunion*, education (*low/high*), income (*low/high*), employment sector (*public/private*), *farm/nonfarm*, religiosity (*high/low*), *female/male*, *periphery/center*, region (*southwest/nonsouthwest*), language (Nynorsk/Bokmål), alcohol (*nonuser/user*). All the controls were coded as dummy variables. The first category mentioned was coded one; the alternate was coded zero.

12. The exact formulas used to create the summary issue variables are

average distance of voter i to party j

$$= [\Sigma_k (\Theta_{ik} - \Theta_{jk})^2/n_i]^{1/2},$$

where Θ_{ik} is the position of voter i on issue k and Θ_{jk} is the mean position of party j on issue k, and

average scalar product of voter i with party j

$$= \Sigma_k [(I_{ik})(I_{jk})]/n_i,$$

where I_{ik} is the position of voter i on issue k − 5.5, I_{jk} is the mean position of party j on issue k − 5.5. In each formula, n_i is the number of issues on which voter i places him- or herself. Cases for which n_i is less than 4 are omitted. In each model, the party position is determined by the mean perceived location of the party across all voters. Both the directional and proximity theories require that each party be located at a single position, and the sample mean location provides the most natural estimate (Markus and Converse 1979). Because the sample mean might have a bias toward the center position (Powell 1989), however, we have also replicated every analysis using the party location based on the mean perception of those who were very interested in politics and who had graduated from *gymnas* (the equivalent of *some college*). Using these two filters creates a quasi-elite sample of approximately one hundred from an original sample of over two thousand. The results obtained using these estimates are similar to those we report in the text and are available upon request.

13. From a statistical standpoint, it is desirable to estimate both the scalar product and the distance effects in the same equation. In Appendix C we discuss such an analysis. The results are entirely consistent with those in the text.

14. The rationale for selecting the six-issue lengths will become clear after examining the results of the pooled analysis. The crime issue has no impact on the party evaluations and thus seems inappropriate to include.

15. The exact value of the penalty variable is 3.931 for the Progressive party, 1.541 for the Socialist party, and 0 for the other five parties. These values were obtained by using 4.305 as the radius of the region of acceptability and subtracting the radius from the vector length of the two parties beyond the boundary.

16. If we exclude the left-right issue, the results remain essentially the same in all analyses, except that in this pooled model the coefficient for the health care issue increases significantly.

17. Based on seven cases, each of the correlations is significant at the .05 level.

18. The Green party also contended in the election but received little support. For an extensive discussion, see Aardal 1990a.

19. For a fuller discussion of the mixed model, see Rabinowitz and Macdonald 1989, 103–7. Howard Rosenthal originally suggested this estimation strategy.

20. We also replicated each of the separate party regressions, using the mixed model. These results are available on request. In these regressions, the ratio with the smallest absolute value was 4.18 for the Christian party, while the median ratio had an absolute value of 6.12.

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MANAGING BLAME: AN EXPERIMENTAL TEST OF THE EFFECTS OF POLITICAL ACCOUNTS

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Public officials are not passive bystanders in the electoral process. Rather, they actively try to shape or manage citizens' perceptions of events (particularly those involving negative outcomes) through explanations or accounts. I argue that consideration of citizens' understandings of political accountability and how these are shaped by public officials represent critical missing components of models of electoral behavior. The distinction between excuses and justifications provides a valuable conceptual framework for understanding the impact of political accounts on a variety of judgments and psychological processes. I examine satisfaction with various excuses and justifications and their impact on subsequent evaluations of the official.

A central challenge for models of electoral behavior lies in specifying the processes that underlie evaluations of discrete political actions (e.g., a representative's policy vote) and identifying how these act-specific judgments contribute to global impressions and electoral choices. The research I shall report is concerned with one important aspect of this challenge: understanding the active role taken by public officials in shaping citizens' reactions to political events. There are two interrelated, and perhaps obvious, assumptions underlying the work. The first is that public officials are not passive bystanders in the electoral process. Rather, they try to influence their constituencies' perceptions of political events through a variety of explanatory tactics, or *accounts*. Second, elected officials are motivated to maintain the approval of those to whom they are accountable—their constituencies—because reelection is a dominant goal. Accounts are instrumental in attaining that goal.

Before outlining the critical concepts and theoretical framework, it should be noted that my specific goal is to examine the impact of a variety of explanations offered by elected representatives to account for unpopular policy decisions. Thus, the study is limited to a particular type of public official and a particular type of political predicament. The focus on representatives does not mean that other political figures do not have at their disposal—and use—a number of explanatory strategies. They most certainly do. However, I do not consider appointed public officials, such as members of the judiciary or the president's cabinet, because citizens' evaluations of their actions have negligible or indirect effects on their political careers, since electoral objectives are less relevant for appointed officials than for representatives. In addition, I do not consider executives or candidates for executive positions. A recent study indicates that citizens react differently to the same explanations, depending on whether the official is a legislator or an executive (Sigelman, Sigelman, and Walkosz n.d.). These results suggest that given the paucity of relevant research, it is prudent to focus on a single type of public official in the early stages of the development of a theoretical model.

Public officials can find themselves in a number of different sorts of predicaments, including a variety of normative transgressions such as acts of corruption or noncriminal ethical violations. These types of predicaments are interesting and timely, certainly worthy of systematic empirical study (Peters and Welch, 1978). However, in this work I focus on a different sort of predicament: verifiable (i.e., roll call) policy votes that have a real or imagined negative impact on some constituency group. This emphasis on the consequences of policy decisions follows logically from the focus on representatives and the importance of responsibility in theories of representation.

Previous research that has examined citizens' reactions to discrete political events has often taken a case study approach (see, e.g., Bennett 1980, an insightful analysis of Watergate rhetoric and, for an overview, Graber 1976, a comprehensive bibliography). Case studies have some advantages. However, they rarely permit the specification of precise empirical relationships or generalizable principles. A second research strategy has relied on the National Election Study (NES) surveys, capitalizing on chance or unexpected political events (see, e.g., Krosnick and Kinder 1990, an analysis of the impact of the Iran-Contra affair on evaluations of Reagan, and Stoker 1990, an analysis of the impact of the Donna Rice scandal on evaluations of Gary Hart). These studies are valuable; but the research is necessarily limited to the standard NES questions, prohibiting a detailed examination of the event itself or of the processes underlying reactions to the event. I have adopted a third research strategy, experimentation, which has particular strengths that can counteract the problems inherent in the case study and "chance" NES-analytic approaches. Of particular value for the present concerns, an experimental approach permits an examination of the causal impact of a variety of political explanatory strategies in the same context and it offers greater precision in specifying the critical psychological processes that mediate evaluations.

Responsibility, Representation, and Blame Management Strategies

The past decade has seen a growing scholarly interest in understanding citizens' attributions of responsibility for political outcomes (e.g., Feldman 1985; Iyengar 1987, 1989; Kluegel and Smith 1986; Peffley 1985; Stone 1989; Thompson 1980; Weaver 1986). The topic deservedly has garnered increased attention because the empirical evidence indicates that perceptions of responsibility contribute to evaluations of political figures (e.g., Abramowitz, Lanoue, and Ramesh 1988; Feldman 1985; Iyengar 1987; Tyler 1982) and issue opinions (Iyengar 1989). However, the bulk of the literature has been concerned with responsibility for broadly defined political, economic, and social problems (e.g., unemployment), where it is generally impossible to establish a veridical causal link between specific actions taken by political leaders and specific consequences. In sharp contrast, there has been very little research on assigning responsibility for discrete political events, such as a policy vote or an act of misconduct, where the behavior of a particular political official can be more clearly identified and evaluated. Yet these discrete events are of great importance because they constitute much of the "raw material" that contributes to citizens' impressions of political leaders (Lodge, McGraw, and Stroh 1989).

Responsibility is a particularly critical construct in theories of representation, as it is clear that legislators worry about being held responsible for their policy decisions and other actions (Arnold 1990; Jacobson 1987). Scholars have long realized that legislators seek to capitalize on attributions of responsibility for positive outcomes through a variety of credit-claiming strategies (Fenno 1978; Fiorina 1977; Kingdon 1981; Mayhew 1974). Weaver (1986, 1988) has cogently argued that public officials are at least as motivated to avoid blame for negative outcomes as they are to claim credit for positive outcomes, and probably more so, as citizens are likely to weigh harms and losses more heavily than gains and benefits (Kahneman and Tversky 1984; Lau 1982, 1985; Tversky and Kahneman 1981; but see also Fiorina and Shepsle 1989). The credit-claiming and blame avoidance motives also figure strongly in Arnold's (1990) theory of congressional policy making. He argues that legislators estimate the probability that their constituencies will be able to draw a causal link between a policy vote and some set of outcomes (i.e., attribute responsibility for the outcomes) before choosing between policy alternatives.

Views about responsibility are not static but, rather, shaped by the ongoing dynamics of political events. For example, Iyengar (1987, 1989) has demonstrated that perceptions of responsibility for national problems such as crime and poverty are susceptible to influence by different types of media presentations. Stone (1989) has argued that "difficult conditions" only become problems on the public agenda when competing political actors deliberately construct "causal stories" involving the allocation of responsibility. According to Stone, it is this "strategic portrayal of causal stories" (p. 299) by political elites that create beliefs about responsibility and reform. Therefore, in order to understand how citizens attribute responsibility, it is necessary to understand the strategies public officials use to shape the responsibility process. A valuable starting point is Weaver's (1986, 1988) analysis of political *blame avoidance* strategies. Weaver argues that a primary motivation of public officials is to avoid blame, and his framework includes a typology of strategies used by public officials to avoid blame-generating situations. These strategies include avoidance of potentially costly decision situations through non-voting or agenda control, as well as by taking ambiguous issue positions.

However, avoidance of a blame-generating situation is not always possible. Through a miscalculation of probable consequences, political constraints, or an inability to appease diverse constituency groups, representatives can find themselves in a situation for which they will be blamed by some segment of their constituency. At this point, they are forced to manage the blame process, most typically by providing an explanation, in order to forestall further political damage. I refer to these after-the-fact damage control tactics as *blame management* strategies.[1]

A Typology of Political Accounts

Elsewhere I have suggested that a useful theoretical framework for thinking systematically about political blame management strategies can be found in the account literature (McGraw 1990; see also Bennett 1980 for a similar argument). An account is "a statement made by a social actor to explain unanticipated or untoward behavior" (Scott and Lyman 1968, 47). Accounts can be differentiated into two basic types—*excuses* and *justifications*—a distinction most prominently associated with the philosopher John Austin (1956).[2] Semin and Manstead define the concepts succinctly: "Excuses deny some or any measure of responsibility for what is admittedly an offensive act. Justifications deny some or any measure of offensiveness in act for which the individual admits responsibility" (1983, 80). In other words, a justification focuses on the outcome and claims that contrary to accusations, the consequences are not so undesirable and therefore that less or no blame is warranted. An excuse, on the other hand, focuses on the causal link between the actor and outcome and involves a denial of partial or full responsibility (if the actor is not fully responsible, less or no blame is warranted). This distinction between excuses and justifications provides a useful organizing framework for thinking about blame management strategies, particularly as it points to clear differences in the processing and interpretation of information. To that end, a typology of political accounts has been developed, as follows:[3]

Excuses

1. past mitigating circumstances
2. present mitigating circumstances
3. horizontal diffusion of responsibility
4. vertical diffusion of responsibility
5. plea of ignorance

Justifications

1. present benefits
2. future benefits
3. comparison to past
4. comparison to others
5. comparison to hypothetical
6. fairness
7. conscience

Perhaps the most common political excuses involve the claim that *mitigating circumstances* are at least partially responsible for the decision (Weaver [1986] uses the term "scapegoating"). Mitigating circumstances can involve the past (e.g., the policies of a previous administration) or the present (e.g., the economy). If accepted as legitimate, this type of excuse reduces or eliminates personal responsibility because the situation is such that the official was left with no other choice but to reach the decision (Harvey 1976; Steiner 1970).

A second type of excuse involves *diffusion of responsibility* for the decision to others involved in the decision-making process. Diffusion of responsibility can be classified into two broad types. The first is horizontal, where the official can argue that the decision is the joint product of a group of equal-status individuals (Thompson [1980] discusses this in terms of "collective responsibility"). The second type is vertical, where responsibility is delegated to an individual or individuals of different status or authority (in Thompson's terms, "hierarchical responsibility"). Vertical diffusion, in turn, can be differentiated according to direction: upward, by delegating responsibility to some authority higher in the decision chain, or downward, by blaming a subordinate. This study focuses on the upward variant of vertical diffusion of responsibility.

A final type of excuse entails a *plea of ignorance,* wherein the official claims that he or she did not intend or foresee the undesirable consequences resulting from the decision. Legitimately unforeseen or unintentional acts are frequently associated with decreased personal responsibility (Heider 1956). But, as Thompson has argued, a plea of ignorance is not likely to be effective in the political realm "when officials are the instruments of their own ignorance" (1980, 912); that is, role obligations require elected officials to be aware of the consequences of their actions, and failure to fulfill these obligations cannot be easily excused (see Hamilton 1980 and Hart 1968 for discussions of role responsibility). Intuitively, pleas of ignorance would appear to be obviously poor political excuses. However, lest anyone doubt that pleas of ignorance ever occur in the political realm, recollect

Reagan's continuing account in the Iran-Contra affair that he "did not remember" and "was not aware" of any decisions authorizing the sale of arms to Iran.

Whereas excuses involve an attempt to weaken perceptions of the causal link between the actor and an undesirable outcome, justifications entail explicit or implicit admissions of responsibility but a denial that the consequences of the decision are really undesirable. An alternative way of thinking about justifications is to realize that they are characterized by an attempt to reframe the undesirable outcome (Kahneman and Tversky 1984) so that it is viewed in a more favorable light.

The list provides five different justifications involving a reframing of the consequences associated with an unpopular policy decision, all aimed at changing perceptions of the undesirability of the policy. The first involves pointing out some present benefits associated with the decision that the constituency has failed to consider. The second involves directing the constituency's attention to the future benefits of the policy, the emphasis being that "in the long run" the policy will lead to positive outcomes. The third entails a comparison to past circumstances, pointing out that "even though the present looks bad, it's a lot better than it's been." The fourth justification involves a social comparison. The public official can point out that other relevant social groups have experienced more losses than the accusing constituency. Finally, the official can offer a hypothetical comparison, in which he or she can argue that "things could have been a lot worse if . . ." (i.e., provide a hypothetical simulation scenario; Kahneman and Tversky 1982). All of these justifications involve attempts to change perceptions of the undesirability of the outcome: if the outcome is not so bad or (if viewed from a different perspective) is even desirable, then blame is unwarranted.

A second set of justifications focus on moral principles, or norms, rather than policy consequences. With this sort of justification, the official appeals to some shared cultural norm that serves to minimize the negative connotations of the act (Tetlock 1985). One such norm is the claim the policy is warranted in the interest of greater societal fairness. Another is the more personal claim on the part of the official that his or her own value system, or conscience, required the decision. Both of these qualify as justifications because, in appealing to norms, the official is claiming that if a different standard is applied, the policy decision is not really undesirable. Thus, whereas the strategic shift in the other five justifications involves the consequences of the decision, the normative justifications are marked by a shift in the moral principles used to evaluate the decision.

Judgmental Consequences of Political Accounts

What impact do political excuses and justifications have on subsequent judgments?[4] For the case of an unpopular policy decision, the processes can be characterized as follows. First, a representative is known to be linked to a policy outcome because of a verifiable vote. Second, a constituency believes, rightly or wrongly, that the decision will impose some costs or burdens, thus reacting negatively to the policy. Because of the link to the decision, the representative will be blamed to some degree for the vote. Once the decision becomes public, he or she may be forced to explain the vote to the unhappy constituency in order to forestall further damage. In response, the individual constituents will either accept or reject (be satisfied with or dissatisfied with) the account. Acceptance of the account is critical, as a citizen must be satisfied with the explanation for it to have the desired goal (from the representative's perspective) of containing the political damage. A major purpose of the analyses reported below is to examine how satisfaction with an account systematically changes evaluations of the policy decision and the official.

These reactions—policy evaluation, blame, and satisfaction with the account—do not exist as isolated, inconsequential, beliefs. Rather, they will also contribute to the citizen's overall impression of the official. If there is little or no previous information about the official (as in this experiment using a hypothetical representative), the unpopular policy incident will necessarily dominate the impression. If an impression already exists, reactions to the unpopular policy incident will be used to update the current impression (Hastie and Park 1986; Lodge, McGraw, and Stroh 1989). In sum, the model assumes that in some circumstances citizens will have knowledge of the links between their representatives' decisions and policy consequences. (From Arnold 1990, the "incumbent performance decision rule" is operative.) If those consequences are negative, citizens will "punish" the representative by either forming negative impressions (if a prior impression does not exist) or by adjusting existing impressions in a downward fashion.[5]

The distinction between excuses and justifications is valuable because it suggests systematic differences in both the evaluations of the policy-account episode and in the factors that contribute to evaluations of the official. The principle of priming—the use of recently and/or frequently activated concepts in judgment tasks because of increased memory accessibility (Higgins and King 1981)—provides a framework for understanding the impact of excuses and justifications. Political science applications of the priming principle have demonstrated convincingly that the standards used to make political evaluations are susceptible to influence by changes in circumstantial or contextual forces (Iyengar and Kinder 1987; Krosnick and Kinder 1990; McGraw and Pinney 1990). Because excuses and justifications focus attention on different aspects of the event under question, they should, according to the priming principle, alter the standards used to evaluate public officials. That is, to the extent that excuses and justifications are associated with systematic differences in reasoning about the predicament, these inferences should be particularly salient and accessible and, as a result, contribute more weight to the final impression of the official.

Consider, first, justifications, which, whether emphasizing consequences or norms, involve a denial that the outcome is really undesirable. If accepted as legitimate, justifications should lead to positive reevaluations of the policy, the result of a successful persuasion tactic on the part of the representative. According to the priming principle, the process of revising evaluations of the policy should strengthen the link between these evaluations and impressions of the representative. Moreover, as part of the reframing process intrinsic to justifications, a second inferential process may occur. Specifically, the official may also accrue *credit* for the decision, in effect, turning a political loss into a political gain. The successful reframing of consequences may lead the citizen to conclude that the official deserves credit for the policy decision; similarly, acceptable normative justifications may result in the perception that the official has integrity and is a morally upright individual, for which he or she deserves credit.[6] Again, according to the priming principle, the realization that the official deserves credit for the policy decision should also strengthen the link between judgments of creditworthiness and impressions.

Successful excuses, on the other hand,

should lead to a very different sequence of inferential processes. In making an excuse, the official does not deny that the outcome is undesirable, so policy evaluations should not be influenced by excuses. Similarly, because there is no focusing of attention on the positive implications of the action, excuses should not elicit high levels of credit or praise. Rather, because excuses directly challenge assignment of responsibility for the negative outcome, successful excuses should lead to an attenuation of blame. In accordance with the priming principle, these revised perceptions of blameworthiness should subsequently be linked more strongly to evaluations of the official.

Two final points of clarification. First, these predictions (that successful justifications will have an impact on evaluations of the policy and assignment of credit whereas successful excuses will lead to an attenuation of blame) are tested most appropriately against a baseline group that does not receive any explanation for the policy decision. These processes imply revisions of beliefs upon acceptance of the account; thus, assessing change of belief requires a contrast with a comparable group that does not receive an account. The experimental design includes such a control group for the statistical evaluation of these hypotheses. Second, both sets of predictions (changes in judgment and the strengthening of the links between the revised judgments and impressions) are hypothesized to be contingent upon satisfaction with the account. Acceptance of the account is a necessary condition for revising the relevant beliefs (policy, credit, or blame); and this process of revision should lead to the strengthening of the inferential link between the changed belief and the impression. Statistically, support for both satisfaction-contingent predictions requires evidence of systematic interactions between satisfaction with the received account and the other relevant variables.

Subjects, Procedure, and Materials

The subjects in this experiment were 475 students enrolled in undergraduate political science courses at the State University of New York, Stony Brook. They participated in fulfillment of course requirements or in order to receive extra course credit. The average age was 21.5; 54% were female. They were about evenly split in terms of partisan identification and political ideology.

The subjects participated individually, in separate laboratory cubicles. The majority of the subjects (n = 408) were randomly assigned a booklet containing one of the 24 different versions of the stimulus materials reflecting the 12 (account) × 2 (policy) between-subjects design. (Complete descriptions of the accounts and policies are provided in Appendix A.) The written instructions stated that the study involved a New York State assemblyman named Ryan, who had recently voted for a state budget amendment bill. The bill was described as being controversial, one that "had been endorsed by a number of political leaders, but also criticized by a number of others." The subjects were asked to imagine that they resided in Ryan's district, that he was their representative, and that the bill would affect them personally.

The budget amendment bill itself was varied. For half of the subjects, the policy in question involved a cut in funding for public safety services. This policy is identical to the one used in previous work (McGraw 1990). The second policy involved an increase in property taxes in order to fund social welfare programs. Inclusion of the two different types of policies in this experiment permits an exploration of the generalizability of the impact of alternative accounts across different policy domains.

After reading about the representative and the specifics of the policy, the subjects were told that many of the district's residents were upset and that Ryan had agreed to meet with concerned citizens at a public meeting to explain his vote. One of 12 different accounts, reflecting the typology outlined in above, was provided as his response at this meeting.

The dependent variables followed. The subjects were asked to evaluate both the policy and the representative, using the standard 101-point feeling thermometer format. Attributions of responsibility were also assessed. Specifically, they were asked, "To what extent do you believe Ryan is *deserving of blame* for his budget amendment vote?," as well as "To what extent do you believe Ryan is *deserving of credit or praise* for his budget amendment vote?" The responses to these two responsibility questions were provided on nine-point scales anchored with *deserving of no blame (credit) at all* and *deserving of a great deal of blame (credit).* Finally, the subjects were asked, "How satisfied are you with Ryan's response at the community meeting?" These ratings were made on a nine-point scale anchored with *extremely dissatisfied* and *extremely satisfied.* These five variables (thermometer ratings of the policy and the representative, assignment of blame and credit, and satisfaction with the account) constitute the dependent variables in the experiment. After these measures were collected, the subjects completed a short questionnaire that included demographic indicators, as well as measures of a variety of political and social attitudes.

A smaller group of subjects ($n = 67$) was provided with the identical information about the representative and his vote as the larger group of experimental subjects.[7] However, the control group did not receive any information about a possible explanation for the vote. These subjects provided thermometer ratings of the representative and policy, as well as attributions of blame and credit in the same manner as the other subjects. Thus, these data provide baseline indicators of these reactions in the absence of an explicit account. The control group subjects also provided satisfaction ratings for all 12 of the accounts (in response to "as if he had provided that explanation" instructions) after the critical dependent variables were assessed.

Results

The empirical results are presented in several stages. First, differences in satisfaction with the alternative accounts are considered. Second, the joint impact of type of account and satisfaction on evaluations of the policy and the credit and blame judgments is examined. Finally, additive and interactive models estimating the determinants of the evaluations of the representative are presented, in order to test the hypotheses concerning the strengthening of the links contributing to those evaluations.

Policy condition (public safety vs. social welfare) was included as a factor in the analyses of variance (ANOVA) I shall report below. Those analyses revealed main effects, such as that the social welfare bill led to more positive reactions than the public safety bill. However, there was virtually no evidence that policy type interacted with the type of account, indicating that the impact of the different accounts was not contingent on the two policies considered in this experiment. In order to facilitate the presentation of the results, I ignore the effects involving type of policy in the main text. Those data are summarized in Appendix B.

Satisfaction with the Accounts

The data presented in Table 1 summarize the data on satisfaction with the alternative accounts. Consider first the original 12 account conditions, set in unbold type. The first column provides the experimental group data, which were

Table 1. Satisfaction with the Accounts

Account Condition	Experimental Group Mean	Control Group Mean (N = 67)
Excuses		
Mitigating circumstances[a]	4.04 (67)	4.82
Past	3.89 (36)	5.12
Present	4.23 (31)	4.52
Diffusion of responsibility[a]	2.51 (69)	3.25
Horizontal	2.74 (35)	3.66
Vertical	2.26 (34)	2.85
Plea of ignorance	1.97 (30)	2.54
Justifications		
Normative principles[a]	4.22 (67)	4.94
Fairness	4.03 (35)	4.70
Conscience	4.43 (32)	5.18
Benefits[a]	4.17 (76)	5.62
Present	4.21 (33)	5.43
Future	4.14 (43)	5.81
Comparisons[a]	3.52 (94)	3.67
Past	3.42 (36)	4.35
Social	3.60 (30)	3.54
Hypothetical	2.54 (28)	3.12

Note: The entries are the mean ratings of satisfaction with each account. A nine-point scale was used, with higher values reflecting more satisfaction. Cell sizes are in parentheses. The data for the collective categories (mitigating circumstances, etc.) are the average satisfaction ratings, combined across conceptually similar account conditions.

[a] Collective categories.

analyzed by a 12 (account) × 2 (policy) between-subjects ANOVA; the control group data in the second column were analyzed by a 12 (account) × 2 (policy) multivariate ANOVA with repeated measures on the first factor. First and foremost, it is evident that *none* of the accounts elicited a great deal of satisfaction, a conclusion that is consistent with other research utilizing these accounts (McGraw 1990; McGraw, Timpone, and Bruck 1991b). Collapsing across account type, the average satisfaction rating for the experimental group was 3.55, reflecting a reaction only slightly more positive than *moderately dissatisfied* on the nine-point scale. The average rating was slightly more positive among the control group (R = 4.24) but still below the scale midpoint.

With that point in mind, there is clear evidence that some accounts were more satisfactory (more accurately, *less unsatisfactory)* than others. Both ANOVAs revealed significant main effects for the type of account (for the experimental group, $F[11,378] = 5.32$, $p < .001$; for the control group, $F[11,693] = 25.93$, $p < .001$). The pattern of effects was quite similar for the two groups, also replicating other research utilizing these accounts (McGraw 1990; McGraw, Timpone, and Bruck 1991b). Among the excuses, diffusion of responsibility, both vertical and horizontal, and a plea of ignorance were particularly poor accounts. Claims of mitigating circumstances, on the other hand, were more acceptable. Among the justifications, the normative appeals (fairness and conscience) and

Table 2. Impact of Accounts on Policy Evaluations, Responsibility Judgments, and Evaluations of the Representative

	Level of Account Satisfaction							
	Policy Evaluations		Creditworthiness		Blamelessness		Evaluations of the Representative	
Account Type	Low	High	Low	High	Low	High	Low	High
Mitigating circumstances	34.57 (35)	53.94 (33)	3.40 (35)	4.64 (33)	4.63 (35)	5.12 (33)	45.32 (35)	58.06 (33)
Diffusion of responsibility	43.88 (33)	42.31 (36)	3.45 (35)	4.08 (36)	4.61 (33)	5.11 (36)	27.61 (33)	42.50 (36)
Plea of ignorance	44.56 (16)	38.64 (14)	3.47 (16)	3.36 (14)	4.87 (16)	5.21 (14)	22.50 (16)	40.79 (14)
Normative principles	29.03 (32)	49.31 (35)	3.53 (32)	4.83 (35)	4.38 (32)	5.49 (35)	37.34 (32)	57.14 (35)
Benefits	21.94 (36)	55.77 (39)	2.57 (36)	4.95 (39)	4.05 (36)	5.90 (39)	30.33 (36)	57.59 (39)
Comparisons	33.36 (50)	47.81 (43)	3.64 (50)	4.30 (43)	4.54 (50)	5.00 (43)	33.24 (50)	51.59 (43)
Control group	45.02 (67)		4.12 (67)		4.97 (67)		54.49 (67)	

Note: The entries are the evaluations of the policy and the representative, both scored on the 101-point thermometer scale; and judgments of creditworthiness and blamelessness (reverse-scored from original dependent variable), both on nine-point scales. For all variables, higher values reflect more positive reactions. Cell sizes are in parentheses.

justifications pointing to present or future benefits were more satisfactory than those justifications involving comparisons with abstract standards.

The data for the original 12 account conditions of Table 1 indicate that conceptually similar accounts (e.g., both diffusions of responsibility, both normative appeals) elicited similar levels of satisfaction. In the service of simplifying the presentation of the remaining results and increasing statistical power, the 12-level typology was collapsed into 6 broader classes of accounts, as indicated by the entries in bold type of Table 1. The two conditions involving claims of mitigating circumstances were combined, as were the two conditions involving diffusion of responsibility. The plea of ignorance remains distinct. The justifications were collapsed into three types: normative appeals, benefit justifications, and comparison justifications.[8] Post hoc comparisons of the differences among the means for the experimental group indicated that diffusion of responsibility and the plea of ignorance each differed from each of the other four types of accounts, with all eight comparisons significant at the .05 level, according to the Scheffé test (Keppel 1982). In addition, the comparison justifications tended to be less satisfactory than both the normative appeals and the benefit justifications, with both comparisons significant at the .1 level, according to the Scheffé test.

In sum, the data distinquish between satisfactory and unsatisfactory accounts. Excuses claiming mitigating circumstances and justifications appealing to normative principles or focusing on present or future benefits were more satisfactory than excuses that attempted to diffuse responsibility or plead ignorance and justifications involving comparisons with abstract standards.

Evaluations and Responsibility Judgments

Recall that excuses and justifications should have an impact on evaluations of the policy and the responsibility judgments but that these effects should be contingent on satisfaction with the accounts, suggesting a significant account × satisfaction interaction for these three variables. In order to examine the validity of these hypotheses, the subjects were classified into two groups: those who were relatively satisfied with the account and those who were more dissatisfied with the account. These classifications were based on within-condition median splits of the satisfaction ratings.[9] The evaluation and responsibility data were analyzed via 6 (account) × 2 (policy) × 2 (level of satisfaction) ANOVAs. Those data are summarized in Table 2. Also provided in Table 2 are the means for the control group, which were used in subsequent planned comparison of means tests (Keppel 1982).

Evaluations of the Policy. Subjects who were satisfied with the account rated the policy more positively ($M = 48.17$) than those who were not satisfied ($M = 33.13$, $F[1,375] = 37.02$, $p < .001$). The main effect for type of account was not significant ($F < 1$). Rather, the predicted interaction between account and satisfaction was evident ($F[5,375] = 3.43$, $p < .01$). It was hypothesized that if successful, justifications should result in more positive evaluations of the policy. A comparison of the three groups who were satisfied with the justifications with the remaining 10 conditions (including the control group) indicated that evaluations of the bill were significantly more positive among the former subjects ($t = 4.53$, $p < .001$). A more direct test requires comparing each of the three relevant means with just the control group. These analyses indicate that those who were satisfied with the benefit justifications evaluated the policy more positively (an increase of 10 degrees on the thermometer scale) than the control group ($t = 2.17$, $p < .05$). However the policy evaluation means for the other two relevant groups (those satisfied with the normative appeals and those satisfied with the comparison justifications), although in the expected direction, did not differ reliably from the control group.

Credit and Blame. The blame judgments were reverse-coded so that higher values reflect *blamelessness*. (This recoding facilitates the interpretation of the regression analyses I shall report.) The credit-and-blame judgments were independent (across all conditions, $r = -.08$), suggesting that the subjects, at least in the aggregate, were able to distinguish between both good and bad aspects of these complex decision situations and accordingly assign credit and blame independently, rather than in some compensatory or trade-off fashion.

The data on creditworthiness for the vote are summarized in Table 2. The satisfied subjects thought the representative was more deserving of credit ($M = 4.47$) than those who were not satisfied ($M = 3.32$, $F[1,375] = 33.18$, $p < .001$). There was no main effect for type of account ($F < 1$), but the predicted account × satisfaction interaction was marginally significant ($F[5,375] = 1.95$, $p < .09$). The logic underlying the predicted account-specific effects on credit is similar to that underlying the policy evaluation predictions. A successful justification should lead to an increase in judgments of creditworthiness because the official is linked with a policy that is viewed as more desirable (particularly likely in the case of the outcome-focused justifications) and/or the character of the official is evaluated more positively (particularly likely in the case of the normative appeals). A comparison of the three, high satisfaction/justification means with the remaining 10 condition means indicated that the representative was attributed more credit in the former conditions ($t = 4.97$, $p < .001$). The more direct comparison of each of those three conditions with the control group indicated that those who were satisfied with the normative appeal and those who were satisfied with the benefits justifications attributed more credit than did the control group ($t = 1.74$, with $p < .09$ and $t = 2.11$, with $p < .05$, respectively). However, credit in the high satisfaction/comparison justification condition did not differ from the control condition.

Turning now to the blame judgments: the satisfied subjects viewed the representative as less blameworthy ($M = 5.32$) than the dissatisfied subjects ($M = 4.49$, $F[1,375] = 18.66$, $p < .001$). However, type of account did not have an impact on the blame judgments, as a main effect or in interaction with satisfaction ($F < 1$ for both), providing no support for the hypothesis that satisfactory excuses attenuate blame.

In addition to the judgment-specific interaction between type of account and satisfaction with the account, it is clear that satisfaction has a substantial independent impact on judgments. Within every account condition and for all three judgments, the reactions of the satisfied subjects were, not surprisingly, more positive than those of the dissatisfied subjects. Less obvious, but more interesting, is the asymmetry in the impact of satisfaction and dissatisfaction. Collapsing across type of account, planned comparisons of the high and low satisfaction groups with the control group reveal that the reactions of the dissatisfied group were significantly more negative than the control group (t = 3.26, 2.78, and 1.97 for the policy evaluations, credit, and blame, respectively). In contrast, the reactions of the satisfied subjects were not significantly more positive than the control group ($t < 1.37$ for all three). Disregarding the account particulars, the negative impact of an unacceptable account was far stronger than the positive impact of an acceptable account. This asymmetry can be interpreted as a manifestation of the more general negativity bias, wherein negative information has a stronger impact than positive information (Lau 1982, 1985).

Evaluations of the Official. Table 2 provides the mean thermometer ratings of the representative. Those who were satisfied with the expressed account evaluated him more positively ($M = 52.46$) than did those who were dissatisfied ($M = 33.70$, $F[1,375] = 100.53$, $p < .001$). Consideration of these data in conjunction with the control group ($M = 54.49$) make it clear that the approximately 20-degree difference between the satisfied and dissatisfied groups was due not to an enhancement of evaluations following a satisfactory account (the difference between the satisfied and control groups is obviously not significant nor even in the proper direction) but, paralleling the asymmetries noted, to substantially more negative evaluations following an unsatisfactory account. (The difference between the dissatisfied and control groups was highly significant, $t = 7.49$.)

Beyond the independent impact of satisfaction, type of account also had a significant impact on these evaluations ($F[5,375] = 9.26$, $p < .001$). Post hoc comparisons of the means for each account condition with the control group indicate that the evaluations following diffusion of responsibility ($M = 35.38$), a plea of ignorance ($M = 31.03$), and the comparison justifications ($M = 41.83$) were significantly lower than evaluations made in the absence of an explanation for the unpopular policy (all three comparisons significant at $p < .05$, according to the Scheffé test). The remaining three accounts were not effective in the sense of causing more positive evaluations. Rather, claims of mitigating circumstances ($M = 51.51$), appeals to normative principles ($M = 47.69$), and benefits justifications ($M = 44.51$) were only successful in the sense that the accompanying evaluations were not significantly worse than those following no explanation ($p < .1$ for all three, according to the Scheffé test).

Finally, the account × satisfaction interaction was not significant in this analysis ($F < 1$), nor was such an effect anticipated. Rather, the interactive hypotheses for the evaluation data are concerned with the determinants of the evaluations.

Table 3. Predicting Evaluations: Additive Models

	Mitigating Circumstances		Diffusion of Responsibility	
Variables	Unstandardized	Standardized	Unstandardized	Standardized
Policy evaluation	.42 (.13)	.56****	.22 (.09)	.28**
Account satisfaction	1.14 (2.15)	.14	5.25 (1.21)	.44****
Blamelessness	1.07 (1.94)	.10	2.09 (1.98)	.19*
Creditworthiness	.97 (1.02)	.11	−.22 (1.20)	−.02
Adjusted R^2	.55****		.37****	
Number of cases	67		69	

	Normative Justifications		Benefit Justifications		Comparison Justifications	
	Unstandardized	Standardized	Unstandardized	Standardized	Unstandardized	Standardized
Policy evaluations	.37 (.10)	.46****	.53 (.09)	.65****	.44 (.07)	.53****
Account satisfaction	1.87 (.95)	.20**	2.32 (1.14)	.22**	2.89 (.79)	.28****
Blamelessness	2.24 (1.13)	.20**	−.52 (.85)	−.05	1.11 (.98)	.09
Creditworthiness	1.08 (.99)	.10	.67 (1.08)	.06	1.06 (.86)	.09
Adjusted R^2	.59****		.71****		.54****	
Number of cases	67		75		85	

Note: The dependent variable is the thermometer rating of the representative. The predictors are scored so that higher values reflect more positive evaluations of the policy, greater satisfaction with the account, and higher levels of attributed blamelessness and creditworthiness. Standard errors are in parentheses.

*$p < .10$.
**$p < .05$.
***$p < .01$.
****$p < .001$.

Determinants of Evaluations of the Official

In order to assess the impact of the determinants of evaluations of the representative, the following model was estimated for each of the account conditions: $Y = b_0 + b_1$ policy evaluation $+ b_2$ account satisfaction $+ b_3$ blamelessness $+ b_4$ creditworthiness $+ e$, where Y is the thermometer scale rating of the representative and the four predictors are the variables reported in the analyses to this point, all of which are coded so that positive coefficients would be expected. Table 3 summarizes the results for these additive equations. Those data indicate that evaluations of the representative were determined largely by the policy evaluations and to a lesser extent, by satisfaction with the account. The four variables generally predicted a substantial amount of variance in the evaluations, ranging from a low of 37% in the diffusion-of-responsibility condition to a high of 71% in the benefit justification condition.[10]

What is striking about the data in Table 3 is the negligible impact of the two responsibility indicators. Eight of the 10 coefficients were appropriately positive, but only 2—both involving blame—approached acceptable levels of significance. In none of the equations did credit have a significant impact. The null impact of credit and blame on evaluations was also evident in the control condition.[11] However, according to the logic developed earlier, the impact of both credit and blame should be strengthened by satisfaction with the account, with the impact of blame strengthened as a function of satisfaction when the account is an excuse and the impact of credit similarly dependent upon satisfaction when the account is a justification. In addition, the impact of the policy evaluations was expected to be strengthened by satisfaction in the justification conditions. In order to examine the validity of these three interactive hypotheses, equations of the following form were estimated for each condition: $Y = b_0 + b_1$ policy evaluation $+ b_2$ account satisfaction $+ b_3$ blamelessness $+ b_4$ creditworthiness $+ b_5$ (policy evaluation $\times$ account satisfaction) $+ b_6$ (responsibility indicator $\times$ account satisfaction) $+ e$. The two interaction terms in each equation were created by multiplying account satisfaction by the policy evaluations and by the appropriate responsibility variable. The "responsibility indicator" term for the two excuse conditions is the blame variable, whereas the corresponding term for the three justification conditions is the credit variable. The results of those equations are summarized in Table 4.[12]

A number of the predicted interaction effects were significant or marginally significant. Consider, first, the three conditions in which the representative offered a justification. Those equations indicate that the link between either credit or the policy evaluation and evaluations of the representative were strengthened by satisfaction with the justification. For the normative justifications, the satisfaction-contingent judgment was *creditworthiness.* As the data summarized in Table 2 revealed, those who were satisfied with the appeals to fairness and conscience attributed more credit to the representative. Consistent with the priming principle, this process of inferring that credit is warranted also served to strengthen the link between the credit judgment and the overall evaluation.

The satisfaction-contingent judgment for the other two justifications, on the other hand, was the *policy evaluation.* The focus on the policy consequences in these justifications—either through a focus on benefits or through a comparison with abstract outcome standards—strengthened the extent to which impressions were influenced by reactions to the policy consequences. Again, consistent with the priming principle and the Table 2 data, this link was contingent upon acceptance of the representative's claim that the policy consequences were not really so undesirable.

The results for the excuse conditions were generally weaker. Satisfaction with the claims of mitigating circumstances marginally strengthened the link between blame and evaluations, consistent with expectations. Blame was directly related to the evaluations in the diffusion-of-responsibility conditions (Table 3), this link not dependent upon satisfaction. Given that the expressions of diffusion of responsibility in this study were extremely unsatisfying, it is possible that there was not sufficient variability in the satisfaction ratings to provide a valid test of the hypothesis. More acceptable variants of diffusion of responsibility might yield different results.

The decision to incorporate the different responsibility-based interaction terms in the excuse and justification condition equations was based on theoretical grounds. Nevertheless, the validity of the

Table 4. Predicting Evaluations: Interactive Models

	Mitigating Circumstances		Diffusion of Responsibility	
Variable	Unstandardized	Standardized	Unstandardized	Standardized
Policy evaluation	.34 (.13)	.45***	.11 (.16)	.15
Account satisfaction	-3.06 (2.15)	-.37	5.60 (4.52)	.48
Blamelessness	-2.06 (1.94)	-.20	3.28 (1.98)	.30*
Creditworthiness	.90 (1.01)	.10	-.07 (1.24)	-.01
Policy × satisfaction	.02 (.03)	.18	.05 (.06)	.24
Blame × satisfaction	.70 (.41)	.55*	-.49 (.73)	-.26
Adjusted R^2	.58****		.38****	
Number of cases	67		69	

	Normative Justifications		Benefit Justifications		Comparison Justifications	
	Unstandardized	Standardized	Unstandardized	Standardized	Unstandardized	Standardized
Policy evaluations	.40 (.17)	.49**	.31 (.16)	.37*	.22 (.13)	.26*
Account satisfaction	-3.14 (2.28)	-.34	2.48 (1.62)	.24	-1.21 (2.22)	.12
Blamelessness	2.30 (1.11)	.21**	-.45 (.84)	-.04	1.48 (.98)	.12
Creditworthiness	-2.65 (2.04)	-.26	3.40 (2.37)	.32	.47 (1.72)	.04
Policy × satisfaction	-.00 (.03)	-.03	.05 (.03)	.50*	.06 (.03)	.43**
Credit × satisfaction	1.08 (.49)	.80**	-.63 (.46)	-.49	.36 (.39)	.20
Adjusted R^2	.63****		.72****		.57****	
Number of cases	67		75		85	

Note: The dependent variable is the thermometer rating of the representative. The predictors are scored so that higher values reflect more positive evaluations of the policy, greater satisfaction with the account, and higher levels of attributed blamelessness and creditworthiness. Standard errors are in parentheses.

*$p < .10$.
**$p < .05$.
***$p < .01$.
****$p < .001$.

argument that acceptance of excuses and justifications strengthens the link between the specific judgments targeted by the account and subsequent evaluations would be even more compelling if it were demonstrated that a number of possible links do *not* exist. Specifically, satisfaction with excuses should *not* strengthen the links between credit and evaluations or between the policy judgments and evaluations, whereas satisfaction with justifications should *not* strengthen the links between blame and evaluations. The nonsignificant policy × satisfaction terms in the excuse condition equations in Table 4 support the conclusion that acceptance of excuses does not strengthen the impact of the policy judgments. In order to examine the other two possibilities, the equations reported in Table 4 were reestimated, substituting the alternative "responsibility indicator" × satisfaction interaction term for the one reported in Table 4. Those results were straightforward and entirely consistent with theoretical expectations. None of the interaction effects (credit × satisfaction in the two excuse conditions and blame × satisfaction in the three justification conditions) achieved an acceptable level of significance ($p > .3$ for all). These null effects reinforce the argument that excuses and justifications operate through separate mechanisms. Effective justifications operate by drawing attention to policy consequences and/or creditworthiness. These inferences are not implicated in reactions to excuses.

Discussion

This study contributes to the study of political accountability by providing evidence as to which types of accounts are more effective than others, as well as a psychologically informed framework linking account reactions to subsequent evaluations of political officials. Both the satisfaction ratings and the evaluations of the representative converge toward the conclusion that excuses claiming mitigating circumstances and justifications that appeal to normative principles or specific benefits are more effective than excuses pleading ignorance or attempting to diffuse responsibility and justifications that draw on comparisons to various abstract referential standards. This basic ordering of effectiveness appears to be quite robust, having also been obtained in other investigations of the same 12-account typology in the context of unpopular budgetary decisions (McGraw 1990; McGraw, Timpone, and Bruck 1991b).

The data support the argument that excuses and justifications are associated with systematic differences in the processing of information, with the predictions pertaining to justifications faring better than those involving excuses. Satisfaction with the normative justifications was associated with enhanced perceptions of creditworthiness and a corresponding strengthening of the impact of credit on the overall evaluation. Satisfaction with the benefits justifications led to more positive evaluations of the policy decision, enhanced credit, and a strengthening of the link between the policy judgment and the overall evaluation of the representative. Thus, both the normative and the benefits justifications have the potential to capitalize on credit-claiming mechanisms, turning the political loss into a partial political gain.

In comparison to justifications, the excuses tended to be less effective. There was no evidence that acceptable excuses are particularly likely to lead to an attenuation of blame. Austin (1970, 177) has speculated that excuses are generally ineffective: "Few excuses get us out of it completely. The average excuse, in a poor situation, gets us out of the fire into the frying pan, but still of course, a frying pan in a fire."[13] In other words, excuses are rarely successful in severing the causal link to an undesirable outcome once it has been established. Justifications sidestep this thorny problem because they involve an explicit or implicit acceptance of responsibility. Of course, not all excuses are ineffective, as the claims of mitigating circumstances fared rather well. Through these excuses, the official claims that he or she was left with no other choice but to reach the unpopular decision. Claims of mitigating circumstances are among the most common accounts that politicians offer, no doubt reflecting the true state of affairs in which political decisions are not made in a vacuum but rather are indeed constrained by external circumstances. I suspect that the effectiveness of these kinds of claims is dependent upon the nature of the cited mitigating circumstances. In the operationalizations in this study, the representative implicated the poor state of the economy, claiming that this left him with no other choice. Explicit acknowledgment of the very real constraints imposed by factors such as partisan loyalties and vote logrolling, which would also be classified as claims of mitigating circumstances, may be less acceptable to many citizens.

Overall, the blameworthiness data present something of an anomaly. Although the motivations underlying political accounts intrinsically are concerned with the minimization of blame, the positive impact of satisfactory accounts, regardless of type, on attributions of blame was weak. There are two plausible, not mutually exclusive, explanations for these anomalous results. One concerns measurement reliability. *Blame* is an elusive concept, and its ubiquity in common language renders its measurement quite difficult (Fincham and Jaspars 1980; McGraw 1987; Peffley 1985; Shaver 1985). The weak effects observed in this study may be strengthened through different assessment techniques.

The other possibility is that blame for an unpopular policy decision may not be strongly influenced by even the most effective excuses and justifications if blame is narrowly conceived (by either the respondent or the investigator) as an attribution of responsibility for a prior negative outcome. Particularly from a political perspective, it is clear that blame entails much more than an attribution of responsibility for a past event but also future liability for censure or punishment via electoral retribution. The blame management process, from this broader perspective, requires that a representative successfully persuade the constituency that even though a policy decision may impose real costs and burdens, he or she is still a competent and responsive leader, deserving of continued electoral support. The official can minimize blame in this prospective sense through accounts that convey positive character information (e.g., integrity in the case of the normative appeals, political savvy and competence in the case of the mitigating circumstances excuses). The poor accounts, on the other hand, may increase blame in this sense of future liability through conveying negative character information (e.g., incompetence in the case of a plea of ignorance, weakness in the case of diffusions of responsibility). The significant increase in blameworthiness following unacceptable accounts is consistent with this argument that blame involves a future liability component, since there is no theoretical reason to expect attributions of responsibility in the retrospective sense to increase after a poor account.

To the extent that character perceptions are critical determinants of candidate evaluations and vote choices (Kinder 1986; Lau 1989; Miller, Wattenburg, and Malanchuk 1986; Rahn et al. 1991), the ultimate effectiveness of political accounts may be most evident in their impact on character perceptions. Consistent with this logic, subsequent studies in my and my colleagues' laboratory (McGraw, Best, and Timpone 1991; McGraw, Timpone, and Bruck 1991a, 1991b) have demonstrated that accounts have a predictable and substantial impact on judgments of political character. The more general point to be made here is that in the process of managing blame for an unpopular policy or any political predicament, explanatory strategies can have an impact on a variety of judgments, including attributions of responsibility for the predicament itself but also including character perceptions.

The other surprising result from this study is that the evaluations of the representative were, on the average, consistently lower when an account was offered than when no explanation was provided at all and were not enhanced significantly even among those who were satisfied with the account. However, it would be a mistake to conclude from these data that providing an account is always more damaging than avoiding a response once the predicament is made public. For example, expressions of principled justifications that differ from those considered in this study (e.g., delegate justifications, communitarian appeals to conscience; see Fenno 1978) were found to elicit high levels of satisfaction (McGraw, Timpone, and Bruck 1991a). Moreover, the negative reactions to the policy decision itself appear to serve as an anchor for the low satisfaction ratings: averaging across all conditions, the correlation between the policy evaluations and the satisfaction ratings was .40 (though this policy–satisfaction relationship is in some conditions nonrecursive, with the benefit justifications leading to revisions of the policy evaluations). It is probable that any available information, including reactions to the policy but also such factors as prior impressions of the representative will serve as an anchor for account satisfaction. For example, satisfaction with these same accounts provided by a representative with a positive prior reputation is substantially increased in comparison to the situation for a representative with a negative or no prior reputation (McGraw, Timpone, and Bruck 1991b)—consistent with evidence that prior attitudes can bias social judgments (Pratkanis 1989) and Fenno's (1978) argument that a "cushion of support" can serve to protect a legislator from the occasional unpopular policy episode. The more general point to be made here is that variations in the expressions of the accounts, the predicament context, and the characteristics of the official can influence satisfaction with political accounts.

Finally, it is clear that satisfaction with the account is a critical factor in the evaluation process. An important direction for future research lies in specifying the factors associated with satisfaction with the various accounts. What is it about claims of mitigating circumstances and benefits justifications that make them acceptable? The present study included some auxiliary data that provide preliminary answers to this important question.

Edelman's (1977) and Bennett's (1980) analyses of political rhetoric converge on the theme that political accounts are banal (i.e., commonplace, trite). According to Bennett, "accounts are so often overworked that they dull the senses with their repetition. A close inspection of a sample of ordinary political accounts would no doubt reveal that the same limited and redundant themes are attached mechanically to the ongoing diversity of political action" (1980, 798). In addition to indicating their satisfaction with all 12 accounts, the control group subjects rated each along a commonality dimension.[14] Each subject's average of the ratings of satisfaction with the 12 accounts was correlated with the average perceived commonality, yielding a substantial correlation coefficient of .53. These data lend support to the Edelman (1977) and Bennett (1980) "banality" hypothesis: citizens are more satisfied with accounts that are perceived to be common. Of course, these data cannot address the issue of the veridicality of the commonality perceptions, for archival analyses would be necessary to assess the frequency with which different accounts are used for different types of political predicaments. Similarly, the correlational data cannot clarify the direction of causality. A rational or instrumental approach implies that common accounts are the ones that public officials provide frequently because they believe them to be effective. In other words, some accounts are common because they are effective. In contrast, a "mere exposure" perspective (Zajonc 1968) suggests the opposite process, namely, that accounts become effective because they are frequently used. Analyses of trends in real political accounts or else an experimental approach systematically controlling exposure to different accounts would provide valuable insights into these important processes.

The commonality data provide a beginning for understanding the *whys*, or mediators, of satisfaction with political accounts. The experimental methodology advocated here certainly is amenable to extensions that will further clarify the *whens*, or moderators, of account effectiveness. As I have noted, characteristics of the official appear to be critical (see Fenno 1978; McGraw, Timpone, and Bruck 1991b). A related consideration is how the account is offered—rhetorical style and nonverbal cues—since the *how* of political accounts may be just as important as the *what*. Moreover, citizens' predispositions—their social and political orientations—can influence reactions to accounts (Sigelman, Sigelman, and Walkosz n.d.). Finally, realization that a predicament is a single—albeit important—event within a stream of other relevant information about a political actor raises interesting questions about how perceptions of the predicament are organized in memory, the extent to which these reactions dominate the impression formation process, and whether these reactions are integrated with other available information in forming a global impression in an "on-line" or "memory-based" fashion (Lodge, McGraw, and Stroh 1989).

Fenno underscored the importance of research on the explanatory strategies used by political elites, claiming that "empirical theories of representation will always be incomplete without theories that explain explaining" (1978, 162). More recently, Iyengar (1987, 1989) has called for systematic investigation of citizens' explanations for political affairs. The experiment reported in this paper contributes to our understanding of both sides of the political "blame game" by demonstrating that representatives' blame management strategies have a systematic impact on the political evaluation process. The challenge for the future lies in developing and validating more sophisticated theories incorporating politicians' motives, citizen responses, and electoral consequences.

Appendix A: Operationalization of Political Accounts and Policy Descriptions

Generally, the wording of the accounts was identical for both policy type conditions. Necessary wording changes in the social welfare policy condition (where the bill involved an increase in property taxes to fund social welfare programs) are indicated in parentheses.

Accounts

Excuses

1. *Mitigating circumstances (past).* "I had to vote for the budget bill because the freewheeling spending of the previous administration had crippled the state's economy."

2. *Mitigating circumstances (present).* "I had to vote for the budget bill because of the poor shape of the state's economy; drastic measures had to be taken."

3. *Horizontal diffusion of responsibility.* Although I voted for the budget bill, I think that it is important to remember that it was a group decision; the bill was passed by a majority of the State Assembly."

4. *Vertical diffusion of responsibility.* "Although I voted for the budget bill, I think that it is important to remember that its ultimate passage will be due to the Governor's signing it into law."

5. *Plea of ignorance.* "I voted for the budget bill but did not foresee that it would result in the police and fire safety cuts (increased property taxes) for this district."

Justifications

6. *Fairness.* "I voted for the budget bill because I believe that the redistribution of tax money for services across the state is fairer for all citizens than under the current budget."

7. *Conscience.* "I had to follow my conscience in voting for the budget bill, and therefore I did what I believed was in the best interests of the community and the state."

8. *Present benefits.* "Although the budget bill will result in immediate cuts in police and fire safety services (increased property taxes), I think that it is important to remember that the bill contains some important benefits for the district, such as decreased property taxes (increased social services)."

9. *Future benefits.* "Although the budget bill will result in immediate cuts in police and fire safety services (increased property taxes) for this district, in the long run the greater economic efficiency will help this community and the entire state."

10. *Past comparison.* "Although the budget bill will result in immediate cuts in police and fire safety services (increased property taxes), I think it is important to remember that these services will still be superior to those the district had in the past."

11. *Social comparison.* "Although the budget bill will result in immediate cuts in police and fire safety services (increased property taxes), I think that it is important to remember that the bill had even stronger effects on other districts in the state, such as social service cuts (cuts in public safety services)."

12. *Hypothetical comparison.* "The budget bill could have been a lot worse. For example, it could have not only cut police and fire safety services but also cut social services (increased property taxes but also cut police and fire safety services)."

Policy Type

1. *Public safety.* "The amendment will result in severe cuts in the supplemental funding that the state provides to your district for public safety. State and local taxes will still provide basic services. However, the passage of the budget amendment means that the number of fire safety, police, and other criminal justice personnel will be cut, the purchase of new equipment will be curtailed, and special programs will be eliminated."

2. *Social welfare.* "The amendment will increase your and your neighbors' property taxes in order to fund the state's Affirmative Action and Job Training Programs. The extra tax revenue will be used to fund affirmative action programs in business and education, as well as job training programs for inner city youth and welfare recipients."

Appendix B: Effects Due to Policy

Policy was manipulated in this experiment in order to explore whether the impact of the alternative accounts is contingent on type of policy or whether their impact is generalizable across (at least these two) different policies. In order to explore these possibilities, the two evaluation and two responsibility measures were analyzed via 13 (account: 12 plus a control) × 2 (policy: public safety vs. social welfare) analyses of variance. The results of those analyses revealed highly significant main effects ($p < .001$ for all) due to policy. The social welfare bill was more positively evaluated ($M = 48.84$) than the public safety bill ($M = 33.50$). Evaluations of the representative reveal similar, though less extreme, effects ($M = 47.45$ and 41.70 in the social welfare and public safety conditions, respectively). Moreover, he was seen as less blameworthy and more deserving of credit when he voted for the social welfare bill. The main effects are interesting; but what is most important about these analyses was the absence of significant interactions between account and policy ($p > .30$ for all), indicating that the impact of the accounts on the evaluations and responsibility judgments was equivalent across the two policies.

The only evidence of an interaction between account and policy occurs for the data on satisfaction with the account. The nature of the satisfaction data requires a separation of the experimental (explanation-receiving) group and the control group. For the experimental group, the main effect for policy ($F[1,378] = 10.26, p < .001$, with more satisfaction accompanying accounts given for the social welfare bill) was qualified a relatively weak account × policy interaction ($F[11,378] = 2.10, p < .05$). The nature of this interaction is such that while the same basic ordering of satisfaction with the alternative accounts (as reported in Table 1) occurred for both policies, the satisfaction ratings were more extreme in the social welfare conditions. Thus, the effects reported in Table 1, in terms of satisfactory and unsatisfactory accounts, are not seriously qualified by the type of policy. The policy effects disappear in the control group, where a repeated-measures analysis of variance of the 12 satisfaction ratings reveals no impact of policy, either as a main effect or in interaction with account ($F < 1$ for both). The negligible impact of type of policy on these within-subject ratings is most likely due to the heightened salience of the accounts themselves in the control condition: rating all 12 no doubt led to a focus on the accounts, whereas in the between-subject context (where only one account is considered) the policy itself remained salient.

Notes

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1. Unfortunately, the distinction between ***blame avoidance*** and ***blame management*** was not made clear in my earlier paper, "Avoiding Blame" (McGraw 1990), which, contrary to its title, is similarly concerned with blame management strategies.

2. Austin's analysis has had a widespread impact on the social sciences. For social psychological extensions, see Schlenker 1980; Schonbach 1990; Semin and Manstead 1983; Tedeschi and Reis 1980; and Tetlock 1985. For a sociological application, see Scott and Lyman 1968; for a political application, see Bennett 1980; for an extension into management and organizational behavior, see Bies 1987; and for legal applications, see Greenawalt 1984, 1987.

3. I make no claim that this typology represents the entire universe of political accounts or explanations. Nor do I claim that all 12 of the accounts have an equal probability of occurrence as explanatory strategies. Undoubtedly, some are used more frequently than others. I do believe the 12 accounts investigated in this study are fairly representative of the wide variety of available political excuses and justifications. Like Bennett (1980), I rely on a two-dimensional (excuse and justification) conceptualization because this particular framework has a tradi-

tion of influence in philosophy and the social sciences. Others, most notably Schonbach (1990), have developed more extensive typologies that include other types of responses such as concessions, apologies, denials, and countercharges. (The Schonbach 1990 typology consists of a total of 117 different accounts.) Apologies and denials are also plausible responses to political predicaments, probably more so for normative transgressions than for the unpopular policy decisions investigated here. The experimental approach advocated here is amenable to examining the impact of accounts beyond those included in this study (see McGraw, Timpone, and Bruck 1991a and McGraw, Best, and Timpone 1991 for experiments utilizing different sets of accounts). Archival research will be necessary (1) to document the universe of political explanatory strategies and (2) to determine whether these strategies covary with different sorts of political predicaments.

4. Surprisingly, the social psychological literature on accounts offers little theoretical guidance for answering this question. Much of the psychology literature has assumed that the primary motivation underlying accounts is internal, namely, self-enhancement; accordingly, much of the work on the consequences of accounts has focused on the impact on the person providing the account (e.g., depression, self-esteem) rather than some external audience (see Weiner 1990 and Snyder and Higgins 1988 for reviews). In contrast, since I assume that the primary motivation for providing a political account is maintenance of electoral support, the question of account effectiveness in this context necessarily must focus on the external audience—the constituency. But there has been very little work in psychology examining the impact of accounts on some external audience (Weiner et al. 1987 and Weiner, Figueroa-Munoz, and Kakihara 1991 being rare exceptions).

5. A number of assumptions should be made explicit here. First, I am not assuming that citizens are aware of their representatives' voting records on a large number of policies. They certainly are not. However, in many circumstances, an "instigator" (e.g., a challenger, the media, a disgruntled organized group) is eager and able to make public a representative's legislative activities (Arnold 1990). Attention to, or awareness of, the policy decision and the account episode is a necessary condition for them to have an impact on the global impression (McGraw, Lodge, and Stroh 1991). Second, the magnitude of the impact of a single unpopular policy decision and the accompanying account is no doubt a function of how positive the prior impression of the candidate is. In Fenno's (1978) terms, if the official has developed a substantial "cushion of support," he or she will be protected from the occasional unpopular policy—it will have little impact on the global impression. The same conclusion follows from the "on-line" perspective: although evaluations of the unpopular policy will be incorporated into the global impression, if the current impression is very positive, the single negative event will have a negligible impact (Lodge, McGraw, and Stroh 1989). The role of prior impressions is not considered in this experiment. (See McGraw, Timpone, and Bruck 1991b for evidence pertaining to prior impressions' moderating impact on satisfaction with unpopular policies and the accompanying accounts.)

6. Note that this hypothesis is contrary to Thompson's (1980) interesting suggestion that normative justifications may be negatively perceived as acts of "moral self-indulgence."

7. Following standard experimental design terminology (Carlsmith, Ellsworth, and Aronson 1976), I refer to the larger group of subjects who received the account independent variable as the *experimental group* and the smaller group who did not receive an account as the *control group* in the presentation of the results. The control group is incorporated into the statistical analyses in varying ways, primarily as a baseline comparison. According to the theoretical arguments developed above, satisfaction with a specific account is a critical moderator of the hypothesized effects. By definition, the control group did not receive an account with which they could be satisfied or dissatisfied. As a result, the control group cannot be included in the analyses specifying an interaction between type of account and satisfaction.

8. Combining these conditions is further justified on empirical grounds. The satisfaction ratings from the control group indicate that the relevant between-pair correlations (e.g., the correlation between satisfaction with the horizontal and vertical diffusions of responsibility) are in every instance larger than any of the other intercorrelations (e.g., satisfaction with the horizontal diffusion of responsibility and any of the other 10 accounts).

9. The Table 1 data indicate that satisfaction was significantly influenced by type of account, which raises questions about nonindependence and the appropriateness of ANOVA techniques. The within-condition classification into high- and low-satisfaction groups maintains an independence between the account type and satisfaction factors. The 6 × 2 contingency table of the resulting 12 subject types supports this claim of independence ($X^2 < 1$, $p = .97$). Thus, ANOVA is an appropriate statistical technique. Nevertheless, it is important to keep in mind that the high- and low-satisfaction groups reported in Table 2 are based on a relative, rather than an absolute, conceptualization of account satisfaction.

10. The plea-of-ignorance condition is not included in Table 4 because the small cell size ($n = 30$) renders the estimates of the model in that condition less reliable. The estimated coefficients from the additive equation for that condition were all in the expected positive direction. Estimation of a similar

equation for the control group, necessarily omitting the satisfaction term, indicates a large impact of the policy evaluation (beta = .53, $p < .001$) and negligible effects due to credit or blame (beta = .09 and .11, respectively; $p > .30$ for both).

11. See n. 10.

12. Attentive readers will have noticed discrepancies between the coefficients for account satisfaction (predictably positive and significant) in the Table 3 additive equations and the corresponding terms in the interactive equations reported in Table 4 (nonsignificant and, in three of the five models, negative). The coefficients in the additive models are estimates of the impact of satisfaction across levels of responsibility (credit and blame) and evaluations of the policy. The satisfaction coefficients in the interactive models, on the other hand, cannot be interpreted as simple independent effects. Rather, they describe conditional relationships. It is not unusual for coefficients in interactive models to differ sharply from those in additive models (Friedrich 1982). Calculation of the overall impact of account satisfaction from the Table 4 data indicates that for all conditions, account satisfaction was associated with more positive evaluations. Changes in the other "main effect" variables also included in the multiplicative terms (blame, credit, and policy evaluations) are similarly due to the conditional, rather than independent, nature of the estimates in the interactive models.

13. Shakespeare concurs: "Oftentimes excusing of a fault / Doth makes the fault the worse by the excuse (*King John* 4.2.30).

14. Specifically, they were instructed to "consider each response in terms of whether you think that type of explanation is frequently or typically offered by political figures to account for unpopular policy decisions."

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BLACK POLITICAL PARTICIPATION IN THE 1984 AND 1988 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS

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Using data from a longitudinal telephone study of voting-eligible black Americans I explore the political context of black voter turnout in the 1984 and 1988 presidential elections and reexamine the attitudinal and demographic variables associated with black electoral participation. Jesse Jackson supporters were more likely to vote in the 1984 presidential election, while black opposition to Reagan was also linked to black voter turnout in 1984. Nonetheless, blacks who preferred Jackson to other primary contenders in the 1988 nominating contest were less likely to vote in the presidential election. Finally, while education, political interest, partisanship, and age were generally associated with black voter participation, race identification had a less consistent effect. Instead, church membership and involvement in black political organizations serve as alternative, community-based resources that promote black participation. This research underscores the importance of both political context and group-based political resources in stimulating the black vote.

While voter participation is determined by the characteristics of voters themselves and constraints of legal procedures and state residency requirements, research has shown that the political context can have strong and independent effects on electoral mobilization (Kleppner 1981). Patterson and Caldeira (1983), for example, demonstrate how campaign and party activity greatly affect voter turnout in gubernatorial elections. More recently, Cox and Munger (1989) show that campaign expenditures in races also stimulate turnout and that turnout is generally higher in close, competitive elections.

In the 1984 presidential election, black participation peaked at 55.8%, reversing a trend of almost 20 years of steady decline, only to drop substantially in 1988 to 51.5% (U.S. Bureau of the Census 1989). This drop may very well have ended a two-decade trend toward eliminating race differences in voter participation (Abramson, Aldrich, and Rohde 1990, 96). I shall examine the political context and the individual-level predictors of black electoral participation in the 1984 and 1988 presidential elections, using a unique national panel survey of black Americans conducted during the 1984 and 1988 national elections, the National Black Election Study (NBES). Two of the more potent political forces operating within the black community in 1984 and 1988 elections were Ronald Reagan and Jesse Jackson. Reagan created a climate that stimulated the black vote. The Reagan budget cuts, his opposition to existing racial programs, and the legislation commemorating Martin Luther King's birthday as a national holiday made Reagan an extremely unpopular political figure within the black community (see Barker 1987). Reagan helped to reestablish party lines and made the

1984 election more competitive than past elections. As a direct result, blacks turned out in unusually large numbers in a collective effort to block his reelection.

Jesse Jackson, competing in the Democratic presidential primary election, also generated intense feelings among black voters in 1984 and 1988; and his candidacy affected black participation rates during this period. Significantly, black participation in the Democratic presidential primaries increased in these two elections. In a number of states, black voter turnout increased from 14% to 87% (Cavanagh and Foster 1984). In the South, especially, black primary participation rates were well above average. It was reported in 1984 that turnout in predominantly black districts in Georgia and Alabama was somewhere between 40% and 50%, in contrast to the statewide averages of 25% and 28%.[1] The split within the black community over Walter Mondale and Jackson also generated new interest and may have spurred the high primary participation rates among blacks.

However, assessments vary regarding the impact of Jackson's 1984 and 1988 candidacies on voter turnout. While many of his supporters have claimed that Jackson boosted black participation in 1984, his detractors have argued that Jackson depressed black participation in 1988. Both are highly plausible in light of the different circumstances of the 1984 and 1988 presidential elections. As the first African American whose candidacy had to be taken seriously, Jackson very probably brought new black participants into the political process and boosted black voter turnout in 1984. However, it is arguable that Jackson's second bid for the Democratic presidential primary was related to the drop in black turnout in 1988 in that black Jackson voters stayed home out of frustration over his second failed attempt at nomination. Furthermore, Jackson's protracted struggle with the party leadership may have left his supporters angry, both at the party and its nominee. Dukakis' selection of Lloyd Bentsen as his running mate, in particular, was interpreted by a number of black Democrats as a sign that the party favored the interests of mainstream white voters over their interests. Although George Bush was easily elected, black nonvoting in 1988 clearly cost Michael Dukakis and the Democratic party the electoral college votes of several states (California, Maryland, Illinois, and Pennsylvania) where Bush won with less than 51.5% of the vote.

In *The Jesse Jackson Phenomenon,* Adolph Reed, Jr. (1986) dismisses the claim that Jackson stimulated black participation in 1984. He attributes the increase in black registration in 1984 to several other factors besides opposition to Reagan, including the steady pattern of growth in black registration rates in the South recorded throughout the 1970s and 1980s, as well as the national registration drives conducted in the early 1980s. Voter registration efforts were less intensive in 1988 than in 1984, with the major parties and private organizations spending significantly less on voter recruitment (Abramson, Aldrich, and Rohde 1990, 94), so that black participation in the 1988 election may have fallen off as a result. Another possible explanation is that because the 1988 turnout was the lowest ever since the 1924 presidential election, blacks, like whites, in a show of disapproval for both candidates, may have stayed home on election day.

Because Jackson was not on the ballot either in the 1984 or 1988 presidential election, his candidacy as a primary presidential contender may have had no discernible effect on black turnout in either of these elections. Research has found that prenomination preferences, in general, do not affect turnout in the general election (Kinney and Rice 1988; Stone 1986). Voters whose candidates lost the party's nomination are no less likely to vote in the general election than those who favored the nominee during the primary season. Prenomination preferences, nevertheless, can affect other forms of voting behavior. Voters whose candidate lost the party's nomination tend to be more critical of their party's nominee and less critical of the opposing party's candidate. They are also less likely to participate in campaign activities such as contributing to the nominee's election funds or campaigning for the nominee.

It is not simply a question of whether or not Jackson as an individual candidate promoted black participation in the 1984 election, however. The larger question to address is whether or not office seeking by blacks serves to stimulate black electoral participation. Although the latter question has not been systematically explored to date, there appears to be a relationship between black office seeking and black political mobilization. Black office seeking, particularly in elections involving blacks as political newcomers, seems to be associated with record-high black turnouts. One can quite easily observe this phenomenon in the past elections of black mayors. For example, in 1967, when Carl Stokes was elected mayor of Cleveland, roughly 80% of blacks who were eligible to vote did vote (Nelson 1987). In the 1983 election of Harold Washington in Chicago, approximately 85% of voting-eligible blacks turned out (Kleppner 1985; Preston 1987). Jackson's candidacy could have brought new black participants into the political process and could very well have boosted black voter turnout in 1984, since, presumably, blacks turn out and vote in greater numbers when a black is competing for elective office because of group loyalty, pride, and increased interest—especially when the black candidate is the first black to seek a particular office. Black turnout may also be higher in such elections because black candidates often campaign more intensively and spend greater resources in black communities in an effort to mobilize that constituency.

In short, the *political climate* and *black office seeking* conceivably had a large impact on black voter participation in 1984 and 1988. In 1984, the Reagan administration created a climate that raised the political stakes for blacks, thus stimulating black voter participation; but this was not a major factor in 1988. As a black seeking the Democratic party's presidential nomination, Jesse Jackson also affected black voter participation positively in 1984 but, perhaps, negatively in 1988.

A Model of Black Political Participation

Before Reagan's and Jackson's impact on black turnout can be ascertained, a short review of the individual-level determinants of electoral participation—and of black participation specifically—is necessary. Because voting, like other forms of participation, is costly to the individual, theories about political participation tie it to individual resources, both material and psychological. Thus, people possessing certain political skills and resources can more easily bear the cost of voting. These resources typically include such things as experience and education. In general, those who are familiar with the political process—usually older and better-educated citizens—are more likely to vote. Psychological attributes that favor political participation include civic duty, a sense of efficacy, and having a general interest in politics. These material and psychological resources are related. Higher-status individuals are more likely to feel that they have a stake in politics, are more efficacious, and are more politically aware. Essentially, socioeconomic status, age, and civic orientations are the major determinants of political participation (Verba and Nie 1972).

It is clear from such a theory of political participation that as a group, blacks are expected to participate in politics at lower levels than whites in the aggregate. Not only are blacks "resource-poor" in that they lack the necessary political skills, the information base, and levels of education that whites generally possess, but, like the poor in general, many also lack the necessary psychological attributes and basic motivation essential for political participation. Given their long history of exclusion from politics, blacks are less likely to trust political leaders and institutions, are more alienated, and less efficacious. However, one of the more important findings related to black participation contained in Verba and Nie's (1972) *Participation in America* was that once socioeconomic status is taken into account, blacks actually participate at a higher level than whites. Verba and Nie attribute this race difference to group consciousness, finding that blacks who frequently mentioned race in their discussion of political issues are more politically active than blacks who gave less race-oriented responses. Miller and his colleagues (1981) later refined this theory by arguing that identification with the group does not necessarily promote political participation among the group's members. Instead, they state that groups whose members feel that their group lacks "relevant resources compared with other strata or groups" are more likely to be politically active. Shingles (1981), writing at the same time, further expands this model of black participation by demonstrating how black mistrust, low political efficacy, and group consciousness relate to various forms of political participation. All in all, the central determinants of black participation are (1) socioeconomic status index, (2) civic and psychological orientations, and (3) group consciousness (see also Walton 1985, chap. 5).

There are problems with the view that group consciousness positively promotes black voting. First, given that Verba and Nie, as well as Shingles, base their conclusions on data collected in 1967, it may be the case that the effects attributed to race consciousness were caused entirely by the protest atmosphere of the 1960s. Blacks at that time were engaged in a large-scale protest movement. Although most of their activism was within the realm of nonconventional protest tactics, this activism could have spilled over into the conventional realm. Indeed, the two forms of political activity—protest and voting—are not mutually exclusive (Pivan and Cloward 1988, xii–xvii; Walton 1985). Black electoral participation in that period, therefore, may have been more centrally affected by the political climate. Moreover, race identification may play a more prominent role in local elections, for example, in Chicago, where race was a politically salient issue in the 1983 election of Harold Washington. There, turnout was not only extraordinarily high, but black registration rates exceeded white registration rates by a margin of 10%. Michael Preston, in his analysis of this election, links group consciousness to the unusually high participation of blacks during that time, noting that "*black consciousness* was raised not only by the mass movement of people but also by the racist campaign of Washington's opponents" (1987, 144; emphasis original).

In addition, the 1967 data also denote a period in black politics when formal black political organizations began to spring up, taking the place of ad hoc indigenous institutions (see McAdam 1982). These developments might explain the high levels of black participation observed in 1967, since these organizations, operating well before the passage of the 1965 Voting Rights Act, helped register and mobilize black voters. Consider, again, the case of the 1983 mayoral election in Chicago, where, for the first time, registration rates between middle-class, working-class and poor black wards became roughly equal (Kleppner 1985; Preston 1987). Kleppner writes that in 1982, as a response to their dissatisfaction with the current administration, more than two hundred black grass-roots organizations, along with the black churches, worked together to register new black voters. He quotes a retired black worker who participated in the registration drives and who stated that during this period registering became as much "in vogue . . . as marching was in the 1960s" (1985, 146). Thus, while a racially charged political climate might inspire blacks living in impoverished areas to register and vote for the first time, it is obvious that their ability to do so improves greatly with the presence of organizations and voter registration drives aimed at getting out the black vote in these communities. And it is also likely that mobilization efforts by nonpartisan and partisan groups operating within the black community contributed to the high black voter turnouts (see Cavanagh 1987). Organizational involvement, therefore, might be a more important determinant of black participation than group consciousness by itself.

Finally, in light of all the changes that have taken place in race relations and black politics, it is not clear whether race consciousness continues to serve (theoretically) as a catalyst for black participation. As Lawrence Bobo and Franklin Gilliam have recently pointed out, the notion of group consciousness as a stimulus to heightened black activism was developed and tested in the 1960s and early 1970s. Since then, they write, "Profound changes in the social and political status of blacks call into question [its] applicability" (1990, 378). Race-conscious and politically discontented blacks may no longer be the most politically active group within the black community today. In fact, Bobo and Gilliam's analysis of a 1985 survey of blacks and whites finds no race differences in voter participation beyond those largely accounted for by group differences in socioeconomic status. Similarly, Wolfinger and Rosenstone, in their analysis of 1972 and 1974 voting data, find race differences to be small—indistinguishable from zero once demographic variables are added (1980, 90–91). Their results lead them to question whether race consciousness continues to play a role as a political stimulant within the black community. Furthermore, in an unpublished study conducted in 1980 that utilizes a large national face-to-face sample of blacks, Brown (1984) found that race consciousness did not predict black electoral participation beyond, again, the variables commonly associated with voter participation (socioeconomic status, political interest, age, etc.).

Black Participation in 1984

The two principal questions I seek to address are whether Jackson or Reagan (or both) served as political stimulants of black participation in the 1984 and 1988 presidential elections and what can be said about the more general individual-level determinants of black electoral participation today; specifically, whether race consciousness still is an important predictor of black voting behavior today. The analysis is based on data from the 1984–88 NBES. A total of 1,150 voting-eligible blacks were interviewed prior to the 1984 election and 872 reinterviewed after the election. In a follow-up survey, 473 of the original 1984 respondents were interviewed prior to the 1988 election and 418 reinterviewed immediately after the election.[2] A full description of the sample is presented in the Appendix.

Political Awareness and Participation Measures

Six measures of political awareness and electoral participation are examined in

Table 1. Black Voter Awareness and Participation in 1984

Awareness and Participation Measures	Yes (Weighted Percentages)	Number of Cases (Unweighted)
Do you happen to recall if there was a presidential primary election or party caucus in your state this year?	53	1,129
Did you vote in the presidential primary election or caucus?	31	1,143
Do you usually vote in primaries, or was voting this time unusual for you? (asked only of those who voted in primary or caucus)	79	366
Were you registered to vote in this election?	91	851
Were you registered before this election year, or was this the first time you registered for an election? (asked only of those who were registered to vote)	86	763
Did you vote for a candidate for president?	76	870

this analysis:

1. *Aware of primaries or caucuses* ("Do you happen to recall if there was a presidential primary election or party caucus in your state this year?").
2. *Voted in primary causus* ("Did you vote in the presidential primary election or caucus?").
3. *Usually vote in primary or caucus* ("Do you usually vote in primaries, or was voting this time unusual for you?"—asked only of those who voted in primary or caucus).
4. *Registered in 1984* ("Were you registered to vote in this election?").
5. *First registered in 1984* ("Were you registered before this election year, or was this the first time you registered for an election?"—asked only of those who were registered to vote).
6. *Voted in 1984 presidential election* ("Did you vote for a candidate for president?").

Slightly more than half the sample (53%) could recall if there was a primary or caucus held in their state (see Table 1). Although 1984 was apparently a record year for black participation in the presidential primaries, only 31% of those interviewed in the 1984 NBES participated in a presidential primary or caucus. Of those who voted, over one-fifth of the sample (21%) said that their participation in the primaries was unusual. It is clear that participation in primary elections is more difficult than in general elections. Not only is information about the candidates harder to obtain (especially at the start of the nomination contest), but there are more candidates for the voter to consider. The rules in primary or caucus elections are more complicated, and vary widely by state, and the timing and location of such events frequently change as well. In addition, because primary elections involve only party members, partisanship cannot be used as a basis to select a candidate (Hagen 1989, 52). As a result, turnout in primary elections is typically much lower than turnout in the presidential elections. Austin Ranney (1972) estimates that between 1948 and 1968, fewer than 3 out of 10 eligible citizens participated in presidential primaries, compared to the 6 out of 10 who voted in presidential elections during the same period.

A much higher percentage (91%) of the black respondents were registered to vote. Approximately 14% of those registered were first-time registrants. Seventy-six percent reported that they voted for president. This number is significantly higher than the 56% figure reported by the census (U.S., Bureau of the Census 1989). The high level of voter participation found in the sample reflects the fact that this is a telephone survey. Telephone surveys generally obtain respondents with a higher socioeconomic profile than face-to-face surveys. Given their background, these blacks were more likely to vote.[+]

Explanatory Measures and Models

Models of electoral participation typically incorporate a long list of predictors. Wolfinger and Rosenstone (1980), for example, estimate a model of turnout with 20 predictors. The explanatory variables used to construct a general model of black participation in my analysis fall under one of three major categories: (1) political context, (2) group-based political measures, and (3) standard predictors of participation.

Political Context. Measures of political context are the factors (e.g., party competitiveness, attractiveness of candidates, and contested seats) that vary across elections. In this case, however, because of the type of data analyzed, indirect indicators of the political context are employed. The measures of political context are candidate evaluations—specifically, support for Jackson and ratings for Reagan as president (and Bush in 1988). Presumably, actual measures of how Jackson affected the political context (e.g., number of days spent campaigning across states or regions, organizational strength across states) will affect his individual rating. In his book, *Presidential Primaries,* Larry Bartels (1988) has shown that all things being equal, well-known presidential contenders receive higher evaluations on average than lesser-known presidential candidates. Strong and effective campaign efforts by Jackson within the black community, therefore, should translate into higher ratings for Jackson among blacks. Similarly, Reagan created a more competitive political atmosphere because his policies were perceived as more partisan than those of past presidents and, within the black community, antiblack. In a 1984 national survey of citizens, 83% of blacks interviewed felt that Reagan's policies had harmed blacks, and 72% of blacks believed that Reagan was racially prejudiced against blacks (Williams 1987, 109). Therefore, the contextual effects of Reagan should be evident in his approval ratings.

Support for Jackson was measured in the models of black primary participation according to the standard Center for Political Studies feeling thermometer, which has a scale of zero to one hundred. In general, blacks rated Jackson very favorably, giving him a mean score of 74. By comparison, blacks gave Mondale a mean rating of 63, while Reagan received a rating of 30. A second Jackson support indicator measured support for Jackson in the primary. Specifically, blacks were asked who they voted for (or would have voted for) in the primary. The Jackson primary support measure is a dummy variable with two levels: (1) Jackson support and (2) support for other candidates, including Mondale in 1984 or Dukakis in 1988. A Reagan approval measure was added as a predictor of black registration and turnout in the general election, though not of primary participation. When asked if they approved or disapproved of the way Ronald Reagan handled his job as president, only 17% of blacks in the sample approved, with 58% disapproving strongly and 19% disapproving less strongly.

Group Resource Measures. Group political resources are indigenous or community-based resources that enable blacks to participate at rates higher than expected, given their individual resources. Verba and Nie (1972) claim that group consciousness is a collective resource, since it helps reduce the race disparity in voting. Other group resources, however—not clearly identified by Verba and Nie—include the extent of organizational involvement within the black community in a given election. As argued earlier, the high levels of black participation observed in 1967 might have been the result of the activities of black grass-roots organizations, as well as the black church. Black political organizations and institutions, including the black church, have been identified as crucial to the success of the modern day Civil Rights movement (McAdam 1982; Morris 1984). Much was made of Jackson's use of the black church as a political funding source during the 1984 presidential primary season. Presumably, belonging to a black political organization or a politically active church will be positively related to black voter participation; those motivated enough to be members of civil rights and black political organizations may be more likely to vote. In addition, black organizations can pool scarce resources, such as time and money, educate members about political matters, and provide additional incentives and motivations for getting involved in politics. Organizational membership may prove to be a more important factor of black electoral turnout than group consciousness alone.

The group consciousness measure in this analysis is an additive index of two questions: to what degree the respondents felt that what happened to blacks in this country affected their lives and to what degree they thought about being black. Although not as complex as the measure used in the study by Miller and his colleagues (1981), it is presumably a stronger measure of race identification than other measures often employed in political science literature. Unlike other group identification measures such as group closeness, this index is a measure of the perception of shared interests (group and individual interests). Theoretically, it should be more politically potent or relevant than the simple awareness of group membership. Blacks were asked if they belonged to any organization that was "working to improve the status of black Americans." Approximately 23% of the sample said they did. Blacks were also asked whether or not they belonged to a church where one hears political information. The question reads, "During this election year, did you attend anything at a church or place of worship in support of a candidate?" Approximately 22% said *yes*.

Standard Predictors. While education, income, age, and homeownership are standard predictors of political involvement and participation, gender and region also may be related to black political activism. Research has found that black women are more likely to participate in politics than black men (Baxter and Lansing 1983; Brown 1984; Verba and Nie 1972; Williams 1987). Blacks in the South are less likely to participate in political activities than blacks residing outside the South (Verba and Nie 1972). Four standard attitudinal predictors are also included in the analysis: partisanship, political interest, political trust, and system responsiveness. The partisanship measure is a categorical variable having three levels: (1) *strong partisan of either major party*, (2) *weak partisan of either major party*, and (3) *no party affiliation* (*independent*) or *other party affiliation*. The measure of political interest is standard. Blacks were asked, "Would you say that you have been very much interested, somewhat interested, or not much interested in the political campaigns so far this year?" The overwhelming majority (82%) of blacks expressed moderate-to-strong interest in 1984 political campaigns. Political trust is a mean sum index of responses to two questions: (1) "How much of the time do you think you can trust government to do the right thing?"

Table 2. Determinants of Black Participation in the 1984 Presidential Primary Election (Logit Coefficients)

	Heard of Primary			Usually Vote in Primaries			Voted in Primary		
Independent Variables	B	SE	B/SE	B	SE	B/SE	B	SE	B/SE
Jackson rating	.03	(.07)	.34	.25	(.26)	.97	.09	(.08)	1.12
Race identification	.05	(.05)	1.10	.12	(.10)	1.20	.12	(.05)	2.38
Black organization (member)	.70	(.24)	2.90	.51	(.43)	1.17	.80	(.23)	3.49
Political church (member)	.38	(.17)	2.29	.34	(.35)	0.96	.46	(.18)	2.54
Education	.10	(.04)	2.82	.11	(.08)	1.39	.05	(.04)	1.32
Income	.01	(.03)	.46	.06	(.06)	.98	.08	(.03)	2.80
Age	.01	(.01)	.98	.04	(.02)	2.80	.02	(.07)	2.45
Gender (female)	-.07	(.17)	-.40	.27	(.36)	.74	.17	(.19)	.89
Region (non-South)	.15	(.16)	.93	.74	(.35)	2.07	.24	(.18)	1.31
System responsiveness	.10	(.07)	1.43	.14	(.14)	1.00	.21	(.08)	2.68
Political trust	.04	(.08)	.50	.17	(.19)	.91	-.05	(.09)	-.52
Political interest	.07	(.06)	1.20	-.04	(.14)	-.26	.17	(.07)	2.48
Partisanship	.19	(.10)	2.03	.31	(.22)	1.44	.53	(.11)	4.77
Homeownership (yes)	.32	(.18)	1.73	.41	(.39)	1.04	.16	(.20)	.80
Urbanicity	.09	(.06)	1.50	.16	(.14)	1.07	.19	(.07)	2.60
Constant	-2.82	(.72)	-3.91	-6.04	(1.74)	-3.47	-5.45	(.82)	-6.61
Total cases		759			255			766	
Cases predicted correctly (%)		63			82			74	
Log likelihood		-475.03			-113.58			-399.76	

Note: Black Republicans were excluded from this analysis.

and (2) "Would you say the government is pretty much run by a few big interests? . . . Or is it run for the benefits of all the people?" This indicator is scaled from *low trust* to *high trust.* It is hypothesized that blacks who feel that the political system is not responsive and who are less trusting of government and government officials are less likely to be involved in politics than those who feel that the system is responsive and who are trusting. Finally, system responsiveness is a mean sum index of the following three Likert-scaled items: (1) "People like me have no say in government," (2) "Public officials don't care," and (3) "White officials always get their way."

Analysis and Results

Logit analysis was performed separately for each participation measure. In all of the primary participation models, those who identified themselves as Republicans or political independents favoring the Republican party were excluded from the analysis, so that turnout in the Democratic presidential primaries or caucuses might best be estimated.

As shown in Table 2, those who rated Jackson favorably were no more likely to be aware of their state's primary or caucus or to vote in the presidential primary election than those whose impressions of Jackson were less favorable; nor were they more likely to report that their participation was unusual. Jackson's presidential bid may have had an indirect effect on black primary participation, however. It may be indirectly linked to black participation through the black church's involvement in politics and new rates of participation among southern blacks. Jackson worked almost exclusively within black churches and campaigned extensively within the South, and his campaign within the South and his church appearances may have encouraged the new political participation of blacks in the South. Blacks who belonged to churches active in politics were more likely to be aware of their state's primary or caucus and more likely to participate in the event than those who belonged to churches that were not involved in politics. Southern blacks were also more likely to report that their participation in the primary was unusual in contrast to those blacks outside the South. In addition, since political interest was strongly related to both primary awareness and primary participation, Jackson's candidacy may have stimulated turnout.

As a group resource, organizational membership appears to have had a more consistent effect on black participation than race identification. Those who are members of a black organization and who belong to politically active churches were more likely to be both aware of their state's primary and caucus and more likely to vote in the 1984 primary. In contrast, race identification was only related to black participation in the primary.

As expected, black primary voters tended to be better educated, affluent, highly partisan and more interested in the campaign. Similar divisions are found among age groups. Older blacks were more likely to vote in the 1984 primary than younger blacks, and age was related to whether or not black participation was unusual or not. Although much has been written about the black gender gap in participation (Lansing and Baxter 1983), gender was not significantly related to black primary participation. Black women were no more likely to be aware of the primary, to participate, or to report that they usually voted in presidential primaries than black men. Finally, of the two social-psychological variables, only system responsiveness was related to black turnout in the presidential primary. The notion of the distrustful, alienated, but race-conscious black as the prototypical political activist within the black community may no longer be credible in light of the gains blacks have achieved in politics.

The belief that Jackson supporters might fail to show at the polls in 1984, given that Jackson was not the nominee, was not sustained by this analysis. Indeed, as shown in Table 3, Jackson primary supporters were more likely to vote in the 1984 presidential election than blacks who supported Mondale or some other primary contender. At the same time, Reagan had a strong effect on black participation in the general election. Blacks who strongly disapproved of Reagan's performance as president were more likely to vote. All told, Reagan proved to be a strong stimulus to the black vote. Neither Reagan nor Jackson was directly related to first-time registration in 1984, however. Those who were not members of a black political organization were more likely to be first-time registrants. None of the collective resource measures (race identification, organizational membership, and church membership), however, were significantly related to black participation in the 1984 presidential election; but in general, education, age, partisanship, and interest were factors related to registration and turnout in the black community.

Black Participation in 1988

The issues surrounding the 1988 presidential contest were similar to those in 1984. Jackson, once again, was running in the 1988 Democratic presidential primary. But unlike the 1984 contest, he was not competing against Mondale, a senior, well-known Democrat. In 1988, he was one of eight presidential candidates. He shared the distinction with Gary Hart

Table 3. Determinants of Black Participation in the 1984 Presidential Election (Logit Coefficients)

	Registered to Vote			First Registered 1984			Voted for President		
Independent Variables	B	SE	B/SE	B	SE	B/SE	B	SE	B/SE
Reagan approval	.17	(.14)	1.17	.14	(.14)	1.01	.22	(.10)	2.27
Primary support (Jackson)	.50	(.41)	1.21	-.48	(.33)	-1.46	.52	(.26)	2.02
Race identification	.11	(.12)	.88	.10	(.10)	1.06	.12	(.08)	1.60
Black organization (member)	1.44	(1.07)	1.35	-1.31	(.60)	-2.17	.49	(.40)	1.20
Political church (member)	-.06	(.42)	-.15	-.15	(.35)	-.43	-.17	(.27)	-.63
Education	.10	(.10)	.96	-.36	(.09)	-3.89	.15	(.06)	2.52
Income	-.01	(.07)	-.13	.04	(.06)	.70	-.03	(.04)	-.69
Age	.04	(.02)	2.29	-.11	(.02)	-5.64	.02	(.01)	1.57
Gender (female)	.77	(.41)	1.89	-.27	(.34)	-.78	.24	(.26)	.91
Region (non-South)	.81	(.41)	1.93	.15	(.34)	.46	.05	(.26)	.19
System responsiveness	.35	(.17)	2.03	.12	(.14)	.83	.07	(.11)	.63
Political trust	.08	(.20)	.41	-.37	(.18)	-1.98	-.06	(.13)	-.45
Political interest	.52	(.15)	3.51	.05	(.12)	.40	.28	(.09)	3.15
Partisanship	.56	(.25)	2.23	-.39	(.20)	-1.96	-.44	(.16)	-2.85
Homeownership (yes)	.55	(.47)	1.17	-.51	(.38)	-1.33	.30	(.29)	1.04
Urbanicity	-.07	(.15)	-.50	-.20	(.12)	-1.59	.05	(.10)	.51
Constant	-2.63	(2.08)	-1.27	7.35	(1.82)	4.02	-2.21	(1.25)	-1.77
Total cases		524			487			524	
Cases predicted correctly (%)		93			89			84	
Log likelihood		-95.64			-129.15			-209.49	

of being the only one who had also run in 1984. Hart's candidacy, however, ended quite suddenly and dramatically. Partly because Jackson enjoyed national name recognition and was assisted by a more professional campaign staff, he was able to generate greater support among both whites and blacks in 1988 than in 1984.

The controversy over the impact of Jackson's candidacy on the black electorate in 1988 was perhaps greater than in 1984. Black participation had plummeted by four percentage points from 1984, and many linked Jackson to the low black turnout in 1988. At the same time, others pointed out that black nonvoting in this election may be related to the fact that Reagan, barred from seeking a third term, was not running for reelection. Indeed, early in his first year in office, George Bush received some of the highest popularity ratings ever recorded. And unlike Reagan, Bush had received high marks from blacks, as well as whites.

With the differences between the 1984 and 1988 elections noted, the logit analysis was repeated for the 1988 participation measures, with some slight modifications. An evaluation of Bush was included instead of a Reagan approval measure. As Reagan's vice-president, Bush was clearly linked to the current administration. Therefore, a Bush administration might have been just as threatening to blacks and their interests as were the past Reagan administrations.[4] Blacks, then, might have been more likely to flock to the polls to vote against Reagan's successor. Since this is a panel study, turnout in the 1984 primary and presidential elections was introduced as a control variable in the 1988 models. Furthermore, campaign media use was added as an additional control variable. This item is a mean index of how much the respondent watched televised reports and read newspaper accounts of the political campaigns. Bartels has shown that primary voters are generally high users of the media (1988, 147).

Two of the following measures of political participation were analyzed in 1988: (1) vote in primary or caucus and (2) vote for president. Forty-eight percent of those reinterviewed in 1988 participated in the primary elections. Although the census estimates that only 52% of voting-age blacks voted in the 1988 presidential election (U.S., Bureau of the Census 1989), 80% of those reinterviewed in 1988 reported voting. This number is especially high largely because of survey attrition. Respondents less likely to vote were lost. Furthermore, the high turnout may also be a reflection of the politicizing effect of the 1984 interview. The 1988 respondents may have registered and voted in higher numbers as a result of having participated in the 1984 interview. In spite of the fact that these respondents' levels of participation are not representative of black participation in 1988, it is still expected that the determinants of black participation in 1988 are unbiased.

Tables 4 and 5 display the results. As in 1984, support for Jackson in 1988 was not directly related to black primary participation. In fact, few of the predictors were significantly related to black primary participation, except for family income and past participation in the 1984 primary. Black participation in the general election, however, was strongly related to several factors independent of voter participation in 1984. The Bush feeling thermometer was also related to black turnout in 1988. Blacks who evaluated Bush negatively were more likely to vote. Given that negative sentiment toward

Table 4. Determinants of Black Participation in the 1988 Presidential Primary Election (Logit Coefficients)

	Voted in Primary		
Independent Variable	B	SE	B/SE
Jackson rating	-.01	(.01)	-.61
Race identification	.03	(.11)	.25
Black organization (member)	.63	(.42)	1.51
Political church (member)	-.38	(.45)	-.85
Education	.12	(.09)	1.27
Income	.19	(.08)	2.23
Age	.02	(.02)	1.25
Gender (female)	-.03	(.39)	-.07
Region (non-South)	.26	(.39)	.66
System responsiveness	-.06	(.15)	-.40
Political trust	.07	(.17)	.42
Political interest	.33	(.16)	2.00
Partisanship	-.17	(.24)	-.70
Media use	.29	(.23)	1.29
Homeownership (yes)	-.39	(.45)	-.87
Urbanicity	.09	(.13)	.70
Voted in 1984 primary (yes)	.82	(.39)	2.08
Constant	-3.59	(1.93)	-1.86
Total cases	195		
Cases predicted correctly (%)	74		
Log likelihood	-102.17		

Note: Black Republicans were excluded from this analysis.

Table 5. Determinants of Black Participation in the 1988 Presidential Election (Logit Coefficients)

	Voted for President		
Independent Variables	B	SE	B/SE
Bush approval	-.03	(.02)	-2.10
Primary support (Jackson)	-1.60	(.67)	-2.38
Race identification	.45	(.21)	2.17
Black organization (member)	.65	(.74)	.88
Political church (member)	2.79	(.77)	3.65
Education	.21	(.16)	1.26
Income	-.03	(.12)	-.22
Age	.06	(.03)	2.14
Gender (female)	-1.13	(.73)	-1.55
Region (non-South)	-.57	(.63)	-.91
System responsiveness	.08	(.26)	.30
Political trust	.32	(.32)	1.00
Political interest	.56	(.26)	2.16
Partisanship	.67	(.41)	1.65
Media use	.11	(.35)	-.31
Homeownership (yes)	1.01	(.76)	1.33
Urbanicity	.64	(.24)	2.70
Voted in 1984 (yes)	.78	(.72)	1.09
Constant	-8.52	(3.37)	-2.52
Total cases	170		
Cases predicted correctly (%)	88		
Log likelihood	-45.636		

both Reagan and Bush was associated with black participation, it may be that anti-Republican sentiment, not specifically Reagan or Bush antipathy, motivated blacks (overwhelmingly Democratic) to vote. As in the 1984 model, prenomination preferences were significantly related to black participation in the presidential election, but in a contrary fashion. Blacks who favored Jackson in the 1988 presidential primary were less likely to vote than those who favored Dukakis or another candidate. Furthermore, strong race identifiers and the members of politically active churches were more likely to vote in 1988 than weak race identifiers and those who were not members of politically involved churches. Finally, blacks living in rural areas were less likely to vote in 1988 than those in urban locations and living in the suburbs.

Black Political Mobilization in the 1990s and Beyond

This analysis revealed that Jackson's candidacy was directly related to black primary participation in 1984, although not in 1988. The Reagan administration is also clearly linked to the surge in black turnout in 1984. Blacks who more strongly disapproved of the Reagan administration were more likely to register and to vote in 1984. At the same time, Jackson both stimulated black turnout in 1984 and depressed it in 1988. Many of the same Jackson supporters who turned out for Mondale in 1984 were apparently unwilling to vote in 1988.

The refusal by Jackson supporters to go to the polls for Dukakis in the 1988 presidential election may have been a strategic decision stemming from a variety of reasons. First, Jackson's supporters may have sat out this election out of disaffection with the Democratic party. The disappointment felt by blacks over Jackson's second failed attempt may have been much greater than the disappointment felt over his initial failure in 1984, and Democratic leadership may have been held accountable for their disappointment. Second, the nonvoting by Jackson supporters may also be related to the different nature of the 1988 presidential contest. Mondale was an established political figure within the black community, while Dukakis was not. Dukakis presented himself not as a liberal (even though the Bush camp effectively labeled him one) but rather as a political moderate and as someone who would more effectively manage government. Because of this, Dukakis may have been less acceptable to Jackson supporters who desired a more progressive, visionary leader. Furthermore, in 1988 white turnout dropped as well, suggesting that neither presidential candidate was especially attractive to the voters. Thus, although Jackson supporters were less likely to vote in 1988, the low black turnout cannot be completely attributed to Jackson. Had a more attractive and dynamic Democratic candidate been nominated, Jackson supporters might have supported him (or her).

The argument outlined here is reminiscent of Angus Campbell's (1960) surge-and-decline theory of electoral participation. Campbell argued that the low turnouts observed with regularity in off-year elections were largely due to a drop-off in participation among the peripheral voters who tend to vote in presidential elections. A segment of the black electorate can be considered to be peripheral voters, except that nonvoting among black peripheral voters could be the result of expressed dissatisfaction with the electoral choices offered. As a political minority, blacks must vote in a party system where one party is virtually closed to them. Too often, they must decide between candidates who, they feel, do not adequately represent their interests. In a larger sense, the surge-and-decline captured in the 1984 and 1988 presidential elections illustrates the larger, ongoing electoral trade-off between participation in elections where neither candidate is preferred and nonparticipation (see Walters 1988).

The analysis also suggests that variations in black turnout cannot be fully accounted for by socioeconomic status and other demographic and attitudinal variables. While black participation appears to be firmly anchored to a number of individual-level demographic attributes, including socioeconomic status, fluctuations around this baseline of participation are better explained by political variables. Race identification affected black participation, while in several instances membership both in black organizations and in politically active churches promoted black participation. No doubt, the political climate and black office seeking directly affect the extent of the involvement of black organizations (including the black church) in a given election. The Reagan administration helped create a political climate in which blacks felt that the political stakes involved in 1984 were perhaps greater than in previous elections. Similarly, Jackson's candidacy may have had an additional effect on black participation, given the strong and positive relationship found between church membership and black participation. Without Jackson's candidacy, fewer churches in the black community might have gotten involved.

But this argument is not to conclude that black office seeking ensures higher turnouts among blacks. Indeed, Jackson's second candidacy was a negative political stimulus within the black community in 1988. Furthermore, once blacks are in fact elected to office, black turnout in urban centers usually drops substantially, and turnout rates return to normal (Browning, Marshall, and Tabb 1979). Browning, Marshall, and Tabb suggest that peak turnouts may no longer be necessary once black or minority political incorporation is achieved (1984, 78). However, the drop-off in black turnout may be more fundamentally related to a decline in political interest and organizational strength within the black community. Once blacks are elected to office, the excitement generated by the campaign dies. Politics becomes routine. In urban settings, a return to normal registration patterns means that registration rates in middle-class, working-class and poor black communities become once more unbalanced and class-skewed. Furthermore, the political organizations designed to help elect black candidates function less effectively, if at all. In 1988, organizational efforts to "get out the vote" were weaker than those in 1984. According to Abramson, Aldrich, and Rohde, Jackson's efforts at mobilizing black voters were less intensive in 1988 than in 1984 (1990, 94; see also Thompson 1990).

Constrained by barriers that limit participation among less-skilled, less-educated, and financially less secure citizens, black political mobilization appears to be too dependent upon the unusual and all-too-fleeting patterns of issue salience and group political mobilization that often accompany precedent-setting elections involving black candidates. In this regard, many blacks can be considered to be "peripheral voters," that is, voters who participate only when pushed by the right set of short-term political forces (Campbell 1960). Accordingly, this analysis suggests that black political participation in elections at all levels in the 1990s will be quite volatile and very much dependent upon the context of the given election.

Appendix: The 1984–88 National Black Election Study, Sample Description

The data utilized in this study are from a longitudinal telephone study of black political attitudes and electoral behavior conducted during the 1984 and 1988 national elections. The study was conducted by the Program for Research on Black Americans at the University of Michigan Institute for Social Research. The 1984 preelection interviews were conducted from late July through 6 November 1984, while reinterviews followed immediately after the election. The 1988 preelection reinterviews were held in August through 8 November 1988, while reinterviews began after the election. A total of 1,150 voting-age black voters were obtained in the first wave, 872 in the second wave, 473 in the third wave, and 418 in the fourth and final wave.

The sample for the first wave of the black panel study was derived from a disproportionate random digit dial design. In this design, all telephone exchanges in the United States were assigned to one of three "black household density" strata. These strata were:

1. high black density—exchanges in all large standard metropolitan statistical areas (SMSAs), with black density of 15% or more
2. medium black density—exchanges in small SMSAs and non-SMSAs in Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Virginia
3. low black density—all remaining exchanges

The selection rate for the high-density stratum was three times that for the low-density stratum. The rate for the medium-density stratum was twice that of the low-density stratum. Given the nonequal probability design, the 1984 samples require weighting. The appropriate weight is equal to the stratum number (cases that originated in the first stratum are weighted 1, etc.).

All working numbers of households with at least one black occupant were eligible. Two hundred secondary numbers were generated from each eligible primary. The overall Waksberg cluster size was 7.5 and included the primary. The racial composition of the household was determined by a direct question about race in the screening instrument. The household informant was asked: "Would you mind telling me your race? Are you White, Black, American Indian, or Alaskan Native, Asian, or Pacific Islander?" The informant was then asked the race of each household member.

Members of eligible households found in the screening of the secondaries were eligible for the study if they were black American (or a self-identified member of another black ethnic group and a naturalized citizen), and if they would be at least 18 by election day. Respondents were selected randomly from all eligible persons within the household (Kish 1965). The overall response rate in the first wave (1984 preelection study) was 57%. The rate is comparable to other surveys conducted by the Survey Research Center during the same period. The study most similar to the NBES was the 1984 National Election Study (NES) continuous monitoring telephone survey. That survey's final response rate was 62%. The response rate for the regular face-to-face NES preelection survey was 71%. The response rate for the second wave of the 1984 NBES postelection survey was 76%. Because the original survey was not intended to be a longitudinal study, more than half of the original 1984 preelection study respondents were lost in the 1988 reinterview. Most of the nonrespondents had no forwarding numbers or nonworking numbers; and a few respondents were lost because of death or illness.

Interviewers attempted to contact respondents first by calling persons named as contact persons during the 1984 study. When that failed, a few respondents were contacted by calling the information operator. Because the 1988 interview was done using a computer-assisted telephone interviewing system, before the interview began, the respondent's race, gender, and age were checked to verify that the person being interviewed was in fact the original 1984 respondent. The 1988 screening also included the following question: "Do you remember being interviewed around the time of the 1984 presidential election?" Interviews were immediately terminated if the respondent, most of whom interviewers were able to identify by name, was not black. Cases with discrepant ages or gender were eliminated in the process of merging the 1984 and 1988 data sets.

The response rate for those contacted was generally high. The percentage of refusals in the third wave was 22% and 22% in the fourth wave also.

Notes

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1. Ronald Smothers, "Bid by Jackson Is Cited in Blacks' Big Turnout," *New York Times,* 15 March 1984.

2. As with any panel survey, the 1988 reinterview is not a representative survey. In addition, in the 1988 reinterview, more than half of the original respondents were lost. Even though the frequencies are not necessarily representative of the black population at large in 1988, it is expected that the relationships uncovered in the following multivariate and covariance analyses remain unbiased.

3. It is possible that the number is inflated because of black overreporting. The extent of overreporting, a problem for all voting studies, cannot be ascertained. Blacks, in fact, may be twice as likely to overreport voting as whites (Abramson and Claggett 1984). Sigelman (1982) found, however, that voting

data that contained overreporters and data purged of overreporters yielded similar results. Consequently, the results presented here are most likely not unduly affected by the unknown extent of overreporting in this study.

4. Because Reagan was such a strong stimulus to the black vote in 1984, anti-Reagan sentiment in 1988 also might have been a strong stimulus to the black vote even at the close of his administration. A Reagan approval rating in 1988 was included instead of a Bush rating in the preliminary analysis, but that factor was found to have no effect on black participation in 1988.

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THE PRESIDENT, REFERENDUM VOTING, AND SUBNATIONAL ELECTIONS IN THE UNITED STATES

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This research is designed to generalize a referendum voting model and investigate its ability to account for the aggregate outcomes of elections for the House, Senate, governorships, and upper and lower chambers of state legislatures. Our analysis shows that these outcomes are influenced by the same systematic short- and long-term forces. In addition to this common referendum structure, the analysis reveals that there is a common response to random shocks, a subtle form of interdependence found in systems of seemingly unrelated regressions.

Within the community of political journalists, the outcomes of several hundred elections held biennially are interpreted from a national perspective that is a product of two assumptions: (1) that elections are referenda on the performance of the incumbent presidential administration and (2) that the presidential referenda operate at all electoral levels. Together, these assumptions (hereafter referred to as *generalized referendum voting*) constitute a conventional wisdom that provides a framework for interpreting elections as coherent national events. To see the influence of these assumptions, we consider several examples.

The first assumption posits that the president and the candidates of his party are judged according to the quality of conditions and events in the domestic and international arenas (hereafter referred to as *quality of life*). When the quality of life is satisfactory, the press attributes favorable results to pervasive public contentment. For example, in assessing the Democratic landslide of 1964, the editors of the *National Review* observed that President Johnson was "buoyed by the felicitous cooperation of the world around him" including a "booming economy" and "a communist world momentarily distracted by introversion" (Editorial 1964, 999). Similarly, when the quality of life is poor, unfavorable results are tied to pervasive public dissatisfaction. William Safire (1974) observed that "the American voter, given that rare opportunity to vote both his pocketbook and his conscience with the single flick of the lever, decided this week to express his indignation about high prices, his worry about the deepening recession, and his outrage at the long exposure to political seaminess." As can be seen, it is a standard media practice to

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link the electoral success of the president's party to the public's quality-of-life evaluation during his tenure.

The second assumption posits that the impact of the public's quality-of-life assessment is a national electoral force that influences elections at all levels. Arthur Schlesinger's (1980) speculation that the Democratic incumbents defeated in the 1980 elections were "*innocent bystanders* mowed down in an onslaught of national disgust against the Administration" (emphasis ours) stresses that the innocent bystanders will include candidates for state offices. For example, following the administration's loss of seven governorships and nine legislative chambers in 1982, *Time* reported that members were " 'shaken' by how badly the G.O.P. was routed in the statehouses" and that "pollsters Richard Wirthlin and Robert Teeter were telling the White House that on the local level the bottom had dropped out of the party" (Isaacson 1982).

While accepted by journalists and politicians, these two assumptions are the subject of an ongoing debate in the U.S. voting behavior literature. Implicit in the academic debate and the research traditions that fuel it are two questions. First, can the logic of referendum voting be generalized to show that the outcomes from the multiple tiers of the electoral system are influenced by the same systematic factors? Second, are the outcomes from these tiers independent so that what happens at one electoral level does not have an impact on the other tiers? To address these questions, we first use past research to formulate a general referendum voting model and investigate its ability to account for the aggregate outcomes of elections for the House, Senate, governorships, and upper and lower chambers of state legislatures. Once the general model is formulated and estimated, the independence of the electoral outcomes is formalized and evaluated.

A Generalized Referendum Voting Model

There is a body of research—including numerous aggregate-level models (e.g., Lewis-Beck and Rice 1984; Marra and Ostrom 1989; Oppenheimer, Stimson, and Waterman 1986; Tufte 1975, 1978), along with studies at the individual level (e.g., Kernell 1977; Uslaner and Conway 1985)—that provides empirical support for the proposition that House elections can be interpreted as referenda on the president. Generalizing this finding leads to the following hypothesis.

GENERALIZED REFERENDUM VOTING HYPOTHESIS. Referendum voting takes place at each of the major levels of the U.S. electoral system.

The rationale for this generalization is based upon two sets of research findings.

First, there is small body of empirical research that finds referendum voting at other levels of the electoral system. For example, Abramowitz and Segal (1986) as well as Lewis-Beck and Rice (1985) detect that both economic conditions and evaluations of presidential performance operate as systematic influences in Senate elections. Relying upon pooled survey data from 1972 to 1986, one of us (Simon 1989) demonstrated that approval of the president influences citizen voting in gubernatorial contests (see also Chubb 1988; Peltzman 1987; Piereson 1975). The consistent nature of these findings serves as an impetus for this study.

The second line of inquiry emphasizes that evaluations of the president represent judgments about the quality of life experienced by the public. An extensive and persuasive body of research shows that all presidents are expected to maintain peace, prosperity, and domestic tranquility (e.g., Hibbs 1987; MacKuen 1983; MacKuen, Erikson, and Stimson 1989; Ostrom and Simon 1985). The upshot of this research is that there is a *quality-of-life base* undergirding evaluations of the president, which is so strong (according to Neustadt 1980, 72) that the most fundamental threat to a president's approval ratings is frustration with "matters of real life." Viewing presidential approval as a proxy for the *national quality of life* provides a strong foundation for expecting the electoral effects of presidential approval to influence all levels (see Ostrom and Smith 1990).

Standing in marked contrast to a generalized referendum voting hypothesis is the conclusion that elections are discrete sets of contests relatively immune to national forces. The rationale for this perspective flows from former Speaker of the House Tip O'Neill's maxim, *All politics is local.* Accordingly, proponents of this view argue that the outcomes of elections are primarily the result of local politics and the advantages of incumbency (e.g., Hinckley 1981; Mann 1978; Ragsdale 1980). This conclusion is reinforced by studies that investigate the growing fragmentation of political parties (e.g., Crotty and Jacobson 1980; Ladd 1982) and behavioral changes such as the rise of independents and split-ticket voting (e.g., DeVries and Tarrance 1972). It is argued that such changes create an electoral milieu that enables incumbents to insulate themselves from adverse national forces (e.g., Ragsdale 1989). In turn, this insulation robs electoral politics of the national focus and evaluative standards necessary to produce an electoral system that is responsive to changes in national conditions (Burnham 1975; Fiorina 1981, 210). As a result, "localism" thrives as elections are influenced by a "host of factors peculiar to each individual contest" (Burnham 1975, 420). Collectively, these arguments provide the foundation for an alternative hypothesis that referendum voting does not take place at each of the major levels of the electoral system.

Formalizing a Generalized Referendum Hypothesis

Within the referendum voting literature, there is general agreement that the outcomes of House elections are a product of two systematic components: (1) a long-term, normal, or baseline vote and (2) deviations from that baseline brought about by the "immediate circumstances of the specific election" (Converse 1966, 11), or "short-term political forces" (Campbell 1966, 62). Within this literature, there is considerable agreement about the factors comprising the short-term components. At a minimum, most models include measures for public support for the president and the state of the economy as prominent short-term forces. As Erikson observes, the "critical issue is how to control for electoral history" in order to capture the long-term component (1990, 380). For this reason, referendum voting models include historically based measures of either partisan voting (e.g., Tufte 1978) or seat distributions (e.g., Oppenheimer, Stimson, and Waterman 1986).

Realizing that consensus about the "correct" referendum voting model does not exist, we have chosen—as a representative—our own (Marra and Ostrom 1989, equation 1), since it includes most of the factors widely acknowledged as prominent short- and long-term influences on congressional election outcomes. In this sense, the following specification is used as a plausible representation of a referendum voting model for the period from 1950 to 1988:

$$Y_t = \beta_0 + \beta_1 X_{1t} + \beta_2 X_{2t} + \beta_3 X_{3t} + \beta_4 X_{4t} + \beta_5 X_{5t} + \beta_6 X_{6t} + e_t, \quad (1)$$

where Y_t is the outcome of House elections and the remaining variables are defined in the Appendix.

Assuming the outcomes from different electoral levels are influenced by the same systematic factors included in the Marra–Ostrom formulation, equation 1 is generalized as follows:

$$YA' + XB' = E, \tag{2}$$

where Y is a $T \times G$ matrix of observations on G endogenous variables, X is a $T \times (K + 1)$ matrix of observations on the $K + 1$ exogenous variables, and E is a $T \times G$ matrix of the residuals from the five equations. The generalized referendum model includes electoral outcomes from the House, Senate, governorships, and upper and lower chambers of state legislatures (Y_{1t} through Y_{5t}).

Our initial test of the generalized referendum voting hypothesis imposes three sets of restrictions on equation 2:

1. *Electoral independence.* Electoral outcomes at one level *do not* affect electoral outcomes at other levels. Consequently, the coefficient matrix for the endogenous variables, A, is diagonal.
2. *Exogenous influences.* Each equation shares the same short-term and party balance measures, while each has a unique equilibrium error measure. This generalization of the Marra–Ostrom model leads to the following B matrix:

$$B = \begin{pmatrix} \beta_{10} & \beta_{11} & \beta_{12} & \beta_{13} & \beta_{14} & \beta_{15} & \beta_{16} & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ \beta_{20} & \beta_{21} & \beta_{22} & \beta_{23} & \beta_{24} & \beta_{25} & 0 & \beta_{27} & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ \beta_{30} & \beta_{31} & \beta_{32} & \beta_{33} & \beta_{34} & \beta_{35} & 0 & 0 & \beta_{38} & 0 & 0 \\ \beta_{40} & \beta_{41} & \beta_{42} & \beta_{43} & \beta_{44} & \beta_{45} & 0 & 0 & 0 & \beta_{49} & 0 \\ \beta_{50} & \beta_{51} & \beta_{52} & \beta_{53} & \beta_{54} & \beta_{55} & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & \beta_{510} \end{pmatrix} \tag{3}$$

   The parameters β_{gk} represent the impact of each exogenous factor k on the electoral outcomes in equation g.
3. *Random shocks.* Within each equation the residuals exhibit no temporal pattern, and the residuals from the individual equations are independent. The latter assumption imposes a set of restrictions that leads to a diagonal variance–covariance matrix Σ.

Equation 2, in conjunction with these restrictions, constitutes the initial version of our generalized referendum voting model.

Operationalizing the Model

While early studies of referendum voting most often focused upon the partisan division of the national vote in House elections (e.g., Tufte 1978), recent research has coalesced around the position that "using actual seat change is the appropriate way to measure the dependent variable where *system level* rather than voter behavior is the question" (Oppenheimer, Stimson, and Waterman 1986, 233 [emphasis ours]; see also Abramowitz and Segal 1986; Lewis-Beck and Rice 1984; Marra and Ostrom 1989). Finding this argument compelling, we rely upon direct measures of the change in seats, governors, and state legislative chambers resulting from an election. Accordingly, Y_{1t} and Y_{2t} represent the change in the number of seats held by the party of the president in the House and Senate, respectively. Y_{3t} is measured as the change in the number of governorships controlled by the president's party as a result of an election.[1] With respect to state legislative elections, the primary outcome of an election is the change in the partisan control of legislative chambers *across the states.* If national forces operate at these lower tiers of the system, an immediate impact of these forces will be to shift the number of chambers controlled by the president's party. Thus, Y_{4t} represents the change in the number of upper legislative chambers controlled by the party of the president while Y_{5t} measures this change for lower chambers of state legislatures.

We (Marra and Ostrom 1989) include four separate variables to capture the impact of short-term political forces: (1) level of presidential approval immediately prior to the election, X_{1t}; (2) "interelection change" in presidential approval, X_{2t}; (3) change in real disposable income,

X_{3t}; and (4) dramatic political events, X_{4t}. Each of the four short-term political forces is hypothesized to have a positive impact on electoral outcomes at each of the five levels (i.e., $\beta_{gk} > 0$; $k = 1, 2, 3, 4$).

Although we (Marra and Ostrom 1989) provide plausible justifications for including these factors, the connection between presidential approval and public satisfaction with the national quality of life leads to two noteworthy observations about the interpretation of these short-term forces. First, the interpretation of X_{2t} can be broadened beyond its characterization in our previous analysis as a proxy for future evaluations. Because presidential approval indexes the public's satisfaction with conditions and events in the environment, the interelection change in approval provides a useful aggregate-level indicator of the magnitude and direction of changes in the quality of life since the last election; that is, the measure taps a form of national momentum.[2] Second, even though it has become standard practice to include real income or alternative economic measures in referendum voting models, it should not be surprising to find that economic variables do not have a *direct* impact on electoral outcomes *given that the approval-based measures are tapping the more general notion of the quality of life.*[3] In order to facilitate comparisons with prior work, however, we include real disposable income in the model. Anticipating that the impact of the economic variables is absorbed by the approval variables, we expect that these coefficients will not differ from zero.

Studies of referendum voting also have addressed the idea of an equilibrium division of the major party vote. In the Marra–Ostrom model this equilibrium division is captured by two long-term political factors. First, the difference between the proportion of the public identifying with the party of the president and the proportion identifying with the opposition party, X_{5t}, is expected to have a positive impact on electoral outcomes (i.e., $\beta_{g5} > 0$). Second, the difference between the number of seats being defended by the president's party and the long-run historical average number of seats held by the president's party, X_{kt} ($k = 6, 7, \ldots, 10$), is expected to have a significant and negative impact on electoral outcomes (i.e., $\beta_{gk} < 0$; $k = 6, 7, \ldots, 10$).

Although we employ the same measure as before (Marra and Ostrom 1989), our rationale is based upon a more general idea of electoral vulnerability. Our rationale begins with the assumption that there exists an equilibrium distribution of seats in a legislature (see, e.g., Sprague 1984). This equilibrium represents the long-run average. Thus, in a given election, the number of seats defended by the party of the president will be greater than, equal to, or less than, this equilibrium. The magnitude and direction of the deviation from equilibrium can be thought of as *equilibrium error.* As noted in the Appendix, equilibrium error (X_{6t}–X_{10t}) represents the difference between the number of seats defended by the party of the president and its long-term historical average. Observe that both the current and historical components of these measures are based upon the number of seats, governorships, and legislative chambers defended. This calculation is based upon a recognition that the number of seats and chambers won by the president's party will depend, in part, upon the number of seats and chambers a party must defend in a given year.

Implicit in the equilibrium argument is the idea that there is an "error correction" mechanism at work (e.g., Engle and Granger 1987). The error correction argument presumes that there is a tendency for the electoral system to return to its equilibrium level if all else is held constant. As such, some percentage of the error will be corrected each election. In sum, our rationale and measurement pro-

Table 1. Ordinary Least Squares Estimates of Generalized Referendum Voting Model

Variable	Electoral Levels				
	House	Senate	Governor	Upper Chamber	Lower Chamber
Constant	-58.22	-16.12	-12.42	-9.55	-13.59
	(-7.36)	(-4.12)	(-2.66)	(-2.94)	(-3.27)
Current approval (X_{1t})	1.19	.30	.22	.16	.25
	(7.93)	(3.75)	(2.44)	(2.67)	(3.13)
Approval change (X_{2t})	1.16	.12	.12	.09	.20
	(7.25)	(1.71)	(1.33)	(1.50)	(2.22)
Personal income (X_{3t})	-1.49	-.33	-.60	.05	-.32
	(-1.64)	(-.77)	(-1.13)	(0.14)	(-.65)
Political events (X_{4t})	1.46	.26	.20	.22	.31
	(7.68)	(2.89)	(1.82)	(3.14)	(3.10)
Party balance (X_{5t})	.25	.01	.05	.07	.11
	(1.39)	(.25)	(1.00)	(1.75)	(2.20)
Equilibrium error ($X_{6t} - X_{10t}$)	-.32	-.69	-.52	-.42	-.58
	(-4.57)	(-4.31)	(-3.06)	(-2.63)	(-4.14)
R^2	.96	.74	.60	.76	.84
Root mean square error	5.73	2.74	3.28	2.24	3.06
Box-Pierce	1.72	6.44	2.14	.76	5.75
ARCH	.01	.96	.24	.05	.01
Dependent Variable					
Mean	-11.65	-2.65	-3.25	-2.05	-3.05
Standard deviation	23.29	4.45	4.31	3.80	6.29

Note: Figures in parentheses are *t*-ratios. With 13 degrees of freedom, the following cut-off levels should be used to conduct significance tests: 1.77 ($p < .05$), 2.65 ($p < .01$), 3.85 ($p < .001$).

duces an index of electoral vulnerability that is tied to the past electoral performance of the president's party, is sensitive to the schedule of elections, and therefore generalizes the notion of marginality developed in the Marra-Ostrom analysis of House elections.[4]

An Empirical Test

To evaluate our characterization of the generalized referendum voting hypothesis, equation 2 was estimated using ordinary least squares applied sequentially to each of the five equations.[5] Table 1 displays the estimated coefficients, *t*-ratios, and assorted diagnostics and summary statistics.

Table 1 provides considerable support for the propositions concerning short-term forces. The president's level of public support is statistically significant in each of the five equations and is among the most potent electoral forces operating in these elections. As anticipated, the inter-election change in approval is also influential; it is statistically significant in the House and lower chamber equations. The change in real disposable income does not have a statistically significant positive impact (four of the five estimates of β_{g3} have the incorrect sign) in any of the five equations, suggesting that economic conditions do not have a *direct effect* on any of the five elections.[6] As noted earlier, these results are not surprising if X_{1t} and X_{2t} "absorb" the impact of the economy. In the present context, this appears to be the case. Turning to the dramatic events variable, the estimates—which are statistically significant in each of the five equations—indicate that dramatic political events reverberate throughout the electoral system. These estimates demonstrate that the previously reported impact of dramatic events in House elections (Marra and Ostrom 1989, 560) extends not only to Senate contests but to elections at the state level as well.

Turning to the two long-term political variables, we find that while the estimated coefficient for party balance is statistically significant in only the lower chamber equation, the equilibrium error variables are statistically significant—and are among the most potent factors—in each of the five equations. As can be seen in Table 1, the estimated values of β_{gk} (k = 6, 7, . . . , 10) indicate that anywhere from 32% (House equation) to 69% (Senate equation) of the equilibrium error is corrected in a given election. There is a clear tendency for the five electoral outcomes to approach their individual long-run equilibria.

The summary and diagnostic statistics presented in Table 1 indicate that the individual equations perform quite well. Not only are the R-squareds and the root mean square errors quite reasonable, but the results compare favorably to previous research (Abramowitz and Segal 1986; Lewis-Beck and Rice 1984, 1985; Oppenheimer, Stimson, and Waterman 1986). As can be seen in Table 1, the estimates are not contaminated by either serial correlation (using Box-Pierce) or autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity (ARCH).[7] Thus, taken together the parameter estimates provide reasonable support for the proposition that the five electoral outcomes are influenced by the same systematic forces.

The Possibility of Electoral Interdependence

Having found empirical support for referendum voting at each of the five levels, we next investigate whether the outcomes at one electoral level are affected by those at other electoral levels. This line of inquiry is pursued by formulating two alternative hypotheses. We begin by observing that there has been no attempt in this literature to characterize the five outcomes as a *system* of simultaneous equations. In fact, reigning methodological practice proceeds *as if* the elections for a given office (e.g., House elections) were unrelated to outcomes from other tiers of the electoral system. This standard approach is reinforced by Burnham's assertion that as a result of party decomposition, "the aggregate relationship between congressional and all other elections will decrease, which entails the position that the pattern of electoral coalitions will become increasingly discrete by office, with one predominant in a presidential election, another in a congressional election, and so on" (1975, 415). Further, the connection between outcomes at various tiers of the electoral system is weakened as the evaluations underlying the vote become an office-specific rather than an "across-the-board pattern of behavior" (Fiorina 1981, 210). Thus, there is an existing substantive argument leading to the hypothesis that these outcomes are independent sets of unrelated contests.

ELECTORAL INDEPENDENCE HYPOTHESIS. Electoral outcomes for the House, Senate, governorships, and upper and lower chambers are contemporaneously independent.

While electoral independence has predominated—at least implicitly—there are also plausible reasons for hypothesizing that these electoral outcomes are interdependent. First, as our previous analysis demonstrates, these outcomes are *substantively related* in the sense that they are influenced by the same short- and long-term factors. Second, the outcomes are *temporally related,* since they represent the aggregated results of choices made on the same day. For these reasons, it is possible that the outcome from one electoral level could "spill over" and influence the outcomes from one or more other levels. This line of argument leads to an alternative, electoral interdependence hypothesis that suggests the outcomes for the House, Senate, governorships, and upper and lower chambers are contemporaneously *inter*dependent.

Formalizing the Independence–Interdependence Hypotheses

To evaluate the independence and interdependence hypotheses, it is necessary to formalize them in the context of equation 2. There are at least two possible ways in which interdependence could occur. First, it could be that A is not diagonal, implying that electoral outcomes at one level *directly* affect outcomes at other levels. As a result, all (or some) of the off-diagonal elements in A will be nonzero. Since any combination of coefficients in A—holding B constant—will satisfy both the order and rank conditions,[8] one is free to choose any of 1,048,576 different combinations of coefficients in A.[9] Absent a theory that discriminates among the possible alternative A matrices, one is left with two possibilities: (1) simply to point to the lack of substantive theory and ignore the possibility of direct electoral interdependence or (2) to generate and evaluate a small subset of reasonable alternative models. We pursue the latter strategy.

A second—and less direct—form of interdependence occurs when the residuals from the various equations are correlated. This implies that Σ is not diagonal. How would one interpret a nondiagonal Σ matrix? The residuals from the individual equations represent "errors" that cannot be explained by the variables included in the model. These errors occur for a variety of different reasons (e.g., Johnston 1984, 14–15). In the present context, errors could be due to factors that cannot be measured at the aggregate level (e.g., election day weather conditions, changes in voter turnout) or as the result of well-publicized random shocks that are not captured by X_{4t} (e.g., the myriad consequences flowing from the 1973 Arab oil embargo).[10] Given the temporal proximity of the five voting decisions, "shocks" to one electoral outcome could easily (and plausibly) affect other electoral outcomes. Hence, one would expect the off-diagonal elements of Σ to be nonzero and positive.

Combining the alternative possibilities of A and Σ produces four cases:

1. *Diagonal A and* Σ. Pure electoral independence in which what happens at one electoral level does not affect what happens at other electoral levels.
2. *Diagonal A and Nondiagonal* Σ. A subtle form of interdependence in which random shocks that affect one electoral level affect other levels as well.
3. *Nondiagonal A and Diagonal* Σ. A direct form of interdependence in which the outcomes of one or more different electoral levels spill over and influence outcomes at one or more other levels.
4. *Nondiagonal A and* Σ. Complete interdependence, combining the interdependencies found in cases 2 and 3.

Testing the Electoral Independence–Interdependence Hypotheses

We propose a testing protocol consisting of two stages. In stage 1, the diagonality of the A matrix is held constant. We estimate a model with a nondiagonal Σ by applying Zellner's seemingly unrelated

Table 2. Seemingly Unrelated Regression Estimates of Generalized Referendum Voting Model

	Electoral Levels				
Variable	House	Senate	Governor	Upper Chamber	Lower Chamber
Constant	-60.12	-18.52	-12.42	-10.90	-13.96
	(-9.41)	(-5.75)	(-3.36)	(-4.18)	(-4.23)
Current approval (X_{1t})	1.22	.35	.22	.19	.26
	(10.17)	(5.83)	(3.14)	(3.80)	(4.35)
Approval change (X_{2t})	1.11	.12	.12	.07	.19
	(8.54)	(2.40)	(1.31)	(1.40)	(2.71)
Personal income (X_{3t})	-1.51	-.30	-.60	-.02	-.31
	(-2.01)	(-.79)	(-1.43)	(-.07)	(-.79)
Political events (X_{4t})	1.46	.26	.20	.24	.31
	(9.73)	(3.25)	(2.22)	(4.00)	(3.88)
Party balance (X_{5t})	.26	.02	.05	.09	.11
	(3.25)	(.50)	(1.25)	(3.00)	(2.75)
Equilibrium error ($X_{6t} - X_{10t}$)	-.37	-.93	-.52	-.56	-.63
	(-7.40)	(-9.30)	(-4.00)	(-5.09)	(-6.30)
R^2	.96	.70	.60	.75	.84
Root mean square error	4.70	2.37	2.65	1.86	2.48
Average absolute error	4.00	1.95	1.81	1.59	1.96
Box-Pierce	2.07	10.94	3.38	.68	8.27
Dependent Variable					
Mean	-11.65	-2.65	-3.25	-2.05	-3.05
Standard deviation	23.29	4.45	4.31	3.80	6.29

Note: Figures in parentheses are *t*-ratios. With 13 degrees of freedom, the following cut-off levels should be used to conduct significance tests: 1.77 ($p < .05$), 2.65 ($p < .01$), 3.85 ($p < .001$).

regression estimation to the system of equations. This set of estimates will be compared to the estimates in Table 1 using the likelihood ratio test suggested by Greene (1990, 515). Based upon these results, we choose between cases 1 and 2.

Depending upon the outcome of stage 1, in stage 2 we compare cases 1 and 3 or cases 2 and 4. To complete the comparison it is necessary to identify several reasonable A matrices. Given the small number of observations, we focused primarily on alternatives with six or fewer nonzero, off-diagonal entries. Accordingly, we selected 20 alternative A matrices that represent plausible forms of interdependence.[11] These include examples of interdependence between the outcomes of House and Senate elections, between the outcomes of elections for the upper and lower chambers of state legislatures, a reciprocal relationship between all elections for state offices, a hierarchical pattern in which elections for the national legislature influence the outcomes of contests for state offices, and instances in which statewide contests are posited to influence elections at the "substate" level. Using Sims's modified likelihood ratio test (1980, 17), the models with nondiagonal A matrices will be compared to the estimates based upon a diagonal A matrix.

The seemingly unrelated regression estimates (Kmenta 1986, 643–44) of the five equations are presented in Table 2. This table displays the estimated coefficients and their *t*-ratios along with a variety of statistics for evaluating the performance of the model. The chi-squared statistic is 28.46 (with 10 degrees of freedom), suggesting that the residuals are correlated at a level sufficient to reject the imposition of a diagonal variance-covariance matrix at the .01 level. On the basis of an examination of the estimated correlations between the contemporaneous residuals, it does not appear that the reason for the significant chi-squared lies in the dominance of one equation's residuals.[12] Furthermore, most of the nonzero correlations are positive, suggesting that the impact of random shocks is similar across the five equations. Consequently, we conclude that random shocks at one electoral level have a contemporaneous impact on other levels of the electoral system. Finding support for case 2, we conclude from a substantive point of view that there is, at a minimum, a subtle form of interdependence and from a statistical point of view that the five equations are only seemingly—as opposed to actually—unrelated.

Having found evidence that the variance-covariance matrix is not diagonal, the 20 versions of equation 2 that include nondiagonal A matrices were estimated using three-stage least squares. The outcome of stage 2 determines whether the explanatory power of the model is improved by considering direct interdependence. The application of Sims's modified likelihood ratio test reveals that 19 of the 20 A matrices have *p*-values greater than .13 (only 4 have *p*-values less than .30); in only one instance is the *p*-value less than .05. Since we would expect at least one of the 20 matrices to exhibit a statistically significant improvement in fit even if the data were generated randomly (King 1989, 33, n. 16), the findings do not provide overwhelming support for the hypothesis that A is nondiagonal.[13] Particularly noteworthy in this regard is the absence of any relationship between the outcomes of the House and Senate elections. In addition, there is little support for the proposition that the outcomes of House, Senate, or governorship elections have an impact on the outcome of upper and lower chamber elections. On the basis of these results—and recognizing that this is a first cut—we conclude that there is insufficient evidence to accept the hypothesis of direct electoral interdependence.

Discussion

Given the evidence to this point, we select a model that posits a common "referendum structure" at each level and a common reaction to random shocks as a plausible aggregate-level model of the electoral system. Since the estimates in Table 2 are somewhat different than those in Table 1, we turn first to a discussion of the differences. The contemporaneous correlation among the error terms provides information that improves the efficiency of the estimates (Kmenta 1986, 642–43). Comparing the *t*-ratios reported in Tables 1 and 2 shows that the gain in efficiency is considerable. Note as well the improvement in the root mean square errors of the five equations; the use of the seemingly unrelated regression technique leads to a 13%–19% reduction in these estimates.

As can be seen, the estimated coefficients do not change markedly. Hence, the interpretation remains the same as presented earlier. However, the *t*-ratios of the coefficients (hence also their significance levels) improve and lead to several additional inferences and observations. This improvement has its greatest influence on X_{2t}, the interelection change in approval (now significant in the House, Senate, and lower chamber equations) and on X_{5t}, the party balance measure (now significant in both chambers of the state legislature and in the House equation). It is noteworthy that the influence of party balance has a significant impact on state legislative outcomes, since these races are the least publicized and visible elections in the set under consideration. Insofar as the error correction component is concerned, the estimates also reinforce our conclusion that these outcomes are driven, in part, by a process in which the President's party moves, in each election, toward its long-run equilibrium division of seats, governorships, and legislative chambers. The estimates for the magnitude of the error correction, which all increased when the nondiagonal Σ is taken into account, range from 37% (House) to 93% (Senate) suggesting that this mechanism is a pervasive and important force throughout the electoral system. Finally, it is noteworthy that the estimates for X_{3t}, the real income variable, remain statistically insignificant and improperly signed.[14]

A final concern is the overall explanatory power of the model. The chi-squared for the system as a whole is 121.54 (30 degrees of freedom), which is significant at the .001 level. The goodness-of-fit measures for each equation are presented at the bottom of Table 2. The House equation accounts for 96% of the variance with an average absolute error of 4.00 seats. This equation predicts incorrectly the direction of seat change in only one of 20 elections. In the case of the Senate, the equation accounts for 70% of the variance with an average absolute error of 1.95 seats. As in the House equation, the Senate equation predicts incorrectly the direction of seat change in only 1 of 20 elections. The equation for governors is the least impressive of the five, since it accounts for 60% of the variance and predicts incorrectly the direction of changes in control of state houses in 4 of 20 elections. The average absolute error is 1.81 state houses. Turning to the state legislatures, the upper chamber equation accounts for 75% of the variance with an absolute average error of 1.59 chambers. This equation predicts incorrectly the direction of the electoral outcome in 2 of the 20 elections. Finally, the lower chamber equation accounts for 84% of the variance with an average absolute error of 1.96 chambers. This equation predicts incorrectly the direction in only 1 of 20 elections. Together, the five equations lead to only nine directional errors. A particularly satisfying aspect of the model involves those relatively rare instances in which the party of the president gains seats, state houses, or chambers as a result of an election: the model correctly predicts 15 of the 17 instances of such gains (across the set of 100 electoral outcomes). In sum, the shifting distribution of congressional seats, governorships, and state legislative chambers over the past 40 years is captured by the model.

Conclusions

We have focused on an empirical test of two hypotheses. The question implied by the first hypothesis (Can the logic of referendum voting be generalized to other tiers of the electoral system?) is answered in the affirmative. Generalizing the Marra-Ostrom formulation, we find that presidential approval, dramatic political events, and equilibrium error variables are statistically significant at each electoral level. Thus, we conclude that there is evidence of referendum voting at all electoral levels.

The answer to the question implied by the second hypothesis (Does what happens at one electoral level have an impact on other levels?) is mixed. On one hand, we find evidence that the error terms from the five equations are correlated with one another. Making use of this information (using seemingly unrelated regression estimation), we obtain efficient estimates of the model parameters. On the other hand, we do not find evidence, based upon preliminary consideration of 20 representative forms of direct interdependence, of direct reciprocal causality. Even though there is no evidence of direct electoral interdependence, we recognize that our 20 alternative nondiagonal A matrices provide a limited evidentiary base and anticipate that our findings will stimulate subsequent research.

The estimates in Table 2 lead to four substantive conclusions. First, the impact of presidential approval is evident throughout the electoral system. In this regard, the results for the gubernatorial and state legislative outcomes are especially dramatic, given that research has traditionally treated such contests as local affairs far removed from the forces of national politics. When interpreted in light of the research on the determinants of presidential approval, these findings lead to an interpretation of referendum voting that goes beyond a simplistic presidency-centered view of elections. Essentially people expect the president to solve the "public trouble pressing on their lives" (Neustadt 1980, 74). To the extent that the president is seen as successful, the public rewards members of the president's party at all electoral levels. In this sense, presidential approval does not simply represent a judgment about a particular occupant of the White House; rather, it encapsulates the degree of public satisfaction or frustration with conditions and events in the real world. It is the sensitivity of electoral outcomes to this underlying evaluation of the real world that allows us to view elections as coherent national events. Second, the prominence of the equilibrium error component is visible at all electoral levels. Hence, elections are not solely referenda on the performance of the president. Regardless of the public's quality-of-life assessment, the electoral outcomes at all levels depend upon what has happened in previous elections as reflected in whether the president's party is above, at, or below its historical average. To assess the importance of short-term political forces, it is necessary to take deviations from historical equilibria into account. Third, our conclusions extend our finding that "the president could, through the manipulation of foreign policy events or crises, have a rather substantial direct impact on the House elections" (Marra and Ostrom 1989, 566). It is noteworthy that the impact of political drama extends throughout the electoral system. Fourth, there is a uniformity within the electoral system, since elections at all levels are responsive to the same short- and long-term forces. However, within this uniformity, there is considerable variability in the magnitude or relative importance of the variables across the equations.[15] Hence, even though the same variables affect outcomes at each level, the magnitude of their impact differs across the types of elections.

Together, the empirical results not only lend credence to the perspective used by journalists in interpreting elections as coherent national events but also provide an interesting baseline from which to explain aggregate outcomes *and* to direct subsequent research. The research demonstrates that outcomes from distinct electoral levels not only can be explained using the same set of short- and long-term factors but that shocks that affect one election affect other elections as well. While we do not deny the importance of localism or the "incumbency advantage" (especially given the level of aggregation used), our research suggests that future studies of voting should examine the manner in which the responsiveness to the national quality of life alters the context within which localism and incumbency operate. Subsequent research should pool individual cross sections to investigate variations in turnout among peripheral voters and to assess the relative impact of national forces (which are the same for each cross section but vary across surveys) and local- and individual-level variables.

Table A-1. Operationalizing the Referendum Voting Model

Variable	Operational Definition	Data Source
Seat Change		
House (Y_{1t})	change in the number of seats in the House held by the party of the president following the election	1950–86: *Statistics of the Presidential and Congressional Election of November 6, 1984* (1985, 73). 1986, 1988: *Congressional Quarterly Almanac.*
Senate (Y_{2t})	change in the number of seats in the Senate held by the party of the president following the election	1954–88: Ornstein, Mann, and Malbin 1990, 54. Prior to 1954: *Guide to U.S. Elections*, 2d ed., 567–671.
Governorships (Y_{3t})	change in the number of governorships held by the party of the president following the election	Prior to 1980: *Guide to U.S. Elections*, 2d ed., 449–566. Since 1978: *Congressional Quarterly Almanac.*
Upper chambers (Y_{4t})	change in the number of state legislative upper chambers held by the party of the president following the election	Prior to 1958: *Book of the States.* 1958–1986: *Statistical Abstract of the United States.* 1988: *Congressional Quarterly Almanac.*
Lower chambers (Y_{5t})	change in the number of state legislative lower chambers held by the party of the president following the election	Prior to 1958: *Book of the States.* 1958–1986: *Statistical Abstract of the United States.* 1988: *Congressional Quarterly Almanac.*
Equilibrium error ($X_{6t} - X_{10t}$)[a]	number of seats, governorships, and chambers defended by the president's party in the election at time *t* minus the average over the eight previous elections (i.e., $t - 1$ through $t - 8$)	All of the above.

Note: The operational definitions and data sources for X_{1t}–X_{5t} are presented in Marra and Ostrom 1989.

[a]The data on the partisan control of state legislatures were available since 1938. As a result, the historical component of the equilibrium error measures for 1950 and 1952 are based upon the average of the previous six and seven elections, respectively.

Appendix

Table A-1 (above) presents the definitions and data sources used to operationalize the electoral outcomes and the short- and long-term forces hypothesized to influence these outcomes.

Notes

We thank Paul Abramson and Renée Smith for their insightful commentary.

1. The gubernatorial elections held in odd-numbered years were *excluded* from the analysis for two reasons: (1) there are only five states that schedule gubernatorial contests in odd-numbered years, and (2) these states do not follow a common schedule.

2. The campaigns of 1958 and 1984 are suggestive. In both, the level of approval immediately prior to the election stood at 58%. For Eisenhower, this level was the result of a 21-point decline from a peak value of 79% in January 1957; the 58% figure for Reagan was a 15-point increase over the 43% level recorded in November 1982. Thus, despite identical levels of presidential approval, the momentum created by changing conditions in the environment—and the electoral outcomes—were quite

different.

3. In commenting on the lack of significance of the change in real disposable income, we conclude "that the primary reason that the economy functions relatively poorly in the context of our comprehensive model is that its influence is absorbed by both presidential approval and the change in presidential approval" (Marra and Ostrom 1989, 565). See also MacKuen, Erikson, and Stimson (1989, 1132–33).

4. Note that the dynamic underlying the equilibrium error measure is frequently cited as an important factor in press coverage of elections. For example, in commenting upon the Republican losses of 1986, Steven Roberts reported that "the 1986 campaign for the Senate really began in 1980, when 16 new Republican Senators were elected in the party sweep led by Mr. Reagan's first-term victory. But several members of that group won with 51 percent of the vote or less, a sign that they might be vulnerable when they ran for re-election six years later" (1986, A28).

5. We recognize that inefficiencies may occur if Σ is not diagonal (e.g., Kmenta 1986, 642–43). We test this hypothesis in the subsequent section.

6. The results are not an artifact of relying upon a particular economic variable. In a series of diagnostic exercises, we replaced the income variable with measures of unemployment, the percentage change in gross national product, and a version of Hibbs's (1982) measure that combines income (R), inflation (P), and unemployment (U) into an overall index (R-P-U). There is no instance in which any of these economic measures were statistically significant in the proper direction. As an additional diagnostic, three alternative versions of the model were estimated by deleting from each equation (1) the level of approval X_{1t}, (2) the interelection change in approval X_{2t}, and (3) both the level and interelection change in approval. The only instance in which the income variable X_{3t} is statistically significant in the proper direction occurs when both X_{1t} and X_{2t} are deleted (case 3). In case 3, even though the coefficient for X_{3t} is positive in all five equations and is significant in the House and upper chamber equations, the R-squareds drop to .52, .37, .32, .57, and .61 for the House, Senate, governorship, and upper and lower chamber equations, respectively. This comparison shows that while the deletion of the two approval variables produces a marked economic effect, the overall results are inferior to those obtained for the original model in Table 1.

7. The Box-Pierce statistic, calculated from the first five lags of the error term autocorrelation function, is chi-squared distributed with five degrees of freedom. The ARCH test is constructed along the lines suggested by Greene (1990, 419) and is chi-squared distributed with one degree of freedom.

8. Greene observes that "if every equation has its own predetermined variable, the entire model is identified" (1990, 608). This condition is satisfied in the context of our model (see equation 3).

9. The number of possible combinations is calculated by assuming that one coefficient in each row of A is normalized to one. The remaining four coefficients (and combinations thereof) in each equation can be either zero or nonzero.

10. The Arab oil boycott and its consequences were not included in X_{4t}, since the initial event did not occur in the Labor Day-to-election-day period of an even-numbered year.

11. A list of the A matrices along with the results of the likelihood ratio tests is available from Simon.

12. Four of the 10 correlations are significant at the .05 level (i.e., greater than or equal to .42). The House residuals are correlated with those from the Senate (.35), upper chamber (.42), and lower chamber (.61). The Senate residuals are correlated with those from the House, governorship (–.27), and upper chamber (.43). The governorship residuals are somewhat correlated with the Senate equation but unrelated to those from the other equations. The residuals from the upper chamber equation are correlated to those from the House, Senate, and lower chamber (.46). Finally, the residuals from the lower chamber are correlated with those from the House and upper chamber equations.

13. If we were to make a case for examining the substantive interpretation of the single significant model as a plausible example of case 4, we could easily be accused of "data mining." For example, were we to estimate the entire set of 1,048,576 alternative specifications, we would expect 52,249 instances in which the p-values were less than .05 by chance alone. In this vein, consider the following observation of Gary King: "Even if . . . data were created by a random number generator, sufficient data mining will reveal any number of apparently strong 'relationships' " (1989, 33).

14. We repeated the analyses in n. 6 using seemingly unrelated regression instead of ordinary least squares. Once again, the substitution of alternative economic variables did not alter the results. Our comparison of the second exercise described in n. 6 again reveals that while the deletion of the two approval variables produces a statistically significant economic effect, the overall results are inferior to those reported in Table 2; that is, even though X_{3t} is significant in the proper direction for the House, Senate, and upper and lower chamber equations, the R-squareds drop to .51, .32, .53, and .61 respectively.

15. To examine the possibility that the impact of the variables is identical, we standardized each of the variables in the model, constrained each set of standardized coefficients to equality (i.e., all coefficients for a given variable must be equal to one another), and reestimated the five-equation model. The likelihood ratio test leads us to reject overwhelmingly any suggestion that the standardized impact of the variables is identical.

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ESCHEWING OBFUSCATION? CAMPAIGNS AND THE PERCEPTION OF U.S. SENATE INCUMBENTS

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Campaigns play a central role in a democracy. I examine the effect of campaigns on the perception of the ideological positions of incumbent senators. The results demonstrate that incumbents affect voter perception both through their actions in office and on the campaign trail. Using the 1988 Senate Election Study, I find that the perceived location of incumbents depends on their roll call voting records, the perceived position of their party and the voter's own position. More crucial is the finding that candidates can affect the clarity of these perceptions through their campaign strategies. Incumbents who stress issues increase the clarity of voter perceptions, while challengers' attacks on incumbents reduce clarity. While elections alone increase clarity, these effects are small in comparison to the effect due to candidate campaign strategies. The results remind us that to understand the politics of elections we must incorporate candidate strategy in our models.

Elections play a central role in democratic society. In addition to providing the mechanism for selecting representatives, election campaigns provide the stage on which the candidates play out the political drama. Sometimes comic, occasionally tragic, often melodramatic, the campaign lets the candidates present their chosen messages to the audience of citizens. At no other time are the choices put before the voters in so concentrated and deliberate a fashion. But at the end of the evening, when the curtain falls, are the voters better off for having witnessed the drama? Are their choices clearer or more clouded?

In this article I consider two aspects of elections that may or may not serve to inform voters about their choices. The first is institutional in nature while the second rests on political judgments. First, elections are institutions of social choice that allow voters to choose among competing candidates. For these choices to be meaningful, the voters must possess sufficient information to make reasonable distinctions between the alternatives. The institution of competitive elections may provide this. Competition for office may induce candidates to reveal information about themselves in attempting to persuade voters to support them. However, competition alone may not be sufficient incentive to produce clear positions. Shepsle (1972) considers situations in which competitive candidates may have incentives to make their positions ambiguous, and Page (1978) argues that there are circumstances that promote obfuscation; but neither argues that this is necessarily always the case. Enelow and Hinich (1981) develop a model asserting that voters are risk-averse and that candidates should suffer from taking ambiguous positions. Bartels (1986) tests this proposition empirically and finds evidence to support it. Thus, we are left with an open question: Do competitive elections in themselves generally promote the clarity of political choices? This will be my institutional focus.

My second focus will be the effect of deliberate candidate choice on the clarity of citizen perceptions. Ultimately, candidates choose how to present themselves to voters. These choices may serve to enhance clarity of perception or to becloud the issues. George Bush, in 1988, was very clear when he declared, "No new taxes." Richard Nixon, 20 years earlier, was less than clear in his references to a secret plan to end the Vietnam War. In both cases, it is safe to assume that the candidates saw political advantage in their approaches. Precisely because the institution of competitive elections imposes so few constraints on candidates, the extent to which voters are informed by campaigns may rest more on the political judgments of the candidates than the formal institution itself. Thus my second concern is the extent to which clarity of citizen perceptions rests in the hands of candidates through their choices of campaign strategy.

There is a considerable body of scholarly work pointing to the incentives for candidates to present ambiguous positions (Page 1978; Shepsle 1972), moderate their positions as elections approach (Poole 1981; Wright and Berkman 1986), and emphasize constituent service over policy conflict (Fiorina 1977). Such strategies may serve the candidates' electoral ambitions; but for the public, the effect may be to obscure the policy choices available. Despite this, it is not clear that candidates always attempt to be ambiguous. Shepsle's work, for example, points out situations in which ambiguity should be avoided. If voters are risk-averse, then ambiguous "lottery positions" may hurt, rather than help, a candidate. And Enelow and Hinich (1981) argue that ambiguity is generally harmful to candidates. Unfortunately, the evidence available simply demonstrates that there are cases in which ambiguity appears to be the preferred strategy and others in which clarity may be favored. This reinforces the argument that such choices result from the political judgments of the candidates.

While there is substantial research on the incentives for candidates to obfuscate, there is less evidence concerning the effects of the campaign on the perceptions citizens have of the choice before them. One line of research has pursued the differences between the candidates, their strategies and resources. This work has examined the impact of campaign spending (Jacobson 1978); contact with constituents (Abramowitz 1980; Mann and Wolfinger 1980); political experience and viability of challengers (Hinkley 1980); and ideological distinctiveness of the candidates (Abramowitz 1981; Wright and Berkman 1986)—to name only a few. These studies do demonstrate that candidate characteristics and strategies affect voters' behavior but do not directly address the issue of the clarity or accuracy of voters' perceptions.

A different approach looks at presidential campaigns over the course of the election year. These studies assume that changes in perceptions and preferences during this period can be attributed, at least in part, to the influence of the campaign. These studies, however, are generally more concerned with the dynamics of attitudes during the campaign period than they are with the impact of the campaign as such. Lazarsfeld, Berelson, and Gaudet's early classic, *The People's Choice* (1944), attributes most perceptual change during the campaign to the re-awakening of partisan predispositions rather than the acquisition of new information. Markus (1982) shows that the proportion of respondents able to assign issue positions to Ronald Reagan increased during the 1980 campaign from around 60% to about 80%. The accuracy of these perceptions is called into question, however, by Markus's finding of a significant projection effect due to the respondent's own preferences and affect toward the candidate (pp. 546–49). While studies such as these can in principle address the influence of the campaign, this has been at best a peripheral concern in the literature.

I shall address the extent to which the campaign serves to increase the clarity of perceptions of incumbent senators' ideological positions. It is, of course, normatively desirable that campaigns enlighten voters. However, we know that rational candidates may sometimes have incentives to obfuscate, so the actual effects of campaigns may rest with the candidates' political judgments as to which strategy will benefit them. The model developed here allows us empirically to examine the extent to which campaigns promote clear perceptions of candidates' ideological positions and, by inference, serve to enlighten and inform voters.

Where To Look for Campaign Influences

Estimation of the influence of the campaign on the clarity of candidate perception requires a research design with two critical elements. First, there must be a measure of the candidate attribute being perceived. In this case, that means measures of the candidate's actual ideological behavior. Second, campaign influence can be estimated by comparing perception during a campaign with perception in the absence of a campaign. Ideally, this comparison should use the same set of respondents in order to avoid possible compositional effects due to differences between citizens exposed to a campaign and those not exposed.

While most work on campaign influences has focused on elections for the U.S. House of Representatives or the presidency, these settings do not provide all the design elements needed for this research. In contrast, the Senate, with its dual-member districts and staggered terms is almost perfectly designed to meet our needs.

Senate elections provide crucial information on incumbents' actual policy positions in the form of roll call records. While candidates may duck-and-weave on the campaign trail, there is a paper trail in their wake showing what they were willing to stand up and be counted for over the past six years. This direct measure of policy behavior is not generally available for presidential candidates, making it harder to study campaign effects in presidential races.[1]

Campaigns for the Senate also provide valuable leverage in the form of multiple races in a given year. In a presidential election, with only one nominee from each party, candidate differences are perfectly correlated with partisan differences. Therefore, we cannot tell if voters are seeing Michael Dukakis as more liberal because of something about his record or simply because he is a Democrat. In order to separate candidate influences from partisan influences, we need to study multiple Democratic candidates, all with different policy records, thus giving us variation within the category *Democratic candidate*; likewise for the Republicans. Unlike the presidential case, Senate elections provide a variety of candidates within each party, thus providing a fulcrum for our lever.

The House, like the Senate, provides roll call records and variation among party members; but it lacks, along with presidential elections, the final elements that distinguish the Senate—staggered election cycles and dual-member districts. Because House members are all up for election at the same time, we cannot compare perceptions of House members who are campaigning with members not up. Thus we cannot compare a campaign setting with a noncampaign setting if we focus on the House (or the presidency). The Senate, with its peculiar structure, however, guarantees that we have voters presented with two incumbent senators—one running for reelection and the other not. This provides the crucial campaign variation we need. Senators vary not only in the type of campaign they run but also in whether there is any campaign at all. This allows us to compare the campaigning senator with his or her colleague from the same state who is blessed with a year off the hustings. If campaigns matter, we should be able to detect differences between these two situations.

A less crucial—but still desirable—aspect of the design is that because each voter has two senators, we can compare the perception of incumbents who are running with those not running using exactly the same set of respondents. This eliminates any confounding effects that could arise from differences in composition if we compared voters in states with Senate elections versus voters in states without Senate elections. Another happy feature of the design is that Senate elections are sufficiently visible that substantial proportions of citizens have developed perceptions of the incumbent while at the same time there is considerable variation in the competitiveness of the races.

In summary, the Senate's unique institutional design makes it an ideal setting for the study of campaign influences. Presidential and House elections, by comparison, are far less suited to such research questions.

Elements of a Model of Candidate Perception

In order to assess the impact of campaigns, we need to specify a model of perception and indicate how the campaign might influence this model. The two are intertwined, but I will start with the perceptual part of the model.

In developing perceptions of political figures, it is reasonable to expect citizens to rely on a mix of information sources. Given the limited information rational citizens acquire, we would expect voters to use a variety of shortcuts that allow reasonable inferences even under limited information (Downs 1957). The sorts of information that might be useful can be grouped into three main categories. The first is information about the object of perception itself. In the case of incumbent senators, voters may be exposed to information about the actions of the senator, such as his or her voting record. This is the most direct information about a senator's policy positions, but it also requires more attention and effort to interpret the raw information. Because it is costly, it is unlikely that voters will rely exclusively on this sort of information.

The second source of information is inferentially based. Citizens who have no information whatsoever about a candidate's policy proposals may nonetheless make some reasonable inferences based on known characteristics and the association of these characteristics with policy positions. Notable among these bases of inference is the partisanship of the incumbent. So long as party provides information (even if imperfect) about the likely policy positions of the candidate, it is rational for the voter to use this source of very inexpensive information.[2]

Finally, the voter may allow personal preferences to affect perceptions of the candidates. There are two possible interpretations of this influence. One is the well-known projection effect (Markus 1982; Markus and Converse 1979; Page and Brody 1972). If we adopt this interpretation, then projection is a systematic bias in perception. An alternative interpretation is that voters can use information about themselves to make inferences about the candidates. Brady and Sniderman (1985) show that citizens can estimate the positions of political groups based on their feelings toward the group and their own preferences. It is possible that voters infer that senators they like reflect their preferences. Empirically, there is little to distinguish these alternative interpretations. Regardless of which interpretation one prefers, it is likely that the voter's own preferences play a role in candidate perception.

These mechanisms—direct observation, inference from attributes, and inference from self—are the core of the perceptual model. One influence of the campaign is to be found in variation in the weight given to each of these elements due to the presence or absence of an election. For example, if obfuscation is rampant in a campaign year, but not in nonelection years (as evidence on policy moderation might suggest; see Wright and Berkman 1986), then we would expect that roll call voting would have less influence on perception in an election year than a nonelection year. Variation in the parameters associated with each of the three perceptual mechanisms is the first cut at estimating campaign influence.

These direct influences on perception do not exhaust the model, however. Other influences might play a less direct role in the perceived location of a candidate and yet contribute to the process of perception. The obvious sources of these influences are attributes of the voter and attributes of the environment.

The voter may be better or worse prepared to process the information received from the environment. This could come from variation in the ability to process the information, due to lack of either cognitive capacity or contextual knowledge allowing for the interpretation of the information. The effect of such intrapersonal factors is not to shift the perceived location of the senator but, rather, to increase or decrease the stochastic variation in that perception.

The second influence on the stochastic noise that bedevils perception arises from the environment. If the environment is filled with spurious information about the candidate, it may be more difficult for the voter to sort the relevant from the irrelevant information. The nature of the campaign is one source of such environmental noise and allows us to introduce two more aspects of the campaign into the model.

A campaign produces a period of intense political debate, accompanied by both paid advertising and news coverage. This implies that the information stream about a candidate (or incumbent in this case) is vastly richer during an election than otherwise but it is unclear what effect this may have on voters. If the election contest is producing useful and relevant information about the candidates, then voters should develop more precise perceptions of the candidates. If, on the other hand, the campaign produces massive amounts of conflicting information that serves only to confuse the voter and increase his or her uncertainty as to the validity of any information, then the effect of the campaign would be to increase the noise in perceptions. While we do not have direct measures of the density of information in each campaign, we do have a measure of the competitiveness of the campaign. Hard-fought campaigns produce more news coverage, as well as generate more paid advertising, than do low-key contests (Westlye 1983). By estimating the effect of competitiveness on the stochastic component of the perception of incumbents, we can address this form of campaign influence.

The last part of the perceptual model concerns the effects of deliberate campaign strategy on voter clarity. As I have argued, candidates make conscious, considered decisions concerning how they present themselves to voters. These decisions rest on the candidate's beliefs about what approaches will provide political advantage. The task here is not to explain how they decide what is to their advantage, but rather to examine the impact of these choices on voters.

In considering the impact of strategy, I adopt a spatial model of candidates and voters. I assume that candidates may choose to inform voters of their locations along a liberal–conservative dimension. For some candidates, it may seem like a good idea to be clear about their position, while for others, this may seem a subject better avoided. In the former case, we would expect candidates to expend considerable effort informing voters of their positions, while in the latter the candidates would look for other things to discuss, such as personal qualities or constituent service. Thus, the emphasis a candidate gives to issue positions should indicate attempts to inform voters as to that location. We would expect that the more the campaign emphasizes issues, the more clearly voters will perceive the candidate's position.

Unfortunately for candidates, they have opponents who attempt to confound the candidate's strategy. An opponent can, for example, dispute the candidate's claims as to ideological location. A candidate may claim to be a moderate liberal, believing this provides an electoral advantage. The opponent, however, may counter by claiming that the candidate is in fact a far-left San Francisco Democrat. The more effort the opponent devotes to attacking the candidate's position, the more conflicting information voters will receive concerning the location of the candidate. We would expect this to lead to less certainty as to where the candidate actually stands.

In a world of a single dimension, this model would suffice. However, the real world is not one-dimensional. Candidates, in fact, take positions on many issues. We are measuring candidate perceptions along a single, presumably summary, liberal–conservative dimension. When asked to assign a position to a candidate, voters must condense the several issues the candidate has espoused and map this onto a single point. This task should grow harder the more issues the candidate has addressed since these may fall at a variety of points along the liberal–conservative dimension. Thus, we should expect clarity to increase as the campaign focuses on a smaller set of issues and decrease as the campaign increases the number of issue topics it addresses.[3]

Taken together, these points claim that candidates and their opponents affect voter clarity through the emphasis they give to issues and the extent to which they focus the campaign on a few issues. The choices candidates make about these options reflect their judgment of the political consequences. In this sense, what voters learn about candidates is partially controlled by political strategies.

The model of perception developed here has two main components. A set of perceptual influences are assumed to affect the perceived location of the candidate directly. Another set of influences are assumed to affect the stochastic component of these perceptions. The influence of the campaign is found in the extent to which campaigns shift the weights accorded to the variables affecting perceived location of the candidate. Campaign influence is also found in the effect of the campaign on the variance of the stochastic component of these perceptions.

There is one remaining issue concerning the clarity of perception. As used here, clarity does not refer to the respondent's subjective assessment of how well he or she understands the incumbent's issue position. Rather, clarity is assessed by the predictability of perceptions, given the candidate's ideological behavior, party, and campaign and the respondent's characteristics. It is possible that respondents may believe they have very clear understandings of where candidates stand and yet assign locations to the candidates that have large stochastic components. It is also possible that respondents might feel very uncertain, while their responses are actually highly predictable.

These two conceptions of clarity and uncertainty are linked if we assume that respondents who are uncertain as to the candidate location are likely to draw their responses from a distribution of locations. In this case, the location is drawn from some distribution with mean θ and variance σ^2. Then the location assigned by the uncertain respondent can be represented as $\theta + \epsilon$, where the variance of ϵ is σ^2. If we assume that θ is a function of the elements of the model, then $\theta = x\beta + u$. The observed response $y = \theta + \epsilon$ then produces a model with measurement error in the dependent variable. In this case we estimate the model

$$\begin{aligned} y &= \theta + \epsilon \\ &= x\beta + u + \epsilon, \end{aligned}$$

where ϵ is simply absorbed into the disturbance term of the model and estimates of β remain consistent.[4] We cannot separately estimate the variances of u and ϵ in this case. It is the variance of this compound disturbance that represents the clarity of perceptions as the term is used here. Thus, under one common conception of uncertainty, the model estimated here absorbs such effects into what is called clarity, along with the other stochastic elements of the model.

The Statistical Model

The statistical model takes advantage of the Senate's multimember district system of representation. This means that each citizen in a state with a Senate election also has a senator not up for reelection. This allows us to capture campaign effects by comparing the perceptual model for those up for election with the model for those not running. This has the additional advantage that exactly the same set of respondents perceive both a campaign environment and a noncampaign case. Thus, there are no compositional differences between the campaign and noncampaign groups.[5] The data are taken from the 1988 National Election Study's (NES) Senate Election Study (SES).

The dependent variable is the perceived incumbent's ideological position, as measured by a seven-point liberal–conservative scale.[6] This is assumed to be a function of the three elements I have discussed: the incumbent's roll call record, the perceived party position, and the respondent's own preferred liberal–conservative position. The roll call record is measured by the senator's 1988 American Conservative Union (ACU) rating.[7] The party position is the respondent's placement of the incumbent's party on the seven-point liberal–conservative scale. The respondent's position is also measured on this seven-point scale.[8]

The projection effect is slightly more complicated than just implied. We would expect voters who feel favorably disposed toward a candidate to give greater weight to their own preferences because they assume the liked candidate is similar to them. This is the mechanism assumed by both the projection effect model of Markus (1982) and the self-inference effect of Brady and Sniderman (1985). This is captured in the statistical model by including both the respondent's own position and an interaction of that position with a feeling thermometer score for the candidate. The feeling thermometer has been shifted to run from −50 to 50, where a score of zero represents indifference. This means that the coefficient on self-location gives the projection effect for voters indifferent to the candidate, while the slope of the interaction term indicates how this slope changes for liked or disliked candidates.

The stochastic component of the model is a function of the respondent's education (measured by years of schooling), the presence or absence of a campaign, the competitiveness of the campaign if there was one (measured by *Congressional Quarterly*'s preelection assessment),[9] and the candidates' issue strategies. These were measured using variables taken from the SES contextual data.[10] The SES data provide counts of the number of positive and negative themes for each candidate. I have distinguished between themes that are issue-oriented and those which are not. For the incumbent, I measure issue emphasis as the percentage of all positive themes that are issue-oriented. For the challenger, the emphasis measure is the percentage of all negative themes that are issue-oriented, since we are interested in what the challenger is saying about the incumbent. The final variable is simply the number of positive issue themes used by the incumbent.

The model, as I have described it, can be written as a regression equation in which the stochastic variance is a function of the education and campaign variables. Further, the coefficients in the location part of the model may be allowed to vary between campaign and noncampaign settings.

The model may be written as

$$y_1 = x_1\beta_1 + u_1 \qquad (1)$$

$$y_2 = x_2\beta_2 + u_2, \qquad (2)$$

where x_1 and x_2 are matrices containing the influences on the perceived location of the senators. Equation 1 refers to the incumbent seeking reelection, while equation 2 describes the senator whose term is not up. The subscript on β indicates that these coefficients can vary across the two senators, reflecting the possible campaign effect. This part of the model is simply a pair of multiple regression equations.

The effects on the stochastic component discussed above are captured by assuming that

$$\sigma^2_{u1} = \exp(z_1\gamma_1) \qquad (3)$$

and

$$\sigma^2_{u2} = \exp(z_2\gamma_2), \qquad (4)$$

where z_1 is a matrix containing the education and campaign variables. Since campaign effects are assumed to affect perceptions only of the incumbent involved in the campaign, z_2 contains only education and an intercept, thus constraining the campaign effects to be zero for the senator not up for reelection. This part of the model is simply an explicit statement of the heteroscedasticity of the perceptions and a specification of the systematic influences on this variance.

Under this specification y_1 and y_2 are jointly distributed. If we assume the stochastic terms have a bivariate normal distribution, then the likelihood for each observation is given by

$$L(\beta_1, \beta_2, \sigma_1^2, \sigma_2^2, \varrho \mid y_1, y_2) = \frac{1}{2\pi\sqrt{\sigma_1^2\sigma_2^2(1-\varrho)}} \times \exp\left\{-\frac{1}{2(1-\varrho^2)}\left[\frac{(y_1 - x_1\beta_1)^2}{\sigma_1^2} - 2\varrho\frac{(y_1 - x_1\beta_1)}{\sigma_1}\frac{(y_2 - x_2\beta_2)}{\sigma_2} + \frac{(y_2 - x_2\beta_2)^2}{\sigma_2^2}\right]\right\},$$

where ϱ is the correlation between the stochastic components, once the systematic components have been taken into account.

Taking logs and substituting the right-hand sides of equations 3 and 4 for σ_1^2 and σ_2^2 gives the log likelihood:

$$
\begin{aligned}
&\ln L(\beta_1, \beta_2, \gamma_1, \gamma_2, \varrho \,|\, y_1, y_2) = \\
&\quad -.5z_1\gamma_1 - .5z_2\gamma_2 - .5\ln(1 - \varrho^2) \\
&\quad - \frac{1}{2(1 - \varrho^2)} \left[\frac{(y_1 - x_1\beta_1)^2}{\exp[z_1\gamma_1]} \right. \\
&\quad - 2\varrho \frac{(y_1 - x_1\beta_1)}{\exp[.5z_1\gamma_1]} \frac{(y_2 - x_2\beta_2)}{\exp[.5z_2\gamma_2]} \\
&\quad \left. + \frac{(y_2 - x_2\beta_2)^2}{\exp[x_2\gamma_2]} \right] .
\end{aligned}
$$

Estimation of the parameters of the model is easily accomplished by maximizing this log likelihood with respect to the parameters β_1, β_2, γ_1, γ_2, and ϱ. (For more details on maximum likelihood methods see King 1989). The estimation was carried out using Gauss-386 and the Gauss procedure Maxlik.

There are several hypotheses I wish to test with this model. Previous research leaves little doubt that the location portion of the model will predict perceived incumbent positions, so this is only a passing interest. More central to the present concerns are the effects of institutional arrangements and the role of candidate strategy.

Institutional effects are captured by the simple presence or absence of an election. It should be recognized that this is a weak test, because there may be differences between the two situations that are not due to the institution itself but, rather, to some other, unspecified influences. However, this approach does give us a bottom-line estimate of the net effect of holding an election—a fundamentally important issue. This also helps establish a basis for comparison with the effects of candidate strategy, insofar as we are able to distinguish between the net effects of elections and the effects that candidates may control.

The two tests of institutional effects concern the coefficients of the location component of the model and the variance of the stochastic term. As I have argued, elections may shift the weights given to the various influences on perception. By providing increased information about the candidates, we might expect elections to increase the weight given to candidate records while reducing the use of the other perceptual strategies (inference from party and from self). On the other hand, one thing elections surely do is increase the salience of the candidates as perceptual objects. If the three mechanisms of perception specified in the model capture fairly common and fundamental methods people use in candidate perception, then the heightened salience brought on by the campaign may simply increase the weight given to each method of inference. To test this hypothesis, we simply need a two-tailed test of the change in parameter estimates between the election and nonelection situations. Specifically, we will ask if the elements of β_1 differ from the corresponding elements of β_2.

The second test of the effect of elections is to compare the stochastic variances of the election and the nonelection situations. But this is a little tricky, because I have also specified several other influences on this variation, hypothesized to be due to candidate strategy and voter characteristics. In order to get a bottom-line estimate of the effect of elections on clarity, I simply reestimate the model by imposing homoscedastic assumptions (i.e., by ignoring all campaign and voter effects on the variance of the error term). This effectively forces the net strategy and voter effects into the intercept of the stochastic equation, that is, into the first element of γ_1. It is simple to test for the equality of the variances in the two settings, and this provides a baseline for comparison with the effects due to candidate strategy.

Beyond simple campaign effects, the competitiveness of the election provides another influence, though it is neither solely institutional nor under the complete control of the candidates. If com-

Table 1. Incumbent Perception Model

Component Parameters	Election	No Election	$\frac{(\beta_i - \beta_j)}{se(\beta_i - \beta_j)}$
Location			
Constant	2.234 (.169)	2.377 (.174)	—
ACU score	.008 (.001)	.006 (.001)	1.55
Party location	.303 (.022)	.321 (.031)	-.49
Self-location	.097 (.025)	.052 (.031)	1.26
Self × thermometer	.003 (.000)	.003 (.000)	1.24
Stochastic			
Constant	.728 (.226)	.776 (.202)	—
Respondent's education	-.022 (.014)	-.016 (.015)	—
Competitiveness of race	-.084 (.065)	—	—
Incumbent issue emphasis	-.006 (.003)	—	—
Challenger issue emphasis	.004 (.002)	—	—
Incumbent issue themes	.115 (.046)	—	—

Note: ϱ = .286 (se .037); log likelihood = -1,619.0; N = 1,086. White's heteroscedastic-consistent standard errors are in parentheses.

petition increases information, we would expect a negative relation between competitiveness and stochastic variance. If competition produces sound and fury—but little light—in November, then we would expect the opposite effect. This leads to a two-tailed test for the coefficient on competitiveness in the γ_1 vector.

The effects of candidate strategy are more straightforwardly assessed. My arguments imply that increased emphasis on issues by the incumbent should increase clarity of voter perceptions, while as the challenger increases issue emphasis in attacks on the incumbent, clarity should decline. Perceptual variance should increase as the incumbent increases the number of issues discussed. These hypotheses are easily rendered as one-tailed tests of the coefficients in the stochastic component of the model, that is, tests about the elements of γ_1.

Empirical Results

Table 1 presents the estimates for the fully specified model. The standard errors are White's (1982) heteroscedastic-consistent standard errors. These are more robust under some types of model misspecification than are the usual estimated standard errors. They also run a little larger than the usual estimates, so their use is conservative. I want to consider first the basic perception model and then the effect of candidate strategy on the stochastic component—and finally return to the impact of the election–no election distinction.

First, as expected, the variables in the location component of the model exert significant effects on candidate perception. All coefficients, except self-location in the no-election case, are much more than twice their standard errors; and all have the expected sign. It is perhaps noteworthy that the influence of roll call record on perception is significant, even when the other perceptual mechanisms are taken into consideration. This is a clear demonstration (if one was needed) that voters respond to what candidates actually do. Similar perceptual models that focus on presidential candidates (e.g., Markus 1982; Markus and Converse 1979) have been unable to address this effect, due to the lack of candidate variance within presidential elections.

The projection, or self-inference, effect varies depending upon the respondent's feelings for the candidate. During an election, the coefficient on self-location varies from $-.063$ to $.257$ as the feeling thermometer ranges from -50 to 50. At its highest, this coefficient still falls below that for inference from party (.304).

Second, let us consider the stochastic component of the model and the role of candidate strategy. As incumbents increase their emphasis on issues in the campaign, the clarity of voter perceptions increases. (The negative coefficient indicates declining perceptual variance as issue emphasis increases.) Challengers can have the opposite effect on clarity. The more the challenger emphasizes issues in attacking the incumbent, the greater the variance in perceptions of the incumbent. Finally, as the incumbent increases the number of issue themes, the variance increases and clarity declines. Each of these coefficients is in the predicted direction and is at least twice its standard error. Thus, it appears that candidate behavior has a substantial impact on the clarity of citizen perceptions.

The competitiveness of the race is less important in determining clarity. While the coefficient has the expected negative sign, it is less than 1.3 times its standard error. It appears that competition is not sufficient by itself to clarify perceptions of the candidates significantly.

Finally, the respondent's education plays, at best, a supporting role in determining the variance of perceptions. While negative, as expected, the education coefficient is 1.55 times its standard error. Since this is a one-tailed test, this gives $p = .061$.[11] The education effect in the absence of an election is even less impressive, with a coefficient barely equal to its standard error. While education appears likely to play some role in candidate perception, at least during elections, the effect is by no means strong.[12]

Finally, let us turn to the differences between the election and the nonelection setting. First, consider the shifts in the coefficients in the location component of the model. The tests for differences of individual coefficients all fall short of conventional significance.[13] Despite this shortfall in attained significance levels, it is interesting to note that the effect of roll call voting appears to increase during the campaign, as does the projection (or self-inference) effect. The effect of perceived party position drops slightly. We can test the hypothesis that the coefficients are all constant between election and nonelection settings by constraining them to be constant and conducting a likelihood ratio test. The result of such a test produces a chi-squared statistic of 7.78 with four degrees of freedom ($p = .100$). Thus, while it is premature to conclude that elections produce shifts in these coefficients, there is sufficient support for that hypoth-

Table 2. Homoscedastic Incumbent Perception Model

Component Parameters	Election	No Election	$\frac{(\beta_i-\beta_j)}{se(\beta_i-\beta_j)}$
Location			
Constant	2.250 (.168)	2.381 (.175)	—
ACU score	.009 (.001)	.006 (.001)	1.80
Party location	.294 (.026)	.321 (.031)	-.78
Self-location	.098 (.029)	.051 (.031)	1.31
Self × thermometer	.003 (.000)	.003 (.000)	1.47
Stochastic			
Constant	.493 (.048)	.582 (.048)	—

Note: ϱ = .276 (se .038); log likelihood = -1,626.8; N = 1,086. White's heteroscedastic-consistent standard errors are in parentheses.

esis not to dismiss it entirely. Perhaps with additional data from the 1990 Senate Election Study, it will be possible to refine this test.

In order to assess the effect of the election on clarity, Table 2 presents the model with the stochastic component constrained to a constant variance. The result is that the estimated variance is exp(.493) = 1.64 for the election case and 1.79 for the nonelection case. An F-test for the equality of these variances yields an F-ratio of 1.093 with degrees of freedom of 1,080 for both numerator and denominator (p = .022).[14] We can reject the null hypothesis that the two variances are equal. It appears, then, at least on average, that elections do act to clarify perceptions of incumbents. However, the reduction in variance, though statistically significant, amounts to only a little more than 9%. I will consider below how we should view this.

As a side benefit, Table 2 also lets us consider the importance of recognizing the systematic influences on the stochastic component. The likelihood ratio test comparing the stochastic component specification of Table 1 and the constrained version of Table 2 produces a chi-squared statistic of 15.6 with six degrees of freedom (p = .016). Clearly perceptual variance is not homoscedastic—campaign strategy and characteristics have substantial influence on the clarity of candidate perception.

The results presented in Tables 1 and 2 are based on maximum likelihood estimation that requires the specification of a specific probability distribution, the bivariate normal in this case. If the distributional assumptions are wrong, the results may be affected (though *how much* is a matter of some debate; see King 1989, 68–72). As a check on the robustness of the maximum likelihood results, it is possible to redo the analysis using ordinary least squares and some two-step estimates for the stochastic component. While less efficient and not as coherent a procedure, this approach has the advantage of known robustness under a variety

Table 3. Expected Location Effects

Variables	Standard Deviation	Election Expected Effect	No Election Expected Effect
ACU score	35.5	.29	.21
Party location	1.8	.55	.58
Self-location (mean)	1.5	.20	.12
Self-location (warm)	1.5	.27	.17

of distributional assumptions. The results of this alternative approach are presented in the Appendix. The substantive conclusions from the ordinary least squares results agree with those of the maximum likelihood estimates. As an example, the ordinary least squares estimate of the variances presented in Table 2 are 1.643 and 1.796, while the maximum likelihood estimates are 1.638 and 1.790 for the election and no-election cases, respectively. The interested reader is referred to the Appendix for a complete discussion.

Discussion

The coefficients of the previous section provide tests of the hypotheses, but they do not convey much of a feel for the data. I now want to elaborate on the analysis and give some perspective to the results, beginning with the location model.

I have noted that incumbent senators' roll call records influence voter perceptions. However, since the scales of the variables are not comparable, the coefficients cannot be directly compared. An alternative way to look at the effects of these variables is to consider how much change they produce in perceptions, given a plausible shift in each independent variable. For this purpose, a plausible shift will be taken as a move of one standard deviation on the independent variable. Table 3 gives the standard deviations of the independent variables and the expected change in perceived location for a one-standard-deviation shift in both an election and nonelection situation. Since the effect of self-location depends on feelings toward the candidate, I have given two estimates: one for the mean feeling toward incumbents in contested races (11.5) and one for warm feelings for the incumbent (25). Recall that the thermometer scores have been shifted by 50 points, so these correspond to scores of 61.5 and 75 on the raw thermometer.

The table shows that the largest likely effects come from party location, followed by roll call record and then projection effects. The expected shifts may appear small in light of the seven-point ideology scale, but the standard deviation of the ideology scale is only about 1.5. Hence, these are fairly sizable shifts, relative to the variability in perceptions of incumbents. The large party location effect is not surprising, given the ubiquity of party as a political cue. It is more surprising to find that variation in actual roll call behavior has as substantial an effect as it does. While about half the size of the party effect, roll call voting nonetheless appears to play a substantial role in developing perceptions of incumbents' ideological leanings. The projection effect is smaller than the roll call effect, even when the candidate is warmly embraced. This indicates that while projection is a significant influence, it has less impact than the effects due to actual behavior in Congress. Clearly, our models of candidate perception would benefit from the addition of measures of actual candidate behavior, since these results make clear that voters can discriminate between candidates of the same party.

While the shifts in coefficients between election and nonelection fell short of statistical significance, they came close enough to deserve some discussion. The effects of roll call record and projection drop by about a third from election to nonelection. The rise in the ACU coefficient in election years is easily compatible with the notion that candidates do things during elections that inform voters of where they stand ideologically. The effect of roll call records does not mean the voters are rushing to read the latest ACU ratings. Rather, it seems likely that candidates generally reflect, in their campaigns, their tendencies while on Capitol Hill. Voters then pick up these messages and incorporate the signals in their perceptions of the candidates. More detailed measures of candidate campaign behavior would allow further specification of this notion but are unavailable at present.

The rise in the projection or self-inference effect is somewhat more puzzling. Two reasonable explanations are available, but there is little empirical evidence to support any choice between them. First, the rise in projection could be due to simple dissonance reduction. In an election campaign, the salience of the object (the incumbent) is substantially increased. When the object is less salient, there is less need for dissonance reduction; but when the campaign raises salience, voters tend to reduce dissonance by increasing projection of their own preferences onto the incumbent. This is substantially aided in the case of a positively valanced candidate and is reduced as affect moves through neutral and on to negative values. The important point to be made is that this explanation rests entirely on individual psychology and depends not at all on the behavior of the candidate.

A second explanation is much more political in nature. Fenno (1978) tells us in *Homestyle* that many candidates adopt a style that emphasizes ties to the constituency. "I'm one of you," the incumbent says in speeches, personal conversations, and advertising. During the election campaign, this message is likely to be repeated many times. To the extent that it is convincing to voters, they may come to believe that the incumbent really is "like" them and thus use their own preferences as a way of estimating the preferences of the incumbent. The important implication of this explanation is that it is testable in principle. Unlike the dissonance reduction explanation, this one depends on the actions of the incumbent. Incumbents who stress ties to the state should produce greater projection effects than incumbents who place greater emphasis on other topics. Fine-grain measures of candidate behavior would again allow the testing of this hypothesis, were they available.

Next, let me turn to the stochastic component of the model. The results in Table 1 show that the clarity of perceptions varies with incumbent and challenger issue emphasis and the number of issue themes and is weakly related to education and even more weakly to competitiveness. I shall use the standard error of perceptions, rather than the variance, as the measure of clarity, because the standard error is in the same units as the dependent variable, making substantive assessments easier.

To consider the effects of each variable on clarity, I take all other variables at their mean, then compute the predicted standard error for low and high values of the variable of interest. Low values are one standard deviation below the mean, high values one standard deviation above the mean. I also compute the percentage increase from the smaller predicted standard error to the higher, to give a feeling for the magnitude of the effects. The results are presented in Table 4, along with the mean and standard deviations of the variables appearing in the stochastic model.

It is apparent from Table 4 that shifts

Table 4. Expected Stochastic Effects

Variables	Mean z	SD z	Predicted se(y) Low z	High z	Difference (%)
Incumbent issue emphasis	60.2	27.9	1.38	1.17	17.9
Challenger issue emphasis	43.0	28.2	1.20	1.35	12.6
Incumbent issue themes	2.3	1.4	1.18	1.38	17.5
Years of school	12.4	3.6	1.33	1.22	8.3
Competitiveness of race	.7	.8	1.32	1.23	6.9

in issue emphasis and number of issue themes can have significant effects on the clarity of perceptions, while holding all other variables constant. The incumbent's issue emphasis and the number of themes each leads to shifts of about 17% in the clarity of perceptions. The challenger's issue emphasis has a bit less impact, about 13%. Note that these are not maximum possible effects but, rather, effects for a reasonable amount of change in the independent variables. The maximum impact of incumbent issue emphasis, for example, would be predicted standard errors of 1.52 for issue emphasis of zero and 1.13 for emphasis of one hundred, a change of 35%.

The candidates, of course, do not act independently; and it is instructive to consider their joint impact on clarity. For example, compare a race in which the incumbent puts low emphasis on issues and the challenger high emphasis with a race in which candidate strategies are reversed. Here again, low and high are one standard deviation below and above the mean, respectively. In the first case, the predicted standard error of perceptions is 1.47; for the second, 1.11, a shift of 32%.

These joint effects are presented in Figure 1 as two contour plots of the predicted standard error as a function of two variables. The diagonal lines show combinations that produce constant standard error contours. The top panel of the figure shows clarity as a function of incumbent and challenger issue emphasis. The bottom panel shows clarity as a function of incumbent issue emphasis and number of incumbent issue themes. Clarity is greatest at the lower right corners and least at

Figure 1. Predicted Clarity for Combinations of Incumbent and Challenger Issue Emphasis and Number of Incumbent Issue Themes



Figure 2. Distribution of Voter Perceptions for Three Levels of Clarity and Probability of Inaccurate Assignment of Candidate Location As a Function of Clarity



the upper left. The range of clarity possible in these figures is substantial. This range overstates the actual combinations present in the data but gives a feel for the limits on high and low clarity based on the estimated model.

Effects such as these beg the question, How much real difference does it make? A way to get a sense of the practical impact of this range of standard errors is to look at several probability densities over the seven-point liberal–conservative scale. As an example, take a Democratic senator with a 30 ACU score, a respondent who sees the Democratic party at a 2 on the liberal–conservative scale and herself at a 4 and who places the senator at the mean (11.5) on the feeling thermometer. The predicted location of this senator is 3.62. First, we can look at the distribution of expected responses about this predicted value for various levels of clarity. The top panel of Figure 2 shows this for three races—a very clear race, an average race, and a rather muddled race—corresponding to standard errors of 1.11, 1.28, and 1.47, respectively. The shift in the curves is obvious.

Another way of looking at this is to ask how likely it is that the respondent will place the senator close to the expected location. In this case the predicted location is 3.6, so either a 3 or a 4 on the liberal–conservative scale would seem reasonable. How likely is it that the respondent will place the senator at 1, 2, 5, 6, or 7 instead of 3 or 4? And how does this vary with the standard error? The lower panel of Figure 2 shows the probability of such a mistake in placement for standard errors from 1.11 to 1.47.[15] For races with high clarity, the probability of a mistake is just over one-third (.37), while for the least clear races, the probability is .49. In other words, the respondent goes from a two-thirds chance of a correct placement to a fifty-fifty chance.

To see how the actual campaigns are distributed, Figure 3 presents a density plot of the estimated standard errors. A density plot is a smoothed version of a histogram retaining some of the details that are usually lost due to the fixed intervals characteristic of histograms (Silverman 1986). The whiskers along the x-axis indicate each actual observation. The 27 observations are the estimated standard errors for each race for a respondent with

Figure 3. Distribution of Clarity in 27 Senate Races



a 12th-grade education. The estimates range from 1.15 to 1.47. It is apparent from the density plot that there are a large number of cases in the 1.2–1.3 range but also a long tail to the right.

The four peaks evident in this plot raise the possibility that the races are a mixture of up to four distinct populations. The number of cases is far too small to put much faith in this impression, but the notion is intriguing. If candidates adopt strategies based on simple rules of thumb or typologies, then this might give rise to campaigns that cluster into a few distinct types, which are then reflected in the density plot. For example, incumbents might base strategy on simple questions, such as, Am I safe or threatened? and Is my strength issues or personal appeal? The answers may suggest one of a small number of "types" of campaign strategies. Such simplification might be especially likely with professional campaign consultants, who may simplify their decision making by thinking in terms of case studies, where the object is to match the current situation with a known example from past campaigns. Data on more races may allow a test of this.

The range of estimated standard errors is instructive. This variation is totally due to variation in campaign strategy and, to a lesser extent, competitiveness. Respondent variation has been removed by assuming a constant education. Compare this range (1.15–1.47) with the difference found earlier between the average election and the nonelection case. The estimated standard errors are 1.28 for an election and 1.34 in the absence of an election. This difference due to the net effect of elections is dwarfed by the variation due to campaign strategy. The import of this is that while elections do produce a statistically significant reduction in perceptual variance, the dominant elements in determining the clarity of candidate perception rest with the candidates themselves.

This result may disappoint those who look to institutional arrangements alone to produce desirable clarity of candidate positions. Yet we should not be surprised. The electoral institution is a very unstructured one and imposes few constraints save competition alone. From this perspective, it is remarkable that we can detect any effect at all. In contrast, candidates have every incentive to devise political strategies that will help them win office. If, in their judgment, a campaign of issues will do so, then that is what they will supply. If obfuscation is called for, then obfuscate they will. The impact of the issue emphasis variables supports the notion that these effects on voter perceptions do result from deliberate decisions concerning the stress given to issues.

It is less clear what role the number of issue themes has in the candidate's strategic plan. The results show that as the number of issues increases clarity declines. But is this deliberate on the candidate's part, or is it an unforeseen consequence? First, this could be a simple artifact of the measure of ideological position used here. Several issues may be harder to reduce to one dimension (even if each issue position is perfectly clear) than are one or two. Second, candidates might deliberately attempt to appeal to voters by taking popular positions on issues that cut the liberal-conservative dimension at different points. For example, a senator might take both a proenvironment and an anticrime position. The intent is not to confuse voters; but when asked where the senator is on the seven-point ideology scale, voters may be justifiably uncertain. Third, candidates may adopt several consonant issue themes in an effort to clarify their ideological position. Here, the key is consistency across issues. High consistency would be expected to increase clarity. Unfortunately, we lack measures of this. The empirical results suggest that this is not a common pattern, however, or else that the result is perverse. Finally, campaigns that focus on a small number of themes appear to encourage clarity in voter perceptions. This could be the sign of a well-orchestrated campaign, hammering away on one or two themes, in contrast to a campaign out of control, lurching from one issue to the next. The former produces clarity, the latter confusion.

It seems unlikely that campaigns deliberately adopt a large number of issue themes just to confuse voters. However, it seems very plausible that they adopt a narrow focus in an attempt to drive home one or two messages. While I lack convincing empirical evidence, my speculation is that large numbers of issue themes is more often a sign of a campaign that is searching for a message, rather than one that has a coherent story to tell. This accounts for the observed relationship between number of themes and clarity.

Conclusions

These results should remind us of the dominance of politics over institutions. Recent years have seen a renewed appreciation for the role of institutions in structuring political choice. This is an important role and should not be discounted. But we must not lose sight of the ability of politicians to maneuver within institutional settings. As Riker (1986) delightfully illustrates, politicians exploit the loopholes, as much as they are bound by the constraints, of institutions.

The electoral arena does not provide politicians with simple incentives to move to the median voter and accept a tie but, rather, pushes them to search for ways to exploit weaknesses of opponents while promoting their own virtues. As with Riker's "herestheticians," the art of politics is finding a winning electoral strategy. For some candidates, this strategy will place great emphasis on issue positions, while others will shun specificity. Current theories of political ambiguity, which treat all candidates as essentially identical, miss this critical point.

We have seen that candidate campaign strategies have significant effects on the clarity of voter perceptions. The extent to which elections help voters clarify their perceptions of the candidates thus rests substantially on the candidates' political judgments about effective electoral strategy. This fact means that we cannot rely on the institution of competitive elections alone to produce an informed electorate. Institutional incentives, though important, are not sufficiently strong to induce uniformity in candidate strategies. As we saw, the variation in clarity accounted for by elections was dwarfed by that attributable to candidate strategy. The urge, present since the founding, to find institutional mechanisms that will ensure desirable political behavior is unfortunately utopian.

If the ball is back in the politician's court, it is also back in the political scientist's. The political nature of elections lies in the choices candidates make about strategy. How to present oneself and one's opponent to the voters is the critical electoral heresthetic. At present, the spatial model is the closest thing we have to an explanation for candidate behavior. Yet we have very little empirical work on campaign behavior with which to test the predictions from this or any other model. As we have become adept at studying voters, it is ironic that we have virtually ignored the study of candidates. Yet it is in candidate behavior that politics intrudes into voting behavior. Without the candidates, there is only the psychology of the vote choice and none of the politics. I have demonstrated that we can learn about the impact of politics, but only if we stop ignoring the politicians.

Appendix

The model can be estimated using ordinary least squares, which does not require the assumptions of bivariate normality. In order to estimate both the location and stochastic components of the model, a two-step procedure is required. In the first step, the location component is estimated as a simple regression equation. In the second step, residuals are saved, then squared and regressed on the systematic influences of the stochastic component of the model. The results of these two steps are combined and presented in Table A-1, which mirrors Table 1.

The location coefficient estimates from the ordinary least squares model are in close accord with those from the maximum likelihood model. The estimates of the coefficients in the stochastic component are more variable, with the education and competitiveness coefficients

Table A-1. Incumbent Perception Model, Ordinary Least Squares Estimates

Component Parameters	Election	No Election
Location		
Constant	2.157 (.153)	2.300 (.156)
ACU score	.009 (.001)	.005 (.001)
Party location	.311 (.023)	.345 (.027)
Self-location	.099 (.026)	.051 (.027)
Self × thermometer	.003 (.000)	.003 (.000)
Stochastic		
Constant	-1.174 (.308)	-.921 (.274)
Respondent's education	.017 (.020)	.002 (.021)
Competitiveness of race	.034 (.106)	—
Incumbent issue emphasis	-.011 (.004)	—
Challenger issue emphasis	.006 (.003)	—
Incumbent issue themes	.186 (.076)	—

Note: ϱ = .270; N = 1,086. Ordinary least squares standard errors are in parentheses.

shifting sign. However, these coefficients have large standard errors in the ordinary least squares estimation. Further, the coefficients on issue emphasis and incumbent issue themes retain the proper sign and exceed twice their standard errors. This increases confidence that the assumptions of the maximum likelihood model are reasonable and the estimates believable.

The one substantive difference between the two estimation approaches is that the ordinary least squares test for equality of coefficients in the location component leads to rejection of the null hypothesis of equality ($F = 2.44$, $df = (4,2162)$, $p = .045$). The parallel test in the text produced a $p = .100$. However, the two are not strictly comparable. The maximum likelihood test is from a model that includes the stochastic component, while the ordinary least squares estimates omit this specification, since the two-step estimation procedure is used. If we perform exactly the same test with maximum likelihood, by forcing homoscedasticity assumptions on the variances, the likelihood ratio test produces a chi-squared of 9.89, four degrees of freedom, and $p = .042$. It seems clear that the discrepancy comes from the fact that the ordinary least squares model is ignoring the parameters included in the stochastic component of the model.

Notes

I am indebted to Larry Bartels, John Gilmour, Gary King, and Jack Knight for helpful suggestions. This research was supported by a John M. Olin Foundation Faculty Fellowship. I remain responsible for errors and interpretations.

1. A direct measure of policy behavior is also lacking for most challengers to incumbent senators. For this reason, I focus exclusively on the perception of Senate incumbents.

2. This easy information can be quite efficient. The correlation between party and conservatism as measured by 1988 ACU scores is about .75, with the average Democrat at 16.5 and the average Republican at 75.6. Clearly, knowledge of party is highly informative in this case.

3. A reviewer pointed out to me that candidates might select several issues, each of which reinforces the others to produce a clear picture of the candidate. In terms of the model here, the several issues would project onto the same point of the liberal–conservative scale. This is certainly the case sometimes; and we would expect that consistency across issues would produce greater clarity than would inconsistency across the same number of issues. Unfortunately, we lack measures of consistency. In the absence of such measures, we must let the data speak. If, in fact, large numbers of candidates use many, consistent issue themes to project a single image, then the hypothesis presented will be rejected and we will find a positive association between number of themes and clarity, rather than the expected negative relation. It should be noted, however, that by including candidate issue emphasis in the model, we are controlling for the campaign's apparent attempt to communicate issue positions to the public. This may vitiate the problem, because we will be looking at the effect of number of issues, holding constant the effort of the candidate to communicate issue positions.

4. This is easily seen from the fact that x is uncorrelated with both u and ϵ. See Franklin and Jackson 1986.

5. Respondents in states without a Senate election or without an incumbent seeking reelection are omitted from the analysis.

6. The basic qustion is, "We hear a lot of talk these days about liberals and conservatives. Think about a ruler for measuring political views that people might hold, from liberal to conservative. On this ruler, which goes from one to seven, a measurement of one means very liberal political views, and a measurement of seven would be very conservative. Just like a regular ruler, it has points in between at 2, 3, 4, 5 or [*sic*] 6. Where would you place yourself on this ruler, remembering that 1 is very liberal and 7 is very conservative, or haven't you thought much about this?" Respondents are asked to place themselves, the incumbent senators from their state, and the parties on this scale.

7. The ACU and Americans for Democratic Action (ADA) ratings are very highly correlated with each other and over time. The correlation between 1988 ADA and ACU scores is −.97 for incumbents with a reelection campaign and −.92 for those whose seats were not up in 1988. Since there seems little to be gained from further processing of these scores, I simply chose a convenient year. Arguably, 1987 might have been used as a year untainted by election year shifts. However, the correlation of 1987 and 1988 ACU scores was .965 for incumbents seeking reelection and .961 for those not up, so this seems a minor issue.

8. Respondents who initially failed to position themselves on the scale were asked whether, if they had to choose, they would consider themselves liberal or conservative. These responses have been coded as 2, 4, and 6 for liberal, moderate, and conservative responses to the probe, respectively, and combined with the other seven-point scale responses.

9. *Congressional Quarterly* rated each election as *safe Democrat, Democrat favored, leans Democratic, no clear favorite,* etc. These codes were folded to measure competitiveness. The codes were assigned values of one to four for *safe* to *no clear favorite.* In the Senate campaigns used here, none were coded four.

10. The campaign content codes were devised by Richard F. Fenno, Jr., Gary C. Jacobson, Jonathan Krasno, Thomas E. Mann, and Raymond E. Wolfinger. Coding was done by Jonathan Krasno with the assistance of James Glaser of the State Data Program at the University of California, Berkeley. See the NES contextual data code book for a more complete description of the coding procedure.

11. In this and all other tests of individual coefficients or their differences, I am using the normal approximation for the distribution of the coefficients, rather than a t-distribution. With the large number of degrees of freedom involved, the approximation should be excellent.

12. Other plausible respondent variables, such as political interest and attention to news, were tried in place of, and in combination with, education. All fared worse than education alone.

13. Note that the standard error of the difference of two random variables is determined from the formula $\mathrm{var}(\theta_1 - \theta_2) = \mathrm{var}(\theta_1) + \mathrm{var}(\theta_2) - 2\mathrm{cov}(\theta_1, \theta_2)$. The ratio of the difference in coefficients to standard error reported in the table is, of course, based on this calculation.

14. The test is $F = (S_1^2/df_1)/(S_2^2/df_2)$. Most tables do not extend the range of the F-distribution to such a large number of degrees of freedom. The calculation here was carried out in Gauss using the cumulative F-distribution function, CDFFC.

15. The calculation is $\mathrm{CDFN}[(2.5 - 3.62)/se] + 1 - \mathrm{CDFN}[(4.5 - 3.62)/se]$, where CDFN is the cumulative distribution function for a normal distribution and se is the standard error. Since the liberal-conservative scale is, in fact, discrete, the midpoints 2.5 and 4.5 were chosen as thresholds separating responses of 2 and 3 and of 4 and 5, respectively.

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INFORMATION, VALUES, AND OPINION

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Past research has modeled mass opinion change as a two-step process involving reception of political communication and acceptance or rejection of that communication. I propose a two-message version of the reception–acceptance model, in which citizens are exposed to two opposing communication flows, either or both of which may affect their opinions. Variation over time in the relative intensity of the opposing communications, along with citizen differences in attention to politics and in political values, interact in the model to explain both cross-sectional patterns of mass opinion and opinion change across surveys. The model, which is applied to data on the Vietnam War, illuminates two research problems: how complex information flows diffuse through a mass audience and how this information shapes mass belief systems.

Every opinion is a marriage of information and values—information to generate a mental picture of what is at stake and values to make a judgment about it. I propose a model of how this union occurs. The model specifies how variations over time in the amount and directional thrust of information carried in the mass media, people's differential attention to this information, and people's political values jointly determine the changing contours of public opinion on major issues. Although the model is fully tested on data from only one case, public opinion toward the Vietnam War between 1964 and 1970, other data are examined in order to indicate the model's broad significance.

Theoretical Background

Information, the Mass Media and Opinion Change

Information, as I use the term, refers exclusively to the flow of political information in the media, including news reports, commentaries, and elite leadership cues. Thus, my examination of the effects of information on opinion is, in effect, an examination of the effects of the media on opinion.

One can distinguish two approaches to media studies. One demonstrates media effects by matching aggregate-level changes in public opinion with changes in the content of the mass media (e.g., Brody 1991; Fan 1988; Page and Shapiro n.d.). When, as is often the case, the media carry countervailing information (some messages pushing opinion one way, some the other), it is possible to show that each of the opposing information flows has a definite impact on opinion.

A second approach, focusing on the individual-level dynamics of change, shows that mass communications do not affect all citizens equally or in a straightforward way. Effects, rather, depend on a two-step process involving (1) exposure to, and reception of, communications carried in the mass media and (2) acceptance of the contents of the communication, where a person's level of political awareness affects probabilities of both reception and acceptance (Converse 1962; McGuire 1969; MacKuen 1984; Zaller 1987). Thus, Converse (1962) has shown that the persons most susceptible to influence in a political campaign may be those at middle levels of political awareness. The most aware are most heavily exposed to the campaign but are also most able to defend their existing beliefs; hence, their attitudes are little influenced. The least aware pay so little attention to politics that they are insulated from efforts to change their opinions; hence, they, too, tend to be stable. This leaves persons in the middle levels of awareness (people who are attentive enough to encounter new information but not sophisticated enough to be able to resist) most susceptible to influence. In this paper, I refer to this two-step process as the reception–acceptance model of media effects.

This classification of media studies, although not exhaustive, highlights characteristic limitations of many studies. The first type of study, in relying on aggregate data, reveals little about the individual-level dynamics of persuasion. The second type, using data from one or two cross-sectional surveys at a time, cannot link opinion change to graduated changes in the content of the media. Finally, neither type of study has been able to link a two-sided information flow (i.e., one carrying both pro and con messages on a given issue) to an individual-level model of the dynamics of persuasion.

The model to be developed in this paper combines the strengths and avoids the limitations of the two approaches. The model accommodates opinion change over multiple time periods. It captures individual-level differences in both reception of, and resistance to, persuasive information. Finally, it takes central account of the effects of two-sided and differentially intense information flows.

Values As Predispositions To Resist Persuasion

Values, as I use the term, refers to any relatively stable, individual-level predisposition to accept or reject particular types of arguments. Values may be rooted in personality, philosophy, ideology, gender, experience, religion, ethnicity, occupation, or interest (among other things). Party attachments, which are often the basis on which people accept or reject political arguments (e.g., Belknap and Campbell 1951; Mueller 1973) also qualify as values under this definition. This usage of values is broader than is customary, but it is consistent with standard definitions[1] and has the advantage of permitting my argument to be pitched at a high level of generality.

A critical question about values is how, exactly, they predispose acceptance or rejection of persuasive messages. Do individuals personally analyze arguments to determine which are consistent with their values? Or do they instead rely on external cues, especially the positions of trusted groups or leaders?

Philip Converse, the leading theorist of mass opinion, maintains that few people reason for themselves about how political ideas are related to one another. Rather, to the extent that individuals respond critically to the political ideas they encounter, they rely on "contextual information" from elites about how different ideas "go together" and thereby "constrain" one another (Converse 1964).

The implication of this argument, for a situation involving mass response to persuasive communications is that people react to new information on the basis of cues concerning what types of political groups favor or oppose a given idea. However, as Converse also stresses, knowledge of these cues is likely to depend on general levels of political awareness. Hence, only people attaining fairly high levels of awareness are likely to respond to communications in a manner that is "constrained" by their values.

The psychological literature on opinion change lends support to the view that individuals typically fail to reason for themselves about the persuasive communications they encounter. A persistent finding of this literature has been that cues about the "source" of a message greatly affect how individuals judge the message. Reviewing this evidence in an influential 1969 article, McGuire wrote that the "message receiver" "can be regarded as a lazy organism who tries to master the message contents only when it is absolutely necessary to make a decision. When the purported source is clearly positively or negatively valenced, he uses this information as a cue to accept or reject the message's conclusions without really absorbing the arguments used" (p. 198).[2]

Within political science, there is an important group of studies that also maintains that citizens respond to political arguments on the basis of partisan assessments of the trustworthiness of sources (Belknap and Campbell 1951; Campbell et al. 1960; Gerber and Jackson 1990; Key 1965; Mueller 1973; Page and Shapiro n.d.; Pollock, Lilie, and Vittes 1989; Price 1989).

I, then, will build on a solid foundation in assuming that citizens respond to new information on the basis of external cues concerning the implications of that information for their values—provided that (as Converse emphasizes) they are sufficiently attentive to politics to have learned the cues.

A Two-Message Model of Mass Persuasion

Let us assume a political world in which, within every time period t and with respect to every political issue, citizens are presented with two information flows, or *messages*, one tending to push mass opinion in a liberal direction and the other in a conservative direction. The two messages represent the sum of all directionally valenced communications relating to a given issue in the period.

The model to be developed in this section will explain how, in such a world, variations over time in the relative intensities of the liberal and conservative messages[3] can explain both the cross-sectional distribution of mass opinion at any one time and changes in opinion over time.

Three axioms may now define a *two-message model* as follows:

AXIOM 1. *An individual's probabilities of receiving the liberal and conservative messages within any given time period t are independent, increasing functions of general level of political awareness, where reception indicates that the person has actually taken in and comprehended the message.*

This axiom implies that within levels of awareness, exposure to one side of an argument is uncorrelated with exposure to the other—in other words, that selective exposure does not occur. This seems justified in view of research indicating that to the extent selective exposure occurs, it does so under special conditions that do not typically arise in situations of mass persuasion (Cotton 1985; McGuire 1969; Sears and Freedman 1967; Wicklund and Brehm 1976).[4]

The mathematical form of the reception function is given below by R_{ijt}, where the subscripts allow reception to vary by individual-level differences in attentiveness (i), message (j = liberal or conservative), and time (t).

AXIOM 2. *The probability that an individual will resist (i.e., refuse to accept) a message, given reception of it, increases with (1) distance between the values of the individual and the value coloration of the message and (2) the* *likelihood that individuals will be aware of the elite-supplied "contextual information" that gives messages their colorations.*

This axiom embodies the notion that people do not automatically resist messages that are inconsistent with their values but must also possess sufficient political awareness to have learned the contextual information that conventionally determines what is consistent and what is not. A mathematical function capturing this specification, A_{ijt}, will be presented.

Before stating the third axiom, it is necessary to define *supporting messages* as those consistent with an existing opinion and *opposing messages* as those which are inconsistent. The final axiom can now be stated as follows:

AXIOM 3. *Two types of opinion change—conversion and decay—may occur: (a) when a person accepts an opposing message, having received it, and does not accept a supporting message (whether receiving it or not), the person* converts *to the opposing view; and (b) if a person accepts no messages in a given period or accepts both a supporting message and an opposing one, the person's initial opinion* decays *toward* no opinion *with a fixed probability of (d).*

Aside from the details of the reception and acceptance functions R_{ijt} and A_{ijt}, which are discussed below, these axioms fully specify a rather complex set of interactions, as will be shown.

Deductions from the Two-Message Model

We can use these axioms to write out an expression for the probability that following some time period t, an individual who initially holds a liberal opinion or no opinion will change to a conservative opinion. From axioms 1–3a, that probability must be

$$P_{i>>Ct+1} = [R_{iCt}(1 - R_{iLt})]A_{iCt} + R_{iCt}R_{iLt}[A_{iCt}(1 - A_{iLt})]. \tag{1}$$

The first term on the right-hand side is the probability that the individual will receive only a conservative message—$R_{iCt}(1 - R_{iLt})$[5]—times the probability that the person will accept it (once exposed), A_{iCt}. The second term is the probability that the individual will receive both messages—$R_{iCt}R_{iLt}$—but accept only the conservative one, $A_{iCt}(1 - A_{iLt})$. $P_{i>>Lt+1}$ can be similarly defined.

One can also write out an expression for the probability that an individual initially holding an opinion will decay to *no opinion.* That probability is *d* times the probability that the person either accepts no message or accepts both a supporting and opposing message, which is as follows:

$$\begin{aligned} P_{i>>Non_{t+1}} &= d[(1 - R_{iCt})(1 - R_{iLt}) \\ &\quad + R_{iCt}(1 - R_{iLt})(1 - A_{iCt}) \\ &\quad + R_{iLt}(1 - R_{iCt})(1 - A_{iLt}) \\ &\quad + R_{iCt}R_{iLt}A_{iCt}A_{iLt}] \\ &= d(1 - P_{i>>Ct+1} - P_{i>>Lt+1}). \end{aligned} \tag{2}$$

This expression is important because it permits estimation of rates of nonopinionation in different segments of the population, depending on the intensities of the two messages and the person's level of attention to politics. Thus, no opinion responses can be regarded as substantively interesting responses in this model rather than (as in most models of public opinion) as missing data.

At some initial moment, everyone has a fixed probability of holding a liberal or conservative opinion or no opinion. Let us call these probabilities $Lib_{(t)}$, $Con_{(t)}$ and $Non_{(t)}$. Then, the probabilities for opinion change defined by equations 1 and 2 (i.e.,

Figure 1. Framework of the Two-Message Model



$P_{>>C}$, $P_{>>L}$, and $P_{>>Non}$) describe a simple Markov system, shown in Figure 1; the figure, in turn, enables us to specify the proportion of individuals that will still have a liberal opinion at time $(t + 1)$. Suppressing the i subscripts, this term is

$$\begin{aligned}\mathrm{Lib}_{(t+1)} &= \mathrm{Lib}_{(t)} - [P_{>>C}\,\mathrm{Lib}_{(t)}] \\ &- [P_{>>Non}\,\mathrm{Lib}_{(t)}] \\ &+ [P_{>>L}(\mathrm{Con}_{(t)} + \mathrm{Non}_{(t)})]. \qquad (3)\end{aligned}$$

A parallel expression can, of course, be written for conservative opinion at $t + 1$.

With some algebraic manipulation, equation 3 can be rewritten as a difference equation that gives the probability of having a liberal opinion after the passage of N time periods, as follows:

$$\begin{aligned}\mathrm{Lib}_{(t+N)} &= \mathrm{Lib}_{(t)}X^N \\ &+ P_{>>L}\,\frac{1 - X^N}{1 - X}, \qquad (4)\end{aligned}$$

where

$$\begin{aligned}X &= 1 - P_{>>C} - P_{>>L} - d \\ &+ d(P_{>>C} + P_{>>L}).\end{aligned}$$

One may conceptualize time as consisting of an infinitude of arbitrarily tiny time units. If so, N is infinity, in which case the term X^N in equation 4 (a proportion raised to an infinite power) goes to zero. This leaves

$$\begin{aligned}\mathrm{Lib}_{(t+N)} &= P_{>>L}\,\frac{1 - X^N}{1 - X} \\ &= \frac{P_{>>L}}{P_{>>C} + P_{>>L} + d - d(P_{>>C} + P_{>>L})}\end{aligned}$$

Thus, opinion at any point in time represents an equilibrium outcome that is independent of starting values. This equilibrium depends, at the aggregate level, on the intensities of the competing information flows and, at the individual level, on people's attention to politics and their values. Opinion change in response to persuasive information—a central topic of my analysis—can be captured as an overtime difference between equilibrium points, where changing equilibria depend on change in the competing information flows.

Form of the Reception and Acceptance Functions

The first axiom assumes that reception of information increases with political awareness. There are strong theoretical reasons for representing this relationship by the S-shaped logistic functional form rather than the more tractable linear form. First, the model deals in probabilities that vary between zero and one; the logistic function varies naturally between these limits, whereas the linear function does not. On these grounds alone, the logistic function is preferable. A second line of argument is that one can conceptualize reception of a particular idea as a "test" of political awareness that some people will "pass" (through successful reception of the message) and others will "fail." From this point it follows via standard test theory that the relationship between awareness and reception should be described by the normal ogive function, which is closely approximated by the logistic form (Lord and Novick 1968, chaps. 16, 17). Hence, I assume that the reception function R_{ijt} in axiom 2 can be represented as the following type of logistic function:

$$\text{Prob(Reception)}_{ijt} = (1 + \text{Exp}[-a_{0jt} - a_1 \text{Aware}_i])^{-1}. \quad (5)$$

According to equation 5, the reception probability of the i^{th} individual rises with political awareness from a floor of 0 to a maximum of 1.0. The steepness of the awareness-induced rise is determined by the a_1 parameter.

The a_0 coefficient captures the loudness of messages in the media. Since intensities of competing messages may differ and since their intensities may also change over time, the a_0 coefficient is subscripted for the directional thrust of the message ($j = L, C$) and time t. The time t subscript is especially critical. It enables a_0 to capture changes in the intensities of the competing messages, which in turn generate opinion change.

I turn now to the acceptance function, A_{ijt}. As before, this function deals with probabilities, so I use a logistic function to represent the negative relationship between awareness and likelihood of accepting a message, as follows:

$$\begin{aligned}\text{Prob(Accept} \mid \text{Reception)}_{ijt} &= (1 + \text{Exp}[b_{0_j} + b_1 \text{Aware}_i \\ &+ b_{2jt}\text{Values}_i \\ &+ b_3\{\text{Time} \times \text{Values}\} \\ &+ b_4\text{Time} + \ldots b_n X])^{-1}. \quad (6)\end{aligned}$$

This equation requires some explication. Axiom 2 implies that the effect of values on resistance to persuasive communications is doubly contingent. It depends on the availability of elite cues to link values to the given messages and on the person's awareness of these cues. Equation 6 captures both contingencies. The inclusion of measures of awareness and values within a logistic function makes the effect of each dependent on the level of the other. Thus, values may have little impact except at high levels of political awareness.[6] Meanwhile, the b_3 and b_4 terms permit the effect of values to vary over time in response to changes in the pattern of elite cues. Since elite ideological disagreement over Vietnam was minimal in the early phases of the war but intense at the end, the b_3 term is expected to be positive, thus indicating that the effect of values on opinion increased over time. (The term b_4 is a nuisance term included to allow an intercept shift in the event that b_3 is nonzero; the j subscript on b_2 is to allow the sign of the coefficient to vary with the directional thrust of the message.)

The ellipses in equation 6 indicate that one could, in the usual multivariate fashion, add multiple indicators of people's values to the acceptance function. Yet in the analysis that follows, I use only two indicators of values at a time. The reason is that my aim is not to disentangle the separate effects of a series of collinear measures but to illuminate the *process* by which values, broadly understood, interact with other types of factors; and this purpose is best served by avoiding multiple indicators.

The Data

The Center for Political Studies (CPS) surveys conducted during the Vietnam War constitute one of the finest data sets available for studying mass opinion change on a major issue. Among the attractive features of this data set are (1) four separate measurements of an opinion that was rapidly changing; (2) an opportunity to observe public opinion shift in opposing directions (toward greater support for the war from 1964 to 1966 and toward lesser support for it after that); and (3) the availability of items from which measures of political awareness and political values can be constructed.

The question available to measure opinions toward the war during the period 1964–1970 is, "Which of the following do you think we should do now in Vietnam?" (1) "Pull out of Vietnam entirely," (2) "Keep our soldiers in Vietnam but try to end the fighting," or (3) "Take a stronger stand even if it means invading North Vietnam."

The second option, because it represents the official policy of both the Johnson and Nixon administrations (Gelb and Betts 1979), will be counted as war support in the analysis that follows, as will the third response option. The pull-out option will be counted as opposition to the war.[7]

The analysis also requires the construction of highly similar measures of awareness and political values in all four surveys, so that similar types of people can be located in each survey. With respect to awareness, this is fairly easy to do. Each survey contains a set of political knowledge items sufficient to build an awareness scale with an alpha reliability of .80 or better. Although the knowledge items vary from year to year, the variation may be assumed to be largely inconsequential.[8] (See Appendix A for a listing of the items.)

Building comparable measures of political values is more difficult. One possible measure of values is a person's ideological position on the left-right continuum, which can be measured in the Center for Political Studies (CPS) surveys as the difference in feeling thermometer scores for liberals and conservatives. This measure, however, has a major difficulty. Although ideology must function in the model as an exogenous cause of opinion toward the war in Vietnam, it is possible that influence runs partly in the other direction. It is possible, that is, that people form evaluations of liberals and conservatives partly on the basis of their opinion on the Vietnam issue rather than vice versa.[9]

Another possibility is to use people's general feelings of hawkishness or dovishness as the measure of predispositions to support or oppose the war. The advantage of hawk-dove attitudes is that it is the dimension of left-right orientation most likely to affect opinions toward the Vietnam War. The problem is that the 1964–70 CPS surveys contain no direct measure of it.

It is possible, however, to use Franklin's (1989) two-sample instrumental variables technique to construct a proxy measure of hawk-dove attitudes. This technique, which uses information from one data set to build instrumental variables in another data set, produces measures that are asymptotically unbiased and efficient.

In applying the method to the Vietnam case, I began with the 1988 National Election Study (NES) survey study, which contained items measuring general feelings of hawkishness, such as "Which do you think is the better way for us to keep the peace—by having a very strong military so that other countries won't attack us, or by working out our disagreements at the bargaining table?"[10]

I next located a set of "auxiliary" predictor variables, that is, variables that were correlated with the hawk-dove items in 1988 *and* were carried in identical form in the 1964–70 CPS surveys. Examples of such variables are sex, religion, and racial attitudes. Finally, using coefficients from an ordinary least squares regression of hawk-dove scores on the auxiliary variables in 1988, I constructed an "instrument" for each person's hawk-dove feelings. This instrumental variable was then built from the same auxiliary items in the 1964–70 data sets and used as a measure of hawk-dove feelings in those data sets.

With proper care in selecting auxiliary

variables, a predispositional variable constructed in this way avoids the worrisome endogeneity associated with the ideology thermometers. A weakness, however, is that the instrument is only as good as the auxiliary variables that are used to construct it—which in the present case is not very good, since the r-squared on the first stage regression is only .14. (See Appendix B for further details and discussion.)

We have, then, two measures of citizens' value predispositions: ratings of liberals and conservatives and an instrumental measure of hawk-dove feelings. Since neither is without blemish, I use each in parallel analyses. Happily, these analyses produce results that are the same in every important respect.

One final measurement issue needs to be addressed. Although CPS asked its basic Vietnam question in each of four surveys, there is a noteworthy discontinuity. In 1964 and 1966, all respondents were asked whether they were "paying attention to what [was] going on in Vietnam," and only those indicating interest were subsequently asked whether they supported or opposed U.S. involvement. In 1964, some 20% of the respondents failed this minimal test of interest and were not asked whether they supported or opposed the war; in 1966, persons failing to pass the initial interest screen fell to 7%. Then, in 1968 and 1970, the interest screen was dropped, so that only those volunteering a *no opinion* response are counted in that category.

This discontinuity makes it difficult to offer confident estimates of the changes in *no opinion* rates between 1966 and 1968. Yet the trajectory of decline from 1964 to 1966 in *no attention* responses (from 20% to 7%) suggests that the number of such respondents still having no interest in 1968 was small; and, of course, respondents could still volunteer a *no opinion* response to the Vietnam item itself. Some 7% did in 1968, which was down from 9% in 1966 and 13% in 1964. The fact that volunteered *don't know* rates continued to fall in 1968 despite removal of the interest filter, as well as other published data (Pierce, Beatty, and Hagner 1982, 142), makes it clear that *no opinion* rates did continue falling between 1966 and 1968. But the CPS data may overestimate the amount by which they did so.

This problem can be accommodated by adding a "floor parameter" to the reception function, as follows:

$$\text{Prob(Reception)}_{ijt} = 1 - (1 + f_t + \text{Exp}[a_{0jt} + a_i \text{Aware}_i])^{-1}, \qquad (7)$$

where f_t changes to reflect the change in question format.

The modified reception function differs from the original equation 5 in only one respect: rather than rising from a minimum value of zero to a maximum of one, it rises from a nonzero floor determined by f_t. This permits the model to attribute opinions to people whose awareness levels are so low that they are unlikely to have been exposed to any argument but who might nonetheless have responded to the Vietnam question when the *no opinion* filter was removed in 1968. (Alternatively, the additional parameter can be thought of as creating a more flexible, three-parameter reception function.)

Empirical Results

The model makes multinomial predictions to three categories: support for the war, opposition, and no opinion. These predictions are made across four data sets having 5,002 respondents. Initial estimation of the model indicated that patterns of opinion change were different among ethnic whites than among other groups. A separate analysis was therefore undertaken for blacks and is reported; however, Hispanic and Asian-American respondents have been omitted because there are too few cases for separate analysis.

Table 1. Coefficient Estimates for Two-Message Model

Variables	Value Measure: Ideology Thermometers	Value Measure: Hawk-Dove Instrument
Reception function (equation 7)[a]		
Awareness (a_1)	1.33*	1.14*
Floor 64–66 (f_t)	.00024	.00087
Floor 68–70 (f_t)	.0026*	.0092*
Acceptance function (equation 6)		
Liberal message intercept (b_{0L})	-4.75*	-5.03*
Conservative message intercept (b_{0C})	.08	.65
Awareness (b_1)	.91*	.85*
Values (b_2)[b]	.17	.26
Values × Year (b_3)	.77*	.71*
Year (b_4)	-2.15	-1.34
Gender (male = 1)	-.61*	-.84*
Decay parameter (d in equation 2)	.0025*	.0081*

Source: 1964, 1966, 1968, and 1970 CPS studies.

Note: $N = 5{,}002$. Dependent variable is a multinomial item on Vietnam policy. The awareness and values variables have been standardized. Coefficient descriptions are keyed to equations 2, 6, and 7 in text.

[a] Intercepts for reception function (a_{0jt}) are shown in Figure 2 and n. 13.

[b] Coefficient is negative in A_{iLt}, indicating less resistance to a liberal message, and positive in A_{iCt}. Liberal poles of these variables are scored high. The gender coefficient also changes signs, depending on message coloration.

*$p < .05$, two-tailed test.

Maximum likelihood coefficient estimates for whites are shown in Table 1.[11] Owing to high collinearity in the estimates of some coefficients, the f-test is the most appropriate test of the statistical significance of the estimates.[12] When this test is performed, most coefficients in the model—all of the substantively important ones—achieve statistical significance, as indicated in Table 1.

The coefficients specifying the influence of values on the acceptance of war information require comment. As noted earlier, the impacts of ideology and hawk-dove feelings were expected to increase over the course of the war as elite ideological disagreement became more intense. The timing of that increase, however, was left open. The increased impact of values might have occurred either gradually, as elite ideological disagreements intensified; or suddenly, at the point when, owing to elite position taking in Congress and elsewhere, liberalism and conservatism first became associated with different stands on the war (i.e., about the time of the Fulbright hearings in early 1966). Since there was no basis in theory for deciding between these alternative possibilities, it was necessary to investigate them empirically.

When a model was specified to allow ideology (or hawkishness) to take a different coefficient in each year (and hence to increase its impact gradually over time), the impact of ideology (or hawkishness) on opinion tended to rise over time; but almost all of the rise came in 1966. Meanwhile, a model that specified a one-step increase in 1966 fit the data essentially as well as the model that permitted year-by-year increases. Parsimony there-

Figure 2. Three Estimates of Trends in Media Content

2a. Coefficient estimates of media trends



2b. Story count from newsweeklies



2c. Pages of listings from N.Y. Times index



fore indicated that the simple, one-step model be used. As Table 1 shows, the impact of the ideology measure in this model increased by a factor of about 3.5 in 1966.

This injection of left-right values into the war debate was a critical element in the evolution of mass opinion on this issue, since the change in elite-supplied "contextual information" about "what goes with what" fueled development of ideological divisions among mass liberals and conservatives.

Let us now examine estimates of the eight a_{0jt} coefficients from the reception function, which are shown graphically in Figure 2a.[13] In this figure and in the remainder of my analysis, I rely on results from the ideology measure because it enabled the model to fit the data slightly better than did the hawk-dove measure; both sets of results, however, generate the same substantive conclusions.

The a_{0jt} coefficients in Figure 2 are the model's estimate of the intensities of the pro- and antiwar information flows that were necessary to produce the observed patterns of opinion toward the war. The absolute magnitudes of these coefficients have little meaning, but changes over time in relative magnitudes are important. In particular, the initial rise and subsequent slight decline in the magnitudes of the prowar coefficients indicate that prowar messages became more intense from 1964 through 1968 and then perhaps declined slightly. The antiwar message, for its part, appears to have been always less intense than the prowar message but to have gained steadily after 1964.

To check the plausibility of these implied claims about information flow during the war, I examined Hallin's (1984) published analysis of prowar and antiwar statements in the television news. A central finding of his study was that "spokesmen for administration policy were heavily predominant during the early period [prior to spring 1968], while after Tet there was relative parity between the administration and its critics" (p. 9). Hallin also reports that the overall volume of war coverage increased through about 1965 and remained roughly steady until after 1970 (personal communication, 23 July 1991).

These estimates obviously agree with those of the model. Since, however, Hallin's data are based on a sample of convenience and since his analysis begins in 1965 and focuses on television coverage, I asked a research assistant to undertake an analysis of war reporting over a broader period, 1963–70, and to examine coverage in three news magazines, *Time*, *Newsweek*, and *Life*. The research assistant was unaware of my expectations as to what the analysis might show. His procedure was to examine each magazine issue in which the Vietnam War or related events (such as antiwar protests) were featured on the cover. He then read all Vietnam stories in that issue, rating each as predominantly prowar in its slant, predominantly antiwar, or offering support for both positions.

The results of the content analysis, as depicted in Figure 2b, bear a rough similarity to the estimates of the model in Figure 2a, as indicated by a Pearson correlation of .79 ($p < .01$) between logged story counts and the exposure coefficients.[14] Substantively, both sets of estimates claim that the intensity of the antiwar message increased continuously from 1964 to 1970. Both also agree that the prowar message gained intensity in the early war years and lost intensity at the end. But there are important differences. The model sees no decline in the overall volume of war coverage and perhaps even a continuous increase, whereas the story count indicates a reduction in news coverage in both 1968 and 1970. Also, the story count indicates that antiwar information predominates by 1970, whereas the model implies that the prowar message remained the more intense message.

In view of the discrepancy between the magazine count on the one hand and Hallin's findings and the estimates of the model on the other, I examined news in a third medium, the *New York Times*. In particular, I did a simple count of pages in the *New York Times Index* devoted to stories about Vietnam. The results, displayed in Figure 2c, agree with the model and with Hallin in suggesting that the total volume of war coverage remained high in the later years of the war.[15]

Also, because of the divergence in estimates of the direction of war news in 1970, I rated the principal *New York Times* stories of 1970, as abstracted in the index.[16] In general agreement with Hallin's and the model's estimates, I found the directional thrust of these stories evenly balanced.

Different indexes of media content thus give somewhat different results, especially for the period after 1968. It nonetheless appears that the model's indirect estimates of information flow (i.e., estimates derived from public opinion data alone) are both inherently plausible and within the range of the various direct estimates of media content, especially those of newspaper and television coverage of the war.

Patterns of Support for the War

The coefficient estimates in Table 1 can be used to construct graphical estimates of trends in support of the war. This has been done in Figure 3, which depicts estimated patterns of support for the war among strong liberals and conservatives, as indicated by feeling thermometer scores, at different times and levels of awareness.[17]

It should be noted, first of all, that the patterns in Figure 3 agree with a similarly organized plot of the raw data (not shown), which shows subgroup means by awareness, values, and time. The correlation between the two plots is above .90, and there are no substantively significant differences between them.

In analyzing Figure 3, let us look first at liberals. The top left panel of the figure shows that in 1964, political awareness among liberals bore a positive relationship with support for the war. This exemplifies what has been called the "mainstream" or "follower" model of opinion formation (Gamson and Modigliani 1966; Mueller 1973). The central idea in this model is that when, as in 1964, elites are unified in support of a policy, higher levels of awareness are associated with greater exposure to the elite consensus in the media and hence greater support for it. That U.S. political elites really united in support of the Vietnam War in this period is clear from the congressional vote on the Gulf of Tonkin resolution, which authorized an open-ended U.S. involvement in Vietnam. This resolution passed without opposition in the House and by a vote of 88 to 2 in the Senate.

By 1966, however, the mainstream consensus was unraveling. Administration policies were being increasingly criticized in Congress, and the media was increasing its antiwar coverage. In reaction, President Johnson mounted a series of "peace offensives," condemnations of "communist aggression," and other publicity actions in an effort to mobilize greater support for the war. Thus, as Figure 2 shows, both the antiwar and prowar messages became "louder" between 1964 and 1966.

These changes in the flow of communications had clear (though, as would be expected, partially offsetting) effects on

Figure 3. Trends in Support for Vietnam War, 1964–1970



Note: Estimates based on coefficients in Table 1.

the opinions of liberals. Focusing still on the top left panel of Figure 3, we see that the intensified prowar message registered mainly among liberals in the middle-to-low range of awareness. People in this range had previously been only lightly exposed to the prowar message and were readily mobilized when the intensified prowar message reached them. Meanwhile, the nascent antiwar message, though still inaudible to most of the public, began to reach the most politically aware liberals, who, in consequence, became less supportive of the war between 1964 and 1966.

This two-directional opinion change (less aware liberals moving to greater support for the war at the same time that the most aware liberals are moving away from it) makes a critical point, namely, that neither citizen values, nor relative intensity of political information flows, nor citizen attention to political information can alone explain opinion; rather, it is a complex (and highly nonlinear) interaction among them that determines both static patterns of opinion and overtime changes in these patterns.

Figure 2 indicates that between 1966 and 1968, the antiwar message continued to intensify, with effects on liberals that are shown in the top middle panel of Figure 3. Moderately attentive liberals now join their more attentive fellows in beginning to move strongly in an antiwar direction. Finally, as shown at the top right of Figure 3, liberals at all levels of awareness were turning antiwar in 1970. Thus, the antiwar message had achieved sufficient intensity to reach even the less attentive strata of society.

It is worth stressing how exactly the model accounts for the curvilinear patterns of war support evident among liberals from 1966 onward. The most informed liberals are heavily exposed to both messages but are more likely to accept antiwar news because it is more congenial to their values. Moderately informed liberals may also be exposed to both messges; but if they are exposed to only one, it is likely to be the louder, prowar one. Also, since moderately aware people are, by axiom 2, less able to discriminate between messages on ideological grounds, they often end up simply internalizing the louder message. Together, these points explain the bulge in support for the war among liberals in the middle range of political awareness. Finally, the least informed liberals are, like everyone else, more likely to be exposed to the prowar message if they are exposed to any message at all. But they are often exposed to no message, with the result that they lapse into *no opinion* more frequently than any other segment of the public, thereby exhibiting low levels of war support. In this way, the nonmonotonic pattern of war support among liberals represents an equilibrium outcome in which the effects of pro- and antiwar messages cross-cut one another, but do so to different degrees in different segments of the public.

I turn now to the opinions of conservatives, as shown in the lower half of Figure 3. Except for a step change in war support in 1966 in response to the intensified prowar message of that year, the dominant impression is one of stability. Awareness is strongly associated with support for the war in 1964, when war support was a mainstream norm; and it remained strongly associated in 1970, when Vietnam was merely a conservative norm. This equilibrium outcome is different than that for liberals because conservatives largely resisted the antiwar message to which they, as much as liberals, were increasingly exposed.

Some conservatives did, to be sure, respond to the strong antiwar message of the late 1960s. As Figure 4 indicates, these tended to be *moderately aware* conservatives—that is to say, conservatives who paid enough attention to be exposed to antiwar information but, in contrast to

Figure 4. Changes in Support for Vietnam War, 1968-1970



Note: Figure shows percent of each type of person who supported the Vietnam War in 1968 but switched to opposition by 1970. Estimates are derived from coefficients in Table 1.

highly aware conservatives, were not sufficiently sophisticated to be able to resist it. Among liberals (as Figure 4 also shows), the most sophisticated were most susceptible to change: As sophisticates, they were heavily exposed to liberal antiwar ideas; and as liberals, they were predisposed to accept them.

Black Support for the War

The small number of blacks available for analysis in the CPS data sets makes it difficult to achieve a confident assessment of their support for the war. Nonetheless, the available data reveal some highly suggestive patterns, as shown in Figure 5. The data in this figure have been constructed from the coefficients of simple polynomial regressions (one regression within each year) of war support on political awareness.

The data in the left panel of Figure 5 show patterns of war support among blacks in 1964 and 1966. In both years, blacks conform to the mainstream pattern: greater political awareness is associated with greater support for the mainstream policy. Support for the war among moderately and poorly informed blacks increased between 1964 and 1966, reflecting the intensification of prowar communications that also affected white opinion. Contrary to some analyses, these data give no indication that blacks were reluctant to support the war.[18]

As can be seen by a comparison with

Figure 5. Trends in Black Support for Vietnam War, 1964-1970



Note: Estimates are derived from coefficients of regression of war support on political awareness within each survey.

Figure 3, black support patterns in the early phase of the war resemble those of white conservatives. After 1966, however, the opinions of blacks resemble those of white liberals; that is, war support significantly declined, especially among highly and moderately informed blacks—the result of the continued diffusion of the antiwar message to which blacks, as a heavily liberal group, now responded sympathetically.

Nothing in the survey data can, by itself, explain why black opinion toward the war should resemble that of white conservatives until 1966 and that of white liberals after that time. There is, however, a fairly obvious out-of-data explanation: the Vietnam War was led by Lyndon Johnson, who in 1964 and 1965 won congressional approval for two historic civil rights bills and also launched his ambitious War on Poverty. In light of this, blacks were apparently more likely than whites to accept Johnson's war leadership. By 1968, however, Johnson's civil rights achievements were well behind him; and many black civil rights leaders, including the recently assassinated Martin Luther King, had come out against the war. In this situation, blacks became more susceptible to the liberal antiwar message.

Thus, blacks appear to have been as responsive as whites to the flow of pro- and antiwar information on Vietnam; however, blacks apparently evaluated this information in light of somewhat different leadership cues.

Gender and Support for the War

As indicated in Table 1, gender has a statistically significant effect on war opinion: males are less resistant than females to prowar information and more resistant to antiwar information.

This finding, however, is more subtle than it may at first seem. The acceptance function in equation 6 assumes that gender interacts with awareness to produce larger impacts at higher levels of awareness; and the significant coefficient obtained for gender in this function supports this assumption.

Figure 6. Gender Differences in Support for Vietnam War in 1970



To be certain that the interaction between gender and awareness is more than an artifact of model specification, I examined the raw data. As Figure 6 shows, the expected interaction is clearly evident in these data. Here, as elsewhere, relatively high levels of political awareness are necessary for the effective translation of political predispositions into appropriate policy preferences.

Yet these results are not fully in accord with the two-message model. According to axiom 2, awareness heightens the impact of values because it is associated with the learning of elite cues. In the case of gender, however, it is difficult to say exactly where these cues might have come from. One possibility is the emergence of the women's movement in the late 1960s; but then, the impact of gender on opinion should have been larger in the later years of the war, and it was not. Thus, it appears that elite cues, though essential for understanding how ideology, hawkishness, and race affected war opinion, may have been irrelevant in the case of gender.

But if elite cues are irrelevant, why does awareness (as we have just seen) still interact with gender to affect the acceptance step of the persuasion process? My surmise is that superior learning of elite cues is an important—but not necessarily the only—reason for the greater value-sensitivity of highly aware persons. Greater capacity for independent judgment of issues in light of one's values may also play a role (see also Carmines and Stimson 1982).

Changes in Rate of Opinionation

I note in closing that although my analysis has focused on differing rates of support for the Vietnam War, the model can also be used to estimate trends in opposition to the war and in *don't know* rates. The latter are rather interesting, as derived from the coefficients in Table 1 and depicted in Figure 7. There is, as would be expected, a strong relationship between don't know rates and political awareness in all four years. But the relationship seems to flatten out late in the war as the intensified information flows reduced overall levels of don't know. (It is this pattern of don't know rates that led the model to estimate that the intensity of war news increased through 1968 and remained stable thereafter.)

Figure 7. Estimated No Opinion Rates Among Centrists, 1964–1970



Note: Estimates are derived from coefficients in Table 1.

Concluding Remarks

I have focused on interactions among three broad classes of variables: aggregate-level variation in the information carried in the media, including elite cues about how new information should be evaluated; individual-level differences in political values; and individual-level differences in chronic political awareness. Interactions among these variables conform to a few simple principles, as embodied in the axioms of the two-message model, but can explain a wide variety of empirical outcomes.

The critical question at this point is whether the model applies to a wider range of cases than Vietnam. The answer is that it surely does. Although the pattern of information flows on Vietnam was probably unique, there are many issues for which information flows resembled those of *particular phases of the Vietnam War;* and for those cases, the public response was essentially the same as in the Vietnam case.

Consider first the early phase of the Vietnam War, in which most elites and most media reporting favored the war. In this period, political awareness was monotonically associated with support for the war. This "mainstream pattern" of opinion holding tends to recur whenever elites achieve a consensus on a mainstream policy. It has arisen in the nonpartisan phases of all of the United States' modern wars: World War II (Cantril 1944, 212), Korea, and Vietnam (Mueller 1973)—and even (initial evidence suggests) the Persian Gulf War.[19] The mainstream pattern has also appeared on a wide range of domestic policies on which elites reached agreement among themselves, including issues of business, race, and civil liberties (see Chong, McClosky, and Zaller 1984; McClosky and Brill 1983, 421).

Later in the Vietnam War, the mainstream consensus dissolved into intense disagreement among ideologically opposed elites. In this period, political awareness was associated with greater *support* for the war among mass conservatives and hawks but greater *opposition* among mass liberals and doves. In other words, political awareness became associated with heightened levels of value-based polarization.

This *polarization pattern* is also a common pattern of mass opinion in the United States. It arises whenever (as in the later phase of the Vietnam War) elites disagree along partisan lines on a salient issue (Belknap and Campbell 1951; Chong, McClosky, and Zaller 1984). Since this pattern is less familiar to opinion researchers, I provide simple evidence of its frequency in Figure 8, which shows how party attachment interacted with political awareness to affect opinions toward three salient themes in the 1984 election (level of government services, social welfare, and defense spending).[20] The fourth cell of Figure 8, included for purposes of comparison, is a rearrangement of liberal-conservative differences on the Vietnam War in 1970 (shown earlier in Figure 3).

It is significant that the polarization pattern, as depicted in Figure 8, is the basis of attitude consistency in the mass public—in particular, its well-known tendency to increase with levels of political awareness. To see how this is so, observe that highly aware Democrats and Republicans in Figure 8 take "consistently" ideological positions across a range of issues but that their less politically aware counterparts exhibit little such consistency. Thus, the operation of the two-message process across multiple issues explains the development of ideological belief systems in mass publics, as described by Converse (1964).

Finally, the pattern of opinion change detected by the two-message model between 1968 and 1970 is also familiar in the existing literature. My previous studies have shown that when overall opinion shifts in a liberal direction, opinion change among liberals and conservatives closely conforms to the pattern of monotonic and nonmonotonic relationships shown in Figure 4 (Zaller 1987, 1989, n.d.). The only difference is that previous work, employing a one-message version of the reception-acceptance model, has explained these patterns of opinion change as a response to a one-sided message, whereas in the present case, the two-message model explains opinion change as a response to shifts in the relative intensity of two messages.

It thus appears that a large fraction of what the two-message model has been able to explain about the Vietnam case—the mainstream and polarization effects, attitude consistency that varies by political awareness, and a particular pattern of opinion change in response to persuasive communications—is familiar in the empirical literature. This familiarity strongly suggests the applicability of the model to many cases other than Vietnam.

The general applicability of the two-message model should be no surprise. Its defining axioms have been derived from the existing literature—especially the reception-acceptance model of media effects developed by Converse (1962) and others, and Converse's classic (1964) argument on how values constrain opinion. What is novel about the two-message model is its mode of formalizing ideas long extant in the public opinion literature.

Altogether, then, the two-message model contributes to, and helps to integrate, two research problems. With respect to the mass media, the model specifies in greater detail than previous research how streams of competing information diffuse through—and interact

Figure 8. Examples of Polarization Pattern



(from Figure 3)

Note: Political awareness is measured by tests of political knowledge. No opinion responses are included in base on which percentages are calculated.

with individual-level characteristics of—a mass audience. With respect to ideology, the model shows how mass belief systems develop from the interaction of competing, ideologically cued information flows and a citizenry that differs in its values and its degree of political awareness.

Appendix A: Measurement of Political Awareness

Much evidence indicates that simple tests of political knowledge are the most reliable and valid measures of political awareness (Fiske, Lau, and Smith 1990; Price and Zaller 1990; Zaller 1990).

In building awareness scales, I gave respondents one point for every correct answer given, except as indicated. Persons with missing data were not eliminated unless more than two-thirds of their responses were missing. Instead, these persons were assigned the average score for the items for which data was available. All the variable designations refer to the code books for these studies published by the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research at the University of Michigan.

The SPSS code used to create these variables is available on request.

1964 CPS Election Study

A 16-point scale: Johnson's and Goldwater's home state and religion (v294 to v297); which party is more conservative (v302); the majority in Congress (v305, v306); congressional candidate names and incumbency status (three items, v309, v312); which party favors government utilities (v346); China's form of government and United Nations status (two items, v352); Cuba's form of government (v354); knowledge of 1964 Civil Rights Act (v406, v407).

1966 CPS Election Study

A 15-point scale: congressional candidate names and incumbency status (three items, v90, v92); majority in Congress (v100, v101); names of U.S. Supreme Court justices (up to four points, v167); interviewer rating of respondent information level (up to four points, v242). Since this scale was used to measure exposure to news about Vietnam, I awarded up to two points for expression of interest in foreign affairs (v65).

1968 CPS Election Study

A 17-point scale: China's form of government and United Nations status (two items, v107); Cuba's form of government (v109); which party is conservative (v361); congressional candidate names and incumbency status (three items, v386, v387); the majority in Congress (v305, v306); up to two points for expression of interest in foreign affairs (v102). There were also two interviewer rating scales, v269 on preelection and v531 on postelection, which were averaged to yield a maximum of four points, and two tests of ability to make proper comparative placements of politicians on issue scales, namely, Johnson and Wallace on Vietnam (v466 and v469); Humphrey and Wallace on urban unrest (v461 and v463).

1970 CPS Awareness Scale

An 18-point scale: attention to Vietnam (v40); which party is more conservative (v177); congressional candidate (v203); percentage of tax dollar to defense (v256); who can change law (v258); the number of allowable terms for a president (v259); term of U.S. Senator (v260); term of congressman (v261); interviewer rating of respondent information (up to four points, v396). There were four comparative location tests, namely, Democrats and Republicans on Vietnam (v93 and v94), Muskie and Wallace on aid to minorities (v110 and v111), Democrats and Nixon on inflation (v114 and v116), and Muskie and Wallace on criminal rights (v124 and v125); also, two one-item location tests, namely, Wallace on urban unrest and Vietnam (v90, v97).

Appendix B: Measurement of Hawk-Dove Attitudes

Franklin's instrumental variables technique provides "a method of estimating relationships between variables not measured in the same dataset" (1989, 23). One has a measure of variable X in data set A but not data set B; however, the dependent variable of interest, variable Y, is in data set B. One then locates a set of auxiliary variables carried in both data sets. The X variable is regressed on these auxiliary variables in data set A, an instrument for X is built from the resulting coefficient estimates, and this instrument is used in data set B as an independent predictor of variable Y. In the present case, the X variable is a measure of hawk-dove attitudes, as measured in the 1988 NES; the Y variable is opinion about the Vietnam War, as measured in the CPS surveys of 1964–70. Provided appropriate assumptions are met, Franklin's technique makes it possible to build an instrumental measure of hawk-dove attitudes in the CPS data sets from information contained in the 1988 NES study.

The most important of these assumptions are that both data sets are samples of the same population and that relationships between the auxiliary variables and the X variable are the same in both data sets. The latter assumption is obviously the more worrisome, since the data sets were created 18–24 years apart. Nonetheless, it is not implausible to believe that the types of persons most likely to be doves in 1988 (e.g., females, atheists, and civil rights liberals) were likely to be doves in the 1960s, as well, provided they were given appropriate leadership cues. In fact, all of these variables are correlated with opinions toward the Vietnam War in the expected directions. Hence, despite some concern, it is reasonable to assume that the conditions necessary to apply the Franklin technique have been met.

Two variables, however, require comment. First, age is associated with greater hawkishness in 1988 (as measured by general hawk-dove items of the type shown in the text) but less support for the Vietnam War in the 1960s. This does not, however, appear to represent an overtime change, since older persons, though presumably still tending to be hawkish in 1991, were also less likely to support U.S. military involvement in the Persian Gulf crisis.[21] Second, education is associated with less hawkishness in 1988 but greater support for the Vietnam War, especially in the early phase of the war. This reversal is best explained by Mueller's observation that better-educated persons, though not dispositionally hawkish, are more susceptible to elite opinion leadership, since they are more heavily exposed to what elites are saying. Again, this does not seem to represent a change in the last 20 years, since education was positively associated with support for mainstream policy in the nation's most recent war even though it was negatively associated with hawkishness, as measured by the NES in 1988.[22] But even though no overtime sign changes appear to have occurred, the "wrong-way" correlations of age and education with hawkishness indicate that they should not be used in building an instrumental measure that is intended to measure predispositions to support the Vietnam War.

The ordinary least squares coefficients used in building the hawk-dove instrument, along with information concerning the auxiliary variables, are shown in Table A-1.

Table A-1. First-Stage Regression Estimates for Hawk–Dove Instrument

Variables	Coefficient	*t*-ratio
Agnostic or atheist	.40	4.04
Catholic	.15	2.51
Fundamentalist[a]	–.18	2.54
Jehovah's Witness	.98	1.05
Jew	.55	2.99
Pacifist religion[b]	.43	1.53
Church attendance[c]	.08	3.57
Too slow on civil rights (845)[d]	.50	6.01
Too fast on civil rights	–.38	6.75
Border state	–.01	.16
Southern state	–.13	1.91
Union member	–.11	1.68
Number of cases	1441	
Adjusted R^2	.15	

Source: 1988 National Election Study.

Note: Dependent variable consists of five items, combined by principal components analysis into a scale: strong military or bargain for peace (v966); importance of strong military (v967); U.S. should stay most powerful (v972); communist takeovers always a threat (v973); U.S. must stop communism (v974). High scores indicate dovish responses.

[a] Codes 130–49 and 152 on v527.

[b] Codes 153, 155, and 156 on v527.

[c] 530, range 1–4.

[d] It was necessary to substitute *aid to minorities,* appropriately recoded, in construction of the form II instrument of the 1970 CPS study.

Notes

This paper was originally prepared for delivery at the World Sociological Congress, Madrid, 1990. The data were collected by the Center for Political Studies under grants from the Ford Foundation and the National Science Foundation and are publicly available through the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research at the University of Michigan. I am grateful to Matt Lyons for research assistance, and to Chris Achen, Stephen Ansolabehere, Larry Bartels, Henry Brady, Charles Franklin, Barbara Geddes, Shanto Iyengar, Don Kinder, J. P. Monroe, and Doug Rivers for helpful suggestions. None of these agencies or individuals bears any responsibility for errors that may remain.

1. By *values,* Kinder and Sears (1985, 674) mean "general and enduring standards" that hold a "more central position than attitudes" in individuals' belief systems. As Rokeach writes, values "lead us to take particular positions on social issues" (1973, 13).

2. Recent psychological research has sketched a more optimistic picture of the critical capabilities of the "receiver." Chaiken (1980) and Petty and Cacioppo (1986) have shown that individuals will, *under some conditions,* entirely ignore "source" information and instead discriminate among arguments on the basis of their actual "strength" or "weakness." The conditions, however, are fairly stringent ones. They are that individuals be "personally involved" with the issue under discussion and that they be asked to react to arguments that are either artificially strong (in the sense that the experimenters have freely invented the "facts" that underlie them) or intentionally weak. When these conditions fail to be met (as in most situations of mass persuasion), even recent work indicates that individuals rely on superficial forms of message processing—in particular, cues concerning the credibility of the source.

3. I emphasize that the terms *liberal message* and *conservative message,* which I use repeatedly, do not imply either that the messages are tinged with ideology or that persons influenced by them are, by that fact, ideologues; the terms refer only to the directional thrust of the given information flow.

4. For example, the one case in which, according to Cotton (1985), selective exposure has been rigorously documented in a nonlaboratory setting involved recent car purchasers (compared to those who had bought cars a year earlier) who were more likely to look at ads for the car they had just purchased than ads for a car they had examined but decided not to buy.

5. The probability of receiving *only* the conservative message is the probability of receiving the conservative message (R_C) times the probability of not receiving the liberal message ($1 - R_L$).

6. Inclusion of a series of Values × Awareness terms, subscripted for time, greatly complicates the model and only marginally improves performance.

7. Some people gave open-ended *other* responses, which were converted to closed-ended codes—either pro- or antiwar, as appropriate.

8. The different scales do have different skews, so that even when standardized, their ranges differ somewhat. The effects of these differences must be absorbed as measurement error.

9. Party attachment could substitute for ideology; however, party is a weaker predictor of war attitudes while suffering the same endogeneity problem.

10. These measures were developed and validated by John Hurwitz and Mark Pefley (1988).

11. I am grateful to Doug Rivers for deriving a maximum likelihood function for the model, thus making Maximum Likelihood Estimates possible. SAS code for the model is available on request.

12. The most serious collinearity is between the decay rate *d* and the eight a_{0jt} coefficients from the reception function, which are correlated at about −.99. The problem is that although the model can use changing rates of *don't know* responses as information about overtime changes in relative message intensity, it cannot fix the absolute intensities of messages independently of the rate at which opinion decays. This problem would exist even if direct measures of media content, of the type shown in Figure 2b, were a variable in the model. What, in these circumstances, the f-test shows is that both the decay rate and absolute message intensities are nonzero.

13. For the feeling thermometers, the yearly intercepts for the liberal message were −6.50, −5.33, −3.92, and −3.21; yearly intercepts for the conservative message were −3.83, −2.77, −2.09, and −2.28. These are the numbers plotted in Figure 2a. For the hawk-dove instrument, the corresponding terms are −7.92, −6.36, −4.62, −3.88, −4.78, −3.94, −3.05, and −3.12 (not shown graphically). All are statistically different from zero on an F-test.

14. When the hawk-dove measure is used in the estimation, the corresponding correlation between exposure coefficients and logged story counts is .78.

15. The decline in volume of war reporting in Figure 2b does not, however, seem to be a fluke. A count of Vietnam stories in the *Reader's Guide to Periodical Literature* confirms a decline of war coverage in this type of medium after 1968.

16. I examined all boldface sentences in the War Policy section of the index. Assertions and justifications of official policy, among other obviously valenced stories, were counted as prowar news; news of combat setbacks, protests, or rising congressional resistance to the war were counted as antiwar stories.

17. These are persons who score ±1.6 standard deviations from the mean on ideology; the awareness scale in Figure 3 runs from the 2nd percentile to the 98th.

18. There is a significant tendency for blacks to be less supportive of the war in both years, but it disappears once a control for political awareness is imposed.

19. In the 1990 NES postelection survey, 33% of persons scoring in the bottom decile of an information scale said the United States was right to send troops to the Persian Gulf; in the top decile, this rate was 70%. (The information scale combined responses to v835–43; the policy item was v737.) For comparable data, see *New York Times*, 14 December 1990.

20. The Party × Awareness interaction is highly statistically significant in an appropriately specified regression. Similar results are, of course, obtained if Ideology is substituted for Party.

21. *New York Times*, 14 December 1990.

22. *New York Times*, 14 December 1990.

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ROLES, RULES, AND RATIONALITY IN THE NEW INSTITUTIONALISM

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I seek to reinvigorate the study of politicians' roles by showing how motivational role theory can be used to examine the impact of goals and incentives upon behavior and thereby integrate economic and sociological perspectives. I address three reasons for the recent neglect of politicians' roles—changes in interdisciplinary tastes, conceptual and theoretical muddles, and failures to demonstrate consequences for behavior—and find them unconvincing. I further argue that the most promising framework for the new institutionalism is one that incorporates not just formal but also informal institutional structures (like roles and norms), a framework that incorporates, rather than excludes, political behavior.

Who now writes about *roles*? Sociologists, novelists, anthropologists, poets, psychologists, journalists, playwrights and historians, among others. The noun "role," which has been used since the seventeenth century, is a word that we cannot do without, yet political scientists have been neglecting it for nearly a decade. Articles continue to be produced on roles but are not much discussed. Nor are there any major research projects underway on political roles or signs of significant innovations in theory and method. It seems difficult to believe that studies of political roles actually dominated our research on politicians during the 1960s and early 1970s. Professional interest in this area has greatly declined. Why?

It is indeed puzzling. It is puzzling because roles are such prominent concepts in the everyday thinking of the politicians we study, quite regardless of what they might pick up second-hand from social-scientific analyses. Politicians use roles in their relationships with one another. For central to the thinking that they bring to their relationships are conceptions of how typical people in typical positions (e.g., minister, whip, or backbencher) are expected to behave. Because so many ordinary people use this concept to organize their experience, it has become well established throughout the social sciences and, with the exception of political science, continues to be studied vigorously (Biddle 1986, 67). Why the exception? There are, I think, three principal reasons that our discipline's interest in political roles has recently gone into eclipse. The first concerns intellectual fashion in the form of a change in interdisciplinary tastes from sociological imports, which include roles, to economic imports, which do not. The second concerns conceptual confusion: a disenchantment with towers of babble constructed in the service of role "theories" that weren't theories after all. The third reason concerns consequences for behavior—there weren't any (or so it

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seemed at the time).

Perhaps these reasons are reason enough to accept the eclipse and not try to recover the study of roles for the study of politicians. I believe, however, that the roles of politicians are much too important to be overlooked. They are central concepts in the symbolic worlds of the people we study. They are also central concepts for the "new institutionalism" that has recently been emerging in political science (March and Olsen 1989; Shepsle 1989). Furthermore, and more forcefully, I believe that all three reasons for the eclipse are unconvincing. I shall examine each of them in turn and take stock of several decades of research on politicians' roles, in order to clear the ground for a new motivational approach to the subject. This approach builds on what went before and satisfies some of the objections that came afterward by being more rational, less muddled, and better oriented to behavior. In presenting these arguments, I shall draw on examples and data about the roles of politicians in the British House of Commons.[1]

Intellectual Fashion

The recent march from *homo sociologicus* to *homo economicus* is more an explanation of, than a justification for, the disappearance of research on roles. It will be difficult to dismiss as "unconvincing," because it is as much a matter of changes in intellectual interest as of argument. Still, there is an argument here that needs to be addressed by putting it in the perspective of the relative significance of formal rules, informal rules, and individual preferences.

Before World War II, classic political views of political institutions were more widely held in political science than they are today, even now that we have brought the state back in. Political scientists and political philosophers emphasized that institutional structures greatly constrained the conduct of politics by shaping the motives and conduct of politicians. They stressed particularly the importance of *formal rules* such as constitutions, laws, contracts, and other institutional arrangements—stable formal rules that guided individual behavior and thereby secured order in the political world (March and Olsen 1989, 5). *Homo politicus* made history, but he made it on stages constructed by constitutionmakers and controlled by formal rules.

By contrast, the decades after the war, especially the 1960s and early 1970s, witnessed the rejection of this formalistic political institutionalism and its replacement by new sociological perspectives. This sociological era of research on politicians turned the discipline's attention away from formal rules and toward the *informal rules* of political organizations, toward norms and roles that were said to guide behavior more directly (Ferejohn and Fiorina 1975; Hall 1985; Sinclair 1983). But what was at first a set of creative and stimulating ideas became increasingly rigid and "sociologistic" as parliaments became characterized as highly structured institutions that, by determining their norms and roles, determined the behavior of their members.

Today, this sociological emphasis on informal rules is still one of two recognizable perspectives in the study of legislative behavior. The other, which took the lead from the mid-1970s and is now intellectually dominant, is associated with economic models of individual behavior—models that are purposive and stress the significance not of either formal or informal rules but, instead, of *individual preferences* and choices (e.g., Fenno 1973; Mayhew 1974; Shepsle 1978; Smith and Deering 1984). Thus, the informal rules, the norms and roles of *homo sociologicus*, have been pushed aside by the reasons of *homo economicus*, by a new interest in the preferences and calculations of individual politicians. Yet just as the sociological approaches were shortsighted in giving short shrift to such individual preferences or goals, so the new economic models underestimate the significance of institutional contexts. Politicians, they seem to suggest, calculate their self-interests and act upon them in a vacuum.

Rules, roles, and reasons—these are ingredients that March and Olsen (1989) have proposed to blend in the new institutionalism. This new perspective on the relationship between institutions and individuals has been emerging since the late 1980s and has come to be regarded as the new wave in legislative studies. It seeks to synthesize the political and sociological theses about rules with the economic antithesis about reasons. Formal and informal rules, March and Olsen argue, do indeed constitute very important institutional constraints on the behavior of politicians. At the same time, however, politicians are purposive actors who pursue their individual preferences or goals. They calculate and they compromise as they adapt to their situations. Surely the new institutionalism offers fertile ground for the study of "rational norms" and "rational roles"—that is to say, norms and roles that are both framed by institutional rules and shaped by individual preferences. But the new institutionalism has so far focused its investigations mainly on formal rules rather than on the informal rules whereby norms and roles play their parts.

This concentration on formal rules seems odd, not least because the study of organizations is currently moving in the other direction and has always, in fact, shifted back and forth between the formal and the informal. It has always recognized the significance of each and also their interdependence (Ouchi and Wilkins 1985). Let us remind ourselves of the distinctions involved. The formal structure of an organization is found in its constitutional code which defines lines of authority and divisions of work by specifying the organization's principal offices and their principal duties and responsibilities. These formal rules always differ, as Herbert Simon long ago taught us, from the organization's actual operations because they can never fully specify or be fully consistent with all the relationships, attitudes, and behaviors that must be developed if the organization is to run smoothly (1957, 147–49).

The informal structure of an organization refers to these relationships, attitudes, and behaviors that are not fully specified in the formal scheme. Informal rules are critical to an organization, for it is not possible to operate without them (Selznick 1943). Every organization, therefore, develops and maintains a structure of informal rules. And the principal components of these informal rules are norms and roles. The relationship between the formal and the informal is reciprocal and complex. The most obvious connection is that the formal rules set boundaries for the informal rules and thereby guide informal relationships along lines that are appropriate for pursuing the organization's goals. Perhaps the current resistance to studying informal rules like norms and roles reflects a reluctance to return to the sociological models that were set aside to pursue the new economic perspectives. Perhaps it is also due to the fact that many of the "new institutionalists" are rational choice theorists, whose models favor explicit rules of the game that politicians can take into account in calculating how they might best achieve their preferences. For rational choice theorists, rules are "the strategic context in which optimizing behavior takes place" (Shepsle 1989, 135). This characterization sometimes applies to formal rules but only occasionally to informal rules, which, in fact, often drive out calculational conduct and replace it with what March and Olsen call a disposi-

Table 1. The Impact of Norms in the British House of Commons (%)

	Conservatives		Labour	
Number of Cross Votes	Formal Collective Responsibility (Members of the Government)	No Collective Responsibility (Backbenchers)	Informal Collective Responsibility (Opposition Front Bench Spokespersons)	No Collective Responsibility (Backbenchers)
None	100	39	62	23
One	0	22	20	29
Two or more	0	39	18	48
Number of cases	(42)	(202)	(50)	(174)

Note: Cross votes are votes cast against the stated policy of one's government (for Conservatives in this case) or one's parliamentary party (for Labour).

tion to pursue normatively appropriate behavior (1984, 744).[2] All the more reason, then, to reemphasize the importance of recovering informal rules and to press the point that without them the new institutionalism may turn out, much like its predecessors, to be rather more sectarian than synthetic.

It is a question of the relative significance of individual preferences, formal rules, and informal rules. From the new economic models, we have learned to take individual preferences and calculations very seriously. And those who have taken them most seriously are now reintroducing formal political rules such as constitutional and other institutional codes. *Homo economicus* is being reunited with *homo politicus*. But what about the informal rules? Handicapped by a distaste for calculation, *homo sociologicus* remains unwelcome because of further doubts about the political significance of informal rules, doubts that linger from our discipline's experience in studying relationships among norms, roles, and political behavior. With regard to roles, I shall address this matter below. But as for norms, if Jon Elster's (1989) recent arguments have not convinced skeptics of the considerable significance of these informal rules, perhaps the data in Table 1 will.

The point is that informal rules are extremely effective in shaping the behavior of politicians and therefore cannot be overlooked. The illustration presented in Table 1 refers to collective responsibility rules in the British House of Commons, rules that apply, conveniently for our present purposes, formally in one situation and informally in another. Thus, the formal rule of collective responsibility, which is a long-standing and important constitutional doctrine (Norton 1982, 61–63), applies to members of the government. It says, among other things, that if they wish to vote against government policy, they must first resign from the government and return to the back benches. By contrast, the informal rule of collective responsibility, which applies to opposition front bench spokespersons, has no constitutional or formal standing. It is instead a norm that has developed during the postwar period, a norm that says if they wish to vote against their party's policy, they, too, should first resign their leadership positions and return to the back benches (Punnett 1973, 287–88).

The relative influence of formal and informal rules can be explored in Table 1 by comparing the number of cross votes cast by members of the government or opposition front bench spokespersons, who are under the collective responsibility rules, with the number of cross votes cast by their party's backbenchers, who are not encumbered by these particular constraints. To be sure, the formal rule of collective responsibility has the strongest absolute effects over the behavior of the Conservatives to whom it applies—there are no deviations. But the informal rule of collective responsibility is impressive as well. In fact, it ensures that nearly three times as many of Labour's opposition front bench spokespersons as compared to the party's backbenchers refrain from cross voting—a ratio that exceeds the parallel ratio between Conservatives.[3]

The new institutionalism seeks to free politicians from their utilitarian cocoons and send them back into the institutional contexts where they work and pursue their goals. Yet, important as formal and informal rules may be, it is necessary to remember that individual preferences are active, too. Indeed, the unfortunate sociological history of role theory's "oversocialized" analyses should caution us against tilting the enterprise too far back toward the institutional side. The reintegration of the formal institutional rules of the prewar period with the informal rules of the postwar sociological decades can be done without losing sight of what has been learned more recently by looking through economic spectacles. What is needed is a new conception of roles that is sensitive to the interplay between institutional frameworks and individual preferences—and to the fact that this balance between framework and preference varies greatly from one role to another.

The best way to understand political institutions is to understand the interaction between such rules and reasons—between the constraints of institutional frameworks and the preferences of individual members. And there is no place where such rules and reasons come together more clearly than in an institution's roles. This leads directly to the motivational approach to the study of roles. But first it is necessary to dispose of the remaining two objections to role analysis itself.

Conceptual Confusion

Another reason that the discipline dropped the study of roles was weariness with the conceptual confusion surrounding "role theories"—which were themselves eventually unmasked as untheories. However, by clearing up the clutter, this too can be shown to be unconvincing. The task can be accomplished by (1) sending most of the neologisms down the memory holes of history, (2) clarifying why "role theory" is not a theory and cannot be a theory, and (3) ordering and interpreting the existing literature, particularly the existing empirical studies, so that we can see where we have been and where we need to go.

Efforts to study roles in the most general terms have produced some of the most spectacular scholasticism in the social sciences (Heiss 1981, 94–96). This has been created by many different scholars studying many different roles from the perspective of many different disciplines. Although it is appropriate to develop different definitions for different research purposes, conceptual pluralism was turned into pandemonium by an extraordinary passion for neologisms that often contained very peculiar assumptions about the determinants of social behavior.[4] *Role* was modified by long lists of adjectives to create concepts like *covert roles, complementary roles, reciprocal roles, contextualized roles,* and *personalized roles;* and it was itself used as an adjective to produce more of the same, such as *role visibility, role enactments, role sets, role integration,* and *role networks.*

I have suggested that "role theory" is not a theory. What is usually called "role theory" are frameworks consisting of topics, concepts, and assumptions. There are in such frameworks no sets of statements that explain why or how pheno-

Table 2. **Three Approaches to Studying the Roles of Politicians**

Approaches	Principal Topics	Preferred Research Methods	Examples
Structural	Sets of norms linked to performance of institutional functions	Structured interviews with large numbers of respondents, using both open- and closed-ended questions to examine norms	Converse and Pierce 1986; Davidson 1969; Jewell and Patterson 1977; Newton 1974; Wahlke et al. 1962
Interactional	Interaction in specific settings, negotiation and learning of roles	Participant observation or in-depth studies with manageable numbers of respondents	Cain, Ferejohn, and Fiorina 1987; Fenno 1978; Huitt 1961; Manley 1969
Motivational	Description of roles emphasizing the influence of goals and incentives	Semistructured interviews with moderate-sized samples, preference for tape-recording responses	Aberbach, Putnam, and Rockman 1981; Barber 1965; King 1974; Payne 1984; Woshinsky 1973

mena occur. There are, in short, no general role theories (Biddle 1986, 86; Stryker and Statham 1985, 312). The difficulty is that this quest for a general theory of roles has always been fundamentally misguided and as unlikely to produce satisfying results as would be a quest for a general theory of holes. The phenomena in question, roles or holes, are so utterly polymorphic that the only general statements applicable to all of them are likely to be as general (and as useless) as this: "The general principle is clear: the more [that] persons have their preferences and needs met in role relationships, the more satisfied they are in those relationships" (Stryker and Statham 1985, 349). The most promising path to theory construction is not a search for a single general role theory but, instead, a series of quests for particular theories about particular problems involved in particular types of roles.

Finally, it is necessary to bring some order to decades of seemingly discursive literature so that we can build constructively rather than simply continue to muddle through. Fortunately, the waters have cleared somewhat since political scientists last looked; and it has become apparent that most studies have more or less proceeded under one or more of the frameworks summarized in Table 2. Each framework concentrates on a different aspect of the subject: the *structural approach* highlights connections between institutions and roles; the *interactional approach* focuses on the processes through which roles are learned; and the *motivational approach* focuses on the content of roles, particularly on the goals and incentives that drive them.

Just as legislative studies do not neatly sort themselves into the sociological and economic traditions I have discussed, neither do they neatly sort themselves into the three approaches to role analysis. Most efforts have been eclectic. And many authors will be uncomfortable with seeing their work categorized in this way. Nevertheless, I believe that there are three identifiable streams of research on the roles of politicians, each influenced more by one of the three approaches than by the others. The studies within each stream share many features with one another and share at least several important features with the general approach under whose umbrella I have gathered them together.

The Structural Approach

The structural approach, an application of structural-functional analysis, was developed under the guidance of Linton (1936), Merton (1957, 1967), Merton and Barber (1963), Parsons (1964), and Znaniecki (1965). It emphasizes the dominance of institutions over individuals, since it treats roles as constructs that are maintained by institutions and have little to do with individual preferences (Homans 1964). Individuals are presented with roles that are built into an institution's structure and will continue to exist whether or not these individuals choose to play them.

The main difficulty with the structural approach as an all-purpose strategy for studying roles is that it introduces, through its definitions, two important but unacceptable assumptions. The first is that there will normally be widespread consensus about how any given role should be played. Actually, such consensus varies enormously from one role to another. It is a variable (Jewell 1970, 494–95; Wrong 1963). The second unacceptable assumption is that the individual's role-related attitudes and behaviors are determined by the expectations of his or her associates. Again, the power of such expectations is surely a variable that differs across different roles and institutions.[5] By the mid-1970s, this emphasis on conformity had cost the structural framework its position as the dominant approach to role analysis.[6] Paradoxically, however, the most important contemporary contribution of the structural approach continues to be its emphasis on what it has always overemphasized: that roles are deeply embedded in institutions that structure the range of roles available and structure how particular roles are to be played. The structural approach takes structure seriously.

The influence of this structural approach has been most apparent in empirical studies that define politicians' roles as sets of legislative norms and use formal interviews to investigate them. One of the earliest and best studies in this tradition was Richard Fenno's (1962) description of roles in the U.S. House Committee on Appropriations, where he found that existing expectations for these roles were very closely defined and very successfully taught to newcomers. These themes of clarity and consensus have been underscored by the many political scientists who have defined roles as sets of norms "that are expected of *anyone* holding . . . a particular position" (Jewell 1970, 462). And the emphasis on conformity can be seen in characteristics of role learning as the teaching of norms needed to perform according *to the organization's* expectations (Gertzog 1970). Although most of the early political studies adopted a structural-functional perspective and therefore sometimes overdid "the cohesion necessary for institutions to continue to exist," they were also usually conducted by political scientists who themselves interviewed politicians and became aware thereby of more variability than the framework allowed. Budge and his colleagues, for example, produced data on the role of the councillor in Glasgow that supported this point (1972, 83–99; see also Rose 1970, chap. 4). And Mishler and Mughan (1978) followed this same lead when they investigated the roles of Scottish and Welsh backbenchers.

Another common characteristic of studies in the structural tradition is that they often interview large numbers of respondents in order to map the complex patterns of expectations for each role. This was certainly true of *The Legislative System* (Wahlke et al. 1962), the best-known political study in the structural tradition. But even this influential book was not as immersed in structural thinking as it seemed to be. The assumptions of clarity, consensus, and conformity were there; but the authors were also inspired by George Herbert Mead's symbolic interactionism. Still, it was the structural perspective that produced *The Legislative System*'s principal research product—a set of representational roles that became by far the study's best-known and most frequently replicated contribution (Jewell 1985, 104–5). *Trustees, delegates,* and *politicos* have by now been examined in nearly every country where systematic interviews with politicians are conducted. Moreover, these roles have been analyzed so much that they have virtually become synonymous with the very concept of politicians' roles. The situation is unfortunate because these representational roles have unexpectedly compounded our confusion. As they have been measured, they reflect a general tendency in the structural tradition to reduce role concepts from the actors' understandings to a few specific norms.[7]

It is easy to see how the confusion arises. In order to link the institution to the individual, the structural approach defines roles as sets of norms that are widely endorsed by an actor's associates. When roles are defined as sets of norms, the tendency to study them more precisely by breaking down these sets and isolating their segments seems standard procedure.[8]

The Interactional Approach

The interactional approach is part of the symbolic interactionist tradition that traces its intellectual roots back to the Scottish moral philosophers of the eighteenth century (Stryker and Serpe 1982). This perspective was adapted for contemporary social science by George Herbert Mead (1934) and is associated with the influential empirical work of Blumer (1962, 1966), Goffman (1959) and Turner (1962, 1968). Symbolic interactionism derives its unusual name from its assumption that symbols, or meanings, emerge from processes of social interaction and serve as powerful forces in shaping behavior. Thus, roles are seen as sets of informal rules created and recreated through interactions, especially through "negotiations" between individuals and their associates (Handel 1979; Meltzer, Petras, and Reynolds 1975).

Symbolic interactionists concentrate so much on these social psychological negotiations that they have been criticized for being "psychologistic," that is, for making exactly the opposite error to that made by the structuralists—for neglecting the broader institutional contexts within which such negotiations occur (Biddle 1986, 71–72). It is striking, therefore, that this approach, which gives so much attention to how people construct the rules that govern their behavior, nevertheless still locks up its subjects in social cages; for symbolic interactionism does not adequately credit people with their own independent standpoints, with their own preferences and incentives outside the flow of interaction in which they are immersed at any given time.[9] The psychologistic cage, in fact, turns out to be sociologistic. Society produces individuals through role relationships that reshape them constantly. Compared with structural frameworks, these interactional cages are much smaller (encounters rather than institutions); but they are sociologistic cages nonetheless, not psychologistic.[10] Still, the chief contribution of the interactional approach remains its emphasis on the facts that individuals participate in defining their own roles, that these roles have many variations, and that they are usually undergoing change (Stryker and Statham 1985).

Interactional studies of politicians examine the negotiation and learning of roles in specific settings. Their ideal research strategy is participant observation or (if that proves difficult, as it often does in parliamentary settings) semi-structured interviews with manageable numbers of respondents. *The Power of the Purse,* by Richard Fenno (1966), builds a bridge between the structural approach and this interactional enterprise. It begins with a structural framework within which interactional themes are introduced. Thus, Fenno pays close attention to political symbols and meanings and to the negotiations through which they develop. He presents glimpses of negotiations over symbols that occur when committee members try to "project an image" that might help them to "exercise some control over House expectations" or when committee liberals work out the compromise between their political goals and the committee's budgetary conservatism. Huitt's (1961) famous case study of Senator William Proxmire's first year in the Senate builds a bridge, too, for it also begins with a standard structural framework. But Huitt's main goal is to criticize structural assumptions about the power of expectations, about the success of Proxmire's associates in compelling him to conduct himself as they believed he should. Huitt uses participant observation (he was Proxmire's legislative assistant) to reconstruct the negotiations through which Proxmire rejected the role that his fellow senators expected him to play and created for himself an alternative role that these colleagues eventually accepted.

By concentrating on the development of the role of the chair of the Committee on Ways and Means of the U.S. House of Representatives, John Manley (1965, 1969) reaches further into the interactional approach. On the basis of participant observation as a congressional fellow, and through lengthy informal interviews with committee members and staff, Manley reconstructs the negotiations between the chair and the members of his committee through which the chair's role is created and developed. This journey from the structural frameworks of Talcott Parsons to the interactional flows of Erving Goffman is completed with Fenno's (1978) strikingly interactional study of the roles that members of Congress play in their constituencies. Here, Fenno treats Goffman's dramaturgical notions about "the presentation of self" as the central component of representatives' interactions with their constituents. By traveling with members in their districts, he was able to observe this "home style" and to understand how representatives shape their roles to elicit trust, a relationship they renew continually through a flow of presentations. This is a study of negotiations about symbols that mean a great deal to members of Congress and their supporters.[11]

Perhaps owing to their lingering links with the structural tradition, none of these political applications misses the significance of institutional constraints. Nor do they exhibit the other major weakness of interactional approaches: underestimating individual preferences, incentives, and calculations. In his encounters with his colleagues, Huitt's Proxmire becomes obsessed with his institutional chains. In their encounters with their constituents, Fenno's congressmen are consciously guided by their goals.

The Motivational Approach

Unlike its counterparts, the motivational framework has not been unfolded in abstract theoretical discussions. It is instead found in empirical studies of politicians' roles and in the minds of the politicians themselves. I shall later return to this motivational approach to develop it theoretically as a synthesis of rules and reasons for the new institutionalism. For the present, three distinctive assumptions will suffice: (1) that the preferences and incentives that politicians use in adapting to their institutions are generally acquired before they take up their posts, (2) that rationality is a dominant feature of the parliamentary institutions in which the roles of politicians are embedded, and (3) that an additional rationality in the outlooks of individual politicians affords them perspectives and agendas that are independent of their current interactions.

The motivational approach suggests that the best way to understand the roles of politicians is to try to see them as they do.[12] This is what Heady's (1974) study of the roles of British ministers was designed to capture: "A minister's-eye view of his job." Heady's semistructured interviews focused on recognizable outlooks and patterns of conduct. The first question he put to his ministers was, "What are the most important tasks a minister has to perform?" They told him about their "priorities" and "role conceptions."[13] Since this goal-oriented outlook is the way that politicians usually characterize their own roles, it should not be surprising to find the same tack being taken by many political commentators and historians (e.g., Morgan 1987; Richards 1972; Rose 1982). When Sir Lewis Namier (1968) constructed his influential account of the roles played by eighteenth-century members of Parliament, he paid very close attention to their motivations.

The roles in motivational studies are very much like the "purposive roles" of Wahlke and his colleagues (1962), roles driven by the politician's main purposes (see also Gerlich 1972; Johannes and McAdams 1987; Kim et al. 1983; Kornberg and Mishler 1976; Mishler and Mughan 1978; Cayrol, Parodi, and Ysmal 1971). These images of politicians as rational, goal-oriented actors are incorporated in role typologies and in the variables that underlie them. Matthews's (1960) study of U.S. senators, for instance, used the criteria of status and accomplishments to generate types, such as "patrician" and "agitator," with strong purposive characteristics. Jewell (1983) regards many of the examples I am characterizing as motivational (including work by Barber, Davidson, Wahlke and his colleagues, and Woshinsky) as leading examples of *purposive* studies. His inclusion of Woshinsky's (1973) and Barber's (1965) studies is particularly noteworthy because they are more explicitly motivational than the other two and demonstrate how purposive roles fit within a more fully developed motivational framework.

Reasons shape role choices and interpretations in Woshinsky's (1973) study of 50 French deputies. Woshinsky draws heavily upon Barber (1965), who also emphasizes that politicians shape their own roles. Indeed, one of the most striking characteristics of Barber's study is the artful way in which it focuses on the individual without losing sight of the institutional context. This was, indeed, the principal aim of his investigation: to examine how politicians with different individual characteristics adapt to legislative institutions. Barber's incentive-based study can be contrasted with the work of Richard Fenno, who has likewise paid close attention to motivations but has emphasized instead cognitive goals. This interest in goals was developed furthest in *Congressmen in Committees* (1973), where Fenno dismantled purposive roles to investigate the specific "personal political goals" within them, like "influence in the House" and "reelection."

The great strength of the motivational studies is that they try to take careful account of political reality as it is experienced by the politicians who construct it. Thus, they favor defining the role concept in ordinary language: *the part one plays in an event or process.* To reconstruct such roles satisfactorily, it makes good sense to try to understand them as they are understood by their players, as dynamic interactions between rules and reasons, between institutional constraints and individual preferences.

Consequences for Behavior

The third unconvincing reason behind the collapse of role research in political science is disappointment over the failure to connect role-related attitudes to behavior (Hedlund 1985, 326). Under the aegis of the structural approach, early studies introduced the role concept as a key that would unlock the door between institutional structure and individual behavior. But as it turned out, measures of the structurally defined roles of "delegate" and "trustee" (the two most widely studied roles in the literature) failed to yield the anticipated relationships. Most studies found no results (Friesema and Hedlund 1974, 413–17; Hedlund and Friesema 1972; Wahlke et al. 1962); and one study (Gross 1978) found that delegates were, paradoxically, much *less* likely than were trustees to vote their constituents' wishes. But the conclusion drawn (that roles are in general unrelated to behavior and are therefore trivial matters that need not be investigated) was wholly unconvincing because it was based on peculiar claims and peculiar concepts.

The claims were peculiar because they assumed that roles must be insignificant unless they are linked clearly to "motor" activities such as voting or putting down Questions, as opposed to, say, "mental" activities such as political thinking or political conversation (Converse and Pierce 1986, 681). Surely, mental constructs like roles can be politically significant without affecting how politicians vote. Still, it would be encouraging to see some impact on "motor" activities, too, on traditional measures of political behavior. But much of that was entirely missed because of conceptual problems in these tests. One difficulty was the failure to distinguish between *position roles* and *preference roles.* Another was to mistake the usual measures of "delegates" and "trustees" for measures of roles that exist in the minds of most politicians.

Parliaments are structured by networks of positions such as whip, parliamentary private secretary, and minister. Position roles are associated with positions that *require* the performance of many specific duties and responsibilities. Position roles are, in this way, clearly defined and highly constrained by the institution. Preference roles, by contrast, are associated with positions that require the performance of few specific duties and responsibilities. They are comparatively unconstrained by the institution and are therefore more easily shaped by the preferences of the role players.

Now it must seem obvious, once it is stated, that position roles, like the roles of whips, parliamentary private secretaries, and ministers in Britain are typically as chock-full of behavior as they are politically important. No one would suggest that links might not exist between position roles like these and traditional forms of behavior. As part of their roles, whips, for example, are required to roam the House and touch base with members, attend committees and take notes for the chief whip, and sit in the chamber and help the Speaker activate procedure. Parliamentary private secretaries are not required to do nearly as much. But no one would suggest that they do nothing. In the same vein, ministers vote a lot; for they are required to do so. They also answer Questions and make statements at the despatch box; they listen in committees; they seek support in corridors; and they drink with backbenchers in Westminster's bars. Surely the conclusion that roles are unrelated to behavior does not apply to position roles like these at all.

Instead, the conclusion could only conceivably be applied to preference roles associated with positions like that of the backbencher, positions where very little specific behavior is actually required of incumbents, where there are very few duties and responsibilities that incumbents *must* do but very many duties and responsibilities that *might* (or might not) be done. Here, role players are freer to exercise their preferences, for the scripts are only partially written. Associated with the position of the British backbencher, for instance, are the preference roles of constituency member, parliament man, policy advocate and ministerial aspirant (which I discuss in more detail later). Many of the roles that have been examined in survey-based studies of politicians are preference roles like these. And they have as much to do with the individual reasons of the role players as with the established rules of the institution. These are the sorts of roles, presumably, to which the conclusion about the lack of connections between roles and behavior was intended to apply.

But did it? I don't think so, because the conclusion was inferred from data on delegates and trustees, from constructs that were not operationalized as roles that exist in the minds of politicians but were, instead, measures of a specific norm or decision rule. This work was done under the structural approach, which has a reductionist tendency to disassemble roles into specific normative components. Thus, the representational roles of delegates and trustees were measured from responses to a question about whether representatives should follow primarily their constituents or their own judgments. Now this norm may indeed be associated with the full-blown roles its name suggests. But in that case, the politicians who play it would be likely to associate the label not just with a single norm but, instead, with a package of motivations (goals and incentives), attitudes, and behaviors that might be regarded as typical of people who devote themselves to playing this part.

These representational roles of ours were at the time the most widely investigated in the discipline. Yet they may not have been *theirs*—they may not have corresponded to any roles the people we were studying typically conceived of (Price 1985). Nevertheless, even these roles were not unrelated to behavior. Later and closer looks suggested that the failure to connect them to behavior may have been due to the fact that other variables were involved in the relationships. Hence, one reaction to the negative findings was to reconceptualize the representational role concept (Alpert 1979). Another was to look more carefully for the relationships to behavior. Eventually, these links were found by focusing on salient policy issues where cues from the district were consistent. They were also found by taking account of the fact that the constituencies politicians think about may vary from issue to issue (Abney and Henderson 1982; Converse and Pierce 1986; Kuklinski and Elling 1977; McCrone and Kuklinski 1979). In sum, the overall empirical results do not look so disappointing after all. But they were disappointing at the time. And, coming on the edge of the march from sociological to economic models and on top of disenchantments with conceptual muddles, the early findings about this norm helped to lock up the study of political roles in the cupboard.

The motivational approach suggests that by directing our concepts and measures toward the roles that exist in the minds of politicians, we will be in the best possible position to explain the consequences of these roles for political behavior. It will be unnecessary to concern ourselves with position roles like the role of the minister, since I assume that by now no one would suggest that what ministers think about the parts they are playing has nothing to do with their conduct. Instead we shall focus our attention on preference roles—roles that are grounded as much in the preferences of the individual as in the rules of the institution.

I have elsewhere identified three such preference roles in the British data as *constituency member*, *generalist*, and *special-*

ist (Searing 1985, 1987). The role of constituency member is focused on the process of looking after constituents. Our measure for this backbench role is based on responses to five interview questions. One very important aspect of the behavior of backbenchers is the amount of time they spend in their constituencies. And the role of the constituency member is strongly related to this (see Halligan et al. 1988). Backbenchers who think of themselves as constituency members spend much more time in their constituencies than do those who do not think of themselves in this way (tau c = .18, gamma = .34 [.01]). Furthermore, the relationship is strengthened considerably by taking account of the constituency's distance from London and therefore from the Palace of Westminster.[14]

Skepticism about connections between informal roles and behavior makes it desirable to look at the role of the constituency member more closely and in association with other independent variables that might be related to the time spent in the constituency. This has been done in the regression reported in Table 3. Here it can be seen that among the independent variables, only role and length of tenure have a significant impact on the *time spent in the constituency;* and that the role variable outperforms all the others including standard workhorses such as electoral security (marginality) and political party. Should this particular behavior seem too much a part of this particular role to count as a robust test, other less obvious probes are possible. Thus, Conservative constituency members might be predicted (unexpectedly) to be more likely to *cross-vote* than Conservative nonconstituency members. They are, in fact, twice as likely to do so (tau c = .18, gamma = .42 [.01]).

Generalists and specialists also have distinctive behaviors that are politically important but not integral parts of their roles. Generalists construct preference roles around influencing the influential by pursuing a variety of concrete political issues. Their scattergun approach stands in contrast to the role of the specialist who likewise seeks influence but, instead, selects two or three topics to pursue quietly behind the scenes.

Table 3. Regression of Time in Constituency on a Selected Set of Independent Variables

Independent Variables	Beta	*t*-ratio
Role	.230	3.38**
Tenure	−.182	−2.63*
Marginality	−.083	−1.17
Party	.079	1.07
Distance	−.023	−.033
Value-security	.008	.14
R	.326	—
R^2	.106	—
Adjusted R^2	.080	—

*$p \leq .01$.
**$p \leq .001$.

Putting oral and written Questions to ministers is an important activity in the British parliamentary system. Table 4 reports regressions of the number of oral and written Questions asked on a selected set of independent variables, including a role measure that distinguishes generalists and specialists. Before considering the results, we should note that the range in this behavior is considerable: some backbenchers put down no Questions at all while others are responsible for hundreds. Moreover, generalists are twice as likely as specialists to ask many oral and written Questions—which produces correlations for written Questions on the Labour side that run up to tau b = .53, gamma = .90 (.001). Table 4 shows that the only independent variables with substantial effects upon this behavior are role and attendance. But the most striking fact is that again, the measure of a preference role outperforms all the other variables, in-

Table 4. Regressions of Oral and Written Questions on a Selected Set of Independent Variables

Independent Variables	Oral Questions		Written Questions	
	Beta	*t*-ratio	Beta	*t*-ratio
Role	-.218	-2.18*	-.218	-2.99**
Attendance	.210	1.78	.265	2.39*
Marginality	-.109	-1.04	.020	.10
Tenure	.049	.45	-.108	-1.04
Party	.035	.33	.052	.54
R	.355	—	.478	—
R^2	.126	—	.228	—
Adjusted R^2	.081	—	.188	—

*$p \leq .05$.
**$p \leq .01$.

cluding electoral security and political party. When we investigate the roles that are actually in the minds of our politicians, we readily find the anticipated links with their behavior.

It would be possible to review dozens of similar examples of relationships between such preference roles and behavior. I hope, however, that enough has been said to render this third reason for the eclipse of interest in political roles as unconvincing as the first two. Still, it is not sufficient simply to counter the chief objections. What is needed is a new agenda that will help us to build on what was done during the 1960s and early 1970s and also to improve upon it.

Discussion: The Motivational Approach

The motivational approach offers a synthetic framework with which to proceed. Its chief recommendation is that it encourages the reconstruction of political roles as they are understood by their players. Moreover, it builds on studies of purposive roles by articulating what has been implicit in such studies and by adding the elements that are necessary to give them their proper due.

The motivational approach incorporates insights from both the sociological (structural and interactional) and the economic traditions. It integrates these two traditions by recognizing that the roles of politicians are embedded in institutional contexts while at the same time treating the role players as purposive actors with independent standpoints. This integration of sociological and economic perspectives reflects, therefore, a recognition that political roles both constrain their actors and enable them (Hollis and Smith 1986, 272). Thus, the motivational approach brings *homo sociologicus* and *homo economicus* into a flexible framework suitable for studying *homo politicus.*

The image of people as conformists, the image of *homo sociologicus,* is surely needed in some form to account for the fact that roles do greatly constrain their actors. Systems of constitutional and other formal rules specify the principal positions around which roles develop. The positions of whip, minister, and backbencher exist in the British Parliament, for example, because formal rules create them. The politicians who take up such positions, however, help to create the corresponding roles which then become part of the institution's informal structure. Such roles vary greatly in the degree to which they are determined by the institution's formal structure. The most highly determined are the position roles—constructed around positions that require the performance of many duties and responsibilities.

Preference roles, by contrast, allow considerable scope for individual preferences to shape role interpretations. Thus, a number of distinct types of roles can be tethered to these institutional positions. Notice, however, that even on the Westminster's back benches, where the formal rules specify few duties and responsibilities, the number of distinct roles created by individual preferences is far smaller than the number of backbenchers involved. In fact, only four obvious preference roles are associated with the position of the backbencher, each framed by one of Parliament's principal tasks: checking the executive (policy advocates); institutional maintenance (parliament men); making ministers (ministerial aspirants); and, redressing grievances (constituency members). Formal rules may not always determine informal rules, but they always affect them and thereby constrain role choices and role interpretations.

Still, roles also enable their players. The motivational approach makes room for rationality and also takes account of it by providing for an independent standpoint, for a quiet place within the bustle of interaction where the actors' own preferences can shape their role choices and interpretations. Here it draws upon economic models, for these are the models that more than any others in the social sciences, recognize the autonomy of the individual self in individualistic cultures like our own and thereby afford actors independent standpoints (MacIntyre 1984, 31–33). Yet, as Hollis and Smith (1986, 278) point out, the economic definition of rationality is too narrow for the study of political roles; simply having *homo economicus* do the calculations for *homo sociologicus* will not give us what we need. If the new institutionalism is to be truly a synthesis, it needs something more like rationality as understood in ordinary language: rationality as the exercise of reason in the service of desire. Hume taught us that reason by itself can never be a motive for action. Only desire can supply the motivation for which reason seeks paths to satisfaction. The difficulty with economic rational choice models is that their overly cognitive assumptions about self-interest tend to obscure and dismiss the wide variety of desires that shape and reshape our goals—and also our judgments about which courses of action will be most effective for satisfying these goals.

This view of reasonable people adapting to the rules of institutions is very much the way that politicians themselves think about their roles.[15] They think about them as patterns, as configurations of *goals, attitudes,* and *behaviors* that are characteristic of people in particular positions. This conception of political roles provides the basis for the synthesis we have been pursuing between reasons and rules; for this is a conception of reasonable actors pursuing preferences in roles shaped by institutional structures (see Figure 1). It is fortified by the interview transcripts from the British data, which suggest that politicians (1) use the term *role* to refer to the part one plays in an event or process and (2) conceive of these parts as "gestalts"—patterns composed of sets of characteristics.

The goals or preferences in Figure 1 are the core of the roles because they concern the motivational drive. They include both cognitive career goals and emotional incentives. For example, a cognitive career goal in the role of the constituency member is "to look after one's constituents." An emotional incentive in this same role is "the desire for a sense of competence." In shaping roles, the cognitive

Figure 1. The Motivational Approach: Principal Components of Politicians' Roles



career goals are usually dominant. Nevertheless, the emotional incentives, which exist before the career goals, structure their selection and also their interpretation and application. These two motivational elements are intertwined in the role's core. Next, we turn to relationships between this motivational core and the role's secondary components, the characteristic attitudes and behaviors that politicians typically associate with the role. To continue with the constituency member as an example, a characteristic attitude would be the belief that "the redress of grievances is extremely important." A characteristic behavior would be "spending a great deal of time in the constituency." Like the relationships within the motivational core, the relationships between the core and these attitudes and behaviors should always be regarded as subject to investigation rather than as fixed by definition. They should also be expected to vary in strength from one role to another and from one individual to another, notwithstanding that the total gestalt defines the role. Specific behaviors are included as integral parts of the roles because that is how politicians themselves see it.[16]

Let us consider further the motivational core. Max Weber suggested that the best way to understand phenomena like roles is to look first to cognitive goals and then, secondarily, to emotional incentives (1947, 92–95). For instance, the role of the policy advocate is played by people who say that their principal goal is "to check the executive." This helps us to understand how they interpret the role and how the role is interpreted generally in the world at Westminster. But they also speak about emotional incentives such as "rectitude and hubris," which, when folded into the cognitive goals, deepen our understanding of the politicians' purposes and performances. The emotional incentives are ancillary but nevertheless essential (Heiss 1981; Payne et al. 1984). The cognitive career goals dominate our thoughts about these roles; yet they are not sufficient by themselves to explain the dynamics involved. The links between a role's objectives and its attitudes and behaviors cannot be properly understood without understanding how these relationships are driven not just by career goals but also by emotional incentives.

Now let us consider further the relationships between the motivational core and the characteristic attitudes and behaviors. Here, too, the motivational approach assumes the likelihood of independent standpoints and rationality. It assumes that the roles politicians construct around their objectives are usually constructed reasonably. This is ensured, in part, by the rationality that is built into structural constraints. It is reensured by the role players themselves, who assess and reassess their preferences and adopt attitudes and behaviors appropriate for pursuing them. They evaluate the outcomes of their performances and, in this light, adjust both their preferences and the attitudes and behaviors associated with these preferences. These adjustments are constrained by institutional structures that restrict greatly, even for informal roles, the range as well as the interpretations of the roles that will be developed. These adjustments are created by rational actors who are motivated by more than self-interest and who are more familiar to the philosopher than to the economist.[17] In sum, the roles of politicians are dynamic and adaptive patterns of goals, attitudes, and behaviors.

Two steps are involved in the analysis of motivational roles. One is a mapping operation to identify the major position and preference roles in a political organization. The position roles are comparatively easy to see, for they are closely tied to, and highly defined by, prominent positions in the institutional structure. The preference roles are more difficult to extract and are best discovered through interviews that probe the topic with a number of open-ended questions. Ideally, these discussions should be tape-recorded for careful analysis and coding. Both types of roles require an interpretative analysis, a reconstruction through interpretative understanding and, wherever possible, through quantitative probing of the interpretations as they develop. This is largely a descriptive enterprise; and much role research in political science has been criticized as insufficiently analytic and explanatory (Jewell 1985, 104; see also Biddle 1986, 69). Nevertheless, the roles of politicians must first be understood as the politicians themselves understand them before they can be explained successfully.

The second step, then, is explanatory. It addresses puzzles about connections among the components of political roles, puzzles that are part of larger puzzles about the consequences of these roles and about their origins. Explanatory puzzles about consequences involve (1) relationships between the motivational cores and the characteristic attitudes and behaviors and (2) relationships between the full-blown roles and other attitudes and behaviors with which they are not typically associated but to which they may be related (e.g., cross-voting among constituency members). Explanatory puzzles about the origins of political roles include (1) How are a role's major emotional incentives related to its cognitive career goals? and (2) What are the sources of role choice in the structure of opportunities and preferences? Why, in short, do people take up one role rather than another?

The successful pursuit of this research path presupposes that it is possible to develop from what politicians tell us a reasonably accurate reconstruction of their viewpoints. This presupposes, in turn, that they themselves understand their roles reasonably well. Of course, most of us most of the time are only vaguely aware of why we do what we do (Weber 1947, 111–12). Yet, politicians reflect self-consciously on their principal political roles because such roles are the frameworks of their careers. Most politicians are, in fact, extraordinarily articulate about these roles and are prepared to talk about them with interviewers just as they talk about them with their colleagues. What they have to say is a rich and subtle source of data. It draws attention to a rule that all of us who study politicians would do well to stencil on our briefcases, namely, if one wants to know why politicians do something, the most sensible way to begin the investigation is to ask them and listen carefully to what they say.

What they say should be enough to convince us that the synthesis proposed by the new institutionalism is much too good an idea to leave to rational choice theorists who seem eager to stuff it into the procrustean bed of their utility maximization models. Lord Wigg (1972) is the only real politician I know whose strategic exploitation of *informal* rules resembles anything like the images conjured up by their models—and he was regarded by his colleagues as an eccentric, whose machinations they dubbed "Wiggery-Pokery." March and Olsen (1989) have clarified the discipline's long march from the formal rules of *homo politicus,* to the informal rules of *homo sociologicus,* to the "unruled" *homo economicus*—from one form of tunnel vision to another. These alternative images of political actors were built into paradigms that led us to study particular subjects and to think about those subjects in particular and sometimes peculiar ways. Each time, we have survived the distortions and learned much more about the political world than we knew before. Still, the time seems long overdue for the sort of synthesis that March and Olsen have suggested, a genuine synthesis of rules and reasons that recognizes the importance of understanding the interactions between them. The political roles of politicians constitute a subject where these interactions can be seen with special clarity, a subject that points directly to motivational frameworks that, compared to their alternatives, are more rational, less muddled, better oriented to behavior, and well suited for investigating how rules and reasons interact to create political roles that are much too important to continue to be overlooked.

Notes

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1. These members of Parliament (N = 521) were interviewed during 1972 and 1973, the middle years of the Conservative Health government. A response rate of 83% applied to ministers and backbenchers alike. Reacting to a combination of open- and closed-ended questions, they discussed their roles at length in the context of tape-recorded interviews about parliamentary careers, political institutions, and political values. Since this is not a probability sample, conventional significance tests are not strictly appropriate. Nevertheless, they will be reported in order to give a general sense of the strength or weakness of the associations we observe; and given the very large proportion of the population sampled, these tests will be extremely conservative indicators.

2. More irritating still for rational choice models is the fact that many informal rules are actually designed to encourage people to behave some of the time as though they are not rational egoists (e.g., Elster 1989; Jackson 1987).

3. Selective recruitment is the most obvious alternative explanation for the greater voting cohesion on the Conservative and Labour front benches than on their respective back benches. This explanation would suggest that those recruited to the front benches are mainly members of Parliament who either agree with their party leaders or are psychological conformists, or both. However, further analyses of the respondents' political values and policy preferences show that within each party, the distribution of opinion on the front benches resembles the distribution of opinion on the back benches. This is perhaps not surprising, at least after the fact, because each party needs, for the sake of party unity, to represent on the front bench most of its significant parliamentary groups and factions. The front benches also include their share of difficult characters, for they have long taken in potential troublemakers to silence them under the collective responsibility rule.

4. Some of the worst muddles were resolved early on. But these efforts had little impact on subsequent research. See Neiman and Hughes 1951 and Gross, Mason, and McEachern 1966. In the last section of this essay, I shall argue for the general (though certainly not exclusive) utility of a "politician-focused" definition of roles as configurations of goals, attitudes, and behaviors that are characteristic of people in particular positions.

5. Stryker and Statham (1985, 331). Structural-functional analysis proposed to study the polity, economy, and society as vast blueprints of roles with each of these "basic units" (roles) clearly specified and with each individual associated with a series of basic units.

6. (Biddle 1986, 70–71). The tendency of the structural approach to create "oversocialized" images of people in worlds of homogeneity and conformity was corrected somewhat by Robert Merton's (1957, 1963) observation that the expectations established for a role often involve inconsistencies. Recent structural research has built on these observations and now takes it for granted that some confusion and inconsistency is the usual state of affairs rather than a departure from normality (Handel 1979; Heiss 1981).

7. Thus, in his study of British and Italian members of Parliament, Putnam interpreted as roles several specific rules for cognition (focus on technical matters or on national interests) (1973, 124–25). Both sorts of definitions are also found in Davidson's (1969) study of roles in the U.S. House of Representatives and in Jewell and Patterson's (1977) review identifying roles that concern job conceptions and fit politicians' understandings of the role concept (broker, committee man) and other roles that concern very particular cognitions and norms (e.g., "executive-oriented"). This tendency to reduce the role concept to one or two norms, such as the proper attitude toward pressure groups, was carried furthest by Newton (1974) in his survey of Birmingham council members.

8. Certainly, we have learned a great deal about legislative behavior by studying trustees, delegates, and politicos. And certainly we, as analysts, may find it valuable to continue to characterize these as roles. But let us be clear that a few specific norms do not usually make a role in the minds of the politicians we study, a point made quite effectively by Converse and Pierce (1986) in their study of French deputies.

9. Mead (1934) argued that social interaction produces a person's mind, as well as self, in an on-going process. From this viewpoint, even the personality becomes no more than a set of social roles that the individual is currently playing.

10. Interactional approaches reject the assumption that behavior is determined by the external force of established norms. Instead, they argue that it is determined by the on-going flow of interactions with one's associates. The individual's basic goals and emotional incentives are, however, frequently overlooked in the interactionists' empirical accounts, which are typically sociologistic and depict people far more as social products than as social producers (see Stryker and Serpe 1982). This tendency to submerge the rational individual in the flow of interaction has been corrected by attributing motivational significance to "chance desires" (Turner 1976) and by attributing conditioning effects to institutional contexts (Handel 1979; Stryker and Statham 1985, 313). Yet neither corrective has been carried far enough to secure for the individual a convincing autonomous viewpoint.

11. Following in Fenno's footsteps, Cain, Ferejohn, and Fiorina (1987) traveled with British members of Parliament in their constituencies. Compared to Fenno, however, they spent less time analyzing the social psychological exchanges and more time analyzing what their subjects actually did and why they did it. This study does examine interactions, but it is perhaps best interpreted as a bridge between the interactional enterprise and the motivational approach.

12. The methods used by motivational studies have been varied, but the most successful has usually proved to be the semistructured interview, an alternative between the structuralists' detailed questionnaires and the soaking and poking of the interactionists. The numbers of individuals studied is frequently in between, too, since convincing motivational accounts require substantial samples, whereas the need for elaborate discussions makes it difficult for these samples to become very large.

13. In the same vein, when Budge et al. (1972) examined the roles of councillors in Glasgow, they, like their respondents, interpreted this subject to mean "the question of what councillors should do." The role types they produced were therefore constructed around career goals. See also Mitchell 1985 and Clapp 1963.

14. In East Anglia, the South East, and London, the correlation rises to tau c = .29, gamma = .73 (.001).

15. Their thinking is used as the point of departure here, because although ignoring it may be necessary for certain theoretical purposes, such strategies often create role concepts that have little to do with the political behaviors we seek to explain. In particular, it seems desirable to avoid definitions of roles that include only observable behavior, since politicians understand the concept to mean far more than that (see Biddle 1979, 58). Politicians want to know what is going on in the *minds* of their associates—and so do we. This politician-focused perspective also suggests that although the alternative rational choice strategy of using unrealistic assumptions about politicians' motivations as theoretical premises (the "as if" strategy) may help to predict events or clarify normative claims, it is usually ill-suited for constructing satisfactory *explanations* of *empirical* phenomena. Empirical explanations are unlikely to be convincing when their basic theoretical premises are presumed to be incorrect (McKeown 1986, 45; Moe 1979).

16. The motivational approach does not ignore questions about relationships between role attitudes and role behaviors. These linkages must be shown empirically to exist in order for specific items to

count as part of the definitions of specific roles.

17. As Hollis and Smith put it, this rationality involves much more than the calculation of expected utilities for means to achieve ends that remain unquestioned: "Our actors *interpret* information, *monitor* their performance, *reassess* their goals. The leading idea is that of reasoned judgment, not of manipulation" (1986, 283).

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DISCONTENT AND THE EXPECTED UTILITY OF REBELLION: THE CASE OF PERU

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Discontent theories of rebellion postulate that politicized discontent will have a strong independent effect on individuals' potential to participate in rebellious political action. Expected utility theories postulate that participation in rebellious action is motivated by expectation of reward and that discontent is relevant at most only insofar as individuals expect that collective action can be successful and that their participation is important to that end. We test these theories with data from a national sample and a sample of students at a protest-prone university in Peru, a country with significant objective conditions of discontent and a high incidence of rebellious political conflict. The results provide no evidence for the discontent models but strong support for the expected utility models. The potential for participation in rebellious political action proves to be a function primarily of discontent weighted *by the expectancy of the action's success and the perceived importance of personal participation. Private social and normative rewards and costs also are relevant—but to a lesser extent—for the individual's calculation of the expected utility of participation.*

The principal contending theoretical approaches to explaining why individuals participate in rebellious political action are those that emphasize deprivation, frustration, and grievances as the primary causes versus those that emphasize expected utility: cost-benefit calculations, resource mobilization, and power politics (Coleman 1990; Eckstein 1980; Lichbach 1989; Snyder 1978; Weede 1988). These approaches differ most fundamentally in their assumption about the role of discontent as a motivation for rebellion. The discontent approach, which Lichbach (1989) calls the *deprived actor* research program, assumes that discontent resulting from deprivation and frustration has a strong, direct, unconditional effect on the likelihood of an individual's participating in rebellious political action. The common denominator of the expected utility approach, which Lichbach (1989) calls the *rational actor* research program, is the assumption that expectation of reward is the primary motivation. The rational actor theory explicitly rejects the deprived actor theory's assumption that discontent is inherently a powerful motivation for participation in rebellious political action. From a rational actor perspective, deprivation and frustration are either irrelevant or else relevant only conditionally, depending on the extent to which they generate an interest in public goods to be achieved through rebellion and are accompanied by belief that rebellion is likely to succeed.

An important requirement for a strong empirical test of these competing theoretical approaches is that individual persons be the unit of analysis. Macro level tests with countries as the unit of analysis can be designed (e.g., Muller and Weede 1990); and they afford an important advantage over micro level tests in that a large number of states varying in levels of rebellious political action and in conditions assumed to produce discontent and expectation of the utility of rebellion can be compared. But since tests at the macro level depend on the acceptance of untestable assumptions about relationships between aggregate properties of countries and states of mind of their inhabitants, micro level tests can provide more decisive evidence.

If individuals are the unit of analysis and if only one or a few countries can feasibly be selected as research sites, then the country or countries must be chosen with careful attention to characteristics that will maximize the power of the test. In the case of testing deprived actor versus rational actor theories of rebellion, the strongest possible single-country test will be one conducted in a country that is already an instance of a conjunction at the macro level between deprivation and rebellion, that is, where both the objective conditions of deprivation assumed to produce discontent and the incidence of rebellious political action are at relatively high levels. If deprived actor theory is correct, a strong relationship between subjective discontent and participation in rebellious political action certainly should be observed in such a setting. If the relationship is weak even in the context of a macro conjunction between deprivation and rebellion and if it is the expected utility of rebellion that motivates individuals to participate in rebellious political action, this would constitute compelling evidence in favor of rational actor theory.

Almost all of the major insurgencies and revolutions in the second half of the twentieth century have taken place in the less-developed countries of the Third World, where objective levels of deprivation are much higher than in advanced industrialized countries. For a critical test of the deprived actor and rational actor theories, we shall use data from surveys conducted in Peru, a less-developed country in which objective deprivation is extremely severe and is accompanied by a very high level of rebellious political conflict.

Research Design

Peru at the time of the surveys (the winter of 1987/88) ranked in the lower category of Third World middle-income countries with a 1986 gross national product per capita of $1,090. It was plagued by a host of serious economic difficulties: triple-digit inflation, severe devaluation, and high un- and underemployment, all of which exacerbated long-entrenched social and economic inequalities. During the 1980–86 period gross domestic product per capita had declined at an annual average rate of .4%; and an annual average decline of 1.9% in real earnings per employee in the manufacturing sector had been coupled with an increasing annual rate of inflation that had averaged 100.1%. Income inequality in Peru in 1985 was substantial, since the poorest 40% received only 12.9% of national income, while the richest 20% received 51.9% (World Bank 1990). With almost seven million inhabitants, Lima, Peru's capital, contained about a third of the nation's total population; Ministry of Housing estimates calculated that more than half of the city lived either in squatter settlements or in central-city slum environments. Basic health care delivery in both urban and rural areas declined throughout the decade of the 1980s, with the result that the occurrence of preventable diseases rose, as did levels of infant mortality, especially among low-income groups (Instituto Nacional de Estadistica 1990).

With respect to political protest and rebellion, an insurgency initiated by Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path) had escalated since 1980 into a high-intensity rebellion of major proportion resulting in repeated declarations of states of emergency and martial law (see Dietz 1990). In 1982, when the first "emergency zones" (i.e., areas under military rule) were established, they included less than 3% of Peru's population. By 1987, these zones had expanded to include more than half of the country's inhabitants. The death rate from political violence during 1980–88 was almost nine hundred per million population (approximately nineteen thousand deaths relative to Peru's 1988 population of 21.3 million [DESCO 1989]). Revolutionary conflict, which originated in the south-central sierra area around Ayacucho, had spread by 1987 into Lima through bombings, blackouts, random assaults and assassinations. The case of Peru thus affords a natural setting for a strong test of hypotheses derived from the deprived actor and rational actor theories of rebellion.

The Peruvian data are from a national survey of 1,571 adults and a survey of 400 university students that were conducted for us by the market research firm APOYO during December 1987–March 1988. The respondents in the national survey are a representative sample of the adult population in the nine provinces of Peru with the greatest percentage of voting age population (at least 18 years of age). Amazonian jungle areas and other extremely remote rural districts were excluded.[1] The respondents in the student survey are from two universities in Lima: San Marcos and the National Educational University (La Cantuta, for teacher training). These universities had been raided by the police in 1986 as strongholds for the revolutionary Sendero Luminoso and Revolutionary Tupac Amaru movements (MRTA).[2] The interview schedule administered by APOYO included measures of (1) past participation and current intention to participate in legal and illegal collective political action (from working in electoral campaigns and petition drives to participating in confrontations with police or troops and destroying public property); (2) discontent with the provision of public goods, that is, dissatisfaction with the performance of the government in regard to specific areas of public policy, alienation from the political system in general, and politicized relative deprivation; (3) belief in the likelihood of success of collective political action and perceived importance of personal participation; and (4) measures of a variety of expected private benefits and costs of participating in collective political action, encompassing material, social network, and personal normative incentives.

We shall specify models for deprived actor and rational actor theories. Then we will describe the measure of participation in rebellious political action and report the results of our tests with Peruvian data of the deprived actor and rational actor models for explaining why people rebel.

Deprived Actor and Rational Actor Models

The most sophisticated contemporary statement of deprived actor theory is Gurr's (1970), which stipulates that relative deprivation, defined as perceived discrepancy between the goods and conditions of life to which people believe they are rightfully entitled and what they actually have, is the basic instigating condition for rebellious political action. The fundamental postulate of Gurr's relative deprivation version of deprived actor theory is that if people hold the political system responsible for their relative deprivation, then their likelihood of participating in rebellious political action will be a strong monotonic function of the intensity of their "politicized" relative deprivation (or discontent), regardless of the instrumentality of the behavior: "Discontent provides an innately nonrational (but widely rationalized) impetus to violence, empirically and analytically distinguishable from actors' estimates of the utilities of violence" (p. 326).

Rational actor theory, by contrast, is based on the assumption that participation in rebellious political action is a function solely of its expected utility for the individual. Politicized discontent, therefore, should *not* have a direct effect on behavior, independent of expected utility. Versions of rational actor theory differ, however, in predicting whether politicized discontent, which entails dissatisfaction with the provision of public goods by the state, is relevant to an individual's calculation of the expected utility of his participation in rebellion.

Private Interest

Tullock's (1974) *by-product* theory of revolution, which builds on Olson's (1965) general theory of collective action, assumes that demand for public goods to be achieved by revolution drops out of a rational actor's utility calculus because public goods are available to all if the rebellion should succeed, regardless of whether a person participates in it or not, and because the objective probability of a single person influencing the outcome of the rebellion is negligible unless he is one of the leaders of the rebellion. Consequently, the only kind of reward that can be a relevant motivation for ordinary citizens is private benefits that the individual expects to receive only if he participates—*selective incentives* in Olson's terminology.

The most important selective incentives in Tullock's theory are material rewards, such as financial gain or a position of power in a revolutionary government.[3] The problem with Tullock's by-product theory is that material selective incentives are typically in short supply and can reasonably be expected only by a few members of the group who are probably influential to the outcome (and could be motivated therefore by an interest in public goods as well). Ordinary citizens—the "footsoldiers" who make up the bulk of the participants in an insurgency—surely cannot have any expectation of being given high office in a revolutionary government. So apart from financial gain through relatively unusual circumstances such as looting or the payment of wages by a guerrilla army, expected material rewards cannot be assumed to have a large positive value in their utility calculus. And since the likelihood of suffering substantial personal costs may be relatively high, the negative weight of expected costs should typically cause the rational ordinary citizen to abstain rather than participate.

There is, however, a class of selective incentives that is in abundant supply even in groups with few material resources. If an individual's friends—or groups the individual belongs to or identifies with—believe that he or she *ought* to participate in collective action, then a social norm of participation exists. If a social norm of participation exists, then the individual actor will be subject to it in social relations with others. These others who adhere to the norm will express approval of those in the social network who conform to it and disapproval to those who do not conform. The individual who is part of the social network, whether it be family, friends, or an organized group, will derive benefit in the form of social approval from conforming to the social norm. In addition to expected benefits of conforming to behavioral norms of significant others and more generally of conforming to behavioral norms of groups to which the individual belongs, the class of social network selective incentives includes affiliation rewards such as getting to know interesting people and making new friends through participation in collective action (Finkel and Opp 1991; Klandermans 1984; Muller and Opp 1986). We hypothesize that in the utility calculus of ordinary citizens, social network selective incentives for participation in rebellious political action are a more important kind of private interest reward than material selective incentives.

Material and social network selective incentives are rewards that gratify the private self-interest of the individual and are provided by an external source (usually a group) to those who participate, regardless of whether the action is successful. In addition to them, there is a third kind of private self-interest reward that can be obtained through participation, regardless of whether it is successful. This kind of reward is a result of conforming to an individual's own internalized norms of behavior and is therefore independent of external selective incentives. Coleman (1990, 494–95), for example, hypothesizes that in an expected utility model of rebellion

> internalized norms and the sanctions supporting them can exert a force of their own. If one has come to hold an ideology containing a utopian vision, then working toward the realization of that vision generates internal psychic rewards, independent of the surrounding social capital. . . . If this conjecture about the role of utopian ideology is correct, the importance of such ideology can be great because the benefits it generates depend only on participation, not on success of the revolt or on effectiveness of the individual's participation in bringing about that success.

Thus, the satisfaction (psychic reward) of conforming to internalized norms represents a third kind of private benefit in an expected utility model of rebellion.[4]

Social networks and internalized norms are not only sources of incentives for the individual to participate in collective action, they also can be sources of disincentives. Social norms and personal norms can proscribe behavior, as well as prescribe it. If they proscribe collective action, then participation would be a cost to the individual. Since rebellious political action is illegal and sometimes violent, social and personal norms proscribing participation are likely to be prevalent and the expected costs of deviating from such norms may exert substantial negative weight in an individual's utility calculus.

Our model of the private interest theory can be expressed by the following equations:

$$\begin{aligned} &R = U_r \\ &U_r = B_m + B_s + B_p - C_m \\ &\quad C_s - C_p \end{aligned} \qquad (1)$$

where R is the extent to which the individual participates in *rebellious political action* and where, in respect to expected private costs and benefits, U_r is the expected *utility* of participation in rebellious political action; B_m is the *material benefits* of participating; B_s is the *social network benefits;* B_p is the *personal normative benefits;* C_m is the *material costs;* C_s is the *social network costs; and* C_p is the *personal normative costs* of participating.

Collective Interest

Material, social network, and personal normative rewards are goods that, unlike public goods, can be obtained only if the individual participates in collective action and can be consumed by the individual privately without others necessarily consuming them as well. Private interest versions of rational actor theory postulate that expected utility is a function exclusively of an individual's expectation of receiving these rewards and of suffering the costs of participation. In these formulations, the participation of ordinary citizens in such behavior is independent of both interest in public goods and of the likelihood of success of rebellion. In an alternative version of rational actor theory, however, both interest in public goods and expectancy of success, as weighted by the importance of personal participation, are assumed to be relevant and potentially powerful determinants of the expected utility of rebellion for ordinary citizens (see Finkel, Muller, and Opp 1989; Muller and Opp 1986).

Because of differences in sociological characteristics such as socioeconomic status (a function of education, income, and occupation) and/or in personality characteristics such as self-confidence, we postulate that people who are not leaders of groups nevertheless may vary in the extent to which they think they can have an influence on the likelihood of success of collective action. Allowing for the possibility of variation in subjective resourcefulness means that some ordinary members of large groups may participate in collective action because they have an interest in the public good or goods to be obtained by collective action and believe that collective action is likely to be successful and that their participation will enhance the likelihood of success. Furthermore, even if many or most ordinary members of large groups are not subjectively resourceful, the logic of free-riding may be overcome by an interaction between expectancy of group success and two other beliefs about the importance of personal participation. One, which we call the unity principle, is a strategic belief quite familiar from the rhetoric of collective action, *United we stand, divided we fall.* The belief that group unity is necessary for success is based on the principle that social networks must be closed or unified in order for it to be rational for utility-maximizing actors not to free-ride (see Coleman 1990, chap. 11). A second belief that promotes personal participation is adherence to a Kantian norm of duty to do one's fair share, on the grounds that if others are cooperating to obtain a desired collective good, then each individual with an interest in the public good is morally bound to cooperate as well. We do not expect that either the unity or the duty principles can motivate people to participate in a lost cause; but when adherence to them is coupled with the perception that collective action is likely to succeed, then individuals who are dissatisfied with the provision of public goods will have an incentive to contribute to collective political action (see Finkel, Muller, and Opp 1989).

Interest in collective benefits (what we call *public goods motivation)* is thus the product of dissatisfaction with the provision of public goods, the likelihood of success of collective action, and the importance of personal participation in collective action. Its motivational force depends fundamentally on expectancy of success and the expected benefit of consuming the public good. A collective and private interest expected utility model of rebellion that includes an individual's interest in both public and private goods is

$$U_r = (E^*I)^*G + B_m + B_s + B_p - C_m - C_s - C_p, \qquad (2)$$

where E is the *expected success* of rebellious political action; I is the *importance of personal participation,* a function of subjective resourcefulness and/or belief in the unity or duty principles; and G is demand for the provision of public *goods,* a function of discontent with the current provision of public goods. The difference between equations 2 and 1 is that the latter assumes I to be approximately zero. If I is approximately zero, then $(E^*I)^*G$ will be approximately zero, and the $(E^*I)^*G$

term becomes a component of U_r that is effectively irrelevant for behavior.

Political Discontent

The principal explanatory variable in Gurr's (1970) version of deprived actor theory is politicized relative deprivation. Since this concept refers to a discrepancy between deserved and actual enjoyment of goods or conditions of life that is blamed on the political system, relative deprivation that is politicized necessarily entails dissatisfaction with the provision of public *goods* and thus is subsumed under G in the collective and private interest model. We also may include under G demand for public goods that is not a result of relative deprivation. Additional sources of demand for public goods are dissatisfaction with the performance of the government in regard to issues of public policy in which one has a personal interest and dissatisfaction with the nature of the political system in general (Muller and Opp 1986; Opp 1989). The relative importance of politicized relative deprivation as compared with dissatisfaction with policy performance and alienation from the political system is a significant subsidiary question in regard to evaluating Gurr's version of deprived actor theory.[5] For the evaluation of deprived actor versus rational actor theory, however, the important questions are (1) whether the broadly defined set of G variables has an independent effect on participation in rebellious political action and, if so, (2) the relative causal weight of discontent variables separately as compared with the expected utility variables. The discontent model is

$$R = G_d + G_p + G_s + U_r \qquad (3)$$

where G_d is politicized relative *deprivation*, G_p is dissatisfaction with *policy performance*, G_s is alienation from the political *system*, and $*_r$ is the expected *utility* of participating as postulated by equation 2.

Illegal Political Protest in Peru

The dependent variable—potential for participation in illegal protest activity—includes (1) taking part in a demonstration that breaks the law, (2) seizing buildings (e.g., factories, government or university offices), (3) participating in confrontations with police or other governmental authorities, (4) participating in political activities that may result in property damage (e.g., breaking windows or damaging construction sites or vehicles), (5) participating in illegal protest activities at the workplace (e.g., wildcat strike, sabotage, slowdown, etc.), (6) participating in confrontations with other political groups or individuals, (7) seizing land, (8) taking part in public disorders (e.g., blocking streets, sit-ins). Respondents were asked to report their past performance of each behavior (*never, once, several times*) and their intention to perform it in the future (five response categories, ranging from *not at all* to *very likely*). In order to ensure anonymity and enhance the validity of the answers, the questions about protest behavior were asked in the form of a self-administered questionnaire, which the respondent placed in a separate envelope that was sealed and given to the interviewer.

Each intention response, scored 1–5, was multiplied by past participation, scored 1–3. According to this weighting procedure, unrealized intentions retain their original value; intentions accompanied by participation only once in the past are given twice the value of unrealized intentions; and intentions accompanied by participation frequently in the past are given three times the value of unrealized intentions. Each product variable thus measures a person's potential for participating in illegal political protest at the time of the interview (necessary in order to avoid the time sequence problem that arises if only past behavior were the dependent variable); and multiplying intention by behavior means that unrealized intentions receive a low weight relative to those that have been realized behaviorally in the past.

Since the *intention* × *behavior product* variables have a high scale reliability in both the national and student samples (alpha = .88 and .93, respectively), an illegal protest scale was constructed by computing the mean of the eight items. Among respondents in the national sample, the illegal protest scale correlates at $r = .85$ with an index of past participation in illegal protest;[6] the correlation for the student sample is .93. The range of the illegal protest scale in the national sample is from 1 to 11.13 with a mean score of 1.64; it ranges in the student sample from 1 to 15 with a mean of 3.09. Almost two-fifths of the 1,571 respondents in the national sample score 1 on the illegal protest scale, meaning that they would never do and have never done any of the illegal actions. A small proportion, 6.4%, scores in the high range (4 or more). These 101 respondents with high illegal protest scores either have participated in the past and at least might continue to do so in the future or else have not participated in the past but would do so in the future. In the student sample only 17.5% score very low on illegal protest, and fully 27.5% score in the high range.

Because of the skewed distribution of the illegal protest scale, the common logarithm of illegal protest scores is used in the statistical analysis. Descriptive statistics for the *intention* × *behavior product* variables and the illegal protest scale are reported in Table 1.[7]

Political Discontent

In specifying deprived actor and rational actor models of rebellion, we distinguished three kinds of dissatisfaction with the provision of public goods that might motivate individuals to participate in rebellious political action. One, denoted G_p, refers to specific policies of the government. We measured this kind of political discontent by asking respondents to report (1) how concerned they were about a series of issues (scored on a 0–4 scale ranging from *not at all concerned* to *extremely concerned)* and (2) (for those issues that they thought were a responsibility of the government) how they rated the government's performance (scored 0 for *not a concern of the government* and 1–5 for ratings from *excellent* to *very poor).* Policy dissatisfaction is the product of issue concern and poor government performance rating.

The second kind of political discontent, G_s, measures alienation from the political system. The system alienation scale for the national sample is the mean of the extent to which a respondent has respect for the political system, believes that the basic rights of citizens are well protected by it, feels that he or she should support it, and is proud to live under it (scored on a 1–7 scale ranging from *a great extent* to *not at all).* The system alienation scale for the student sample also includes an item measuring the extent to which the courts are thought to guarantee a fair trial.[8]

The third kind of political discontent is politicized relative deprivation, G_d, as defined by Gurr (1970). Although Gurr discusses the concept in relation to an individual's personal situation, it is also possible for an individual to be concerned about the relative deprivation of a *group* that he or she belongs to or identifies with, regardless of personal circumstances. The personal relative deprivation measures are in regard to a person's income and life in general. Politicized relative deprivation re income is the product of (1) the extent to which a person believes that his or her income is less than deserved in terms of level of education

Table 1. Descriptive Statistics: Illegal Protest Variables

Protest Activity	Observed Range	Mean	Standard Deviation	% Very Low[a]	% High[b]	Item-Total Correlation
National Sample (N = 1,571)						
Illegal demonstrations	1→15	1.89	1.92	61.7	10.6	.63
Seizing buildings	1→15	1.68	1.66	67.3	7.6	.65
Confrontations with police	1→15	1.63	1.54	68.9	7.9	.74
Destruction of property	1→12	1.39	1.11	74.2	3.9	.60
Illegal action at workplace	1→15	1.84	1.90	63.1	9.0	.62
Confrontations with groups	1→12	1.56	1.34	65.9	6.4	.67
Seizing land	1→15	1.60	1.47	65.3	6.9	.53
Public disorders	1→15	1.50	1.45	69.0	5.3	.75
Illegal protest scale[c]	1→11.13	1.64	1.15	38.9	6.4	alpha = .88
Log (illegal protest)	0→1.05	.15	.20	—	—	—
Student Sample (N = 400)						
Illegal demonstrations	1→15	4.30	4.32	36.8	40.0	.75
Seizing buildings	1→15	3.39	3.41	37.5	29.7	.78
Confrontations with police	1→15	3.29	3.52	43.8	27.0	.81
Destruction of property	1→15	2.24	2.72	60.0	13.0	.77
Illegal action at workplace	1→15	3.43	3.43	34.3	28.7	.79
Confrontations with groups	1→12	2.32	2.56	54.5	17.0	.73
Seizing land	1→15	2.37	2.47	50.8	17.5	.72
Public disorders	1→15	3.36	3.80	45.5	27.0	.85
Illegal protest scale[d]	1→15	3.09	2.74	17.5	27.5	alpha = .93
Log (illegal protest)	0→1.18	.36	.31	—	—	—

[a] Score of 1: *would not do and have not done.*

[b] Scores of 4 or more (rounded for illegal protest scale): at least *might do and have done* or *would do and have not done.*

[c] Correlation between illegal protest scale and index of past participation: r = .85.

[d] Correlation between illegal protest scale and index of past participation: r = .93.

(scored on a four-point scale ranging from 0 for *as good as what you deserve* to 3 for *very much worse)* and (2) the extent to which the government has responsibility for this (scored from 1 to 3 for *only a little, some,* and *a lot).* Politicized relative deprivation re life in general (overall welfare) is the product of (1) the extent to which a person believes that he or she is less well off than deserved in comparison with most people in Peru (on a scale of 0 for *as well off,* 1.5 for *less well off,* and 3 for *much less well off)* and (2) the extent of government responsibility for this. Relative deprivation in regard to a group was measured by presenting respondents with a list of groups (women, students, blue-collar workers, white-collar workers, intellectuals, poor people, businessmen, entrepreneurs, the elderly, rich people), and asking them to name which group they felt closest to, if any, and to rate the extent to which they thought the group was getting as much as it deserved. The measure of group relative deprivation is the product of closeness to the group (scored 0 for those who did not feel close to any group, 1 for those who felt *somewhat close,* and 2 for *very close)* and the extent to which the group is perceived as getting less than it deserves (scored on a 1-5 scale ranging from *a great extent* to *not at all).*

Descriptive statistics for the various measures of dissatisfaction with the provision of public goods and the correlations

Table 2. Descriptive Statistics and Correlations between Illegal Protest and Measures of Dissatisfaction with Provision of Public Goods

	National Sample			Student Sample		
Public Goods Dissatisfaction	Mean	Standard Deviation	r: log-illegal protest	Mean	Standard Deviation	r: log-illegal protest
Policy dissatisfaction (0→20):[a] What the government does to						
Reduce employment	11.58	5.41	-.04	13.63	5.20	.12*
Reduce cost of living	12.60	5.44	-.08	14.37	5.26	.16*
Reduce income inequality	9.35	5.72	-.01	13.07	6.25	.31*
Reduce external debt	7.93	5.41	-.01	10.85	5.91	.19*
Reduce population growth	9.52	5.71	-.04	11.65	6.23	-.02
Combat crime	11.34	5.74	-.06	12.33	5.90	.02
Combat terrorism	11.21	5.72	-.05	12.64	6.17	.03
Prevent corruption	11.38	5.66	-.02	13.43	5.76	.06
Solve problems in your community	8.36	6.57	.02	9.76	6.45	.08
System alienation (1→7)	4.31	1.25	.09*	5.30	1.10	.39*
Relative deprivation (RD): Politicized Personal RD (0→9)						
Re income	1.58	1.99	.11*	2.10	2.52	.22*
Re overall welfare	2.53	2.11	.07*	3.29	2.54	.13*
Group RD (0→10)	3.52	2.78	.13*	4.52	2.94	.23*
Number of cases		1,571			400	

[a]Possible range of variables in parentheses.

*$p < .01$, one-tailed.

between them and the illegal protest scale are shown in Table 2. For the national sample the correlations between the policy dissatisfaction variables and illegal protest are exceedingly small and, with a single exception, are in the wrong direction. One explanation for this is that the questions were confusing to many respondents in the national sample. An alternative explanation is that because the Peruvian state is exceedingly weak, the bulk of Peru's citizenry does not expect it to provide these public goods effectively. Thus, individuals may rate the performance of the government poorly; but policy dissatisfaction may not be correlated with political protest because individuals do not expect that the government could perform better. Students, by contrast, may have higher expectations for governmental performance; therefore, policy dissatisfaction might be more likely to be a source of political protest directed against the state.

The mean system alienation score for respondents in the national sample is 4.3. Since the system support end of the continuum could be considered as comprising scores in the range of 1.0–2.5, and the alienation end could be considered as comprising scores in the range of 5.5–7.0, the general public in Peru appears on the average to be ambivalent about the democratic political system that was reestablished in 1980 rather than supportive of it or alienated from it. Those who *are* alienated are more likely to participate in illegal protest than those who are ambivalent or supportive, since the correlation between system alienation and illegal protest is positive and statistically significant; but the magnitude of the correlation

Table 3. Regressions of Illegal Protest on Dissatisfaction with Provision of Public Goods

Variables	Log-Illegal Protest: National Sample (Equation A)	Log-Illegal Protest: Student Sample (Equation B)
Intercept	.056	−.341
Policy dissatisfaction income inequality	—	.008* (.17)
Policy dissatisfaction external debt	—	.001 (.03)
System alienation	.011* (.07)	.083* (.29)
Politicized relative deprivation: income	.008* (.08)	.017* (.13)
Politicized relative deprivation: welfare	.003 (.03)	.004 (.04)
Group relative deprivation	.008* (.12)	.020* (.19)
Adjusted R^2	.029	.235
Number of cases	1,571	400

Note: Standardized coefficients are in parentheses.
*$p < .01$, one-tailed.

(.09) is exceedingly weak. This is also the case in regard to the measures of relative deprivation, where all correlations are significant but the highest (group RD) is only .13. By contrast, the students are on the average relatively alienated from the current democratic regime in Peru; and their level of alienation shows what is for survey data a rather strong correlation with illegal protest (.39). All the relative deprivation measures also correlate positively and significantly with illegal protest among respondents in the student sample, although their magnitudes are weaker than that of system alienation.

A baseline test of the political discontent version of deprived actor theory is reported in Table 3. Here, the test is simply the magnitude of R-squared for regression equations (ordinary least squares) of illegal protest on the measures of dissatisfaction with the provision of public goods that showed significant bivariate correlation with it.[9] The explained variance is exceedingly low for the national sample (3%) but relatively high for the student sample (24%). This difference is far too large to be a function solely of measurement error. Clearly, the strength of baseline support for the political discontent model is heavily dependent on the context of a "radicalized" community.

Public Goods Motivation

The collective and private interest model of rational actor theory as expressed by equation 2 stipulates that dissatisfaction with the provision of public goods will have no direct independent effect on the likelihood of an individual's participating in rebellious political action. We hypothesize that dissatisfied people will have a high likelihood of participating only if they think

Table 4. Regressions of Illegal Protest on Public Goods Discontent, Expectancy of Success, and Importance of Participation

	Log-Illegal Protest			
	National Sample		Student Sample	
Variables	Equation A	Equation B	Equation C	Equation D
Intercept	.010	−.117	−.548	−.542
Log (public goods discontent)	.226* (6.6)	.191* (6.1)	1.180* (9.9)	.782* (7.1)
Log (likelihood of group success)	—	1.203* (9.6)	—	1.215* (5.1)
Log (personal influence)	—	.563* (8.4)	—	1.145* (7.4)
Log (unity principle)	—	.282* (4.1)	—	.242 (1.2)
Log (duty to participate)	—	.028 (0.6)	—	.140 (1.0)
Adjusted R^2	.026	.183	.196	.387
Number of cases	1,571		400	

Note: t-ratios are in parentheses.

**p* < .01, one-tailed.

that the group can succeed and that their own participation is important for the success of the action. Support for the hypothesis of a multiplicative interaction between public goods discontent, expectancy of success, and importance of personal participation was found in a previous study of political protest in West Germany (Finkel, Muller, and Opp 1989).

The expectancy-of-success measure, called *likelihood of group success*, is the product of the extent to which respondents (1) perceive that groups have helped their cause through rebellious political action in the past and (2) think that other people with political views similar to theirs are currently likely to participate. Importance of personal participation is a function of one or more of the following beliefs: (1) that personal participation will have an influence on the success of rebellious political action, (2) that the participation of all members of a group is necessary for success (the unity principle), and (3) that people who are dissatisfied with policies of the government have a duty to do something about it (duty to participate).

A test of whether the components of the $(E*I)*G$ term of equation 2 interact multiplicatively can be performed by estimating the parameters of a regression equation in which all variables are logged (see Finkel, Muller, and Opp 1989, 895–96). In equations A and B of Table 4, which reports tests for the national sample, G is represented by the common log of the average of the three relevant political discontent variables from equation A of Table 3: alienation from the political system, politicized personal relative deprivation in regard to income, and relative deprivation in regard to interests of groups with whom one identifies.[10] E is represented by the common log of likelihood of group success; and I is represented by the common logs of personal influence, the unity principle, and duty to participate. Equation A of Table 4 estimates the effect of discontent only. Equation B of Table 4 estimates the multiplicative effect of discontent, expectancy of success, and importance of participation, or $(E^*I)^*G$.

The relationships hypothesized in our specification of the public goods motivation term are supported by Table 4, equation B, as the indicator of E (the likelihood of group success), two of the three indicators of I (personal influence and the unity principle), and the indicator of G (average public goods discontent) are estimated to have statistically significant positive multiplicative effects on illegal protest. Moreover, as the comparison of R-squared for Table 4, equations A and B, shows, the explanatory power of the $(E^*I)^*G$ expected utility term (B) is far superior to that of G, the discontent term, alone (A). In the national sample, people who are dissatisfied with the provision of public goods are not much more likely to participate in rebellious political action than those who are satisfied. But people who are dissatisfied with public goods, and expect that rebellious political action is likely to succeed, *and* believe that their participation is important are substantially more likely to participate in rebellion than those who are not dissatisfied, or do not think rebellion has much chance of succeeding, or do not think their participation will make any difference to the outcome.

For the student sample the summary index of discontent with the provision of public goods is the weighted sum of the four relevant variables from equation B of Table 3: dissatisfaction with the policies of the government for reducing income inequality, alienation from the political system, politicized personal relative deprivation in regard to income, and relative deprivation in regard to interests of groups with whom one identifies. Despite the fact that public goods discontent is related far more strongly to illegal protest in the student sample than in the national sample, the multiplicative interaction of discontent with expectancy of success and importance of personal participation shows much greater explanatory power than public goods discontent alone, as R-squared for Table 4, equation D (.387) is approximately twice as great as that for equation C (.196). Thus, even in a social context where a relatively strong relationship obtains between discontent and participation in illegal protest, the expected utility specification of the effect of discontent on illegal protest is superior.

In the student sample the set of I variables is dominated by one—personal influence on the success of illegal protest. Neither of the beliefs promoting cooperation is statistically significant. Objectively, students at elite universities have far greater resources than the average respondent in a national sample. These objective resources are translated into a much greater effect of subjective resourcefulness, since the coefficient for personal influence in Table 4, equation D (1.145) is approximately twice that for the national sample (.563).

Private Interest Motivation

In the private interest model as expressed by equation 1, interest in public goods is irrelevant for U_r because I is assumed to be approximately zero. Consequently, the individual's expected utility of participation is a function of the B terms (the private benefits that can be obtained only through participation) and the C terms (the personal costs of participation). We distinguish analytically between material, social network, and personal normative private benefits and costs.

Private Material Benefits and Costs

We operationalize the B_m term by the most obvious kind of material incentive, financial gain. The C_m term is operationalized by the most obvious kind of material cost—suffering negative sanctions due to arrest or injury—and by the opportunity cost of spent time. Respondents' expectations of the likelihood of receiving these benefits and costs if they participate in illegal protest are measured on a scale scored 0 for *very unlikely*, .33 for *unlikely*, .67 for *likely*, and 1.0 for *very likely*. The negative sanctions variable is the mean of the probability estimates of suffering arrest and injury; the time constraints variable is the mean of the probability estimates of illegal protest's "taking too much of my time" and a general *agree/disagree* question asking whether "I am so busy that I have no time for political involvement" (scored on a 0/1 scale).

Private Social Network Benefits and Costs

The B_s term is operationalized by three social network incentives. First, we asked respondents about their perception of the extent to which people who are important to them (spouse, friends, colleagues, or others) would think positively or negatively of them for participating in illegal protest. Responses were given on a five-point scale ranging from *very negatively* (scored −2) to *very positively* (scored 2). Scores in the positive range represent expected benefits. In this instance, there is no separate measure of C_s because scores in the negative range represent expected costs. Second, we asked respondents whether any of the organized groups to which they belonged (e.g., religious groups, cooperatives, professional associations, unions) encouraged them to participate in illegal protest (scored 1 for *encourage*, 0 otherwise). Third, respondents were asked to estimate the likelihood (scored on a 0 to 1.0 scale) of "getting to know people with similar interests and points of view" if they participated in illegal protest.

Private Personal Normative Benefits and Costs

We measured the individual's expected benefits and costs from conforming to personal internalized norms of behavior in two ways. The B_p term is operationalized by asking individuals to estimate the likelihood (scored on a 0 to 1.0 scale) of "feeling good for standing up for what I believed in" if they participated in illegal protest activities. The C_p term is operationalized by the product of (1) the extent to which the respondent disagrees on a 1–5 scale with the statements "Violence against property in order to achieve political goals is morally justifiable" and "Violence against persons in order to achieve political goals is morally justifiable" and (2) the likelihood (on a 0 to 1.0 scale) that the respondent "would feel guilty" if he or she participated in illegal protest. The expected cost of deviating from internalized moral norms proscribing illegal protest thus ranges from 0 to 5 and is at a maximum value among individuals who believe that political violence is morally unjustifiable and expect to feel guilty if they participate.

Distributions and Correlations with Illegal Protest

Descriptive statistics for the private interest variables and their correlations with illegal protest are shown in Table 5. For the national sample the expected private benefits correlate significantly, but generally weakly, with illegal protest. For the student sample expected financial gain and negative sanctions correlate weakly or not at all with illegal protest; but the correlations otherwise are somewhat stronger than for the national sample. The private interest incentive that correlates most strongly with illegal protest in the national sample is conformity to the behavioral expectations of important others. This incentive and the disincentive

Table 5. Descriptive Statistics and Correlations between Illegal Protest and Private Benefits and Costs

Private Benefits and Costs	National Sample Mean	National Sample Standard Deviation	National Sample r: log-illegal protest	Student Sample Mean	Student Sample Standard Deviation	Student Sample r: log-illegal protest
Material						
Financial gain	.39	.29	.07*	.30	.27	−.07
Negative sanctions	.74	.24	−.12*	.71	.24	.00
Time constraints	.58	.23	−.13*	.51	.22	−.19*
Social network						
Expectations of others	−1.42	.92	.27*	−1.15	1.00	.35*
Group encouragement	.08	.27	.16*	.11	.31	.24*
Meet like-minded people	.62	.27	.10*	.65	.25	.18*
Personal normative						
Standing up for beliefs	.61	.29	.12*	.65	.29	.27*
Moral norms proscribing illegal protest	1.97	1.45	−.16*	1.47	1.26	−.34*
Number of cases		1,571			400	

*$p < .01$, one-tailed.

of personal moral norms proscribing illegal protest are the strongest correlates of participation among the students.

The Expected Utility Models and Discontent

We shall test the private interest model (equation 1), the collective and private interest model (equation 2), and the discontent model (equation 3). Our major hypotheses are, in regard to the private interest model, that social network and personal normative incentives (and disincentives) will be more important than material incentives, since the former are in more abundant supply than the latter; in regard to the collective and private interest model, that public goods motivation will be an important incentive independent of the expected private benefits and costs; and in regard to the discontent model, that indicators of political discontent will not have any direct additive effect on illegal protest independent of the expected utility variables.

The effects of the private interest incentives on illegal protest are estimated by the first equations of Tables 6 and 7. For the national sample, the private benefits and costs have significant effects in the expected direction with the exception of financial gain. The expected reward of conforming to the behavioral norms of important others shows a standardized effect of moderate magnitude; but the magnitude of the standardized effects for the other benefits and costs is small, and Table 6, equation A explains only 11% of the variance in illegal protest. The explained variance of the private interest equation (A, Table 7) for the student sample is more than twice that for the national sample. As in the national sample, all of the social network and personal normative incentives are significant. Two of these incentives stand out as most important among the students: the reward of conforming to expectations of others and the cost of deviating from personal norms that proscribe illegal protest. Otherwise, financial gain is irrelevant, and none of the material costs has a significant deterrent effect on illegal protest. These findings support our initial hypothesis that social network and personal normative benefits and costs will have the strongest effects in the private interest model.

The collective interest incentive is the multiplicative $(E*I)*G$ term from equation 2. This is operationalized by a composite variable, which we call *public goods motivation,* constructed from trimmed equations B and D of Table 4.[11] Public goods motivation is more closely correlated at the bivariate level with illegal protest than is any other expected utility variable in both the national sample and the student sample. These moderate-to-strong correlations (.43 and .62, respectively) reflect the R-squared values obtained for Table 4, equations B and D.

When the effect of the collective interest incentive is taken into account in equation B, Table 6, and equation B, Table 7, the explained variance increases to 21% for

Table 6. Regressions of Illegal Protest on Expected Utility and Public Goods Discontent for the National Sample

	Equations for log Illegal Protest				
Variables	A	B	C	D	E
Intercept	.230	.066	.059	.063	.055
Financial gain	.013 (.03)	–.009 (–.01)	–.008 (–.01)	–.007 (–.01)	—
Negative sanctions	–.042* (–.05)	–.024 (–.03)	–.026 (–.03)	–.027 (–.03)	—
Time constraints	–.056** (–.06)	–.040* (–.05)	–.042* (–.05)	–.042* (–.05)	–.046* (–.05)
Expectations of others	.045** (.21)	.021** (.09)	.021** (.09)	.021** (.10)	.021** (.10)
Group encouragement	.081** (.11)	.053** (.07)	.053** (.07)	.052** (.07)	.055** (.07)
Meet like-minded people	.054** (.07)	.039* (.05)	.038* (.05)	.038* (.05)	.032* (.04)
Standing up for beliefs	.048** (.07)	.038** (.05)	.038** (.06)	.037** (.05)	.035* (.05)
Moral norms proscribing illegal protest	–.011** (–.08)	–.008** (–.06)	–.008** (–.06)	–.008** (–.06)	–.009** (–.06)
Public goods motivation	—	.824** (.36)	.798** (.34)	.796** (.34)	.826** (.36)
Discontent	—	—	.004 (.03)	—	—
Politicized relative deprivation: income	—	—	—	.001 (.01)	—
Group relative deprivation	—	—	—	.003 (.04)	—
Adjusted R²	.111	.214	.214	.214	.214

Note: Standardized coefficients are in parentheses. Number of cases = 1,571.

*p < .05, one-tailed.
**p < .01, one-tailed.

the national sample and to 44% for the student sample. The standardized effect of public goods motivation is quite high absolutely and is by far the most powerful relative effect in each sample.[12] We thus find very strong support for our second hypothesis that interest in collective or public goods, weighted by expectancy of success and importance of personal participation, is a central component of an expected utility model of participation in illegal protest.

In equation C, Table 6, and equation C, Table 7, the summary measure of discontent with the provision of public goods is introduced. These equations are the test of the discontent model as expressed by equation 3. Gurr's (1970) version of deprived actor theory, which postulates a strong positive independent effect, specifically of relative deprivation on rebellious behavior, is tested by equation D, Table 6, and equation D, Table 7. We find no evidence of any significant effect

Table 7. Regressions of Illegal Protest on Expected Utility and Public Goods Discontent for the Student Sample

	Equations for log Illegal Protest				
Variable	A	B	C	D	E
Intercept	.389	.156	.119	.143	.134
Financial gain	−.005 (.00)	−.030 (−.03)	−.029 (−.03)	−.027 (−.02)	—
Negative sanctions	−.007 (−.01)	−.076 (−.06)	−.077 (−.06)	−.084 (−.06)	—
Time constraints	−.100 (−.07)	−.058 (−.04)	−.059 (−.04)	−.060 (−.04)	—
Expectations of others	.074** (.24)	.037** (.12)	.038** (.12)	.038** (.12)	.040** (.13)
Group encouragement	.173** (.17)	.148** (.15)	.148** (.15)	.147** (.15)	.145** (.14)
Meet like-minded people	.187** (.15)	.113* (.09)	.112* (.09)	.113* (.09)	—
Standing up for beliefs	.087 (.08)	−.015 (−.01)	−.012 (−.01)	−.010 (−.01)	—
Moral norms proscribing illegal protest	−.054** (−.22)	−.025** (−.10)	−.025** (−.10)	−.025** (−.10)	−.030** (−.12)
Public goods motivation	—	.827** (.52)	.753** (.47)	.804** (.50)	.839** (.52)
Discontent	—	—	.013 (.06)	—	—
Politicized relative deprivation: income	—	—	—	−.001 (−.01)	—
Group relative deprivation	—	—	—	.006 (.06)	—
Adjusted R^2	.244	.444	.444	.444	.442

Note: Standardized coefficients are in parentheses. Number of cases = 400.

*$p < .05$, one-tailed.
**$p < .01$, one-tailed.

of political discontent on illegal protest independent of the expected utility variables. The summary measure of public goods discontent is nonsignificant in Table 6, equation C and Table 7, equation C, as are the effects of politicized relative deprivation in regard to income and group deprivation in Table 6, equation D and Table 7, equation D. These results clearly support our third hypothesis that discontent will have no direct impact on rebellious political action.

Finally, trimmed equations E of Table 6 and Table 7 show the effects of all the statistically significant variables in both samples.[13] The relevant variables for participation in rebellious collective action in both samples are quite similar, with public goods motivation being by far the most important factor, followed by the social network rewards of conforming to the behavioral expectations of others and group encouragement, and somewhat weaker effects of personal normative rewards and costs. Material incentives, except for the very weak effect of perceived time constraints in the national sample, are consistently irrelevant, as are the politicized discontent variables. The results indicate that the expected utility model of participation is generalizable across samples of individuals with very different social background characteristics. Individuals participate in rebellious political action when expectations of achieving desired public goods and of receiving social and personal normative rewards outweigh the behavior's expected costs.

Conclusion

This research addresses a fundamental point of controversy between theories of why people rebel: Does participation in rebellious political action result principally from conditions that produce discontent, frustration, and anger? Or is it a result of cost-benefit calculations that produce a high expected utility of rebellion?

The most decisive way to test discontent versus expected utility theories of rebellion is to measure discontent, expected utility, and participation in rebellious political action directly with data from surveys of individuals. Ideally, the surveys should be conducted in a country where there is a conjunction between objective deprivation and rebellion. If discontent hypotheses are supported in such a context, this would be evidence that deprived actor theory holds at least when structural deprivation is severe, which has been the premise of much cross-national research conducted at the macro level of analysis. If discontent hypotheses are not supported in such a context and expected utility hypotheses are supported, this would constitute strong evidence against deprived actor theory and in favor of rational actor theory.

We selected Peru as the site for a critical test of discontent versus expected utility theories of rebellion. Peru's economy currently is one of the worst in the world, characterized by negative economic growth and extraordinary levels of inflation and un- and underemployment; moreover, inequality, absolute poverty, and malnutrition among some population groups remain extreme despite efforts at reform in the 1970s. The Peruvian state is weak and is unable to deal effectively with Peru's multitude of economic and social problems. An insurgency of regime-threatening proportions has been accelerating since the early 1980s, and the scope and intensity of political protest and violence is substantial. If anger resulting from subjective feelings of discontent is a powerful motivation for participation in rebellious political action, this relationship should be evident in Peru.

Using data from a national sample and from a sample of students at universities that have been the site of confrontations between police and revolutionary groups, we found little support for deprived actor theory. Among the Peruvian general public, a variety of measures of discontent with the provision of public goods show at best weak bivariate association with an individual's potential for participating in illegal political protest as measured by a scale that weights current intention to participate by past participation. Measures of public goods discontent correlate more strongly with the illegal protest scale among respondents in the student sample; but in both samples the relationships between discontent and illegal protest are strongly conditioned by expected utility variables: expectancy of success and importance of personal participation.

We tested two variants of rational actor theory. One, a pure private interest model, is based on the assumption that interest in public goods is irrelevant for collective action and that the expected utility of rebellious political action is therefore a function only of interest in private goods discounted by private costs. The other, a collective and private interest model, is based on the assumption that in addition to private goods, interest in public goods can be an important conditional motivation for participation in rebellious political action by ordinary citizens who are not leaders of dissident groups. The collective and private interest model was strongly supported by the Peruvian data: the public goods motivation construct was estimated to have a standardized effect on illegal protest of .36 among the general public and .52 among students, while all private benefits and costs had standardized effects in the range of −.12 to .14. According to our results, then, the predominant reason for participation in illegal protest in Peru is that people are dissatisfied with the provision of public goods, expect that rebellious political action will be a successful means of obtaining them, and believe that their participation is important to the likelihood of success. Those who are *only* dissatisfied with the provision of public goods but otherwise do not expect that rebellion will be successful and/or do not believe that their participation is important, have little potential to participate in rebellious action. The strong support found here for the collective and private interest model suggests that rational action theories that focus exclusively on private rewards and costs ignore the critical contribution of public goods motivation in the individual's utility calculus.

Since discontent with the provision of public goods *is* relevant (although only conditionally), an important subsidiary question is, What kinds of public goods discontent are most relevant? Among university students in Peru, alienation from the political system is by far the most relevant. This finding replicates that of research conducted in advanced industrialized societies, where alienation from the political system has been found to be the kind of political discontent most relevant not only for students but also for the general public in New York City, for deprived groups such as blacks in a Midwestern city in the United States, and for residents of protest-prone communities in West Germany (see Muller 1980; Muller and Opp 1986). Among the Peruvian general public, alienation from the political system is relevant; but it is not the most relevant kind of political discontent. Thus, the question raised by Rule as to whether the importance of system alienation for protest in industrialized societies can be generalized to other historical contexts (1988, 221) is answered generally in the affirmative by the Peruvian data, although the comparative weakness of the relationship between system alienation and illegal protest among the general public indicates that relationships can be conditioned by context.

What is new and especially interesting theoretically is that in the Peruvian context, where objective deprivation is extremely severe, relative deprivation measured according to Gurr's (1970) conceptualization (a discrepancy in regard to "just deserts") is found to be as relevant as system alienation among the general public. And relative deprivation is relevant (but much less so than system alienation) also among Peruvian university students. Moreover, the kind of personal relative deprivation that is relevant both among the general public and among university students is in regard to the distribution of income. And among university students, relative deprivation in regard to income is augmented by dissatisfaction with the performance of the government in reducing income inequality. Thus, while we find no evidence of any association between illegal protest and relative deprivation or policy dissatisfaction related to Peru's macroeconomic performance in terms of growth, inflation, and employment opportunities, we do find association between illegal protest and relative deprivation or policy dissatisfaction related to the inegalitarian distribution of income in Peru. This finding lends support to the macro cross-national relationship between income inequality and political violence found by Muller and Seligson (1987; Muller 1985). It must be emphasized, however, that at the micro level the nature of the relationship between dissatisfaction with income inequality and potential for participation in illegal protest is congruent with rational actor, not deprived actor, theory, since the motivational impetus of inequality-based discontent is conditional on the extent to which illegal protest is expected to succeed and the participation of the individual is perceived to be important.

Notes

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1. A truly representative sample of the entire national population is not feasible because the population has a low density and wide dispersion. Adequate sampling frames do not exist for isolated Andean peasant population groups and inhabitants of the Amazonian jungle region. The logistical problems of interviewing people are formidable, as many of these areas are accessible only by foot, canoe, or horseback. Consequently, we drew the national sample from the nine provinces with the largest voting age population, which are representative of approximately two-thirds of the total population: Lima, Callao, La Libertad, Piura, Junin, Arequipa, Cuzco, Lambayeque, and Loreto. Samples in each province were drawn through a multistage random sampling procedure.

2. Students from the two most politicized faculties (humanities and social sciences) were chosen at each university. The samples are not random, since there is no complete list of students registered at either university available. Rather, a set of 20 classrooms was chosen at each university, and 10 students from each class were interviewed.

3. Tullock also includes the *entertainment* value of participating in rebellious political action (1974, 39). Although this might be a relevant incentive for student protest actions carried out in the relative safety of the campus, entertainment is not considered to be an important variable in serious revolutionary activity.

4. Social norms and/or internalized norms have also been proposed as solutions to one of the vexing problems in the theory of rational choice: the question of why people vote (Coleman 1990; Riker and Ordeshook 1968). Positing the existence of such norms of participation can solve the "first-order" free-rider problem because rational actors can derive utility from conforming to them; but this still leaves open the "second-order" free-rider problem, namely, why norms of participation would ever emerge among rational actors. A verbal and mathematical exposition of the social-structural conditions that are sufficient for the rational emergence of social norms and thus solve the second-order free-rider problem has been developed by Coleman (1990, esp. chaps. 10–11, 30). We find Coleman's argument compelling but note that there is not yet a consensus among social scientists about either the rationality of the

emergence of norms or the appropriateness of including them in expected utility models. A forceful statement of the counterthesis that social norms and rationality are incompatible can be found in Elster 1989.

5. See Muller 1980 for a summary of prior research from surveys conducted in the United States and West Germany in which it has been consistently found that system alienation is a much stronger determinant of participation in rebellious political action than relative deprivation. See also Barnes and Kaase 1979, in which policy dissatisfaction is found to be a stronger determinant of political protest than relative deprivation in five advanced industrialized countries. The possibility that relative deprivation might be more important in less-developed countries has not been investigated.

6. This is the sum of the participation variables, where each is scored 0 for *never,* 1 for *once,* and 2 for *more than once.*

7. Missing data on the components of the illegal protest scale and for all other subsequent variables used in this analysis was replaced by the sample mean. This is necessary because although there are few missing responses to any single question, the number of cases would be drastically reduced if missing data on the multitude of variables used in the analysis was excluded.

8. The set of indicators of system alienation included a sixth item, the extent to which one believes that the system of government is the best possible system. This item had low item-total correlations in both the national sample (.39) and the student sample (.22). The "courts guarantee a fair trial" item had a low item-total correlation in the national sample (.36) but not in the student sample (.51). The four-item system alienation scale for the national sample has a reliability coefficient of .75, which is the same as the reliability coefficient if all six items were used; the mean inter-item correlation for the four-item scale is higher (.43), however, than that for a six-item scale (.34). The five-item system alienation scale for the student sample has a higher reliability coefficient (.80) than a six-item scale (.74), and the mean inter-item correlation is also higher (.45 vs. .35).

9. In regard to the student sample, the items with significant correlations less than .2 (unemployment and cost of living) were not significant in a first regression, so they were dropped from the analysis reported in Table 3.

10. In constructing the public goods discontent variable for the national and student samples, all components are first converted to the same scale, 0–10, before computing the mean.

11. For the national sample public goods motivation is computed by the equation

public goods motivation = −.113 + .192*log (public goods discontent) + 1.202*log (likelihood of group success) + .564*log (personal influence) + .288*log(unity principle).

For the student sample public goods motivation is computed by the equation

public goods motivation = −.467 + .799*log (public goods discontent) + 1.244*log (likelihood of group success) + 1.163*log (personal influence).

12. The stronger effect of public goods motivation compared with the private incentives also can be demonstrated by computing the predicted score from equation A in Table 6 and equation A in Table 7 to represent a summary measure of all the material, social, and personal normative incentives and entering that construct into a regression equation with the public goods construct. The standardized effect for the private incentives construct is .19 in the national sample and .27 in the student sample, compared to effects of .35 and .49 for the public goods construct. The summary measure of politicized discontent showed insignificant effects when added to these equations in both samples.

13. Although *meet like-minded people* was statistically significant in Table 7, equation D, its effect became irrelevant once other insignificant variables were omitted. This variable, therefore, was deleted from the final trimmed equation.

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TRANSITIONS BY AGREEMENT: MODELING THE SPANISH WAY

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Several nonrevolutionary cases of transition to democracy are modeled. Different preferences and strategic choices between the alternatives of continuity, reform, and rupture of the authoritarian regime are used to define conventional distinctions between hard-liners, soft-liners, and opposition more precisely. Six groups of actors emerge. Using game theory, the interactions among these actors are formally analyzed. The possibility of political pact in the first phase of change is identified with the possibility of cooperation between players in games in which the equilibrium is a deficient outcome. Three models of transition by agreement are established: agreed reform within the ruling bloc, controlled opening to the opposition, and sudden collapse of the authoritarian regime. Each of these models entails differences in the pace of change and in the limits of the pact and can be associated with different cases of transition in Southern Europe, Latin America, and Eastern Europe.

Around one-third of the democratic regimes existing today are the result of transitions from authoritarian regimes that have taken place since 1973. Three large waves can be distinguished: in Southern Europe in the mid-1970s, in Latin America in the 1980s, and in Eastern Europe since the end of the 1980s. In many of these processes, frequent and praiseworthy references to the *Spanish model* of transition to democracy have been made, generally identifying it with negotiations and pacts among political elites and consensus among the citizenry that avoid acts of revenge, violent confrontations, and civil war. Spanish politicians have often presented themselves abroad as protagonists of this process; and numerous politicians from other countries in transition have sought inspiration in the Spanish experience.[1] At the same time, scholars on comparative transitions in Southern Europe and Latin America have paid particular attention to the "Spanish model." One of them, Juan J. Linz, who has studied the breakdown of democracies extensively, returned to this subject after the first wave of transitions to democracy (Linz 1978, 1981). The references to the Spanish model are also abundant in the important collective work directed by O'Donnell, Schmitter and Whitehead (1986) in which Adam Przeworski goes so far to say that "Spain seems the country to be studied" (1986, 3, 61).

To model the Spanish transition, it is important to observe the first phases of the process. It should be especially noted that real negotiations and pacts between the former Francoists, converted to reformists of the authoritarian regime, and the democratic opposition—which tend to be presented as characteristic of this case—did not take place until after the first free elections, held on 15 June 1977, a year-and-a-half after the death of the dictator on 20 November 1975. In fact, these postelectoral pacts (especially the elaboration of a new democratic constitution, the

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decentralization or creation of the "autonomous communities" and the "Moncloa agreements" in economic policy) were largely conditioned by the composition of the elected Cortes, in which the reformists of the government, the Unión del Centro Democrático, failed to obtain the majority to which they aspired. Instead, in the preelectoral period, which tends to be decisive in many aspects of processes of transition, the reformists did not agree with the democratic opposition but, rather, with the continuists of the authoritarian regime.

Based on this case, some of the characteristic features of the first phase of the transition to democracy are modeled below in a manner I believe valid for interpreting processes of change of regime in multiple real cases. The conceptual categories and the analyses presented, based on game theory, are especially appropriate for a phase characterized by much uncertainty among the actors about the future and by the predominance of strategic behaviors—namely the phase between the liberalization (which permits the definition of positions and the identification of actors) and the first free elections (which establish a more precise relationship of forces and tend to move the interaction of groups within parliamentary and state institutions).

Game theory furnishes useful tools to study situations of interaction between several groups with contradictory and at the same time interdependent interests, such as transitions to democracy. The theoretical framework focuses on choices and strategies; but some findings of our formal analysis also indicate the importance of social and cultural factors in identifying the relevant actors and their orders of preferences, aspects to be further developed in the future. For the moment, I present a definition of the alternatives and actors of the process and a formal analysis of the interactions, especially in some games permitting a beneficial cooperation between players, in order to interpret and stress certain features of real processes of transition.

Alternatives and Actors

In light of numerous cases, it may be said that in the face of an authoritarian regime, three basic alternatives can be defined. First, there is the continuity (C) of the regime, which sometimes may be based on a successful institutionalization process of the authoritarian government. Second, there is a moderate reform (r) of the authoritarian institutions, which generally leads to a limited democracy. Those who favor this alternative accept that a postauthoritarian regime has to be based on a plurality of parties and on free elections by universal suffrage but usually attempt to impose some restrictions on the activity of certain parties, an electoral system that deviates representation in their favor, the continuity of certain institutions, and the absence of the settling of accounts and reprisals against authoritarians. When the transition necessarily entails change in the economic system, as in the socialist countries, they also attempt to maintain control of some parts of the productive apparatus. Third, there is the rupture (R) with the legal and institutional framework of the authoritarian regime and the initiation of a constituent process without restrictions for the establishment of a democratic regime (as well as a market economy in the transition from the socialist regimes).

It is easy to line up the three alternatives according to a greater or lesser degree of change or discontinuity with the past: R, r, C. There are six different orders of preference of the three alternatives, which define six different actors or strategic groups in the political process of transition, as seen in Table 1. Understand that column 3, for example, means that for the persons of this group the first preference is r, the second preference is R, and

Table 1. Transition Preference Orders of Strategic Groups

	Opposition		Ruling Bloc			
			Soft-liners		Hard-liners	
Strategic Groups	1 Revolutionaries (Maximalists)	2 Rupturists	3 Reformists (Gradualists)	4 Openists	5 Continuists	6 Involutionists (Maximalists)
Most Preferred	R	R	r	r	C	C
	C	r	R	C	r	R
Least Preferred	r	C	C	R	R	r

Note: R = rupture; C = continuity; and r = reform.

the third prefrence is C; that is, reformists prefer reform to rupture and rupture to continuity. The rest of the columns indicate the other possible orders of preferences.

These different orderings exist among citizens as well as among political elites and allow us to identify the actors of the political process of transition more precisely than the usual simple distinctions between "hard-liners" and "soft-liners." Broadly, they can be defined as follows:

1. *Revolutionaries.* Of the existing alternatives, they prefer rupture; but rather than reform, which would only halfway satisfy popular demands and would mortgage possibilities for more radical change for many years, they prefer to preserve revolutionary militancy and continue the struggle against continuity.
2. *Rupturists, or democratic opposition.* They prefer rupture but would rather accept reform (which can provoke internal contradictions among continuists and allow a more gradual and somewhat slower advance toward the achievement of some democratic objectives) than continuity. Some former members of the revolutionary opposition may join this group following experiences with negative results, such as a previous civil war. However, the failure of a transition by agreement can also push some members of this opposition toward the first group's position of intransigent radicalism.
3. *Reformists.* They desire a change of regime, controlling it better from above, preserving some elements of continuity, and benefiting from the advantages that their positions of power give them. Some members of the democratic opposition may adapt their preferences, identifying them with those of the reformists, after having reached the conclusion that rupture is impossible or too costly and because, above all, they wish to rid themselves of the dictatorship.
4. *Openists* or promoters of a political thaw (*aperturistas* in Spain or *aberturistas* in Brazil). They desire moderate reform, but faced with the danger of rupture, they prefer to resist by joining the continuists. Some authoritarians may adopt this position after reaching the conclusion that continuity is impossible and that rupture is to be feared more than anything else.
5. *Continuists.* They prefer continuity but would rather accept reform (which would allow them to conserve some privileges from the past) than the feared rupture.
6. *Involutionists* (known as "*el bunker*" during the Spanish transition). They

> aspire to continuity, but in the face of a democratizing reform that would dilute the foundations of the authoritarian regime, they would prefer a direct confrontation with the rupturist opposition as a way to establish a new dictatorship. Some continuists may feel compelled to radicalize their position toward those in this column if their initial concessions to reform end up leading to the success of rupture.

Observe that groups 2-5 maintain orders of preference consistent with the above gradation R, r, C; for this reason I will call these groups *gradualists.* On the other hand, groups 1 and 6 prefer the two extreme options to the intermediate one; for this reason I will call these groups *maximalists.*

Maximalists may adopt more or less bombastic expressions, such as "Better to die on one's feet than live on one's knees," as some Spanish communist leaders said during the civil war of 1936–39, or "Better to die with honor than live in contempt," a common expression in some publications of Spanish fascists of the 1960s. Often, the political culture of these groups includes elements such as the interest in "unmasking the true nature" of the enemy, the opinion that their possibilities for success increase in a situation of open confrontation, the rejection of "lukewarm attitudes," the shared hatred of liberalism more than even communism or fascism, and dialectical pirouettes such as "The worse, the better." Obviously, in both cases, to *live* on one's feet or with honor is preferred above all; but in contrast to the magnificence attributed to that main objective, the alternative implying humiliation or mediocrity is relegated to last place. Understandably, characteristic slogans of the gradualist groups, such as the "lesser evil" or "A bird in the hand is worth two in the bush," are judged by maximalists to be expressions of moral misery. The actors in columns 2–5 tend to be characterized by risk neutrality or risk aversion, that is, caution and fear, and those in columns 1 and 6, by a propensity for risk and a taste for *vivere pericolosamente* ("living dangerously," the slogan of Italian fascism).

This distinction between gradualists and maximalists may be compared with that outlined by Duncan Black in his study of the conditions of equilibrium in voting. While the preferences of gradualists may be represented by single-peaked curves, those of maximalists would take the form of multipeaked curves. According to this theory, maximalist opinions would always be defeated in any voting in which gradualists converge around an alternative preferred by the majority; but if the maximalists had sufficient support, they would generate cyclical majorities (Black 1987, esp. chaps. 4–7). This suggests that if maximalists are sufficiently influential, they can generate a situation of prolonged political instability, with an absence of equilibrium. Otherwise, they tend to be excluded from the consensus among gradualists. I will return to this suggestion later.

It may be significant of maximalism that the same expression, *ultras,* was used in Spain during the 1970s to describe the nostalgics of the early Francoism, which would correspond to Group 6 of our table, and in the Soviet Union of the 1980s to refer to certain members of the radical opposition who would fall into group 1. Although perhaps in both cases these would be persons of similar right-wing ideology, in conventional terms, transition politics is characteristically not ideology- or class-based; rather, actors are distinguished fundamentally by their strategic orientations in the face of change. In fact, the orders of preference here presented can be adopted by various ideologies and, of course, by civilians as well as members of the military. The same ordering can be shared by different organizations; and several of them may coexist within a party, a platform of several parties, a government, or a military body, so that in each case an applied analysis will have to carefuly delimit those collectives to which one can attribute the same will and a single criterion of choice.

The proportions of political strength and social support of one or another strategic group probably depend on factors like the social structure and the duration and forms of domination of the authoritarian regime. They are also, however, the expression of attitudes of initiative, self-confidence, daring, imitation, and opportunity of their leaders, as well as of the opinion formed in different sectors of society through reflection on past experience. As I have already suggested in presenting the various groups, some persons may change their affiliation to one group or another in the course of the transition process, given the characteristic uncertainty in which the actors perform and the abundancy of unexpected or undesired consequences of their choices in such a fluid situation. In any case, the identification of the six groups of actors is, as we shall see, sufficiently pertinent and allows us more precisely to define the "various currents and factions" that O'Donnell and Schmitter (1986) perceived among hard-liners and soft-liners (see also, for some ideas of this sort, although centered on alternatives of economic change, Hirschman 1963, 277–97).

It is also convenient for our analysis to retain affinities by blocs: the opposition bloc, made up of groups 1 and 2, revolutionaries and rupturists, coincide in their first preference R; the bloc of soft-liners, made up of groups 3 and 4, reformists and openists, coincide in their first preference r; and the bloc of hard-liners, made up of groups 5 and 6, continuists and involutionists, coincide in their first preference C. The last two blocs make up what can be called a broader-ruling bloc.

Formal Analysis of the Interactions

The interesting situations—because their result is not obvious—are those in which none of the mentioned groups or blocs is sufficiently predominant to impose its first preference by itself on the others. In these situations, in which the "nonrevolutionary transitions" are included, each of the groups may use different forms of legal or illegal pressure, from the use of repressive mechanisms to the mobilization of the masses or threats of boycott. Each group, however, must necessarily enter into relations of concessions and compromises with one of the other groups in order to obtain their objectives. In the Spanish transition of 1976–77, for example, the expression *ruptura pactada* (agreed rupture) expressed the desire of the democratic opposition to negotiate the rupture with soft-liners, while the expression *reforma pactada* (agreed reform) expressed the desire of the reformist government to attract other groups to its reform project.

Though each group interacts with the others, I limit myself to interactions by twos. Thus, each actor has to choose not between the three alternatives defined above, R, r, and C but between pairs of alternatives, that is, situations defined by the actor's choice and the choice of the interlocutor. We need to establish, then, orders of preferences for each actor with respect to each pair of alternatives. To do this, in accordance with the three alternatives, I construct the ordering of pairs of alternatives presented in Table 2, graduated from greater to lesser degree of pressure for change.

To avoid unnecessary complications and in order to maintain an appropriate degree of realism, I will consider only the situations created by the choices made between each actor's first two preferences. The choice of an actor's last preference should be considered, rather than an

Table 2. Pairs of Transition Alternatives By Level of Pressure for Change

Pressure Level	Pairs of Alternatives
Very high	RR
High	Rr, rR
Medium	rr, RC, CR
Low	Cr, rC
Very low	CC

Note: R = rupture; C = continuity; and r = reform.

interaction, a complete defeat or surrender to the predominance of the other actor; hence, its inclusion would not add any interesting development. I adopt the logical hypothesis that each actor's first preference is the pair of alternatives with a degree of pressure for change that corresponds to the first preferred alternative (high and very high for those who prefer R, medium for those who prefer r, and low and very low for those who prefer C); each actor's second preference is the pair of alternatives with a degree of pressure for change that corresponds to the second preferred alternative, and so on. I assume that each actor follows the complementary criterion that when there are several pairs of alternatives, with the same degree of pressure for change (as at the medium level), the achievement of the objective that satisfies that level by coinciding with the interlocutor is preferred to the constant conflict and confrontation between incompatible alternatives, since in the latter situation no alternative can win. Consequently, the order of preferences derived from this criterion can be considered an expression of an attitude relatively inclined to pacts. I will return to this later.

These assumptions are enough to construct a complete order of preferences for the six actors defined with respect to the pairs of alternatives, as seen in Table 3 (where the initial sign of each pair indicates the choice of the actor and the second sign the choice of the interlocutor). Thus, for example, group 2 (rupturists) prefers the pair of alternatives following the same order from top to bottom as presented in Table 2 (eliminating those where the choice would be the actor's last preference, C); group 5 (continuists) prefers the pairs of alternatives in an exactly inverse order (eliminating those where the choice would be the actor's last preference, R); group 3 (reformists) first prefers the pairs of alternatives with a medium degree of pressure for change, then the pairs with a high and very high degree of pressure, and finally the pairs with a low degree of pressure (eliminating those where the choice would be the actor's last preference, C) and, in case of pairs with the same degree of pressure for change, giving priority to the pair in which there is a coincidence with the interlocutor and in which the actor's most

Table 3. Preference Orders of Pairs of Transition Alternatives of Strategic Groups

Strategic Groups	1 Revolutionaries	2 Rupturists	3 Reformists	4 Openists	5 Continuists	6 Involutionists
Most Preferred	RR	RR	rr	rr	CC	CC
	Rr	Rr	RC	CR	Cr	Cr
	CC	rR	rR	rC	rC	RR
	Cr	rr	Rr	Cr	rr	Rr
	RC	RC	RR	CC	CR	CR
Least Preferred	CR	rC	rC	rR	rR	RC

Note: R = rupture; C = continuity; and r = reform.

preferred alternative is adopted, and so on.

Games

We can now proceed with the formal analysis of the interactions among the actors using game theory. The combinations of six elements by twos give us a total of 15 different pairings of actors. In each situation defined by the choices of two paired actors, an ordinal value from four to one is given for each actor, according to the orderings in Table 3. The corresponding games, whose matrices can be found in the Appendix, can be classified according to the complete taxonomy of 78 nonequivalent two-by-two games elaborated by Rapoport and Guyer (1966). We find the following categories:

> No-conflict games. Those with interactions between two groups of the same bloc: 1-2, 3-4, and 5-6 (Figure A-1).
>
> Games with a single strongly stable equilibrium. Those with interactions between contiguous groups of different blocs: 2-3 and 4-5 (Figure A-2).
>
> Games with a single, strongly stable deficient equilibrium. That with interaction between gradualist groups of distant blocs: 2-5 (Figure A-3).
>
> Games with a single, threat-vulnerable equilibrium. Those with interactions between other groups of distant blocs, with presence of maximalists: 1-5 and 2-6 (Figure A-4).
>
> Games with a single, force-vulnerable equilibrium. Those with interactions between gradualist distant groups of neighboring blocs: 2-4 and 3-5 (Figure A-5).
>
> Games with a single, unstable equilibrium. Those with interactions between other distant groups of neighboring blocs, with presence of maximalists: 1-3 and 4-6 (Figure A-6).
>
> Preemption games, or two-equilibria games with nonequilibrium outcome. That with the remaining interaction between groups of distant blocs, the two maximalist actors: 1-6. It is interesting to observe that in an interpretation of this game as a confrontation, known as Let-George-Do-It, or Apology, each party wants to settle with a conciliatory apology, but each prefers the other to take the initiative to avoid "losing face"—a very appropriate image for a confrontation between political extremes (Figure A-7).
>
> Cycle games, or games without equilibria. Those with interactions between the most distant groups of neighboring blocs, also with maximalists: 1-4 and 3-6 (Figure A-8).

Rapoport and Guyer (1966) employ the notion of *natural outcome* (defined by the dominant strategies of the actors, the Pareto equilibrium, and the maximin strategy), represented always in the upper left-hand corner of the matrix. Observing these outcomes in the matrices of the Appendix, we can establish three different types of interactions with three different types of outcomes.

Alternative Acceptable to Both Actors. This alternative is rupture, R, in game 2-6 and continuity, C, in game 1-5. In descriptive terms, this means that the democratic opposition can obtain its objective of rupture if the relevant adversary in confrontation is a hard-liner group with maximalist strategic attitudes. This model might possibly explain some aspects of the establishment of democracy in certain countries in Europe in historical periods previous to those I consider here, including some processes that took place at the end of World War II, at least in those countries where there was an organized antifascist resistance by the main democratic parties. In a similar manner, the continuists can obtain their objective, continuity of the authoritarian regime, if the adversary with which they are in confrontation is a group with maximalist strategic attitudes, as shown by the survival capacity of certain nontotalitarian dictatorships when they confront a revolutionary opposition. In other words, maximalists on each side are defeated by the gradualists of the opposite bloc.

Confrontation between Two Alternatives or a Cycle. In games 1-3 and 2-3 an outcome Rr is obtained; that is, the interaction of the two opposition groups and the reformists produces a confrontation without agreement between the alternatives of rupture and reform. In games 4-5 and 4-6 an outcome rC is obtained; that is, the interaction of the openists and the two hard-liner groups produces a confrontation without agreement between the alternatives of reform and continuity. In game 1-6 an outcome RC is obtained; that is, the interaction of the two maximalist groups, revolutionaries and involutionists, produces a confrontation without agreement between the alternatives of rupture and continuity. In games 1-4 and 3-6 cycles are obtained; that is, in the remaining interactions of the maximalists not included in the cases already mentioned, confrontations without agreement also take place between different alternatives, in these cases with changing outcomes that may indicate a situation of general political instability.

Deficient Equilibrium Improvable by Cooperation between the Two Actors. They are those represented by games 2-4, 2-5, and 3-5. According to the orders of preferences I have hypothesized, the cooperation leading to an agreed and efficient outcome is only one possibility. There is no guarantee that this outcome will occur, especially if the actor or actors motivated, in each case, to choose the alternative leading to a better outcome do not have the necessary capability for promise and threat to make the other comply with the commitment. This means that cooperation would not be possible if the structure of preferences of the actors did not follow the complementary criterion adopted before on the preferability of coinciding over confrontation when both outcomes entail the same degree of pressure for change. But even following this criterion, the possibility appears only in very few interactions, as we have seen. The real meaning of these games, the matrices of which I reproduce in Figure 1, is the possibility of political change by means of a pact. As can be easily observed, success depends in large part on the subjective conditions of the actors to take advantage of the opportunity.

Game 2-5 is the celebrated prisoner's dilemma, where a deficient outcome is reached, situated in the upper left-hand corner of the matrix, and both players are motivated to cooperate to transfer the outcome to the lower right-hand corner of the matrix, that is, to reform by agreement. However, once there, both players are also motivated to depart from this

Figure 1. Games of Transitions by Agreement

		3 Reformists	
		R	r
5 Continuists	C	2 3	4 1
	r	1 2	3 4

		4 Openists	
		C	r
2 Rupturists	R	2 3	4 1
	r	1 2	3 4

		5 Continuists	
		C	r
2 Rupturists	R	2 2	4 1
	r	1 4	3 3

outcome—so they need mutual promises and threats to consolidate the agreement. In games 2-4 and 3-5, games with a single, force-vulnerable equilibrium, a deficient outcome is also achieved in the upper left-hand corner of the matrix, and both players are motivated to cooperate to transfer the outcome to the lower right-hand corner, that is, to reform by agreement. In these cases, however, once there, only one player (group 2 in the first game and group 5 in the second) is motivated to abandon this outcome—so it is the other player who needs promises and threats to consolidate the agreement.

Transitions by Cooperation

These theoretical findings signify in political terms that there are several possible outcomes to the pressures faced by an authoritarian regime. One possible way to democracy is the change achieved by rupturists confronting an adversary with involutionist strategic attitudes (interaction 2-4). In many other situations a confrontation without solution between different alternatives—that is, a more or less permanent political instability and perhaps a civil war—can occur. Finally, there are three possible pacts, or nonrevolutionary transitions. These are

1. between rupturists and openists (interaction 2-4)
2. between reformists and continuists (interaction 3-5)
3. between rupturists and continuists (interaction 2-5)

In other words, there is one possible pact between an opposition group and a soft-liner group, another between a soft-liner group and a hard-liner group, and another between an opposition group and a hard-liner group. The exclusion of maximalists from the consensus among some gradualists appears, then, to be confirmed.

It seems logical to assume that the groups that occupy intermediate positions among the pairs mentioned are also incorporated in the new political framework, although they occupy a subordinate role in the process of change (e.g., the pact 3-5 would entail the inclusion of group 4). But what is most interesting is that there do not seem to be real possibilities for agreement when the two main actors of the interaction are situated in contiguous spaces in the continuum from greater to lesser change (like those represented in Tables 1 and 3) but only between actors relatively distant in their strategic positions. Thus, the pact between soft-liners and hard-liners is not carried out by proximate openists and continuists—as seen in the interaction 4-5, the outcome of which is a confrontation between reform and continuity—but rather by the more distant reformists and continuists (3-5). In the same manner, the pacts of the rupturist opposition are not reached with reformists—the outcome of the interaction 2-3 being a confrontation between rupture and reform—but, rather, with openists (2-4) or continuists (2-5).

This paradox is explained by the capacity of threat and deterrence that can be found between actors who are relatively distant in their strategic positions, leading one or both of them to accept a second-best alternative more readily than the proximity of strategic positions does. Expressed in more formal terms, in interactions 2-3 and 4-5 the two players coincide in their two most preferred alternatives, although they prefer them inversely. In this manner, neither of the two can threaten the other with choosing the second preference, since it would only satisfy the first preference of the interlocutor. Conversely, in interactions 3-5 and 4-2, the player named first in each case can threaten to adopt the second preference, which is the worst for the interlocutor. The latter is then forced to pick the lesser evil of the second preference, which is the first preference of the first player. In interaction 2-5 the threat is mutual, given that the first preference of each player is the worst for the other, so that both are motivated to coincide in the second.

In the real world, this capability of agreement between actors who are relatively distant can explain surprising and apparently mysterious occurrences, such as great difficulties in reaching agreements in negotiations between groups whose preferences are too proximate, reformist government's capacity for maneuverability in trying to persuade continuists to accept reform of the authoritarian regime, and the outstanding role of certain hardliners with a notorious history of repression in some pacts with the opposition (whom they themselves might have persecuted at one time).

The Spanish Way and Other Ways of Transition

If we follow the analysis of Rapoport and Guyer (1966), the three games mentioned can be the object of some interesting observations that help to enlighten real cases of transition by agreement.

Agreed Reform

We can observe that in game 3-5 only group 5 (continuists) is motivated to accept reform at first. But in the efficient outcome reached through cooperation, only group 3 (reformists) is satisfied (having obtained the first preference, with ordinal value 4), while the second is motivated to return to continuity. For this reason, the first needs promises and threats to consolidate reform and avoid the possible generation of a cycle. These characteristics suggest that cooperation toward the outcome rr can only occur at the initiative of group 3, which is actually the most interested in reform.

An initiative of this type by reformists toward continuists led to the success of the reform in Spain between July 1976 and June 1977. After the death of the dictator Franco in November 1975, King Juan Carlos named as president of the government the last president of General Franco, Carlos Arias, who can rightly be considered a genuine continuist. However, the new government also included some openists—promoters of a reform of the Francoist legal framework—particularly Manuel Fraga, who was named second vice president and minister of the interior. The openists of the government tried to negotiate the reform in a mixed commission (especially created for that purpose) between representatives of the government and the Consejo Nacional del Movimiento, the single party of the dictatorship where there was a heavy concentration of Francoists. With a logic that my framework may explain with interaction 4-5 (openists and continuists), the openists' capacity to pressure the continuists was insufficient, and the reform negotiations failed. Meanwhile, popular movements in the form of strikes and demonstrations promoted by the rupturist opposition and some revolutionary groups, reached their highest levels.

After this failure, in July 1976, King Juan Carlos named a new president of the government, the reformist Adolfo Suárez, who resolutely faced down the continuists. Suárez soon presented a bill for political reform and submitted it to the consideration of both the commanders of the armed forces and (as the Francoist laws required) the organic Cortes.

Suárez pressured the continuists with a new combination of promises and threats. On the one hand, he promised the Francoists the continuation of the monarchy in the person of Juan Carlos de Borbón, who had been designated by General Franco as his successor; the maintenance of the "unity of Spain"; and ("given its current status and demands") the exclusion of the communists, as well as the revolutionary opposition, from the political arena. The Francoists were particularly sensitive to these questions ever since the military uprising against the Spanish Republic and the subsequent civil war of 1936–39, in which the form of government, regional nationalisms, and the influence of the communists were some of the main issues. Suárez also accepted the petitions of continuists and openists in favor of an electoral system that rewarded representation in rural areas (which also benefited him personally) and the establishmnt of a second chamber elected by a plurality system with a certain number of senators designated by the king.

On the other hand, the army chief of staff and Suárez's direct collaborator, Lieutenant General Manuel Gutiérrez Mellado, called for political abstention by all military commanders under threat of expulsion from the military. This threat was applied exemplarily to hard-liner Lieutenant General Fernando de Santiago, first vice-president since the previous government, who was dismissed and relegated to the reserve for having expressed his disagreement with the government project on labor unions. Suárez also threatened the members of the Cortes named by Franco with the dispossession of their posts in state companies, with making public the recordings of telephone taps the government secret services had made in their homes and offices, and with the transmission on television of the nominal vote of their bill for reform in case they decided to vote *no*.

With these and other measures, Adolfo Suárez obtained the acceptance of the reform of the authoritarian regime by the very Francoists who occupied the institutions; that is, he successfully promoted the cooperation we have seen is possible in interaction 3-5 (reformists and continuists) while avoiding a further cycle and convoked general elections that would open a new phase.

It is important to note that during this process there was never any real cooperation between the reformist government and the rupturist opposition. The latter's member parties—communists, socialists, Basque and Catalan nationalists, and a few liberals and Christian democrats—joined together in the Plataforma de Organismos Democráticos to defend the formation of a provisional government with the participation of the opposition. This government would have convoked elections without any positions of advantage for any group, along with the parallel establishment of regional governments in Catalonia and the Basque Country, freedom of activity for all parties, and the free choice by the constituent Cortes of the forms of state and government. This Plataforma even designated a nine-man commission to open a dialogue and negotiate with the government. However, Suárez received only a few members, not informing them of his projects or allowing them any sort of negotiation, and he made only a few minor concessions. In other words, interaction 2-3 (rupturists and reformists), as my formal framework explains, did not lead to real cooperation. In fact, Suárez used the conversations with the opposition as a latent threat to the continuists that he would join the rupturist project if they did not accept the reform. It can be said, then, that the first phase of the Spanish transition was a *reforma pactada* within the ruling bloc, without interaction with the opposition.

The only important concession made by Suárez to the opposition before the elections was the result of his direct negotiation with the general secretary of the Spanish Communist party (PCE), Santiago Carrillo, for the party's legalization. After the legal approval of the reform by the organic Cortes, the leaders of the PCE followed the rest of the opposition parties and presented the documents that the law required to be legalized. The communists, however, did not present their traditional statutes, but other improvised documents in which they substituted an affirmation of democratic principles for their traditional revolutionary and republican objectives. At a secret meeting in Madrid, Suárez and Carrillo agreed that the PCE would be legalized if it expressly accepted the monarchy and the two-colored monarchical flag, an agreement fulfilled by both parts two months before the elections convoked by Suárez. In this manner, all the parties of the rupturist opposition accepted the legal framework of reform agreed upon by reformists and continuists, excluding from their electoral platforms any questioning of the monarchical form of government or the unitary form of the state. Meanwhile, Suárez imposed an electoral system that favored him and utilized the advantages of power to organize a candidacy with himself leading the Unión del Centro Democratico (UCD) ballot.

Negotiations and pacts between reformists and the rupturist opposition as a whole did not take place in Spain, as I have said, until after the elections of June 1977. The reformist candidacies of the UCD received a plurality of votes; but despite the serious deviations created by the electoral system imposed by the government, they failed to obtain a majority of deputies. That is why Suárez's reformists had to abandon the limited constitutional reform they had prepared and accept the elaboration of a new constitution with a wide consensus in the new democratic Cortes in December 1978 (finally approved a year-and-a-half later). The majority of parties also agreed on a new decentralization or creation of the "autonomous communities" and the "Moncloa agreements" in economic policy. It was in this later process when the objective of rupture—a democratic regime without restrictions—was obtained, although by a different path than the one originally desired by the rupturists. But these postelectoral pacts no longer correspond to the initial phase of the transition, which I am modeling by defining the actors according to their strategic orientations. In fact, other actors, better defined by government platforms and ideologies—mainly the centrist, socialist, communist, and Catalan nationalist parties—did this by way of vote trading, logrolling, and parliamentary coalitions, which were based no longer on fears and subjective expectations of the future but, rather, on the specific number of deputies each obtained.

These later concessions and pacts of Suárez with the rupturist opposition led to his confrontation with the continuists. They accused him of "treason" and repeatedly conspired with some involutionist groups to organize a coup d'état, which failed. In fact, the partial agreement of Suárez with the communists and, after the elections, the constitutional and other pacts with the opposition parties, broke the agreements that the reformist president of the government had contracted with the Francoists during the first phase of the transition.

Nevertheless, the fact that the transition was initiated by way of an agreement between reformists and continuists (3-5), without the participation of the opposition, has had consequences for the Spanish democracy. For many years, the elements of continuity with the previous authoritarian regime have been very important. Not only was the monarchy consolidated, but no breakdown in the armed forces or any purge of the political police took place. At the same time, there has been a low level of politization of the citizenry, thus conceding a broad margin of autonomy to the political elites.

The process and the result of the Spanish transition of 1976–77 contrast with the process and result in a previous historical situation, the Second Spanish Republic of 1931–36. Its instability and tragic end were influenced in large part by the prominent activity of the maximalists and the weakness of gradualist attitudes in the various ideological fields. There is no doubt that the reflection on that disaster and the trauma that the civil war of 1936–39 provoked in broad layers of Spanish society fed the fear of the repetition of a violent confrontation. This fear induced in the principal political actors a predisposition to negotiation and compromise that has been formalized in our analysis and that is usually pointed out as the characteristic feature of the "Spanish model" of transition. (For a more in-depth analysis of the events of the Spanish transition and its implications for consolidated democracy, see my book [Colomer 1990]; for an analysis in English, see Maravall and Santamaría 1986 and, for the postelectoral period, Gunther 1985.)

Controlled Opening and Collapse

Unlike the Spanish model, the other ways of transition by agreement that have been identified coincide in including the opposition among the decisive actors of the first phase. In game 4-2 only the second player (rupturists) is motivated to accept reform at first. But in the efficient outcome obtained by way of cooperation, only the first player (openists) is satisfied with obtaining the first preference (with an ordinal value of 4), while the second is motivated to return to rupture. For this reason, the first player needs to have enough deterrent capability to consolidate reform and avoid the possible generation of a cycle. These characteristics suggest that in this game, the cooperation toward an rr outcome can only occur at the initiative of group 4, the openists, while the rupturist opposition has to adapt to it.

There are several cases where, coinciding with the indication of this framework, the openists have tried to set the conditions of transition and have maintained a certain control over the initial, rather slow, rhythm of the liberalization and democratization process. Although my purpose here is more conceptual than descriptive, I can illustrate its analytical possibilities by referring briefly to several cases.

The clearest one is probably Brazil between 1982 and 1985, where there was first a period of liberalization (*distençao*) and opening (*abertura*), exercised by the governments of generals Ernesto Geisel and João Figuereido against the hardliners of General Sylvio Frota. Later, a slow democratization process included an implicit—or explicit but secret—political pact of some government soft-liners, the regime party, and the armed forces with the opposition to name opposer Tancredo Neves, leader of the Movimento Democrático Brasileiro as president, in January 1985. Following this, direct presidential elections were convoked for November of that same year. Although some differences between the Spanish, Brazilian, and other cases probably have to do with broad differences in socioeconomic and other structural factors, these would not necessarily explain the attitudes and strategic choices of the relevant actors that I stress here.

A formally similar situation of interaction between openists and rupturists may be seen in the transition that took place in Uruguay between 1983 and 1984. Some soft-liners of the authoritarian regime, headed by the president, General Gregorio Alvarez, and General Rapela of the political affairs commission of the armed forces, maintained conversations over a period of months with representatives of most of the opposition, the Partido Colorado and the Frente Amplio (excluding the Partido Blanco, which they considered to be responsible for most of the political instability in the period previous to the coup d'état). Finally, the Acuerdo del Club Naval was reached, and presidential elections were convoked for November 1984.

A similar process of cooperation might also explain the democratization process initiated in Chile in 1989, including the agreement that General Augusto Pinochet would continue to be head of the armed forces while presidential elections were held with the participation of the opposition parties led by Christian Democrat Patricio Alwyn. Given the initiative of the openists in all these processes and their imposition of certain initial conditions, such as a calendar, the offices to be elected, the electoral system, and the absence of acts of revenge, I propose to call this model of transition *controlled opening to the opposition.*

The third model is the one formalized in game 2-5 (rupturists and continuists), which, as I have said, is a prisoner's dilemma. Here, both players are motivated to abandon their initial choice and shift to reform, as long as the other cooperates in the same maneuver. But once this new result has been obtained, neither is fully satisfied, and both are motivated to return to their dominant strategy. Thus, the success of the cooperation requires that the two actors employ deterrents and that the two make concessions. This need for symmetrical and conditioned efforts by both parts suggests that the agreement needs to be more synchronized and probably quicker than in the previous games, where one of the actors maintains an initiative to which the other adapts. This leads us to think that this is the most appropriate formal explanation for situations where a power vacuum has been created that must be filled without delay, that is, transitions provoked by a sudden collapse of the authoritarian regime.

A situation of this sort can be perceived in the crises produced, for example, by the military defeat of a dictatorship from abroad. This would be the case of the colonial crisis of Portugal in Africa, which led to the uprising in 1974 of the same armed forces that had carried out the colonial domination, followed by the transitional agreement between the army and the regime's opposition parties. While General Antonio di Spínola became president of the republic, a provisional government led by the centrist Adelino di Palma Carlos, with the participation of Socialists and Communists, was formed, quickly leading to the holding of constituent elections.

As clear, or more so, would be the case of Greece a few months later. Following a failed liberalization in the period of General Papadopoulos, the Ioannides hardliners organized a disastrous military intervention in Cyprus, after which they convoked a "national council" with the opposition of radicals and centrists. This led to the naming of exiled Constatino Karamanlis as first prime minister, while General Fedon Ghizikis remained as temporary head of state until the celebration of elections in November of that same year, 1974.

Finally, the transition in Argentina in 1983 also offers many elements that can be clarified by way of a game of cooperation between continuists and rupturists. The failed invasion of the Falkland/Malvinas Islands provoked the dismissal of President Galtieri by other members of the military. His substitute, General Reynaldo Bignone, soon established a *concertación* with the traditional parties, the *Justicialistas* and the *Radicales,* that led to presidential elections in October of that same year.

In all of these latter cases there is no such thing as a liberalization process that precedes the democratization, but rather the two take place at the same time. The result obtained, however, is fairly vulnerable, since, unlike the other two models, the two principal actors are motivated to break commitments that had been so urgently and pressingly reached. Hence, the breaking of promises in the postelectoral phase should not surprise us. Reprisals against past authoritarians, as well as destabilizing conspiracies and plans to overthrow the regime, are rela-

Table 4. Models of Transition by Agreement

Model	Agreed reform within the ruling bloc	Controlled opening to the opposition	Sudden collapse of the authoritarian régime
Actors	3-5 (Reformists-Continuists)	4-2 (Openists-Rupturists)	5-2 (Continuists-Rupturists)
Game	Game with a single force-vulnerable equilibrium	Game with a single force-vulnerable equilibrium	Prisoner's Dilemma (a single strongly stable deficient equilibrium)
Characteristics of the game	3 needs threats to consolidate cooperation 3 is satisfied in the outcome	4 needs threats to consolidate cooperation 4 is satisfied in the outcome	Both players need threats to consolidate cooperation Both are aggrieved in the outcome
Political meaning	Initiative of reformists, adaptation of continuists Liberalization precedes democratization Elements of institutional continuity (no revenges, offices out of elections)	Initiative of "openists," adaptation of rupturists Liberalization precedes democratization Elements of institutional continuity (no revenges, offices out of elections)	Mutual concessions between continuists and rupturists Sudden change of régime
Cases	Spain 1976–77, Soviet Union 1985–1991	Brazil 1982–85, Uruguay 1983–84, Chile 1989–90, Poland, Hungary 1987–90	Greece 1974, Portugal 1974, Argentina 1982–83, East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, Rumania 1989–90

tively frequent (as in the three countries mentioned).

Unlike the other two models, in this third model of transition, the "sudden collapse" of the dictatorship does not allow the hard-liners a gradual reconversion to openist positions but gives them an unforeseen role in the negotiations and pacts with the opposition. In the controlled-opening-to-the-opposition model the intentions of the openists may have ripened longer, either because from the start the authoritarian regime publicly maintained that its intentions were to return to democracy (as occurred in Brazil) or because their attempts at institutionalizing the regime failed (as occurred with the governmental defeats in the Uruguayan referendum in 1980 and the Chilean in 1988). The Spanish model, or *agreed reform,* maintains an intermediate pace between the other two. It sprang from a situation of moderate social support for the authoritarian regime, as seen, for example, in the success of the institutionalization of Francoism (including its victory in 1966 in a referendum similar to those already mentioned). However, a sudden event—the death of the dictator—accelerated the process and oriented it toward democratization. In this latter case, the first free elections had a doubtful constituent character when they were convoked. Instead, in the case of the two models with the participation of the opposition, the process led to the reestablishment of the previous democratic constitution or elections to a constituent assembly with the possibility of deciding the form of government (which signified, for example, that in Greece, unlike Spain, the monarchy was abolished by popular referendum). A summary of the achievements presented is seen in Table 4.[2]

It should also be possible to apply the formal categories presented up to this point to the transitions from the socialist regimes that have recently taken place in Eastern Europe. At least two categories can be distinguished. For example, we have two processes, those of Poland and Hungary from 1987 to 1990, in which we can perceive a liberalization prior to democratization and where the authoritarian governments developed a certain capacity for initiative. Their dealings seem to correspond in large to the model of cooperation 4-2 (openists and rupturists).

In Poland, the government's defeat in a referendum on economic policy toward the end of 1987, as well as a resurgence of labor strikes in the following months, led to the convocation of a round table in 1989. The president, General Wojciech Jaruzelski, began negotiations with the opposition Solidarność movement led by Lech Walesa. As a result of these conversations, free elections were called, but with some restrictions: the communists kept the majority of seats in one of the chambers for themselves, and Jaruzelski was named as president without taking part in the elections.

In Hungary, the liberalization, especially the economic one, had begun in the previous period. But it was also in 1987 when the general secretary of the Communist party, Karoly Grosz, announced the initiation of dialogue between the government party and the opposition. This announcement was followed by the removal of Communist leader Janos Kadar and the isolation of the hard-liners, as well as a series of "national reconciliation meetings" between governmental communists and the opposition round table. Before the celebration of free elections, the openists had time to carry out a series of changes under their own initiative: the opening of frontiers, the proclamation of a nonsocialist republic and the reconversion of the Communist party into a Socialist party to improve its electoral possibilities.

The other processes have followed, instead, a much faster pace. It has been said (with a certain chronological imprecision but a suggestive image) that while Poland needed 10 years to rid itself of authoritarian communism, Hungary did it in 10 months, East Germany needed but 10 weeks and Czechoslovakia just 10 days. (It could be added that a little over 10 hours was enough time for Rumania.) The truth is that something close to a sudden collapse of the regime took place in the fall of 1989 in the rest of the countries of Eastern Europe after Poland and Hungary. The opening of the borders by governments and their crossing by citizens, combined with protests in the streets (i.e., as much or more "exit" as "voice") accelerated "tipping" and the downfall of those republics.

In November, hard-liner Egor Krenz, general secretary of the communists in East Germany, opened the Berlin Wall and called free elections, after which he began a round table of negotiations with the Democratic Forum and the opposition parties. In Czechoslovakia, in December, there were direct conversations between the communist leader Ladislav Adamec and the leader of the Civic Forum, Vaclav Havel, which resulted in Havel's rise to the presidency and the formation of a government of national union as a step toward elections. In the same month, in Bulgaria, the head of state and of the party, Petar Mladenov, promised free elections, following which the Communist party started negotiations with the Union of Democratic Forces. In Rumania, a popular revolt and—as everything seems to indicate—a parallel communist and military conspiracy brought down the dictatorship and led to the creation of the National Salvation Front, in which high-ranking members of the communist regime and the opposition coincided, including the newly named president, Ion Iliescu, and Doina Cornea the Christian democrat. It seems, then, that many of the agreements between members of the ruling bloc and the opposition in all these cases can be interpreted with our model of cooperation 2-5 (rupturists and continuists). The difference with respect to the previous cases is that the collapse of the regimes in Eastern Europe has not been the direct result of a military defeat of the authoritarian rulers by a foreign power but rather of the collapse of its international support structure, that is, the USSR's abandoning of its guardian role.

In this limited overview, cases of transition by agreement best comparable to the "Spanish model" of cooperation between reformists and continuists (3-5) surprisingly do not abound. However, I suggest that some elements of this model can be usefully applied to the analysis of the process in the Soviet Union in 1985–1991. Following a first stage of *glasnost* (liberalization) the process of *perestroika,* which implied democratization but also a federal redefinition of the Russian Empire and a complex change of the economic system, ran into serious difficulties. As a result, change in the USSR gave way to the transition in the other socialist countries of Eastern Europe, which have gone from being its wards to being its support cushion.

In this particularly slow process, the reformists led by Mikhail Gorbachev were to operate between two main actors. On the one hand, there were the powerful continuists installed in the Communist party apparatus, the secret services and part of the army. On the other, there was a relatively weak opposition, which, unlike other Eastern European countries, maintains practically no connections with previous democratic movements, has practically no relationship with the main democratic tendencies of Western countries, and is led in part by recently converted former communists (like the Russian Boris Yeltsin). At some point, it appeared that Gorbachev's negotiations with the opposition might lead to specific agreements, such as the economic reform known as the Five Hundred Day Plan discussed during the summer of 1990. But the president of the USSR avoided any commitment and seems to have used his contacts with the opposition as a threat to overcome the resistance of the continuists to the controlled changes he wished to impose. A few months later, Gorbachev named some openists as high-ranking officials. Possibly he thought that these threats and concessions, as well as his victory on a March 1991 referendum to preserve the union, were enough to impose his reform project to hard-liners. However, when he tacked again toward the opposition to sign a new union treaty, openists and continuists, considering that their agreements with Gorbachev were not upheld, turned against him. In this way, and independent of the applied analysis remaining to be done, our model allows us to stress some aspects of the process that in a comparative perspective, may gain importance and improve our understanding of the factors of change in the USSR.

I would reiterate that everything that has been said up to this point refers only to a preelectoral phase of the processes of transition. Electoral results tend to change the delimitation of the actors and formulate new relevant issues, so that the outcome obtained by way of interactions by agreement may then be more or less dramatically altered. As I said, in the agreed-reform and controlled-opening-to-the-opposition models, frequently, the ruling bloc makes efforts to preserve some of its advantages, and recourse is made to "national reconciliation" or the "law of silence" to avoid acts of revenge against the authoritarians. Sometimes there are also attempts at restructuring the future system of parties "from upstairs." However, electoral results, which always carry with them a certain unrelinquishable degree of uncertainty, can defeat some of these expectations; and the process of reform itself can then lead to a clearer obtainment of the objectives of the rupture (e.g., in Spain, Uruguay, and Hungary). As I have also indicated, in the sudden collapse model, it seems even more logical to expect surprises and a certain instability.

Conclusion

Several nonrevolutionary ways of transition to democracy, with different actors, paces of the process, and contents of the agreements have been identified. One of them, the first phase of which is based on a pact between reformists and continuists of the authoritarian regime, is that that best coincides with the Spanish model, that is, the transition begun in Spain in 1976. A characteristic that distinguishes this model from the others presented is that the opposition does not have the opportunity to intervene directly and conspicuously in the pacts until after the first elections have been held, which concedes to members of the ruling bloc opportunities to introduce some elements of institutional continuity in the future democratic regime.

However, the three models share certain characteristics that can be considered necessary conditions for a transition by agreement. A first condition is the weakness or absence of maximalist actors, because their participation causes disequilibrium and political instability. This formal condition might lead us to explore the social and cultural factors that may explain the greater or lesser relative importance of the gradualist and maximalist actors in a specific society. A second condition is a preference among the gradualist actors for coinciding over confrontation when both outcomes entail pairs of alternatives with the same degree of pressure for change. This formal condition is linked to the existence of subjective attitudes favorable to cooperation or compromise, possibly the result of having learned the lessons of historical experiences of civil wars, the failure of authoritarian regimes, and the suffering caused by repression and violence. Finally, it is necessary that given the greater capacity of threat or deterrence between actors relatively distant, the main actors of the agreement be noncontiguous in a gradation of orders of preference. This condition emphasizes the strategic aspects of the processes of transitions, where political structure and the initiative of some of the actors toward others create interactions that entail various possibilities of negotiations.

Some formal aspects of the analysis here presented could be further advanced—for example, by the study of some interactions or games of three or more players. However, the framework seems to already allow a few retrospective explanations. These can be more descriptively developed and extended to transitions in other countries and other more distant historical periods. In a process of change where one can distinguish several actors by their strategic orientations—which tends to require a liberalization process—the present formal models should also contain a certain capacity for prediction.

Appendix

In this section the matrices of two-by-two games of the six actors in transitions to democracy are presented. The natural outcome is always located in the upper left-hand corner of the matrix. In games in which cooperation toward a more efficient outcome is possible (Figures A-3 and A-5, representing the interactions for transitions by agreement), this cooperative outcome is located in the lower right-hand corner.

Figure A-1. No-conflict Games

		2	
		R	r
1	R	4 4	3 3
	C	1 2	2 1

		4	
		r	C
3	r	4 4	1 2
	R	2 1	3 3

		5	
		C	r
6	C	4 4	3 3
	R	1 2	2 1

Figure A-2. Games with a Single, Strongly Stable Equilibrium

		3	
		r	R
2	R	3 3	4 1
	r	1 4	2 2

		5	
		C	r
4	r	3 3	4 1
	C	1 4	2 2

Figure A-3. Games with a Single, Strongly Stable Deficient Equilibrium

		5	
		C	r
2	R	2 2	4 1
	r	1 4	3 3

Figure A-4. Games with a Single, Threat-vulnerable Equilibrium

		5	
		C	r
1	C	3 4	2 3
	R	1 2	4 1

		2	
		R	r
6	R	3 4	2 3
	C	1 2	4 1

Figure A-5. Games with a Single, Force-vulnerable Equilibrium

		3	
		R	r
5	C	2 3	4 1
	r	1 2	3 4

		4	
		C	r
2	R	2 3	4 1
	r	1 2	3 4

Figure A-6. Games with a Single, Unstable Equilibrium

		3	
		r	R
1	R	3 3	4 2
	C	2 1	1 4

		4	
		r	C
6	C	3 3	4 2
	R	1 1	2 4

Figure A-7. Two-Equilibria Game with Nonequilibrium Outcome

		6	
		C	R
1	R	2 2	4 3
	C	3 4	1 1

Figure A-8. Cycle Games, or Games without Equilibria

		4	
		r	C
1	C	2 3	3 1
	R	4 2	1 4

		3	
		r	R
6	R	2 3	3 1
	C	4 2	1 4

Notes

I began working on this subject while I was a visiting scholar at the University of Chicago. I am grateful to David Laitin, for his welcome at Wilder House, Center for the Study of Politics, History, and Culture, and for all I learned at the seminar, "Rational Models in the Social Sciences," convened by Gary Becker and James Coleman.

1. Limiting to recent declarations by East European politicians to Spaniards, we can mention, for example, those of Romanian prime minister Petre Roman, those of the president of the Czechoslovakian Parliament and former general secretary of the Communist party Alexander Dubcek, and the Polish president Wojciech Jaruzelski, respectively, in "Roman arranca a González la firma de un documento," *El País* (Madrid), 18 April 1990; "González rinde homenaje a la figura de Dubcek," *El País*, 27 April 1990; and Hermann Tertsch, "Los vecinos no se pueden cambiar," *El País*, 10 June 1990. President George Bush has also presented the Spanish model as "a very special example" for the march to democracy in Eastern Europe (José María Brunet, "Bush propone a España como modelo para la evolución de la Europa del Este," *La Vanguardia* (Barcelona), 20 October 1989. Outside the Spanish context, see, e.g., the repeated comments of veteran Polish oppositionist Adam Michnik, an "enthusiast" of the Spanish way (e.g., "The Two Faces of Europe," *New York Review of Books*, 19 July 1990).

2. I only know of one conceptualization comparable to that here presented, that of Share and Mainwaring (1986). Three "ideal types" are distinguished and called "transition through regime defeat," "transition through extrication," and "transition through transaction" (although the study is limited to the latter).

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ABSOLUTE AND RELATIVE GAINS IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY

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The problem of absolute and relative gains divides neoliberal institutionalism and structural realism. The former assumes states focus primarily on their absolute gains and emphasizes the prospects for cooperation. The latter supposes states are largely concerned with relative gains and emphasizes the prospects for conflict. Existing work in international relations theory generally traces the differences between these two theories to different assumptions about states' preferences. Using a simple game-theoretic model, this essay offers a reformulation of the problem of absolute and relative gains that links changes in the states' behavior, the feasibility of cooperation, and especially the states' concern for relative versus absolute gains explicitly to changes in the constraints facing the states. Many of the differences between neoliberal institutionalism and structural realism appear as special cases of the model.

The problem of absolute and relative gains divides two of the most influential approaches to international relations theory. Neoliberal institutionalism assumes that states focus primarily on their individual absolute gains and are indifferent to the gains of others. Whether cooperation results in a relative gain or loss is not very important to a state in neoliberal institutionalism so long as it brings an absolute gain. In terms of preferences, this focus on absolute gains is usually taken to mean that a state's utility is solely a function of its absolute gain. In contrast, neorealism, or structural realism assumes that states are largely concerned with relative rather than absolute gains. In the anarchy of international politics, "relative gain is more important than absolute gain" (Waltz 1959, 198). A state's utility in structural realism is at least partly a function of some relative measure like power.[1] These differing assumptions about states' preferences lead to different expectations about the prospects for international conflict and cooperation. The more states care about relative gains, the more a gain for one state will tend to be seen as a loss by another and the more difficult, it seems, cooperation will be.[2]

However, tracing different expectations about the likelihood of conflict and cooperation to different assumptions about states' preferences poses an important theoretical difficulty for international relations theory.[3] Jervis (1988), Keohane (1984), Lipson (1984), Stein (1983, 1984), and the contributors to the volume edited by Oye (1986) have recently called for trying to bring at least some aspects of the study of international political economy, which is usually taken to be the province of neoliberal institutionalism, and the study of security affairs, which is usually taken to be the province of structural realism, within a single analytic framework. But if neoliberal institutionalism and structural realism really do make fundamentally different assumptions about states' preferences, then efforts to unify these approaches with a third-image explanation cannot succeed.

To use Waltz's analogy (1979, 89–91) between political structures and economic market structures, it will be impossible to explain the differences between neoliberal institutionalism and structural realism over, say, the prospects for international cooperation in the same way that economists explain the differences between outcomes in a perfectly competitive market and a monopoly. In that explanation, economists assume that the goals or preferences of the unit, in this case the firm, are the same in both a perfectly competitive market and in a monopoly: a firm seeks to maximize its profits. What varies in moving from one market structure to the other are the constraints under which a firm attempts to maximize its profits. Thus, changes in the market constraints and not in the units' preferences account for the variation in a firm's behavior in the two different market structures. If, however, neoliberal institutionalism and structural realism are actually based on fundamentally different assumptions about states' preferences, then moving from a neoliberal institutional to a structural realist setting would see a change in the attributes of states, that is, their preferences. In this sense, neoliberal institutionalism and structural realism would be about essentially different types of units, one primarily concerned with absolute gains, the other with relative gains. Consequently, the locus of the differences between neoliberal institutional and structural realist explanations of international behavior would be in the first or second images. A third-image unification of these approaches, which would explain changes in states' behavior in terms of changes in the constraints facing the states and not in terms of changes in the type or nature of states' preferences, would be impossible.

I offer a reformulation of the problem of absolute and relative gains and take a step toward bringing the study of international conflict and cooperation within a single analytic framework.[4] I show that many important aspects of neoliberal institutionalism and structural realism may be seen as special cases of a very simple model of the international system in which changes in the states' behavior, the feasibility of cooperation, and especially the states' concern for relative versus absolute gains are explicitly linked not to different assumptions about the states' preferences but to changes in the constraints facing the states. The model thus shifts the focus of analysis away from preferences to constraints.[5]

In the model, states are assumed to be trying to maximize their absolute gains. That is, a state's utility depends solely on the absolute level of economic welfare it attains. This is in keeping with neoliberal institutionalism. But the states are trying to maximize their economic welfare within the constraints imposed by an anarchic international system in which the use of force, in keeping with structural realism, may be at issue. When the cost of using force is sufficiently low that the use of force actually is at issue, cooperative outcomes that offer unequal absolute gains cannot be supported as part of an equilibrium even though the states' preferences are defined only over their absolute level of economic welfare. This inability to cooperate is in accord with the expectations of strucural realism, though the assumption that states are maximizing their absolute gains is not in keeping with its usual formulations. If the use of force is not at issue because fighting is too costly, then the results are more in accord with neoliberal institutionalism. For example, cooperative outcomes that could not be sustained when the use of force was at issue now become feasible.

Thus, many aspects of neoliberal institutionalism and structural realism appear as special cases of the model.

The model developed below is extremely simple. It aims primarily at conceptual clarification, not empirical application. To this end, it has been deliberately designed to show, in the simplest possible well-defined game-theoretic model, that many of the differences between neoliberal institutionalism and structural realism can be traced explicitly to the constraints facing states, rather than to their preferences. The extreme simplicity of the model clarifies the relation between constraints and the problem of absolute and relative gains that although present in more complicated models, would be more difficult to discern there. The development of more complicated and less contrived models awaits future work.[6] But despite the model's simplicity, its analysis makes three new points that are relevant to international relations theory. Most narrowly, it suggests that cooperation in some circumstances may be even more difficult to achieve than has been previously appreciated. Some agreements that offer equal absolute gains—and therefore no relative gain—cannot be sustained in equilibrium. The reason is that cheating on the agreement would bring large relative gains.

The second and third points address two other broader issues in international relations theory. The model offers a simple formal example showing that Waltz's notion of political structure is unable to account for important changes in the feasibility of international cooperation. The political structure as Waltz defines it (1979, 79–101) remains constant throughout the analysis; but the feasibility of cooperation varies. Thus, variations in what Waltz takes to be the structure of the political system cannot explain the variation in the feasibility of cooperation in the model.

The second issue is the relation between anarchy and cooperation. Structural realism generally associates anarchy with a concern for relative gains and a lack of cooperation (Waltz 1979, 105). Neoliberal institutionalism, however, argues that anarchy in the sense of a "lack of a common government" (Axelrod and Keohane 1986, 226; Keohane 1984, 7) does not imply a lack of cooperation (Keohane 1984, 65–84). The present analysis helps to elucidate the sources of this difference. The ability or inability to enforce rules of behavior is relevant only if the physical environment defined by the system's constraints is such that one of the possible behaviors is to use one's relative gain to one's advantage and to the disadvantage of others. If there are no such opportunities, then the inability to commit oneself to a promise not to use a relative gain to one's advantage is moot. Thus, the concern for relative gains arises from both anarchy and the constraints that define the range of possible behavior. Although such a system is clearly implicit in structural realism, neither neoliberal institutionalism nor structural realism fully appreciates the significance of the system's constraints in the origins of the concern for relative gains.

One consequence of the failure of both structural realism and neoliberal institutionalism to appreciate the role of the system's constraints in the problem of absolute and relative gains is the use of repeated games in both of these approaches to model the international system implicit in structural realism (e.g., Jervis 1978, 171; Keohane 1984; Oye 1986). As will be shown, relative gains in repeated games, including the repeated prisoner's dilemma, cannot be used to one's advantage. Thus, even if states are unable to make binding agreements in these models, relative gains in repeated games do not matter. This renders any analysis of structural realism's understanding of the relation between anarchy, relative gains, and cooperation based on these models problematic.

Finally, a more complete understanding of the relation between the system's constraints and the origins of the concern for relative gains also shows there is nothing theoretically special about the possible use of force. If the nature of military technology is such that one state can turn a relative gain to its advantage and the disadvantage of others, then these constraints will induce a concern for relative gains and this may impede cooperation absent any superior authority to ensure that these gains not be used in this way. But if, for example, the nature of an oligopolistic market is such that a firm can use a relative gain in market share to increase its long-run profits at the expense of other firms, then this system will also induce a concern for relative gains that may make cooperation difficult. The concern for relative gains may characterize many domains, and a more refined understanding of the origins of this concern helps to identify them.[7]

I will examine a very simple neoliberal institutional model of the problem of cooperation. The examination shows that the repeated games offer poor models of the problem of conflict and cooperation in structural realism. I will then modify the model so that the constraints of the modified model create opportunities for a state to turn relative gains to its advantage, which in turn, induces a concern for relative gains. I then use this model to study how changes in these constraints affect the feasibility of cooperation.

A Simple Neoliberal Institutional Model

The essence of the neoliberal institutional analysis of the problem of cooperation is that the shadow of the future may lead the egoistic states hypothesized in structural realism to cooperate. Repeated interaction gives each actor the ability to punish uncooperative behavior today with future sanctions. If the shadow of the future looms sufficiently large, then the future costs to uncooperative behavior will outweigh the immediate gains; and, weighing costs against benefits, even egoistic states will cooperate. This logic is, in turn, formalized in the neoliberal institutional analysis with a repeated prisoner's dilemma in which mutual cooperation can be sustained as an equilibrium outcome with a strategy of punishing defection should it occur.[8]

First, I will present a simple neoliberal institutional model of the problem of conflict and cooperation. The model has been explicitly designed to capture the essence of the neoliberal institutional analysis in the simplest possible formal setting and to be as similar to a repeated prisoner's dilemma as possible. This similarity helps to clarify the relation between the formalization used here and that employed in other work on neoliberal institutionalism. Second, I will demonstrate that the model actually does capture the essence of the neoliberal analysis problem of cooperation. Finally, repeated games are shown to be poor models of the problem of absolute and relative gains and cooperation in structural realism.

The simple neoliberal institutional model is a three-by-three game that is played twice. The states, in keeping with neoliberal institutionalism, will try to maximize the absolute sum of their first- and second-period payoffs. The second play of the game casts a shadow of the future onto the first play of the game. But because the game is only played twice, there is no shadow of the future to affect the prospects of cooperation in the second period. Thus, the problem of cooperation reduces to seeing if the shadow of the future makes cooperation possible in the first period. In this way, the two-period repeated game provides a formal setting for studying the problem of conflict and cooperation that is simpler than the infinitely repeated prisoner's dilemma.[9]

The three-by-three game, which will be played twice, will be called $\mathscr{E}$ and is derived from the prisoner's dilemma by adding a third strategy to the two-by-two prisoner's dilemma. There are two states, S_1 and S_2, in this game; and each has three strategies: *F, T,* and *C*. Figure 1 shows the payoffs to the various possible outcomes. The four cells at the upper left form a simple prisoner's dilemma in which each state strictly prefers playing *T* to *F* regardless of whether the other state is playing *T* or *F*. But if both states play *T*, they are worse off than if both had played *F*. The outcome (*T, T*) is Pareto-inferior to (*F, F*). If one state plays *C*, then that state's payoffs are zero regardless of what the other state does—while the other state obtains 0, −1/2, or −1 if it plays *C, T,* or *F*, respectively.

Figure 1. A Neoliberal Institutional Model

			S_2	
		F	T	C
	F	3,3	1,4	-1,0
S_1	T	4,1	2,2	-1/2,0
	C	0,-1	0,-1/2	0,0

It is important to emphasize that the game composed of two plays of $\mathscr{E}$ is an extreme theoretical simplification. $\mathscr{E}$ has been explicitly designed so that it captures the essence of an infinitely repeated prisoner's dilemma and the neoliberal institutional analysis of the problem of cooperation in the simpler formal setting of a two-period repeated game. At this level of abstraction, $\mathscr{E}$ serves as a substantive model of the international system or of the international economy only in the very general ways that the repeated prisoner's dilemma does in neoliberal institutional or structural realist analyses of the problem of cooperation. Nevertheless, $\mathscr{E}$ may be given a more concrete interpretation that is roughly based on an optimal tariff model, and describing this interpretation may help to make the analysis clearer. Building on Johnson's (1953) seminal work on optimal tariffs, the strategies *F, T, C* may denote free and open trading policies, imposition of the optimal tariff, and closure of the economy by trade prohibition, respectively. By assumption, there are only two states; consequently, the option of closing the economy is equivalent to imposing an embargo.[10] The game $\mathscr{E}$, then, represents the case in which a state gains if it is the only state to impose a tariff but both states lose if they both impose tariffs; that is, the outcome in which both states impose tariffs (*T, T*) leaves both states worse off than the free trade outcome, (*F, F*). If both states close their economies and effectively embargo each other by playing *C*, there will be no trade. The payoffs in this case are less than the payoffs obtained if both states had imposed an optimal tariff.[11] If only one of the states closes its economy, there will still be no trade regardless of what the other state does; and the state that closed its economy receives the same payoff regardless of what the other state does. But the state that had expected to trade, either freely or with tariffs, suffers a loss due to a misallocation of its productive resources. Accordingly, each state prefers to close its economy if the other does. For the sake of clarification, the neoliberal institutional model composed of playing $\mathcal{E}$ may be loosely interpreted as a very rudimentary model of strategic trade.[12]

The formal aspects of the neoliberal institutional critique of structural realism's analysis of the problem of cooperation are based on a repeated prisoner's dilemma in which the shadow of the future is large enough to induce cooperation. In order to relate the present formalization to that employed in the neoliberal institutional critique, the payoffs of the model developed here have been constructed so that the shadow of the future does induce cooperation in the model. More formally, the neoliberal institutional model has been explicitly designed so that (*F, F*) is a first-period equilibrium outcome.[13]

To show that (*F, F*) can be a first-period equilibrium outcome, the equilibria of the neoliberal institutional model will be determined. In equilibrium, the outcome on the last play of a repeated game must be an equilibrium of the stage game that is being repeated.[14] In particular, the second-period outcome of the game composed of two plays of the stage game $\mathcal{E}$ must be an equilibrium of $\mathcal{E}$. $\mathcal{E}$, in turn, has two pure-strategy equilibria.[15] In the first equilibrium, each state imposes the optimal tariff and receives a payoff of 2. In the second equilibrium, each state embargos the other by closing its economy to trade. This yields the payoffs (0, 0). Thus, in the game in which $\mathcal{E}$ is played twice, the only second-period outcomes that can be part of an equilibrium are (*T, T*) and (*C, C*).[16]

Playing $\mathcal{E}$ twice does, however, affect the first-period outcomes that can be sustained in equilibrium. Indeed, the free trade outcome (*F, F*) as well as the outcomes in which one state imposes a tariff, (*T, F*) and (*F, T*), can occur in equilibrium. For example, the equilibrium strategies that lead to (*F, F*) in the first period are for S_1 to play *F* in the first period and *T* in the second period if (*F, F*) is the first-period outcome and *C* if not and, similarly, for S_2 to play *F* in the first period and *T* in the second period if (*F, F*) is the first-period outcome and *C* if not. In essence, the state that remained faithful to free trade during the first period by playing *F* is punishing the defector in the second period by imposing an embargo. Clearly, (*F, F*) is the first-period outcome if both states follow these strategies. These strategies also constitute an equilibrium if neither state can improve its payoff by deviating from its strategy, given that the other player is following its strategy. If both states follow these strategies, each receives three in the first period and two in the second for a total payoff of five. If, however, a state deviates in the first period by playing *T*, it will do better in that period by realizing a payoff of four. But given the other state's strategy of imposing an embargo in the second period by playing *C* if (*F, F*) was not the first-period outcome, the most that a defector can attain is a second-period payoff of zero. This yields a total payoff of four; that is, the future cost of defection, which is to obtain zero rather than two in the second period, outweighs the immediate gain to defecting, which is four rather than three in the first period. No player has any incentive to deviate from the strategies just described, so these strategies constitute an equilibrium whose first-period outcome is (*F, F*).[17] Thus, threats to punish can be used to sustain cooperation in this model. Similar strategies will also support (*F, T*) and (*T, F*) as equilibrium outcomes.[18]

As in the neoliberal institutional critique of structural realism, anarchy does not imply a lack of cooperation. The equilibria of this model are consistent with the lack of a common government in the sense that they are subgame perfect.[19] This means that carrying out the threatened punishment of imposing an embargo in equilibrium is in the threatener's own self-interest. Neither state can improve its payoff by backing down and not following through on its threat, given the other state's strategy.[20] Because implementing the threat to punish deviation is in the threatening state's own interest, the equilibria supporting (F, F), (T, F), or (F, T) do not implicitly require that some external authority exists to enforce threats or promises that are in a state's interest to make but not necessarily to implement should the time come to do so. In this sense, these equilibria are in keeping with the notion of international anarchy as the absence of a central authority. Cooperation, even in anarchy, is possible.[21]

In sum, the repeated prisoner's dilemma has been widely used to provide the formal underpinnings of the neoliberal institutional analysis of the problem of international conflict and cooperation. The repeated game composed of twice playing $\mathscr{E}$ formalizes much of the essence of the neoliberal institutional critique of structural realism in a simpler setting. The shadow of the future makes cooperation possible even in an anarchic system in which each state judges "its grievances and ambitions according to the dictates of its own reason" (Waltz 1959, 157) because there is no authority that is superior to the states. In particular, the cooperative outcome in which both states maintain open economies and receive equal absolute gains can be supported in equilibrium. This equilibrium offers each state a payoff of five in the repeated game. The absolute gains are equal, so there are no relative losses. There are, however, also equilibrium outcomes in which the states' absolute gains are unequal and, therefore, one of the states suffers a relative loss. For example, in the equilibrium in which (F, T) is the outcome in the first period, S_1 receives four in the first period and two in the second for a total of six. S_2 receives one in the first period and two in the second for a total of three. Because these are equilibrium payoffs, the state suffering a relative loss, while certainly preferring a higher payoff, cannot improve its payoff by altering its strategy. In this sense, this state is unconcerned by its relative loss.

Although the repeated prisoner's dilemma provides the formal foundations for the neoliberal institutional critique of structural realism's pessimistic assessment of the prospects for cooperation in anarchic systems, repeated games, including the repeated prisoner's dilemma and the simple neoliberal institutional model developed here, formalize structural realism's understanding of the international system and, especially the role of force in that system very badly. This, in turn, significantly weakens any analysis of the problem of relative gains and the feasibility of cooperation based on this type of formalization. Repeated games are poor models for two reasons.

The first is more readily apparent but less directly related to the problem of absolute and relative gains and the effects of the concern for relative gains on the problem of cooperation. Structural realism, as well as realism,[22] focuses on a system in which states have the option of using force if that seems to them to be in their best interest and in which the use of force may transform the system. For Aron, international relations "present one original feature which distinguishes them from all other social relations: they take place within the shadow of war" (Aron 1966, 6). For Waltz, force in international relations "serves, not only as the ultima ratio, but indeed as the first and constant one. . . . The constant possibility that force will be used limits manipulations, moderates demands, and serves as an incentive for the settlement of disputes" (1979, 113). And for Gilpin, hegemonic war is a principle means of systemic change (1981, 42–49).

Given the central role that the possible use of force plays in structural realism, it would seem that any model of the international system envisioned in structural realism would have to satisfy two requirements: (1) the option of using force should be represented in the model; and (2) the model should allow for the possibility that the use of force might, whether intentionally or not, change the system. For a repeated-game model, the first requirement means that one of the options in the stage game that is being repeated should correspond to the option of using force. If, for example, the system is being formalized with a repeated prisoner's dilemma, then defecting should be taken to represent the option of attacking. Repeated games can satisfy this requirement.

But repeated games cannot satisfy the second requirement, and this renders them poor models of the international system implicit in structural realism. If the international system is modeled as a repeated game, then the state of the system (i.e., the actors, the options available to the actors in each period, and the payoffs to the various possible combinations of actions) remains constant. Every period looks like every other period in a repeated game. Nothing the actors do can change the state of the system. Fighting a hegemonic war in one period does not affect the constraints facing the actors in the next period. If, for example, both states defect in any round of a repeated prisoner's dilemma and this is interpreted as fighting a hegemonic war, then a hegemonic war can never change the system; for immediately after the war, the same states simply play the prisoner's dilemma again and the game continues on as if nothing had happened. Put another way, using a repeated game to model the international system is to say that the system in 1939 was formally equivalent to the system that emerged in 1945. Because force can never change the system if this system is formalized as a repeated game, formalizing the international system inherent in structural realism in this way is quite problematic.

The second reason that repeated games formalize structural realism's conception of the international system poorly is more subtle but also more directly related to the problem of absolute and relative gains and the feasibility of cooperation. The concern for the relative gains in structural realism arises because a state's relative loss to another state may be turned against it as that other state pursues its own ends: "If an expected gain is to be divided, say, in the ratio of two to one, one state may use its disproportionate gain to implement a policy intended to damage or destroy the other" (Waltz 1979, 105). If, therefore, a model is to provide a good formalization of structural realism's conceptualization of the problem of relative and absolute gains, there should be some way for a state in that model to use a relative gain to its advantage and to the detriment of the other state. Unless such an option exists in the model, there is no reason for a state to be troubled by a relative loss, and the model is not capturing what structural realism sees as the essence of the problem of relative gains and cooperation. But no such option exists in repeated games; consequently, they assume away what structural realism takes to be the essence of the problem of relative gains and cooperation.

That there is no way for a state's relative loss to be turned against it in a repeated game is easiest to see by considering how actors sustain cooperation in repeated games and then showing that a state's ability to induce the other state to cooperate is unaffected by any relative losses. To sustain cooperation in any two-actor game, each actor must be able to make the long-run costs of defection for the other actor outweigh the immediate gains. The future costs that each actor can impose on the other determine whether or not the actors can sustain cooperation. But in a repeated game, an actor's ability to make the future costs of defection higher than the immediate gain does not depend on how well that actor has done in the past relative to the potential defector. If, for example, a sanction must be imposed for five periods in a repeated game to make the cost of defection exceed the gain, then it will always take five periods to do this regardless of how well the actors have done in relation to each other before the sanction is imposed. Because the ability to impose future costs does not depend on how well the states have done relative to each other, achieving a relative gain or suffering a relative loss does not affect a state's ability to induce cooperation with threats of future punishment. A state that has suffered a series of relative losses can threaten to impose just as much future punishment on the other state as it would have been able to threaten had it not suffered these relative losses. Relative losses do not impede a state's ability to enforce cooperation in a repeated game. There is, therefore, no reason to be concerned with relative gains or losses. Thus, the formalism of a repeated game omits what structural realism sees as the very essence of the problem of absolute and relative gains. For this reason, repeated games formalize the international system implicit in structural realism very badly.[23]

A more satisfying analysis of the problem of relative gains and the feasibility of cooperation requires a model in which the option of using force is represented explicitly and in which a state's relative loss may be turned against it. Using the neoliberal institutional model analyzed here as a point of departure, I next develop a model that satisfies these two requirements. In that model, each state's ability to use force successfully to achieve its ends will depend on how well it has previously done relative to the other state.

A Structural Model of the Problem of Absolute and Relative Gains

I develop a very simple and highly stylized formalization of the problem of absolute and relative gains. States will now have the explicit option of using force if that seems to them to be in their best interest. More importantly, the model has been explicitly designed so that relative gains and losses matter because they affect a state's ability to use force successfully to further its interests. As will be seen, these constraints actually do induce a concern for relative gains. For this reason, this model offers a better formalization of the structural realism's understanding of the problem of absolute and relative gains.

Because the constraints in the model formally induce a concern for relative gains, the model may be used to examine how changes in these constraints affect the states' relative concern for absolute and relative gains and the feasibility of cooperation. This examination shows that many important aspects of neoliberal institutionalism and structural realism emerge as special cases of the model. If the use of force is at issue because the cost of fighting is sufficiently low, cooperation collapses in the model. This is in keeping with the expectations of structural realism. But if the use of force is no longer at issue, cooperation again becomes feasible. This is more in accord with neoliberal institutionalism. The model thus offers a synthesis of the apparently conflicting perspectives of neoliberal institutionalism and structural realism on the problem for relative gains and the feasibility of cooperation by explaining variations in the relative concern of relative gains and in the corresponding feasibility of cooperation in terms of changes in the constraints facing the states and not in terms of the attributes of the states.

The model also addresses two other

Figure 2. The Option of Fighting



issues in international relations theory. First, the structure of the international system as Waltz defines it will be shown to remain constant throughout the analysis. Yet the feasibility of cooperation varies. This means that Waltz's notion of structure is unable to account for these changes in the feasibility of cooperation. Second, the model clarifies the relation between anarchy and cooperation by helping to explain why anarchy does not imply a lack of cooperation in some systems but does impede cooperation in others as neoliberal institutionalism has shown.

The specter of war is introduced into the model by assuming that each state must decide whether or not to attack between the two plays of $\mathcal{G}$. As illustrated in Figure 2, after the first play of $\mathcal{G}$, S_1 chooses between attacking, *A*, or not attacking, *NA*. If S_1 attacks, there is war. If S_1 does not attack, then S_2 must decide between attacking or not. If S_2 attacks, there will also be war. If S_2 does not attack, then there is no war and the game ends with the second play of $\mathcal{G}$.

To complete the specification of the modified game, the payoffs to attacking must be defined. This specification depends, in turn, on making a fundamental assumption about the nature or technology of warfare; and it is at this point that relative gains formally enter the analysis. The very simple, highly stylized assumption about the nature of warfare underlying this analysis is that the stronger a state is economically, the more likely it is to prevail in war. Thus, relative gains matter because they affect how the states are likely to fare in the event of war and thus affect the states' future expected payoff. It is important to emphasize, however, that relative gains are significant not because a state's utility is a function of them—the states are still trying to maximize their absolute gains—but because the constraints imposed by the underlying technology of war makes it possible for a state to use its relative gains to its advantage and to the disadvantage of the other state.[24]

To formalize a stylized technology of warfare in which relative gains and losses affect a state's ability to prevail in the event of war, the payoffs to attacking will be taken to depend on what happened on the first play of $\mathcal{G}$. The states are assumed to be roughly equal before the game begins, so that the states will fight to a stalemate if there is war and if the difference between the first-period payoffs is too small to give one state a significant military advantage. More specifically, if one state attacks and the difference between the first-period payoffs is less than 3, then both states will fight to a draw, paying a fighting cost of 3.5, and then play $\mathcal{G}$ for a second time. These payoffs are shown in Figure 3, where $\mathcal{G} - \{3.5\}$ is the payoff matrix obtained by subtracting 3.5 from each payoff in $\mathcal{G}$. If the difference between the first-period payoffs is at least 3, then the state with the higher payoff will be assumed to be sufficiently strong economically that it will prevail if there is war. If a state prevails, then its payoff to the entire game is what it received on the first play of $\mathcal{G}$, which must have been 4 (for otherwise the difference between its payoff and the other state's payoff would have been less than 3) less the cost of fighting, 3.5, plus the payoff to victory, which will be taken to be 6. In sum, the total payoff to prevailing is 6.5. Defeat

Figure 3. The Payoffs If Fighting Brings Stalemate



Figure 4. The Payoffs if S_1 Will Prevail



means a loss of 3.5 due to the cost of fighting plus 0, which will be taken as the payoff to defeat. Thus, the total payoff if a state is defeated is the first-period payoff, which must have been 1 if the difference between the states' first-period payoffs was at least 3, less the cost of fighting, 3.5, for a net of -2.5. These payoffs are depicted in Figure 4.

The prospect of war renders cooperation in the first play of $\mathcal{E}$ impossible. Clearly, the outcome (*T, F*) cannot be sustained as a first-period equilibrium outcome. If S_1 imposes a tariff and S_2 maintains an open economy, then S_1 is sure to attack and defeat S_2 because this maximizes S_1's payoff. The game would end with payoffs (6.5, -2.5). S_2, however, can do better than this by playing *T* in the first period. This will give S_2 a first period payoff of 2; and, because war would mean stalemate, neither state will attack. S_2 will therefore end the game with at least two. Thus, S_2 has an incentive to deviate from *F* in the first period in order to deprive S_1 of its relative gain; and this means that (*T, F*) cannot be part of an equilibrium. A similar argument shows that (*F, T*) cannot be an equilibrium outcome.

The effects of the specter of war on the outcome in which both states maintain open economies (*F, F*) illustrate a point that suggests cooperation may even be more difficult than has been previously appreciated. Because (*F, F*) offers both states equal absolute gains and consequently no relative gains, it might seem that it would be possible to sustain this outcome in equilibrium. This, however, is not the case. Although this outcome offers no relative gain, deviating from it does; and this means that it cannot be an equilibrium outcome. If one state plays *F* and the other cheats with *T*, then the latter will secure a large relative gain and then attack and prevail. Each state, therefore, has an incentive to deviate from *F* if the other player is playing *F*, so (*F, F*) cannot be an equilibrium outcome. Anarchy and the possible use of force may even prevent the realization of agreements that provide equal absolute gains if deviating from the agreement would yield large relative gains.

These results are in keeping with the expectations of structural realism. Although each state in the model is trying to maximize its absolute level of economic welfare, it is doing so within an anarchical structure whose underlying technology of warfare means that the relative gains of another can be turned against it so as to reduce its future level of economic welfare. These constraints force the states to be concerned about relative gains in the sense that outcomes that offer unequal absolute gains or the prospect of unequal absolute gains should one state cheat on an agreement cannot be sustained in equilibrium. The only first-period equilibrium outcomes in the model are those in which both states impose tariffs (*T*, *T*) or close their economies (*C*, *C*).

But if the constraints facing the states change, the conclusions are more in accord with the expectations of neoliberal institutionalism. In particular, cooperation reemerges once the use of force is not at issue. To formalize this, suppose that the cost of fighting rises from 3.5 to 7. Then the payoff to victory is $4 - 7 + 6 = -1$, to defeat, $1 - 7 + 0 = -6$. In these circumstances, a state prefers not to attack even if it has secured a relative gain on the first play of $\mathscr{E}$. Even if sure of prevailing, no state will resort to force; and cooperation again becomes feasible in the model. To sustain (*F*, *F*), for example, the state's equilibrium strategies would be to play *F* in the first play of $\mathscr{E}$, not attack, and then play *T* in the second period if both states played *F* in the first period. If a state deviated from *F* in the first period or if a state attacked and the war ended in a stalemate, then the states would sanction each other during the second period by playing *C*. To see that these are, in fact, equilibrium strategies that do support (*F*, *F*) in the first period, note that if both states follow them, then each receives 3 in the first period, does not attack, and then obtains 2 in the second period for a total of 5. If S_1 deviates from *F* by playing *T*, it will receive 4 in the first round and then must decide whether or not to go to war. If it does, it will prevail, but its total payoff will be the first-period payoff of 4, less the cost of war, 7, plus the payoff to victory, 6. The overall payoff of deviating in this way is 3. This, however, is less than S_1 would have obtained had it followed the original strategy. S_1, therefore, has no incentive to deviate by playing *T* and then attacking. S_1 also has no incentive to deviate by playing *T* in the first period and then not attacking, for S_2 will be playing *C* in the second period because of S_1's deviation from *F*. In this case, S_1's payoff will be $4 + 0 = 4$. S_1, therefore, has no incentive to deviate from the strategy specified; nor, by a symmetric argument, has S_2. These strategies thus constitute an equilibrium that leads to the cooperative first-period equilibrium outcomes.

In brief, cooperation collapses in the model when the use of force is at issue. This is in keeping with structural realism. But if the cost of war is sufficiently high that the use of force is no longer at issue, then cooperation again becomes possible; and this is in accord with neoliberal institutionalism. Thus, the simple model developed here integrates much of structural realism and neoliberal institutionalism within a common analytic framework, in that many aspects of these two approaches appear as special cases of the present model.

The structural model illuminates two other issues in international relations theory. First, it formally shows that Waltz's notion of a political structure (1979, 79–101) cannot explain the variation in the feasibility of cooperation considered here. The political structure, as Waltz defines it, remains constant and unchanged throughout the analysis. Consequently, structural changes as Waltz conceives of them cannot account for the variations in the likelihood of cooperation. Explaining the range of cooperative behavior examined here requires a more detailed examination of the system's constraints than Waltz's definition of structure permits.

To see that the three characteristics that define a political structure for Waltz, i.e., the distribution of capabilities, the functional differentiation or nondifferentiation of the units, and the ordering principle, remain constant, note that the game is completely symmetric. There are only two states, and the only difference between them is that one is labeled S_1 and the other is labeled S_2. Thus, as the cost of fighting varies, there is no change in the distribution of capabilities or in the functional differentiation of the states. The ordering principle also remains that of anarchy, in that the games are always analyzed in terms of subgame perfect equilibria. The political structure, therefore, remains constant, although the feasibility of cooperation varies.

The second issue in international relations theory is the relation between anarchy and cooperation. Cooperation collapses when the use of force is at issue. But anarchy in the sense of a "lack of common government" to enforce agreements is not in and of itself the cause of this collapse. No such authority exists in the neoliberal institutional model in which $\mathcal{G}$ was simply repeated twice or in the structural model. Yet, cooperation was an equilibrium outcome in the former and in the latter when the use of force was sufficiently costly. Anarchy, as neoliberal institutionalism argues, does not logically imply a lack of cooperation (Keohane 1984, 65–84).

What accounts for the lack of cooperation is not anarchy for this is present in all of the models. Rather, the explanation lies in the different sets of constraints that define what the states can do in anarchy. In the structural model when the use of force is at issue, as it is in the international system envisioned in structural realism, relative gains matter. In these circumstances, the constraints in the structural model formally create an opportunity for each state to exploit its relative gain to its own advantage and to the detriment of the other state. Such constraints will then induce a concern for relative gains unless there is a central authority that can ensure that no state will exploit the opportunity afforded by these constraints. Cooperation, therefore, collapses for two reasons. The constraints create opportunities for a state to exploit its relative gains to its advantage and to the disadvantage of the other state; and there is no common government to ensure that states do not exploit these opportunities. In contrast with the structural model, anarchy does not imply a lack of cooperation in the neoliberal institutional model, because relative gains do not matter in that model. As I have shown, each state's ability to deter defection with the threat of future punishment does not depend on how well that state has done relative to the other in a repeated game. The constraints in the neoliberal institutional model do not offer the states a way to exploit a relative gain. Consequently, there is no need for a common government to ensure that the states do not exploit opportunities to turn a relative gain to their advantage, because there are no such opportunities in the model.

In sum, two factors combine to induce a concern for relative gains and make cooperation difficult. The first factor, which heretofore has only been implicit in structural realism's description of the international system, is that the constraints defining the system create opportunities for one state to turn relative gains to its advantage and to the disadvantage of other states. The second factor, on which both structural realist and neoliberal institutional analyses of the problem of relative gains and cooperation have focused, is anarchy.[25] If opportunities to exploit relative gains exist, then the absence of a common government to ensure that the states do not exploit these opportunities may impede cooperation.

By emphasizing that structural realism implicitly assumes that the nature of military conflict means that the potential use of force creates a set of constraints in which states can exploit their relative gains, I may have obscured a more general point. The general problem confronting a state in this system is one of constrained optimization in which the units are trying to maximize their absolute level of economic welfare subject to a set of constraints in which a unit's current relative gain may be translated into a future absolute gain for that unit and a future absolute loss for the other units. If this more general description also applies to other systems, then the present analysis may also help to explain why cooperation may be difficult to achieve in those systems even though the units in those systems are attempting to maximize their absolute gains and the possible use of military force is not a relevant part of the problem. If, for example, long-run profit maximization within an oligopolistic market structure depends on relative gains in terms of, say, market share, then this analysis would suggest that it may be very difficult to achieve international cooperation and collaboration even if national security concerns are not at issue.[26] Describing the problem faced by states in the international system in the more abstract terms of the optimization problem confronting them may suggest previously unappreciated parallels between this and other problems where the possible use of force is not the source of the concern for relative gains.

Conclusions

The problem of absolute and relative gains divides neoliberal institutionalism and structural realism. The former assumes that states are primarily concerned with absolute gains while the latter assumes that states are primarily concerned with relative gains. What to assume about states' preferences is a theoretical question, not an empirical one. States as rational unitary actors do not exist. They are a theoretical construct. Thus, the question of whether states maximize absolute gains or are concerned about relative gains is empirically meaningless. The real question is, Which assumption about state preferences is more useful? Which in the context of a broader theory gives rise to better insights? Any firm judgment about this must await further work. As a first step toward this judgment, I have begun to describe some of the insights that follow from examining a simple model in which states are assumed to be attempting to maximize their absolute level of economic welfare in an anarchic international system in which an absolute gain but relative loss today can become an absolute loss tomorrow.

This simple model takes a step toward bringing neoliberal institutionalism and structural realism within a single analytic framework by showing that many aspects of these two approaches can be seen as special cases of the model. In keeping with the expectations of structural realism, states are concerned about relative gains when the possible use of force is at issue. Cooperative outcomes that offer unequal absolute gains cannot be an equilibrium in this system. Indeed, even some agreements that offer equal absolute gains, and therefore, no relative gain cannot be sustained in equilibrium, because one state can achieve a relative gain by defecting from the agreement. The prospects for cooperation are, however, sensitive to the costs of fighting. If the use of force is no longer at issue, then a state's relative loss will not be turned against that state. Relative gains no longer matter, and cooperation now becomes feasible. This is in keeping with the expectations of neoliberal institutionalism.

The model also furthers the analysis of two other issues in international relations theory. First, it provides a simple formal example showing that Waltz's characterization of a system's political structure in terms of its ordering principle, the functional differentiation of its units, and the distribution of capabilities across the units cannot account for the variations in the feasibility of cooperation examined here. Changes in the cost of war do not affect the system's structure in Waltz's formulation but do affect the potential for cooperation in the model. Second, the model helps to clarify the relation between anarchy and cooperation. Anarchy, as neoliberal institutionalism has shown, does not imply a lack of cooperation. Rather, two factors combine to make cooperation difficult. The first is anarchy, defined as a lack of a common government that can enforce commitments. The second factor (crucial to structural realism but only implicit in it) is that the system be characterized by a set of constraints that present the states with opportunities in which they can use relative gains to their advantage and to the disadvantage of others. Absent such opportunities, relative gains cannot be exploited, and there is no need for a central authority to ensure that these nonexistent opportunities are not exploited.

Notes

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1. For discussions of neoliberal institutionalism's emphasis on absolute gains and realism's or structural realism's emphasis on relative gains, see Gilpin 1981, 18–25; Gowa 1986, 172–79; Grieco 1988a, 1988b, 1990; Hoffmann 1973, 6–12; Jervis 1988, 334–36; Keohane 1984; Keohane and Nye 1977, 23–37; Keohane and Nye 1987, 728–33; Krasner 1983, 356; Lipson 1984, 12–18; Mearsheimer 1990, 11, 44–45; Morgenthau 1967; Rosecrance 1981, 705–7; Rosecrance 1986, 44–63; Snidal 1981, 3–6; Stein 1983, 134; Stein 1984, 383–86; Viner 1948, 1–29; Waltz 1959, 34–36, 196–98, 219–21; Waltz 1979, 102–28; and Wolfers 1962, 67–115.

2. Discussions of absolute and relative gains and the problem of cooperation include Gowa 1986; Grieco 1988a, 1988b, 1990; Lipson 1984; and Snidal 1991.

3. For specific examples characterizing the concern about relative gains in terms of preferences, see Gilpin 1981, 18–21; Grieco 1988a, 1988b, 1990; Jervis 1988, 335; Keohane 1984, 66; Lipson 1984, 15; Mearsheimer 1990, 11, 44–45; Snidal 1991; and Stein 1983, 134; Stein 1984, 382. Keohane also claims that many aspects of neoliberal institutionalism can be based on the same set of assumptions about states' preferences that structural realism employs (1984, 67). However, Gowa (1986) in general and Grieco (1988a) in particular argue that the repeated prisoner's dilemma on which Keohane bases much of his analysis (1984, 65–84) is not consistent with structural realism.

4. For other attempts to integrate the analysis of conflict and cooperation, see Lipson 1984, Oye 1986, and Stein 1984.

5. Explaining states' concern for relative gains in terms of constraints rather than preferences is incidentally more in keeping with the original notions of structural realism. Indeed, what makes structural realism structural and distinguishes structural realism from realism is that the concern for relative gains is induced by the system's structural constraints (Waltz 1959, 34–36).

6. See Powell (1991) for an effort in this direction.

7. For Waltz, the concern for relative gains also extends beyond the international system to other self-help systems (1979, 91). But it is difficult to define self-help precisely.

8. For examples using the repeated prisoner's dilemma to formalize the problem of cooperation see Axelrod 1984, Keohane 1984, and Oye 1986.

9. As is well known, if the prisoner's dilemma is repeated a known finite number of times and there is complete information, there is no cooperation in equilibrium. There must be infinitely many repetitions for there to be cooperation in equilibrium. If, therefore, one is to study the problem of cooperation formally in the context of a repeated prisoner's dilemma, one must focus on an infinitely repeated prisoner's dilemma. The present formulation permits the formal study of cooperation in the simpler setting of a two-period repeated game.

10. One of the weaknesses of this interpretation is that the states in $\mathscr{E}$ are choosing their policies simultaneously and must endure significant losses before they can change their policies in the second period. A better substantive model would not entail simultaneous decisions or would allow the states to change their policies before suffering significant losses.

11. Johnson (1953) shows that if both states impose optimal tariffs, then, depending on the elasticities of demand, one or both states will suffer compared to the free trade outcome. Optimal tariffs cannot make both states better off. (In this analysis, optimal tariffs are assumed to leave both states worse off relative to the free trade outcomes. Consequently, the payoffs to (F, F) are larger than those to (T, T) in $\mathscr{E}$.) He also establishes that there will be a positive volume of trade even if both states have imposed an optimal tariff. This implies that the states obtain higher payoffs even with mutual tariffs than they would if there were no trade. Thus,

payoffs to (*T*, *T*) are higher than the payoffs to an outcome in which at least one of the states plays *C*.

12. For an introduction to, and survey of, some of the recent work on strategic trade, see Cohen 1990, Krugman 1986, Richardson 1990, Stegemann 1989, and Stern 1987.

13. Recall that the problem of cooperation reduces to what can happen in the first period because $\mathscr{E}$ is only played twice, which implies that there is no shadow of the future in the second period.

14. If the equilibrium of a repeated game did not require the states to play an equilibrium of the stage game in the last period, then one of the states would have an incentive to deviate from the purported equilibrium strategy in the last period of the game. This implies that the purported equilibrium strategies cannot actually be equilibrium strategies because no actor can ever have any positive incentive to deviate from an equilibrium strategy.

15. I will focus exclusively on pure-strategy equilibria and disregard mixed strategies.

16. The combination of strategies (*T*, *T*) is an equilibrium of $\mathscr{E}$ because no state has any incentive to deviate from its strategy, given the other state's strategy. If S_1 plays *T*, then playing *T* offers S_2 its highest payoff. Conversely, if S_1 plays *β*, then¿ also offers S_2 its highest payoff. Similarly, (*C*, *C*) is an equilibrium even though it is Pareto-dominated by (*T*, *T*) because no state has any incentive to deviate from its strategy, given the other state's strategy. If S_1 plays *C*, then playing *C* offers S_2 its highest payoff; conversely, if S_1 plays *C*, then *C* also offers S_2 its highest payoff.

17. The reason that cooperation can arise in equilibrium in the game composed of a finite number of repetitions of $\mathscr{E}$ but not in a finite number of repetitions of the prisoner's dilemma has to do with a very peculiar characteristic of the prisoner's dilemma, which is that the minmax payoff equals the equilibrium payoff. This is true of very few other games; and when the minmax payoff does not equal the equilibrium payoff, cooperative outcomes, as well as any other individually rational outcome, can be supported in equilibrium in a finitely repeated game if the number of repetitions is sufficiently large and the actors do not discount the future too much. Indeed, the technical reason for adding the strategy *C* to the prisoner's dilemma formed by the strategies *F* and *T* is to make the minmax payoff unequal to the equilibrium payoff. This makes it possible to sustain cooperation in the first period and thus to capture the essence of the infinitely repeated prisoner's dilemma in a simpler setting. For further discussion of the equilibria of repeated games, see Benoit and Krishna 1985, Fudenberg and Maskin 1986, and Kreps et al. 1982.

18. The problem of multiple equilibria frequently plagues repeated games. Indeed, almost any outcome can be supported in equilibrium. More formally, any individually rational payoffs can be approximated in the limit if the game is repeated sufficiently often and the actors do not discount the future too much (Benoit and Krishna 1985; Fudenberg and Maskin 1986).

The existence of multiple equilibria suggests that one purpose of institutions and regimes may be to focus expectations on a particular equilibrium. This is certainly in keeping with the notion that regimes are "sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actors' expectations converge in a given area of international relations" (Krasner 1983, 2). Although suggestive, this is formally rather ad hoc. Ideally, one would like to formalize the institution within the model with the result that the model has a unique equilibrium. For an important effort along these lines see Morrow 1990.

19. See Rasmusen 1989, 83–89 for a discussion of subgame perfection.

20. To see that the equilibrium supporting the (*F*, *F*) is subgame perfect, let S_1's strategy be to play *F* in the first period and *T* in the second period if (*F*, *F*) is the first-period outcome and *C* if not. Similarly, S_2's strategy is to play *F* in the first priod and *T* in the second period if (*F*, *F*) is the first-period outcome and ′ if not. As shown above, neither state has any incentive to deviate from its strategy, given the other state's strategy, so this combination of strategies constitutes a Nash equilibrium in which (*F*, *F*) is the first-period outcome. To establish subgame perfection, it must also be shown that neither state has any incentive to deviate from carrying out the threatened embargo, given the other state's strategy and that (*F*, *F*) was not the first-period outcome. Suppose that S_1 played *T*, rather than *F*, in the first period. Given S_1's strategy of playing *C* in the second period if, as is assumed, (*F*, *F*) was not the first-period outcome, then S_2 has no incentive to deviate from its strategy of embargoing S_1; that is, S_2 cannot improve its payoff by playing something other than *C*, given S_1's strategy of playing *C*. Similarly, given S_2's strategy of playing *C* in the second period if (*F*, *F*) was not the first-period outcome, then S_1 has no incentive to change its strategy by playing something other than *C*, given that S_2 is playing *C*. Neither state has any incentive not to carry out its threat, given the other's strategy; and the equilibrium is subgame perfect.

21. Although the equilibria of the neoliberal institutional model are subgame perfect, the desire to conduct this analysis in the simplest formal setting possible creates some difficulties. These equilibria are not renegotiation-proof (Farrell and Maskin 1989). Surmounting this would require moving to a more complicated formal setting that would tend to obscure the basic points the model is intended to illustrate.

22. See n. 5.

23. Gowa (1986) and Grieco (1988a, 1988b, 1990) have also criticized the use of the repeated prisoner's

dilemma to model structural realism's conception of the problem of cooperation. Their criticisms, however, focus on the states' preferences and the assumption that states are trying to maximize their absolute gain.

24. The phrase "technology of warfare" is used here because the nature of military technology in this formalization constrains the states in the international system in much the same way that the technology of production constrains firms in an oligopolistic market.

25. For examples of this focus, see Oye 1986.

26. Indeed, Grieco (1990) studies the problem of relative gains in the context of negotiations between the European Community and the United States over nontariff barriers, a context in which it is difficult to attribute any concern for relative gains to the effects that a relative loss may have on the probability of survival. This analysis helps explain why this concern may nevertheless still be present at least at the level of firms and why they may try to induce the government to reflect these concerns.

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JAMES MADISON ON RELIGION AND POLITICS: RHETORIC AND REALITY

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The recent Oregon *v.* Smith *decision's shifting of the burden in free exercise cases from legislatures to minority religious claims has brought fierce opposition, most conspicuously from leading nonpreferentialist Richard J. Neuhaus, who sees in it the foundation of majority tyranny. Against* Smith, *Neuhaus employs Madison's "Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments," which is universally read to argue that the superiority of religion to politics proscribes majoritarian hegemony over religious practices. I contend that the Memorial's appeals are better understood as rhetoric than as reflecting Madison's true view. I find Madison hostile not only to religious establishments but also to religion itself. This hostility was the basis of his rejection of the nonpreferentialists' utility-based argument for government support of religion. In this light, I uncover a curious historical irony: the nonpreferentialist Neuhaus seeks today to protect religion from hostility by adhering to a position that was originally animated, in key respects, by hostility both to religion and to its nonpreferential support.*

The Supreme Court's recent ruling in the "peyote case," *Department of Human Resources of Oregon et al. v. Smith et al.* (1990) has brought fierce opposition, most notably from leading nonpreferentialist Richard J. Neuhaus. The *Smith* opinion, written by Justice Scalia, upholds as an "unavoidable consequence of democratic government" the "relative disadvantage" of minority religion. Neuhaus fears this rationale will "leave religion naked in the face of state power" (1990, 42). Against what he views as Scalia's naked majoritarianism, Neuhaus offers his and Michael McConnell's interpretation of Madison's "Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments." McConnell (1990) voices the consensus view, which interprets the Memorial to argue that religious freedom is "unalienable because it is a duty to God rather than a privilege of the individual," so that "even the mighty democratic will of the people is, in principle, subordinate to the commands of God, as heard and understood in the individual conscience" (pp. 1497, 1516).

I shall radically depart from the unanimous view of Madison interpreters that the Memorial represents Madison's true view regarding the superordination and subordination of religious and political obligation, respectively.[1] I argue that the Memorial's explicit religious appeals are better understood as rhetoric than as expressions of Madison's conviction that politics is "subordinate" to God's "commands." Moreover, I find Madison's thought hostile not only to religious establishments (as is well known) but also—contrary to the language of the Memorial and to its consensus interpretation—hostile, in important respects, to revealed religion itself. On the latter basis

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Madison was led largely to reject the utility-based argument for government support of "general religion." In light of my analysis of Madison's deepest intentions, I find a curious historical irony in nonpreferentialist opposition to *Smith*: the nonpreferentialist Neuhaus seeks today to protect religion from hostility by adhering to a position that was originally animated, in key respects, by hostility both to religion and to its nonpreferential support.[2]

The Memorial Examined

The scholarly consensus correctly stresses the religious appeal of the Memorial,[3] which begins by invoking the Deity through a quotation from the Virginia Declaration of Rights: it is a "fundamental and undeniable truth, 'that Religion or the duty which we owe to our Creator and the manner of discharging it, can be directed only by reason and conviction, not by force or violence'." This duty is also an "unalienable right" both because of its necessity to meeting divine obligation and due to the fact that human opinion cannot be compelled to "follow the dictates of other men" (art. 1). This opening argument sets the document's tone. Throughout, the harmony between natural rights doctrine and Protestantism is highlighted.

Duty to "our Creator" is of such dignity that it transcends civil society itself; that is, unlike our other rights, the absolute exercise of which we barter in exchange for the protection of civil society, "in matters of Religion, no man's right is abridged by the institution of Civil Society and . . . Religion is wholly exempt from its cognizance."[4] This owes to the fact that religious duty is "precedent, both in order of time and degree of obligation, to the claims of Civil Society" (art. 1). In relation to civil society, duty to God is primary in both senses of the term. Thus, the separation of church and state concretizes the divine order: politics is demoted to a secondary status. Separation is a means to the realization of true religion, which, according to dissenting Protestant thought, is achievable only through the meeting of the individual conscience with the word of God, as found in Scripture. The individual's relationship to God is the one thing needful, in comparison with which the claims of the majority pale.

While religious establishments corrupt both church and state, "just government" (which is instituted to perpetuate liberty) needs no establishment. It will be supported precisely to the extent that it protects religious freedom—through the maintenance of sect equality—"with the same equal hand which protects . . . person and property" (art. 8). Thus, the needs of politics and religion cohere: the separation of each from the other is necessary both to salvation and to good government. As true religion is best supported when least mixed with politics, just government is most likely to be sustained when its only function with regard to religion is the protection of religious freedom from both private individuals and from government itself.[5]

Concluding as it began, with an invocation of the Deity, the Memorial "earnestly pray[s]" that the Supreme Lawgiver will illuminate the members of the legislature to "turn . . . from every act"—and therefore from Henry's assessments bill—"which would affront [God's] holy prerogative," in order to render themselves and their constituents "worthy of his blessing." Those favoring government support of teachers of the Christian religion have strayed from God's path, endangering not only the piety of the commonwealth but also its "liberties, . . . prosperity, and . . . happiness" (art. 15).[6]

As this necessarily brief examination demonstrates, there is no denying the variety of pious appeals in the Memorial.[7] The recurring theme—literally the first and last argument of the Memorial—is the claim that both revealed religion (meaning, in particular, dissenting Protestantism) and natural rights doctrine testify to the subordinate character of civil society in its relation to, as McConnell puts it, "the commands of God" (1990, 1516).

But was this justification for separation—religion's superiority to politics—Madison's final judgment on the subject? Might he have utilized his audience's Protestant beliefs in church-state separation to fulfill a project neither Protestant nor even religious but, instead, hostile, in key respects, to religion? The need to address these questions emerges on a comparison of the Memorial with other of Madison's discussions of the subject.

Federalist 10

Wholly unnoticed by Madison scholars, in *Federalist* 10 Madison presents an understanding of religion and republican government that is somewhat at odds with the Memorial. There he addresses the "mortal disease" of republican government, faction, which can be neutralized by either "removing its causes" or "controlling its effects" (Madison, Hamilton, and Jay 1961, 77). There are also two methods of removing faction's causes. The first, destruction of liberty, promises also to destroy "political life," which is qualitatively distinct from the master-slave relation. The second poses the more serious alternative, elicits a longer and more substantive response, and first raises the issue of politics and religion. It consists in "giving to every citizen the same opinions," passions, and interests. But this agenda is "as impracticable as the first would be unwise," for it ignores the diversity fixed in human nature. Natural diversity results from the coupling of liberty with fallible human reason. But the marriage of error and freedom does not, of itself, produce faction: citizens may approach their differences with indifference, or at least toleration, in light of the recognition of their shared fallibility. But the further conjunction of fallible reason with self-love prevents this: "As long as the connection subsists between [a man's] reason and his self-love, his opinions and passions will have a reciprocal influence on each other; and the former will be objects to which the latter will attach themselves" (p. 78). The ineluctable combination of error and self-love prevents the separation of passion from opinion in political activity. Radical homogeneity of opinions, passions, and interests is impracticable because it depends on the abolition of the connection that subsists between fallible reason and selfishness.

Nature lays a further obstacle to uniformity: "The diversity in the faculties of [men is no less] an insuperable obstacle." Arguing that the right to acquire property originates in the natural hierarchy of talents, a politics in accordance with human nature must regard as its first object the "protection of these faculties," and with them, their fruits (Madison, Hamilton, and Jay 1961, 78). But the protection of diverse and unequal talents gives rise to diverse and unequal fruits ("different degrees and kinds of property"). From the influence of this diversity and inequality in property on "sentiments and views" arises a corresponding societal division "into different interests and parties."

Human nature thus revolts against radical homogeneity as the result of factors that while conceptually distinct, interact with and reinforce each other; the thread connecting both is selfishness. Fallibility made clinging by self-love, and the effect on sentiments and views of differences in property, together with the influence of each on the other, provide a natural standard for government. But adhering to this standard, i.e., allowing for the unimpeded fulfillment of the variety of human excellences, understood here primarily in the context of productive capacities, gives rise to the very divisions that threaten the stability and justice on which that fulfillment depends. Human nature is both the source of, and a problem for, good government.

While "sown" in our nature, the power of the two sources of faction—"opining" and economics—varies with the circumstances of society. Thus, Madison proceeds to list the different expressions resulting from these two sources, beginning with the "reciprocal influence" of "opinions and passions":

> A zeal for different opinions concerning religion, concerning government, and many other points, . . . an attachment to different leaders ambitiously contending for preeminence and power; or to persons of other descriptions whose fortunes have been interesting to the human passions, have, in turn, divided mankind, . . . inflamed them with mutual animosity, and rendered them much more disposed to vex and oppress each other. (Madison, Hamilton, and Jay 1961, 79)

This famous passage simultaneously illuminates various manifestations of the first cause of faction and obscures others. Clearly, it is natural to opine about the public good and the proper form of government. But at the same time, the reader's attention is drawn to the obscurity of the last example on the list—the attachment to "persons of other descriptions." Clearly, these are not political actors in the precise sense. But why the obscurity-producing reticence on this cause and not the others? I contend that Publius is referring here to the world's great religious figures.

My thesis is supported by Madison's letter to Jefferson of 24 October 1787 (1962–, vol. 10, pp. 206–19). This lengthy correspondence, written one month before *Federalist* 10 was published, is the virtual first draft of that paper. Assuming that a private letter to a trusted friend[8] would reveal more fully than a public statement the deepest thoughts of its author, there emerges a distance between the public and private Madison on the status of revealed religion.

In this letter Madison rejects the usefulness of religion as a rights-protecting "restraint" on the "bulk of mankind who are neither Statesmen nor Philosophers." Further, he not only rejects religion that has "kindled into enthusiasm" but argues that "even in its *coolest state*" religion "has been much oftener a motive to oppression than a restraint from it" (1962–, vol. 10, pp. 213–14; emphasis mine).[9] Given the friendship expressed for religion in the Memorial, this letter is somewhat shocking: While the Memorial stresses the harmony between piety and liberty, the letter not only rejects religion as a remedy for faction but also views it as a frequent source of oppression. Not only is it much oftener an agent against liberty, but even at its most moderate ("in its coolest state"), religion is much oftener tyrannical than liberating. But is this a merely historical observation (to whose truth a believer could agree), or does Madison regard the truth of his observation to follow from the very nature of revealed religion?

While the letter's explicit criticism of religion is omitted from the published *Federalist* 10, the basis for that criticism begins to emerge from the latter's teaching on the political implications of human nature. My examination of that essay left off when questioning the identity of, and reason for, Madison's obscure reference to "persons of other descriptions." If even the coolest religion is much oftener a source of, not a remedy for, faction, might Madison's "persons of other descriptions" refer to the great religious leaders who kindled the people's interest into enthusiasm? It would be no small matter if he regarded the likes of Moses, Christ, and Muhammed as, in the final count, destructive of their followers' ability to "cooperate for their common good" (Madison, Hamilton, and Jay 1961, 79).

But note the change in verb tense in his list: while personal attachment is rendered both to "different leaders" and to "persons of other descriptions," the former describes an allegiance to those who were at that time actively contending for power, whereas the latter describes an attachment to those whose fortunes *"have been* interesting to the human passions" (emphasis mine). The use of the perfect tense in the latter signals that these fortunes have excited interest from the past up to the present. This implies that at some point these persons were no longer with those who struggled in their names. Certainly Europe's great religious wars were fought in the name of a man long since gone. Note, further, that the letter to Jefferson likewise employs the perfect tense: even the coolest religion *has been* much oftener oppressive than liberating. But these grammatical considerations are not intended to be dispositive; more important is the historical consideration to which they point. From the standpoint of history, it appears unlikely that Madison's description could apply to other than the world's great religious figures; for what persons other than the political leaders already listed have excited *and* continue to excite their followers to the point that they become divided and inflamed?

Circumstantial evidence for my interpretation is the light it sheds on the immediate sequel. There Madison finds the power of "animosities" such that even absent a substantial occasion, the "most frivolous and fanciful distinctions have been sufficient to kindle" unfriendly passions and the "most violent conflicts" (Madison, Hamilton, and Jay 1961, 79). Note that again the perfect tense is used. Further, as with the "persons of other descriptions," no example is given of a "frivolous . . . distinction." What is clear here is that the marriage in human nature of error and self-love gives rise to conflict. Further, the prior passage linked the power of "persons of other descriptions" to their appeal to the passions. Passion (used in *Federalist* 10 interchangeably with *self-love*), in its connection to reason, was listed earlier as a cause—if not *the* cause—of homogeneity's impracticability. If the power of religious leaders lies in their appeal to the passions and passion in assemblies "wrest[s] the scepter from reason," might Madison view as primary among the "most . . . fanciful distinctions" something like a Thirty Years War over the issue of Protestantism versus Catholicism? (Federalist 55: 342; see also Diamond 1981, 71). This interpretation is provisional, for it assumes that Madison here relegates religion and its leaders' appeals to the realms of passion and fancy. In contrast, the Memorial explicitly argues that religion somehow transcends, while cooperating with, human reason. To substantiate this provisional interpretation requires examining *Federalist* 37, in which Madison addresses the subject of epistemology and, with it, the status of revelation.

A Madisonian Digression on Reason Versus Revelation

In *Federalist* 37, in an apparent digression,[10] Madison reflects on the obscurity that must accompany human communication: "And this unavoidable inaccuracy . . . [is proportional] to the complexity and novelty of the objects defined. When the Almighty himself condescends to address mankind in their own language, his meaning, luminous as it must be, is rendered dim and doubtful by the cloudy medium through which it is communicated" (Madison, Hamilton, and Jay 1961, 229).

While the divine is omniscient, its messages to humanity require the "cloudy medium" of speech. This alone does not deny the pious possibility that prophets can receive God's message through inspiration. But their attempt to communicate the divine way to uninspired humanity requires the cloudy medium of words, which "render dim and doubtful" the Almighty's meaning. The most striking inference to be drawn from this passage is that if inaccuracy grows with the "complexity and novelty of the object," the Bible, Torah, Koran, and so on, in addressing subjects no less complex than the nature of and duties owed God, must exceed other books in doubtfulness. But is this a veiled attack on the cognitive status of revelation or simply a recognition, shared by many a believer, of the mysterious character of the divine?

This issue is addressed more explicitly in a private letter to Dr. Caldwell of 1825 (1884, vol. 3, pp. 504–5). Here Madison "reject[s] the idea maintained by some divines, of more zeal than discretion," that the rational discernment of nature is an insufficient "road . . . to nature's God." Not only is natural reason simply sufficient for Madison, but "all the knowledge" of nature's God that preceded its "written revelation" is argued to be "derived from," and thereby relegated to the status of, an "oral tradition" (p. 505). This appears both to reveal the full but veiled thrust of *Federalist* 37 and to question the Memorial's sincerity in simply harmonizing the gods of revelation and nature. Of course, many believers agree that their holy texts derive from an oral tradition, albeit one that is divinely inspired. And asserting the simple sufficiency of natural reason does not deny that the conclusions of revelation can *agree* with those of reason. However, it raises the deeper question of the cognitive status by which an oral tradition's agreement with reason can be deemed an authoritative *confirmation,* since the simple sufficiency of reason implies the superfluity of revelation. From the believer's standpoint, the superfluity of revelation denies its existence simply; for the superfluous cannot be at the same time (and as the believer holds) the one thing needful for humanity.[11]

In this light, Madison's project for religious liberty is theoretically grounded in the denial of human capacity to know the nature and existence of the commands of—and thus the duties toward—revelation's God. It appears that we have come some distance from the apparent Protestantism of the Memorial. This is not to deny the influence of Locke's natural theology on eighteenth-century U.S. Protestantism (see Pangle 1988, 21–24). But the core of Protestantism, certainly at that time, continued to be the indisputable authority of Scripture. It has been seen that the primacy of religious conscience is justified for Protestantism by its belief in the accessible truth of the Bible (see also 2 Timothy 3:16–17 and 2 Peter 1:20).

In this light, we can infer that faction and bloodshed stemming from differences over the content of a "dim and doubtful" oral tradition are the height of irrationality (and must therefore be centered in the passions, for Madison). *Federalist* 10 argued that it was the fortunes of "persons of other descriptions" that "have been interesting to the human passions." We see now why Madison locates this appeal in the passions; for after his analysis of revelation, what must Madison say of the reliability of the sources that report the fortunes of the religious founders?

If the identification of *Federalist* 10's "persons of other descriptions" is accepted, then the list of the "opining" causes of faction opens ("a zeal for different opinions, concerning religion") and closes ("persons of other descriptions") with religion. While positive appeals to revealed religion constitute the first and last arguments of the Memorial, *Federalist* 10 appears to disclose revealed religion, among the manifestations of the opining faculty, to be literally the first and the last cause of oppression. Such arguments are hardly the stuff of Protestantism or of any revealed religion, but represent instead a characteristically Enlightenment critique of religion.

Religion is again addressed near the end of *Federalist* 37. While Madison's chief aim here has been to explain the difficulties faced by the convention, he concludes by finding cause for "real wonder" over its unprecedented unanimity despite such difficulties. So unexpected was this feat that "it is impossible for any man of candor to reflect on this . . . without partaking of the astonishment. It is impossible for the man of pious reflection not to perceive in it a finger of that Almighty hand which has been so frequently . . . extended to our relief in the critical stages of the revolution" (Madison, Hamilton, and Jay 1961, 230–31).[12]

Note the care with which Madison writes. He appears initially to say that candor requires a pious astonishment at the convention's unanimity, but a rereading suggests that the reader is given the choice of viewing the matter with either "candor" (reason?) or piety. While he is silent as to where he stands in this dichotomy, the thrust of his earlier analysis of revelation suggests his doubt of providence. His silence here parallels both his obscure reference to "persons of other descriptions" and the veiled manner of his public reflections on the status of revelation.

The foregoing sufficiently indicates Madison's doubt of the God of revelation. The doubt is presented in published writings but is not an open attack on revealed religion.[13] Nor does that doubt leave humanity without transcendent moral and political guidance. Madison finds such in "the transcendent law of nature and of nature's God." This law is the "absolute necessity of the case"—"the great principle of self-preservation" (Federalist, 279). In a private letter to the Reverend Mr. Beasley of 1825 (1900–1910, vol. 9, pp. 230–31), he clarifies the distance between the duties arising from human origins in the state of nature as opposed to the Garden of Eden. Here he responds to Beasley's request for his opinion of Beasley's rational "Proof of the Being and Attributes of God." He refers Beasley to Samuel Clarke's (1735) "celebrated" *Discourse,* which claimed to prove rationally the goodness, immortality, omnipotence, and perfect wisdom of God. Not only does Madison appear to commend Clarke's work, he also offers his strongest endorsement of religion's utility: "the belief in a God All Powerful wise and good, is so essential to the moral order of the World and to the happiness of man, that arguments which enforce it cannot be drawn from too many sources" (pp. 230–31). But he signals his reservations with Beasley's—and by implication, Clarke's—"abstract" ideas by recommending in their place "reasoning from the effect to the cause, 'from Nature to Nature's God'," as the "more universal and more persuasive application." His reservations grow greater still in the letter's final paragraph, which argues that the human mind, confronted with infinity,

> *prefers* at once the idea of a self-existing cause to that of an infinite series of cause and effect, which augments, instead of avoiding difficulty; . . . it finds *more facility* in assenting to the self-existence of an invisible cause possessing infinite power, wisdom and goodness, than to the self-existence of the universe, visibly destitute of those attributes. . . . In this *comparative facility* of conception and belief, all philosophical reasoning on the subject must perhaps terminate. (p. 231, emphasis mine)

This passage is striking. Granting the *utility* of the belief in God's power, wisdom, and goodness, it remains the case that "all philosophical reasoning on the subject must perhaps terminate" in mere "comparative facility." But Beasley and Clarke intend to prove that such assent is rationally justified. While he concedes these proofs' "effect on some," Madison grants neither here nor elsewhere that philosophical reasoning can prove God's goodness. To the contrary, the finiteness of human understanding "betrays itself . . . especially when it contemplates . . . infinity." In fact, the only basis he explicitly offers for assent to these notions is its greater facility, or ease, which the mind prefers and on which happiness depends. The political relevance of Madison's doubt that philosophic reason can prove God's goodness is that it undergirds his position that the laws of nature and of nature's God provide the "more universal and more persuasive application" necessary to morality and happiness. How they do so requires grasping religion's utility.

While the Beasley letter grants the utility of religion, how can this be reconciled with the October letter's censure of even the coolest religion? Madison apparently views as useful religion that squares with "reasoning from the effect to the cause." This is consistent with the Memorial, where the political conclusions from the laws of nature's God (religious toleration) are assumed to harmonize simply with duty to revelation's God (Christian charity). Thus, whether or not Madison believes reason can prove God's goodness, it is clear that his teaching on nature's God aims publicly to harmonize reason's political direction with revelation's teaching of God's goodness. Such harmony is necessary to persuade those referred to in the October letter as the "great bulk of mankind who are neither Statesmen nor Philosophers."

Understanding his belief in religion's utility, including the alleged harmony between nature's laws and revelation's duties, requires understanding his view of what today is called the "religious impulse." In an 1833 letter to the Reverend Jasper Adams, Madison writes, "There appears to be in the nature of man what ensures his belief in an invisible cause of his present existence, and anticipation of his future existence" (1900–1910, vol. 9, pp. 484–87). He then rejects Adams's call for a stronger church-state alliance with an argument that appeared 10 years earlier in a letter to Professor Everett: "There are causes in the human breast, which ensure the perpetuity of religion without the aid of the law" (cited in Alley 1985, 84). As in the 1825 Beasley letter, Madison says in neither of the latter letters that the ineradicable belief in God is divinely implanted. He says only that it is found in human nature, and facility is the only explicit basis that he offers for such belief. Further, so intransigent are these notions that their support by law is unnecessary. In short, he is able qualifiedly to grant religion's utility while denying the need for government to nurture this expedient.[14] Notice that this perfectly harmonizes his private teaching of religion's utility with the Memorial's public teaching that government should not support religion.

How the teaching on nature's God produces the more persuasive and universal effect on the religious impulse emerges fully from considering what can be inferred to be Madison's critique of Christianity. While he views religious belief as natural and, when made to accord with reason, "essential" to morality and happiness, *Federalist* 10's analysis of human nature implies that Christianity's aspiration to the radical overcoming of natural selfishness aims at what experience shows to be "impracticable." Without denying that a certain restraint results from this attempt, he can be inferred to regard the unnaturalness of such restraint to give rise to a tension or anger in the soul—from which, perhaps, springs the oppressive tendency of even "coolest" religion. Further, the denial of nature implicit in this attempt may set the stage for additional—and more violent—rejections of a natural standard: "reasoning" may tend increasingly to fall to passion. The claim to wisdom that transcends and at times contradicts nature's laws, coupled with an unnatural suppression of the love for the things of this world, appears, then, to explain Madison's condemning such an ethos as a leading cause of the spilling of blood over the "most frivolous and fanciful distinctions."[15]

The preceding analysis produces a balanced portrait of the nature and extent of Madison's assent to religion's utility and explains his confidence in the more persuasive public teaching on nature's God. In sum, while religion is natural, ineradicable, and morally salutary, this must be balanced against his charge (in a 1792 essay) that neither morality nor happiness but slavery has been humanity's general lot (cited in Padover 1953, 43–44). As a remedy to this, religion has been worse than inadequate. But if it, like faction's other causes, is both natural and divisive and if destroying the liberty essential to it is a "remedy that is worse than the disease," to what remedy is the friend of popular governments to look? (Madison, Hamilton, and Jay 1961, 77, 78). In the same 1792 essay, Madison answers, "The people ought to be enlightened." While ineradicable, religion can be "awakened," that is, moved from reliance on an oral tradition toward nature's God. The Memorial's attempt publicly to harmonize the biblical God with nature's God is a brilliant example of such an enlightening effort. By publicly harmonizing revelation and natural rights doctrine, the latter's "more universal and persuasive application" promises to demystify the former. But the great force behind Madison's project for liberty lies not in theological education per se but in its effects on the souls of the citizens of life in an extended commercial republic. To this theme Madison devotes the remainder of *Federalist* 10.

Federalist 10 on Politics and Religion: Part II

Federalist 10 finds the second major cause of faction to be "the various and unequal distribution of property." Madison's remedy to this cause relies on multiplying, in order to highlight, conflict over *kinds* of ("various") property, in contrast to *amounts* of property. Madison learned from Adam Smith that regulating various interests is the principal task of "modern legislation" emerges only in modern, or democratized, commerce (Madison, Hamilton, and Jay 1961, 79). The latter, unlike ancient commerce, affects the behavior, nature, opinions and habits of the majority to an extent heretofore unachieved. Further, while democratized commerce inculcates commercial habits in the people generally, it serves also to focus their commercial allegiances on the various interests into which they have been fragmented, thereby downplaying awareness of, and conflict over, amounts of property. The democratization of commerce exercises both a uniting and a dispersing function, and the interaction of both is instrumental in remedying the effects of faction.[16]

In explaining his remedy to property-based faction, Madison further examines the relation of politics and religion. Crucial to this relation is that individuals focus on local pursuits and away from potentially fatal struggles over basic principles. The fragmentation required for liberty and served by multiplicity cannot exercise its intended effect in the absence of "opposite and rival interests," specifically, widespread acquisitiveness (see Diamond 1971). This root of the "most common and durable" source of faction is also prerequisite to effective fragmentation of multiple interests. This channeling of rival interests, according to *Federalist* 55, remedies humanity's general lack of "better motives" (Madison, Hamilton, and Jay 1961, 322). If natural selfishness cannot be simply negated, government, "the greatest of all reflections on human nature," must seek instead to moderate selfishness through multiplying its foci (p. 322). The coalition process is driven by the citizens' recognition that to satisfy their selfish aims, they must come down to the "brokerage level"—at which a majority comprised of diverse interests, religions, and geographies can agree. Creating unity out of extraordinary multiplicity compels, for merely selfish reasons, the moderation of the most extreme claims of all. While *Federalist* essays 52–83 contain arguments for the need for other-regarding virtue in the people and in their representatives, the durability of selfishness appears to be the foundation on which *Federalist* 10 rests.

Religion enters this political analysis and process thus. The fragmenting effects of multiple interests depend on acquisitiveness. But this poses a certain tension with an ethos that regards lucre as filthy and teaches that the love of money is the root of all evil (1 Peter 5:2). The character-forming effects of democratized commerce promise to weaken the soul's crusading tendency, that is, to counteract the call to subordinate this world and the body to higher pursuits. Selfishness made rational by institutional restraints is the ethos encouraged by the multiplicity-of-interests scheme—in obvious tension with the pronouncement "How hardly shall they that have riches enter into the kingdom of God" (Luke 19:24).[17]

Religion is affected politically not only by fostering acquisitiveness but also by multiplicity of sects. With gentleness that is appreciable only in light of the October 1787 letter, *Federalist* 10 states that a sect "*may* degenerate into a political faction" locally but sect multiplicity will prevent its ranging across the nation (Madison, Hamilton, and Jay 1961, 84; emphasis mine). The political concern (liberty) requires that no majority religious faction be formed. The more religions the better, because each sect is smaller and more dispersed and thus "unable to spread a general conflagration" (p. 84). But this political concern is in tension with religion: believers qua believers desire not the diminution in their own sect concomitant with sect multiplicity but, rather, their sect's enlargement at the expense of other sects. In this sense, Madison's requirement of sect multiplicity signals and implements the primacy of the political over the religious. True, religious multiplicity was a given in his day, but it was also much more for him than a constraint to which he had to accommodate himself; it was a blessing for liberty.

Multiplicity of interests and multiplicity of sects thus look to and require each other. The former dampens the otherworldly emphasis by which religion "kindle[s] into enthusiasm," supplying in its place commerce's lower but more sober virtues of industry, mildness, and thrift (see Hirschman 1977, 42–66). Sect multiplicity renders even this milder state of piety less capable of concerted action. This double blow was for Madison the foundation of his project to blunt religion's tendency to "oppress." In Madison's republic, the need to compromise whittles away at religion's extremes; majority formation amid economic and sect multiplicity requires appeals to the "more persuasive and universal" laws of nature. Clearly, he recognized that sources other than religion can equally destroy liberty "under different circumstances." But *Federalist* 10's list of the causes of faction begins and ends with religion due to the particular circumstances he envisions. Given his aim to subordinate dispute over amounts to dispute over *kinds* of property, faction stemming from opinion (religion in particular) most threatens republicanism; for revealed religion generally imperils the prudent egoism on which the multiplicity of interests scheme depends. The "new science of politics," in turn, depends on this scheme to ground its recommendation of the new Constitution "to the esteem and adoption of mankind" (Madison, Hamilton, and Jay 1961, 80–81).

Elements of the Current Debate in Light of Madison's Free Exercise Views

But is not my interpretation of Madison's view of religion contradicted by his concern over its free exercise? Malbin notes Madison's attempt to insert into the Virginia Declaration of Rights the protection of all but those religious practices that (in Madison's words) violate "equal liberty" and "manifestly endanger" the state's existence (1978, 22). Even in the more moderate Memorial, Madison's thrust is to place the standard for valid free exercise largely within the conscience of the individual believer.[18]

This question returns us to the *Smith* debate. It has been seen that Neuhaus's critique relies on the view that Madison's expansive free exercise understanding is grounded in the superiority of God's commands. Against my findings it could be argued that Madison's friendship with religion is signaled by his concern to prevent the restrictions justified in *Smith.* But even to grant both the Memorial's and the private Madison's opposition to *Smith* does not disprove—and may even further confirm—my thesis if Madison's approach to free exercise is an additional means to neutralize politically the already-diluted piety that emerges from the coalition process.

My argument begins with an analysis of Madison's 1792 essay, "Property." Here he distinguishes between material property and property that individuals have in their opinions, religion, persons, and faculties (1962–, vol. 14, 266–68). *Federalist* 10 argues that "protect[ing] these faculties is the first object of government." The essay "Property" finds conscience to be the "most sacred" property, being a "natural and unalienable right." While the essay "Property" links conscience to "religious rights," the precise nature of that linkage emerges in Madison's letter to Jefferson of 17 October 1788, which responds to the call to include religious freedom in the proposed Bill of Rights. While he desires such constitutional protection, Madison fears that "the rights of conscience, in particular, if submitted to a public definition would be narrowed much more than they are likely ever to be by an assumed power." His example of such narrowing is the objection by some that the prohibition on religious tests "opened the door for Jews, Turks, and infidels" (1962–, vol. 11, p. 297). "Infidels," at that time, included atheists (see Glenn 1987, 349). In this light, the protection of "religious rights" also includes the protection of atheism. The essay "Property," then, argues that the freedom to believe or not to believe in God is the "most sacred" property that government is instituted to protect. Why?

It has been seen that the freedom of the mind's status as a natural and inalienable right is for Madison known only through reason, not through an oral tradition. While absolute necessity, the law of nature's God, signals the primacy of self-preservation, good government, for Madison, aims at more than this. It aims to protect the faculties, or the mind's freedom, in recognition of the highest human capacity. We have seen that this is the condition by which humanity will be "enlightened," by which it will escape its history of "slavery" and the role that servitude to the "mysteries" of religion has played in that history. In this light, separation aims not only at the free, but also at the rational, society.

But the conditions of enlightenment require a defense against the darkness. While the freedom of reason is threatened both by religion's dependence on an oral tradition and by its "much oftener" oppressive politics, the expansive protection of religious rights (as Madison wishes them defined) is the precondition for the protection of the freedom of reason. This is because in protecting religious rights from its usually religiously motivated suppression, the freedom of reason is likewise protected. In this light only, one appreciates the full significance of the fact that when he wrote to Jefferson of the successful passage of their bill for religious liberty in Virginia in 1785, Madison signaled his pride in their victory over not the opponents of religious liberty precisely, but rather over those who would make "laws for the human mind" (1962–, vol. 8, p. 473). Madison's careful choice of phrase here is perfectly consistent with his efforts to deprive religious majorities of the power to discourage reason's development. Reason thus protected, adherence to an oral tradition could be replaced by guidance from the laws of nature. In this sense, for Madison, the liberation *from* revealed religion required the liberation *of* revealed religion.

These reflections provide a framework in which to place Madison's expansive free exercise understanding. Such protection is necessary only for religious minorities; only their practices will conflict with democratic laws. *Federalist* 10 is less concerned with minority religion's effect on liberty; a minority faction "will be unable to execute and mask its violence under the forms of the Constitution" (Madison, Hamilton, and Jay 1961, 80). Only a majority religious faction possesses the legal power to implement its designs. By radically privatizing free exercise, Madison sought to lessen the moral and legal force of majority religion. This explains his attempt to remove from the Virginia Declaration of Rights Mason's "happiness of the community" standard as a valid basis for restricting free exercise, offering in its place only the criterion of "manifest" danger to "equal liberty" and the "existence of the state."

An expansive free exercise understanding grounds and furthers the multiplicity solution, the foundation of Madison's project. Such an understanding also provides an additional fence against the already-moderated piety that emerges from multiplicity. Not the superiority of God's commands but the denial of political power to majority religious factions explains Madison's view that religious freedom (rather than religion) transcends majority will. An expansive free exercise understanding aids his project for the radical privatization of religion—in a manner wholly consistent both with the end of liberty and with a significant degree of hostility to revealed religion in light of that end. So certain is he that the beliefs in God and immortality are ineradicable that he appears to entertain no fears that the dilution and radical privatization of religion may in time threaten those beliefs and thus the morality and happiness to which he grants they are essential. Being firmly planted in the "human breast," the salutary effects of these beliefs require no legal aid. What is most required is preventing religiously motivated majorities from imposing less-than-rational public policies. His confidence in both the ineradicability of these potentially salutary (when diluted) beliefs and in the sufficiency of the commercial virtues justifies for him the simple goodness of his diluting project.[19]

In light of Madison's intentions, nonpreferentialist opposition to *Smith* presents a curious historical irony. The nonpreferentialist position on religious establishment (favoring government support of "general religion") appears to harmonize best with the (pre-*Braunfeld*[20] articulation of the) "secular regulation" rule for free exercise. This rule declares invalid laws that either do not serve a legitimate, secular governmental end or that aim at particular sects. But having met this standard, the fact that a law violates certain religious duties neither invalidates it nor requires religious exemptions. As the case history suggests, the aggrieved parties in such cases (e.g., Mormons, Christian Scientists, Jews, and Seventh Day Adventists) are usually not included in the majority's, or "general," religion.

Thus, while the secular regulation rule treats both majority and minority religions neutrally by requiring all to obey valid laws, no law particularly offensive to general religious sentiments is likely to be passed. If the majority of U.S. citizens belonged (like the respondents in *Smith*) to the Native American Church, it is unlikely that the ingestion of peyote as a sacramental rite would be illegal. Thus, the practical political "other side" of the secular regulation rule's neutrality is that only minority religions are likely ever to have their practices restricted. *Smith* upholds this as "unavoidable" in a "democratic government."

For this very reason, the secular regulation rule appears to "support" general religion in the sense that all laws agreeable to the latter are enforced even on disagreeing sects. In this light, Madison's radical free exercise is not so much a protection of religion as it is a protection of nongeneral religion. In this sense, not only does it offer general religion no support, but from the nonpreferential standpoint it also to a certain extent deprives general religion of the capacity to codify the moral precepts that define it. Further, to the extent that restricting various minority religious practices diminishes minority sect membership, this supports the unity at which the nonpreferentialists' support for general religion aims.

Thus, one would think that Neuhaus and all who favor government support of general religion would welcome *Smith* if in fact it restores the "secular regulation" rule, and to the extent that this restoration serves to codify and thus to uphold for public reverence the moral and legal standards underlying majority, or general, religion. But Neuhaus may view the majority culture today—or perhaps the elites who legislate and adjudicate for majority culture—as secular and antireligious. Therefore, fearing secular power as much as Madison feared religious power, he may now see in Madison's radically privatized free exercise understanding a refuge from that secular power. If this is the case, it would be both historically ironic and a testimony to the Memorial's rhetorical success that *Smith*'s nonpreferentialist critics should seek today to protect religion from hostility by adhering to a position that was originally animated, in key respects, by hostility both to religion and to its nonpreferential support.

Finally, my analysis raises—but cannot answer—a deeper question: Did Neuhaus, in crafting his own "Memorial" against *Smith*, learn Madison's lesson in rhetoric? While the answer lies beyond the scope of this essay, it can at least be inferred from my examination of Madison's aims that if Neuhaus is correct in seeing the new danger to religious liberty not in religious hostility but in hostility to religion, then Madison, whose concern all along was to protect political liberty from tyrannical majorities, might grant Neuhaus's use of his free exercise understanding—inverted as I have shown that use to be.

Conclusion

While I have contested the consensus view that Madison's project for religious liberty stems from his belief that government is subordinate to God's commands, I in no way deny the explicit harmony between dissenting Protestantism and the Memorial. As has been seen, Protestant adherence generally to the primacy of religious conscience, to the view that property is God's reward for toil, and to the view that church-state separation is necessary to salvation, provided Madison an audience that was at least in part receptive to his arguments.

But I have sought to demonstrate that contrary to the Memorial's pious appeals, Madison and dissenting Protestantism come to their formal agreement from opposite poles. The view that God's commands outrank the merely natural or political, on the one hand, and Madison's view that an oral tradition is inferior and in certain respects hostile to nature's laws and to a government grounded in them, on the other, can both agree that politics and religion should be radically separated. In this light, dissenting Protestantism's political utility consists in part of the fact that its belief in the simple transcendence of God's word, accessible only to the individual conscience, aided Madison in his quest to relegate revealed religion to the realm of the radically, because politically undisturbing, private. In sum, in all but its politically salutary features, religion would be gagged by its own liberty.

Notes

I thank Gerard Bradley, Matthew Franck, Morton Frisch, and Chistopher Wolfe for thoughtful criticisms.

1. The Memorial, addressed to the Virginia Assembly, opposed Patrick Henry's "Bill Establishing a Provision for Teachers of the Christian Religion." The scholarly consensus finds in the Memorial's religious appeals the argument that true piety requires strict separation of church and state. Levy sees the Memorial as a mix of Baptist preacher John Leland's influence with that of the "deistic Jefferson," implying that Madison's thought stands between the two (1986, 168). Levy also finds in the Memorial Roger Williams's argument that the integrity of religion depends on "private conscience, untarnished by government" (1987, 91–92). Riemer likewise couples Madison and Williams (1989, 15–23; see also Reichley 1985, 88, 91, 93). Murray finds the Memorial grounded in the "essentially theological" argument that "religion is of its nature a . . . matter of the individual conscience" (1949, 29). Brann views the Memorial's argument for the superiority of divine to political obligation to be the "crux . . . of the work" (1984, 19).

Similarly, the Court, in *Abington Township School District* v. *Schempp* (1963), finds in Madison, Williams, and Jefferson the true understanding of church-state separation. The Memorial's immense influence is shown by its being appended (by the dissenting Rutledge) to the landmark *Everson* v. *Board of Education of Ewing Council* (1947) case. No other state paper has ever been so authoritatively singled out by the Court, and with good reason: in the U.S. political tradition, Madison is one of the two most authoritative authors on the subject of religion and politics. His Memorial is our substantively most important and politically and historically most influential text on that subject.

2. This essay cannot pretend to settle the broader issue of "the Founders on religion." Nonetheless, the coming to grips with the deepest intentions of the man known as "Father" of both the Constitution and the Bill of Rights is a first but essential step toward answering the larger question.

3. This is especially apparent when comparing the Memorial (1962–, vol. 8, 298–304) with Jefferson's bill (1950–, vol. 2, p. 305; see Sandler 1960). For scholarly consensus, see n. 1.

4. This argument, grounding radical separation on the superiority of religion to politics, is recognizable in Roger Williams's writings. When Williams called for a "wall of separation" in 1643, he was articulating the fundamentalist Christian view that because Christ's kingdom is "not of this world," to mix politics and religion corrupts both (1963, 362).

5. Madison divides the Memorial into 15 articles. This argument of the eighth article is the Memorial's intellectual and literal core. It argues, again agreeing with Roger Williams, that the kingdoms of Christ and of the civil magistrate must be separated so long as humanity is separated from God. That the "Truth may be made flesh" in the future requires the separation of church and state at the present. According to this strand of dissenting Protestant thought, piety and liberty, far from being in tension with each other, are, instead, mutually dependent.

6. While its pious appeals are my focus, on viewing the Memorial in its entirety, one is struck by the heterogeneity of its arguments. They include appeals to the fear of tyranny (article 15 warns that the assessments bill may lead the legislature also to control the press, abolish trial by jury, and despoil suffrage rights), reverence for the Virginia Declaration of Rights, the nobility of the Revolutionary War, the fear of property loss, the fear of future religious persecution, anti-Catholic prejudice and the specter of the Old World's Inquisition atmosphere, the pride of Christians (suggesting that an establishment will raise suspicions as to their confidence in Christianity), the desire to increase the state's population and prestige, the sanctity of law, and the people's pride (arguing that they merit full consultation prior to the passage of any law). Indeed, it would be as hard to name an interest or concern to which Madison does *not* appeal as it would be to find a better example of the role and activity of public persuasion in democratic statesmanship.

7. At the same time, the restrained nature of its pious appeals (in deistic style, it never mentions God but instead uses *Creator* and *Lawgiver*) may explain the initially surprising fact that another petition on the same subject received more than three times as many signatures as the now-famous Memorial. This

more popular petition argued that the assessments bill both was contrary to the "Spirit of the Gospel" and would not check "that Deism with its baleful influence [which] is spreading itself over the state" (cited in Rutland 1985, 203–4). On Madison's attempt to hide his authorship of the Memorial, see Rutland's editorial note in Madison 1962–, vol. 8, pp. 295–98 and Brann 1984, 12–13.

8. Malone argues that "the friendship between Jefferson and Madison was one of the greatest in history" (1985, 303).

9. McConnell (1990, 1452) neglects or dismisses this letter in arguing that "none of Madison's writings displayed the disdain Jefferson expressed for the more intense manifestations of religious spirit."

10. See Epstein's analysis of this digression (1984, 114–18).

11. This interpretation reveals both the breadth and depth of a statement on religion that appears only in the notes Madison gathered in 1791 on the subject of extrastructural influences on government: "the cave of Jupiter in Crete where Minos, Epimenides and Pythagoras pretended to have received a divine sanction to their laws" (1961–, vol. 14, p. 163; see Morgan 1988, 149). See also Madison's *National Gazette* essay of 20 December 1792: "Mysteries belong to religion, not to government" (cited in Padover 1953, 43–44).

12. The only uses of the term *Almighty* in the entire *Federalist Papers* are in *Federalist* 37. God is also mentioned twice: *Federalist* 18 reports an ancient battle fought to "avenge the violated god" (Madison, Hamilton, and Jay 1961, 124). *Federalist* 43 mentions God in responding to the question "on what principle the Confederation . . . can be superceded without . . . unanimous consent": "[By] recurring to the absolute necessity of the case; to *the great principle of self-preservation*; to the transcendent law of nature and of nature's God" (p. 279; emphasis mine). Both essays were written by Madison. (See also *Federalist* 19, p. 133.) The only use of the word *providence* occurs in *Federalist* 2, the most pious essay in *The Federalist Papers*, written by Jay. See Epstein's discussion of *Federalist* 2 (1984, 19–21), but note Hamilton's dismissal of it at the beginning of *Federalist* 6 (Madison, Hamilton, and Jay 1961, 53).

13. Ketcham (1985, 184) wholly denies my interpretation. He finds Madison hostile only to " 'enthusiasts' and New England theocracy," which "hardly amounts to hostility toward religion." Like McConnell, he neglects or dismisses the October letter to Jefferson. While Ketcham grants that Madison "relished Voltaire's devastating jibes at religion," he regards as a proof of Madison's piety his "cordial support" from "various religious groups."

Ketcham also regards Madison's letters to William Bradford as proof of his piety (1985, 181). In one letter, Madison recommends "becoming fervent advocates in the cause of Christ." In another, he writes of "the need to have our names enrolled in the annals of Heaven" but one sentence later writes that he does not "expect a long or healthy life" (1900–1910, vol. 1, p. 10). Ketcham grants the relation of these undoubtedly pious letters to Madison's illness at the time. Alley notes that in addition to his fear of an early death, Madison was severely depressed at this time over the death of a close friend (1985, 23). Moreover, Madison wrote these pious letters between the ages of 21 and 24. No doubt a deathbed conversion can survive the false prospect of imminent demise and guide the convert thereafter. But as the young Madison's sickness and fear of a premature death faded, so did his pious letters. Such sentiments appear nowhere in the record of the remaining *six decades* of his life. For these reasons, coupled with the statements we do possess from his adult life, the Bradford letters are proofs only of Madison's piety at this early stage in his life.

14. In the Adams letter, Madison identifies Christianity as "the best and purest" religion. While this may further confirm the dependence of his arguments on the makeup of his audience, at the same time, Protestantism appears to harmonize best with his political project. Thus, while he did not exempt it from his criticism of even "coolest" religion, no doubt he had Protestantism in mind in his praise of the Christian religion.

He makes a parallel argument in his 1822 letter to Edward Livingston, where he stamps as an "old error" the view that without an alliance, neither government nor religion can be "duly supported" (1900–1910, vol. 9, pp. 100–03). Here he argues, as in the Memorial, that separation has produced greater "purity of religion." If this praise of pure religion is more than rhetoric, what might it mean? His 1821 letter to the clergyman F. L. Schaeffer points to an answer: "A mutual independence [of church and state is] most friendly to *practical religion*, to social harmony, and to political prosperity" (1900–1910, vol. 3, p. 242; emphasis mine). This is repeated in the Everett letter. Mere toleration "is no security for public quiet and harmony" (cited in Alley 1985, 84). In this light, pure religion is practical religion, which fosters "public quiet" and "political prosperity"; in other words, pure religion is guided by nature's, not revelation's, God. So guided, this constitutes what Madison called in 1799 religion's "genuine lustre" (1900–1910, vol. 6, p. 336), whose truth cannot "be tested by numbers" and which refers to a "religion" that denies to revelation any status other than that of an oral tradition (cited in Fleet 1946, 558).

15. From this it might be inferred that for Madison, guidance from such sources tends to take the natural desire for immortality in the direction of episodes like the Crusades. The etymology of *crusade* may provide the basis of his critique: linked to the Latin *crux* (cross), a crusade is animated by the purpose of putting aside the things of this world in pursuit of a higher end, for example, the recovery of the sepulcher of Christ. Madison can be inferred to

view the consequences of the Crusades (wholesale slaughter, persecution, the sacking of Constantinople) to have been implicit in its animating ends, as expressed in Pope Urban II's 1095 Clermont address: "I urge you men . . . to exterminate this race [the Turks]. *Christ commands it*. . . . Let those who have worked for *wages* now work for an *eternal reward*" (cited in Boak 1959, 228–29, emphasis mine).

16. Before presenting this remedy, Madison turns first to reject reliance on moral and religious motives to control the effects of faction: "If the impulse and the opportunity . . . coincide, . . . neither moral nor religious motives can be relied on" (Madison, Hamilton, and Jay 1961, 81). Note the dilution of this statement in comparison with the October 1787 letter, where religion was found to be much worse than merely an inadequate control. Note the similarly mild treatment in the first public formulation of this argument in his essay "Vices of the Political System of the United States" of April 1787: "Religion in its coolest state *is not infallible*, it *may* become a motive to oppression *as well* as a restraint from it" (1962–, vol. 9, pp. 350–51; emphasis mine). Unless one assumes a radical transformation in Madison's thought in the few weeks between the letter and the publication of *Federalist* 10, the latter's diluted language, like much of the rhetoric of the Memorial, must be interpreted as politically necessary in the more pious atmosphere of 1787.

17. At the same time, Protestantism generally is more friendly to property than is Catholicism (see Tocqueville 1969, vol. 2, p. 530). That its relative harmony with the multiplicity-of-interests scheme did not serve to exempt it from Madison's condemnation of religion suggests that while he was aided by this Protestant view, he did not regard this harmony to be decisive.

18. The Memorial states, "It is the duty of every man to render to the Creator such homage and only such as he believes to be acceptable to him" (art. 1) making it decidedly more latitudinarian on free exercise than is Jefferson's bill (Jefferson 1950–, vol. 2, 305; Malbin 1978, 22–29).

19. Madison's true intentions clarify a key point of contention in the current debate over the relation of the free exercise to the establishment clause. For Madison, there is not the contradiction that nonpreferentialists find between the post-*Everson* interpretation of the establishment clause and the Court's dismantling of the "secular regulation" rule prior to *Smith*. This is not to deny the charge that while *Everson* requires government neutrality between religion and irreligion in matters of establishment, cases such as *Sherbert* v. *Verner* (1963) and *Wisconsin* v. *Yoder* (1972) grant exemptions from valid laws precisely on account of religious beliefs (see Wolfe 1987, 85–89). But while these decisions disjoin the clauses on the issue of neutrality, the clauses marry in furthering the radical privatization of religion. Thus, the Court is correct that this view of the two clauses conforms with Madison's project.

20. See *Braunfeld* v. *Brown*'s enunciation of a new and more rigorous standard for evaluating legislation challenged on free exercise grounds.

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SYMPOSIUM

WHERE IS THE SCHEMA? GOING BEYOND THE "S" WORD IN POLITICAL PSYCHOLOGY

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Schema theory has established wide currency today among scholars who study political attitudes, beliefs, values, recollections, or other perceptions and orientations that citizens may exhibit. How much does schema conceptualization actually contribute to understanding political behavior and attitudes? How much potential does schema theory have for future contributions? We address these questions, arguing for a more satisfying political psychology than is offered by research emanating from schema conceptualizations.

Political socialization, as a field, is moribund (Cook 1985); public opinion and voting behavior are holding their own; but much of the bustle and excitement in the study of mass politics is now in political psychology, especially political cognition. This booming field has drawn on the slightly older literature of social cognition, which in turn represents an effort to capitalize on revolutionary developments in cognitive psychology.

To date, the most trumpeted concept in political cognition has been that of a *schema* (roughly, an individual's cognitions about some person, role, group, event, or other object); and the great bulk of the current wave of political research professes to apply *schema theory* (Allen, Dawson, and Brown 1989; Beer et al. 1986; Conover and Feldman 1984, 1986b; Entman 1989; Erber and Lau 1990; Graber 1984; Hamill and Lodge 1986; Hamill, Lodge, and Blake 1985; Lau 1986; Lau and Sears 1986a, 1986b; Lodge and Hamill 1986; Miller 1986; Miller, Wattenberg, and Malanchuk 1986; Rapoport, Metcalf, and Hartman 1989; Sears and Citrin 1985; Sears, Huddie, and Schaffer 1986). Schema theory is decidedly "in."

For our part, we find reason to be less enthusiastic. We shall argue that while many of the studies just cited have yielded interesting results, the authors' insights often owe little to schema theory. The applications are in many cases too loose, the theory itself too familiar and too limited. We believe that the study of mass politics can and should make better use of cognitive and social psychology, and shall sketch some of the ways in which it might do so.

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Schema Theory and Cognitive Psychology

Our critique depends for its shape, though not for its validity, on the definition of "schema theory." Some cognitive psychologists modeling the mind and its activities refer to cognitive structures in memory as "schemas" (though often as only one of several more or less synonymous terms). A few even describe what they are doing as schema theory. But the lion's share of self-identified schema theory—the schema theory that surfaces in social and political psychology, which we have in mind here—is concerned with the effects of largish memory structures on the processing of new information. This sets it apart from the rest—the preponderance—of cognitive psychology, which both has wider concerns and is more microcognitive in orientation.[1]

In this usage, then, schemas are cognitive structures.[2] To take the broadest view, a schema is the set of cognitions relevant to some concept.[3] The cognitions may be few or many, highly structured or ramshackle, affectively neutral or loaded with feeling. The schemas on which the theory focuses, however, are at least moderately well developed, in the sense of involving cognitions of at least some minimum number and organization. They are also increasingly assumed to be carrying some affective charge. In the realm of politics, for instance, many people have reasonably well developed *George Bush, Republican, election,* and *rich person* schemas.

It is through schemas, according to schema theory, that we make sense of the world. Schemas are the mental "theories" by whose light we perceive, construe, and remember the kaleidoscopic flow of experience. We are likeliest to notice the stimuli that are relevant to (though not necessarily consistent with) our schemas and to give deeper attention to those that are flagrantly enough at variance with them.[4] Once perceived, a schema-relevant stimulus activates the schema, which then channels the way the information in the stimulus is processed. We tend to see, understand, and remember things the way we expect them to be, that is, in conformity with our schemas. Similarly, we tend to draw schema-consistent inferences, filling in the lacunae in the information we actually have with the properties we expect. The upshot is much obliviousness, misconstruction, and misrecollection, as well as much perspicuity, insight, and accurate recall.

Schema Theory in Political Psychology

All this sounds right, if vaguely familiar, and is largely applicable to the study of mass politics. Yet, somehow, the recent spate of political applications has fallen short of the promise. Let us see why.

Vagrant Measures

Many of these studies feature measurements of schemas, although just what about schemas is supposedly being measured is generally left vague. Since the usual references to measuring schemas may suggest that the target is the actual contents of a schema (the constituent cognitions, affective loadings, and connections among them), we hasten to observe that that is not what any of these studies actually measures. We have been given no maps of political schemas. The remaining possibilities, at which various of these measures do seem to be shooting, are (1) the central tendency, on some specified dimension, of a schema's cognitive contents; (2) the central tendency, presumably on some positive–negative dimension, of its affective contents; and (3) its level of *development,* in the sense described earlier, that is, the multiplicity and organization of its contents (see Fiske and Taylor 1984, 173–75).[5]

A plurality of the measures seem to be aiming at target 3. Thus, Hamill, Lodge, and Blake (1985) gauge partisan, class, and ideological schemas by counting the number of times the respondent places prominent schema-relevant stimuli (Democratic and Republican, rich and poor, and liberal and conservative, respectively) on the correct side of various seven-point issue scales and subtracting the number of times they are placed incorrectly. Lodge and Hamill (1986) measure partisan schemas chiefly by asking the respondent to identify Barry Goldwater, Tip O'Neill, Harry Truman, Howard Baker, Jack Kemp, and Claiborne Pell as Democratic or Republican, and counting the number of correct responses.[6] Conover and Feldman (1986b) count the number of issues on which the respondent can place the parties, whether correctly or no. For our purposes under the same rubric, Lau (1986) measures group, party, issue, and candidate schemas by the proportions of an individual's responses to the open-ended National Election Study (NES) party and candidate questions that fall into the appropriate category.[7]

The remaining measures seem to be striving for target 1 or 2, although it is not always clear which. Fairly clearly in the first category are Allen, Dawson, and Brown's (1989) factors gauging blacks' endorsement of positive and negative black stereotypes, the Q-factors that Conover and Feldman (1984) extract from the respondent's agreement or disagreement with a variety of policy statements, and the competence, integrity, reliability, charisma, and personal factors in Miller, Wattenberg, and Malanchuk's (1986) analysis of the open-ended NES candidate questions. Somewhat less clearly in the second category are Allen, Dawson, and Brown's factors gauging blacks' identification with black elites and black masses and Entman's (1989) measurement of "ideological schemas" by liberal–conservative self-placement. These may be better measures of feelings about being black and about liberals versus conservatives, respectively, than of pure cognition of these concepts. Allen, Dawson, and Brown's "black autonomy" factor—intended to gauge "black awareness of their own rational group interest and opposition to the interests of other groups" and indicated by the respondent's agreement or disagreement with statements that blacks should study an African language in school, vote for black candidates, give their children African names, and shop in black-owned stores—is similarly in between, though a bit more cognitively oriented. These measures can be faulted in various details, but the main points are two.

First, all are equally interpretable as measures of other concepts. The reader must surely have been struck, in the preceding paragraphs, by the indistinguishability of these measures from traditional measures of attitudes and attitude structure. The measures of target 1 can be seen as measures of the cognitive component of attitudes, those of target 2 as measures of the affective component of attitudes, and those of target 3 as measures of attitude structure. But the problem here is as much conceptual as epistemic, and we shall return to it.

Second, the unclarity about what is being measured has resulted in some distinctly unschema-like things being called schemas. In one of the earliest and most widely cited studies, Conover and Feldman (1984) equate their Q-factors—*Hobbesian-Freudian*, *liberal sex roles-nonreligious*, and the like—with schemas. No mere factor, however, can be (or represent) a schema.[8] The most basic objection is that factors are statistical abstractions, not necessarily thoughts anyone in the sample has actually had (Luskin 1987). But even if they resided in the psyche, they could never do justice to schemas. They are "adjectives," not "nouns," capable at most of catching some *aspects* of schemas, on the lines of target 1 or 2. Factors like *black autonomy* and *closeness to the black masses* (the "schemas" in Allen, Dawson, and Brown 1989) may be useful in *describing* self, black, or racial policy schemas but are not schemas themselves. The same confusion also manifests itself in Entman 1989, where the "schema" is *ideology* in the sense of self-identification as liberal or conservative—not a factor, but, again, an adjectival formulation. This may be *one corner* of one's self-liberal or self-conservative schema, a degenerate case of target 1; it may also, as previously suggested, be a measure of target 2; but it is not a schema.[9]

Individual problems aside, the larger question is whether political psychologists should endeavor to measure political schemas at all (see Hastie 1986). We anticipate a small payoff, especially if the goal is to accumulate knowledge. Different researchers, armed with different ideas and different sets of questionnaire items, will inevitably discover different schemas. Indeed, this may explain the absence of attempts at measurement among social psychologists, who take everyday schemas as given and manipulate the information to which subjects are exposed. In any event, the schemas that have made their way into political science journals fall short of the parent conceptions found in cognitive and social psychology.

Cosmetic Applications

One reason, perhaps, for the slack relations between measures and concepts is that so many of the analyses are only loosely tied to schema theory. For instance, Miller, Wattenberg, and Malanchuk (1986) inform us that people who use a given dimension of candidate appraisal (competence, integrity, reliability, charisma, or personal) in one election are apt to do so again in the next. The well-educated, they also find, are more likely than the less-educated to make candidate-centered comments.

Conover and Feldman (1986b) model voters' attributions of issue positions to candidates as a function of the voter's own prior position, prior perception of the candidate's party's position, and prior perception of the candidate's ideological complexion. Among other things, they find that voters project their own positions onto candidates they like more than they impute positions they disagree with to those they dislike and that inferences from partisanship are stronger for economic than defense issues.

Allen, Dawson, and Brown (1989) show that the extent to which black respondents endorse positive and negative black stereotypes, identify with ordinary blacks and black elites, and agree with propositions implying an opposition of black and white interests depends on their socioeconomic status, religiosity, and reliance on black media.

Entman (1989) provides evidence that people's political opinions are affected both by the editorial liberalism of the newspapers they read and by the two-sidedness of the news coverage, that editorials affect liberals and conservatives more than moderates, that they have stronger effects on opinions on new issues and on issues peripheral to the reader, and that people are less vigilant against counterattitudinal information in news stories than in editorials.

These summaries do not sound very schema-theoretic; nor do the analyses themselves. Miller, Wattenberg, and Malanchuk describe the use of their dimensions of candidate appraisal as *schematic processing;* Conover and Feldman describe the coefficients for the respondent's own position, perception of the party's position, and perception of the candidate's ideological stance as indicating the extent to which the voter makes inferences from self, party, and candidate schemas; Allen, Dawson, and Brown describe their attitudinal dependent variables as schemas; Entman describes ideological self-placement as a schema. But what difference does this coating of schema terminology make to any of these analyses? The results are generally interesting; but the analyses might as easily have been done, and could as easily have been reported, had schema theory never existed. This is standard public opinion and voting research in schema-theoretic clothing.

Familiar Theory

Is the remedy, then, simply to use schema theory more integrally? We think not. In some few of these applications—most notably in the work of Lodge and his colleagues (Hamill, Lodge, and Blake 1985; Lodge and Hamill 1986)—the schema theory is in fact much closer to the marrow. Yet there, too, it sheds little new light, despite the authors' creative efforts.

The key word here is *new*. Schema theorists are quick to assert that schemas subsume *scripts*, *frames*, and *prototypes* (fellow terms from the cognitive revolution; see, e.g., Wyer 1980) but are considerably more loath to acknowledge the essential equivalence between schemas and such prerevolutionary concepts as *cognitive maps* (Tolman 1948), *personal constructs* (Kelly 1955), and *conceptual systems* (Harvey, Hunt, and Schroder 1961). In social psychology (largely cognitive even under the ancien—behaviorist—regime; see Mandler 1985) such bundles of prior cognition (and affect) have long been known as *attitudes.*[10] Psychologists dealing with attitudes have probably given somewhat more attention to affect than to cognition, whereas those dealing with schemas are only beginning to take affect into account; but this difference in emphasis and the usual within-concept variation in definitions aside, it seems fair to conclude with Wildavsky (1987) that schemas are just attitudes in new bottles.

More important, schema theory not just the schema concept, evokes déjà vu. Selective perception and retention, biases in interpretation and memory, the facilitative effect of prior knowledge on learning—these are all venerable propositions. It is true that schema theory has highlighted these cognitive phenomena, given them a firmer empirical base, and in these respects made a contribution to psychology (Markus and Zajonc 1985). But *political* psychology, a higher-order discipline, needs to take most of the detail in psychology proper as background. For us, too, schema theory's highlighting of cognitive phenomena may be worth something; but for our purposes, the propositions being reinforced should be premises, not conclusions, and imply nothing new for being better supported. Do we now know more firmly that people are likely to read new information by the light of what they already know or believe, perceiving or misperceiving, remembering or misremembering, accordingly? Probably not.

One prominent example in political psychology lies in the effects of schema development on the absorption of schema-relevant information (as in Lodge and Hamill 1986). Schema development is the same thing as *attitude crystallization* or *structure* (the continuum that has *non-attitudes* at its nether end); the mean development (and multiplicity and interrelatedness) of all the schemas in a given domain is the same thing as *expertise*, *cognitive complexity*, or *sophistication* (the continuum that has *ideology* at its upper end);[11] and these equivalences take some of the shine off schema development effects. That the information-rich get information-richer is an old story.[12]

Limited Theory

To say that schema theory is less than new is not to say that it is wrong. If traditional attitude theory has merit, so must schema theory. But the latter also affords a seriously limited view of the life of the mind.

One limitation lies in the depiction of cognition and cognitive processes, which, as a number of cognitive psychologists contend, is at best incomplete. Alba and Hasher (1983) summarize evidence that schemas control encoding and storage much less than schema theory envisions (see also Johnson and Hasher 1987). Holland and his colleagues (1986) point out that schema theory ignores the coordination and integration of schemas, necessary to solving novel problems. More generally, schema theory's focus on the effects of whole schemas makes it relatively gross and static. It has relatively little to say about the internal structure of schemas, how schemas arise, or how they are modified. Thus Anderson complains of the difficulty of "getting any action" from it (1983, 37). Rumelhart, once (1980, 1984) closely associated with schemas, has now essentially abandoned them, relegating them to asides and redefining them in a way that makes them both unrecognizable and epiphenomenal: "Representations like . . . schemata are useful structures for encoding knowledge [but] only approximate the underlying structure of knowledge representation that emerges from the class of [parallel distributed processing] models" (Rumelhart and McClelland 1986, 1:9). It is perhaps illustrative of the lags involved in thirdhand borrowing that political scientists are embracing schema theory just as many psychologists are backing away.[13]

A further limitation lies in the neglect of emotion. In many ways, as Zajonc (1980) reminds us, affect dominates cognition. We frequently like or dislike someone or something at first sight, more readily note a new fact about someone or something we like or dislike than alter the like or dislike, and often know that we like or dislike someone or something without quite remembering why. Most cognitive processing serves to justify opinions already held and decisions already reached. This picture may be somewhat overdrawn, and its accuracy undoubtedly varies from person to person, stimulus to stimulus, and judgment to judgment; but there can be no dispute that affect is important. It is especially important in judgments of political and other social stimuli, which are inherently spicier—more affect-arousing—than triangles, chairs, or other inanimate objects.[14] Some recent schema theory gives cognitions affective tags (Bower and Cohen 1982; Fiske and Pavelchak 1985); but this ancillary participation may still not give affect its due.

A final limitation lies in the neglect of social context. Ulric Neisser (1980), one of the pioneers of cognitive psychology, objects that the social in social cognition research is largely missing. The perceiver in this literature is a "passive onlooker, who . . . doesn't *do* anything—doesn't mix it up with the folks he's watching, never tests his judgments in action or interaction. He just watches and judges" (pp. 603–4). This may be an acceptable simplification for a first cut; but ultimately, it will not do. We are still social beings, and theories of social cognition must eventually take account of the fact (see also Krauss 1981).

If Not Schema Theory, Then What? Some Suggestions for Political Psychology

The confluence of two factors—initial excitement among social psychologists over the potential of schema theory and Kinder's (1983) recommendation that political scientists use it to understand how people think about politics—explains the intense research activity of the last five years. Unfortunately, schema theory has not carried our understanding of mass politics very far—in part, because it has been only loosely applied but more fundamentally, because it cannot. Cognitive structures are certainly important; and we have no objection to denoting them with the "S-word" or using schema theory to describe their effects, so long as we do not expect to go much further than we have already come. There is more to cognitive and cognitively oriented social psychology than schema theory, and we should like to offer some thoughts about how we might get more mileage from them.

A Five-Point Research Strategy

Use The Whole Gamut of Cognitive Theories. The microcognitive models of memory and mentation that occupy a large portion of cognitive psychology (Anderson 1983; Laird, Newell, and Rosenbloom 1987; Rumelhart and McClelland 1986, vol. 2) may well be too micro (about as useful for political psychology, perhaps, as knowing the chemical composition of the ink is for reading a newspaper); but they do at least provide a newer and more satisfying view of the mind and may yet turn out to have political applications.[15] More clearly applicable are various patches of more macrocognitive theory. Space permits only a cursory and partial listing, but the concepts meriting greater attention include *heuristics* by which people estimate the likelihood of events (see Kahneman, Slovic, and Tversky 1982), including, for example, the events that particular politicians have particular characteristics or issue positions or that one's vote will affect the outcome of an election; *valuation of outcomes* in decision making (as in *prospect theory;* see Kahneman and Tversky 1979); the contents and uses of *social categories,* which mentally represent social groups (Dovidio, Evans, and Tyler 1986; Lingle, Altom, and Medin 1984; Turner 1987); *visual images,* with which our perceptions of individual leaders, groups, and events are infused (Brewer 1988; Kosslyn 1980; Lynn, Shavitt, and Ostrom 1985; Mehrabian 1981); and the nature, elicitation, and consequences of *affective responses* (Frijda 1988; Gray 1981; Ortony, Clore, and Collins 1988; Tellegren 1985).[16]

Emphasize Information Processing. Although the two notions—schemas and information processing—go hand in hand in the social cognition literature, it is undeniably the latter that motivates psychologists and should motivate political scientists. We have much to learn about how ordinary citizens encode political information, store it in memory, and later use it to interpret new events. Happy to say, a number of those most responsible for ushering schema theory into political psychology are already moving in this direction (Conover and Feldman 1989; Lodge, McGraw, and Stroh 1989).

Focus on Process. That political scientists working in the schema tradition wish (and purport) to examine underlying thought processes is evident from the language they use: "We . . . begin by comparing theoretically the contributions of affect and cognition to the evaluation *process*" (Conover and Feldman 1986a, 51; emphasis ours) and "In general, the data imply schematic rather than piecemeal *processing* of information about presidential candidates" (Miller et al., 1986, 528; emphasis ours). We applaud the efforts of these authors to think in process terms. Moreover, research on political schemas represents a significant and desired departure from the causal modeling tradition of the past. Still missing (although evolving) is a strong commitment to a commensurate methodology.

Use Experiments. Only a handful of the panoply of measurement devices in cognitive psychology have found their way into political applications—at least partly because so many of these studies have been attempting to graft laboratory-bred theory onto survey designs. Conventional surveys simply cannot reveal the finer grain of stored cognition, much less cognitive processes; to glimpse these and be more certain about within-sample causality, we must enter the laboratory (or at least bring elements of the laboratory into our surveys, as we shall describe).[17] To take just a few examples, the experimenter can manipulate the physical appearance and presentational style, as well as the messages, of the "candidates" between whom subjects must choose; time the speed with which subjects react to words and phrases; and record "protocols" (Ericsson and Simon 1984) of what the respondent says he or she is thinking when answering a question or working through a problem. We do not mean to suggest that all research on mass politics should be done by experiment; but for these cognitive variables, at least (and probably for more other problems than we have been wont to recognize), the loss in generalizability is more than offset by the gain in measurement.

To our notion, the most exciting possibility is the new "experimental survey" (Piazza, Sniderman, and Tetlock 1989; Kuklinski and Schwarz n.d.), which provides a middle way. Using computer-assisted telephone interviewing technology, one can vary questions, question wording, question sequence, instructions, and so forth (in ways that constitute experimental manipulations and generate measurements like reaction times) while still working with large probability samples.

Begin with the Problem. The formula for a truly satisfying political psychology is more than just a matter of picking the right theory and applying it shrewdly. It is comparatively easy, as research goes, to take the psychological (or sociological or economic) theory of the moment and administer it to political phenomena; and we may, indeed, learn something from the result. But if that is as high as we aim, we shall be condemning ourselves to practicing a lagged, attenuated version of some other discipline and thus to missing or grazing many of the questions we care about most. The most rewarding studies start not with a psychological theory that seems to have political applications but with the *political* phenomenon to be explained.

An Illustration

To flesh out these suggestions, let us sample some of the uses to which they might be put in the study of racial attitudes. This is an important domain—race permeates U.S. politics—and we make no pretense of doing it justice. What follows are merely a few rough sketches, for illustrative purposes.

Stereotypes of Blacks in White Thinking. What do whites call to mind when they think about blacks? It is now commonly considered that people define social categories such as *blacks* in terms of prototypes and their characteristic features, or *stereotypes.*[18] One straightforward way of determining the content of black stereotypes would be to supply a list of adjectives *(dangerous, lazy, disadvantaged, hard-working, oppressed,* etc.) and ask how much each comes to mind when the respondent thinks about black people (and, for purposes of comparison, other groups). A less reactive way, given an experimental design, would be to prime subjects to think about blacks (by asking them, e.g., to discuss the causes of the Civil War or to name their favorite professional basketball players). Using computer monitors, they then, in an ostensibly different task, would identify adjectives like the foregoing as quickly as they could. The shorter the response time, presumably, the more central the characteristic.[19]

Images of Blacks in White Thinking. Another slant on the same question concerns visual images. Kosslyn (1980) has shown that people regularly consult visual images in memory when making judgments; and although it is difficult to gauge mental images directly, we can at least observe the phenomenal images from which they are abstracted. On television, both news and entertainment shows present images of blacks (black children caught in appalling poverty, the squalor of urban ghettos, black drug pushers and other miscreants, successful black athletes), each conveying its distinct message about the characteristics and circumstances of black people. Experimental manipulation of the news after the fashion of Iyengar and Kinder (1987) should reveal what kinds of images increase support for government policies aimed at combating black poverty (impoverished black children?) and what kinds decrease it (pregnant black women?). Equally important, such manipulations can help researchers to ascertain whether "too much" news about black people (whatever its content) may actually decrease sympathy among whites.

Or consider another experiment designed to measure differences in response to hypothetical candidates or political leaders—some black, some white, some with a middle class mien, some with an underclass mien, some speaking in a conciliatory tone, some speaking in an incendiary tone. With the proper care, a researcher should be able to determine how different combinations of these factors affect people's evaluations of the candidates and what they recall (accurately or inaccurately) about the candidates' messages.

Race in Contemporary Political Thinking. If, as numerous authors contend (Carmines and Stimson 1989; Sears, Hensler, and Speer 1979), race drives contemporary U.S. politics, then terms like *liberal* and *conservative*—the coin of political discussion—should be heavily imbued with racial meaning. Unfortunately, continued reliance on conventional surveys to test this hypothesis has led to a seemingly endless cycle of claim and counterclaim, with resolution nowhere in sight.

Consider, in this light, the value of an experimental survey. One could easily ascribe randomly varied positions on issues from the foreign policy, economic, social, and racial domains to some fictional candidate; ask the respondents to rate the candidate's liberalism; and see how far the ratings depend on each of the issues and, in particular, whether the racial issue dominates the rest.[20] What more compelling evidence in support of the race-ideology hypothesis than to find that people construe candidates who take problack positions as liberal no matter what their positions in other domains?

The Quality of Racial Thinking. The most basic question, with which we began, is, What do whites think of when they think about blacks? The most *critical* issue has to do with the *quality* of people's judgments.

According to the "symbolic racism" thesis (Kinder and Sears 1981; Sears, Hensler, and Speer 1979), opposition to racial policies stems largely from people's gut-level feelings toward blacks. Because bigoted whites may mute direct expressions of antipathy for fear of social disapproval, traditional surveys are not the best vehicle to test this argument. Experiments and experimental surveys permit subtler, less restrictive measurement. One strategy is to provide randomly divided groups of respondents with several statements of fact or possibility that might "make them mad" and to ask them how many (not *which)* items do so (Kuklinski and Hurley 1991). One group was given a list of items without obvious racial referents, like *the amount of money I pay for electricity* or *Congress passing legislation prohibiting abortions;* a second group received the same list plus one explicitly racial item, *a black family moving into my neighborhood;* and a third group received the original list plus one policy-related item, *government establishing quotas to enhance blacks' positions in the workplace.* Subtracting the mean number of angered responses of each of the two latter groups from the mean of the first group provides a measure of the extent to which people respond viscerally to the racial items.

It is possible, of course, that many whites oppose government programs designed to benefit blacks not because they are ill disposed toward blacks, but because they hold the individualistic belief that everybody, blacks included, ought to succeed (or fail) by personal effort. Since even this could still be mere rationalization of racial animus, what we need to know is how people *justify* (Herzog 1985) such values in light of the history of racial discrimination in this country. Applying the techniques of Ericsson and Simon (1980, 1984) to the protocols produced by subjects required to consider this juxtaposition aloud may indicate how far opposition to ameliorative programs stems from individualism and how far individualism masks prejudice. Moreover, the taped protocols would allow a researcher to judge the *tone* of subjects' statements—which itself may be a revealing measure of what people really think.[21]

Toward a More Political Political Psychology

Thus, our closing plea is for a more eclectic, creative, and distinctively political political psychology. Let us let our knowledge of psychology inform our work in a general way. Let us take inspiration from particular theories and results—not forgetting older ones, now fallen from fashion. (People still experience strains toward cognitive-affective-behavioral consistency and still respond, with whatever cognitive mediation, to reinforcement contingencies.) But let us focus on the substantive problem, taking our insights wherever we find them and weaving them all into the fullest and most satisfying explanation we can.

Converse's (1964) landmark study of political belief systems is a shining example. We scarcely notice the paucity of references to the psychological literature of the time because Converse's own account of the nature of the variable we have been calling *political sophistication,* its individual-level correlates, the radically skewed distribution it assumes in mass publics, the differences in distribution between parties of the Right and parties of the Left, and the consequences for democratic systems was so much more lucid, rich, and penetrating than anything on which he could have drawn.

A more recent example, of more formal stripe, is Brady and Sniderman's (1985) simultaneous equation model of affect and perception (see also Sniderman, Brody, and Tetlock 1991). Beginning with the axioms that people maximize (1) the accuracy with which they place political groups on issue dimensions, (2) the extent to which these placements enable them to agree with groups they like and disagree with those they dislike, and (3) the accuracy with which their expressed likes and dislikes represent their true feelings, Brady and Sniderman derive an elegant nonlinear model, grounded in psychological theory but going well beyond it.

The works that we have cited throughout this essay have laid the foundation for a new and exciting *political* psychology, one that will greatly expand our horizons. Going beyond the "S-word" will be an important part of the task lying before us.

Notes

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1. To appreciate the difference, see, e.g., Johnson-Laird 1983; Laird, Newell, and Rosenbloom 1987; or Rumelhart and McClelland 1986, vol. 2. Of course, it is always possible to define schema theory to include works like these; but being defined into schema theory would come as a surprise to most cognitive psychologists. Johnson-Laird (1988), in his masterly review of computer models of cognition, devotes only two of nearly four hundred pages to anything called "schemas"; Anderson mentions schema theory only to criticize it (1983, 36–40) and to argue that his ACT model accounts for the same phenomena and more (pp. 208–14); the new collection called *Thinking* (Osheron and Smith 1990), with chapters such as "Remembering," "Categorization," and "Judgment," tallies only a few fleeting references, confined to 1 of the 10 chapters. More important, we then should have to fault the simpler, more narrowly focused, and more macrocognitive "schema theory" in social and political psychology for being a debasement of schema theory so redefined. The redefinition would change only the form, not the essence, of our critique.

2. A few authors, including Bartlett (1932) and Neisser (1976), use the term to denote processes; see Markus and Zajonc 1985. Rumelhart's new definition is of another sort entirely: "On our current view . . . there is no representational object which is a schema. Rather schemata emerge at the moment they are needed from the interaction of large numbers of much simpler elements all working in concert with one another" (Rumelhart and McClelland 1986, 2:20).

3. This is Fiske and Linville's "completely noncontroversial, minimalist view of schemas [as] the richly-connected network of information relevant to a given concept" (1980, 552)—if we just strike *richly-connected.* See also Taylor and Crocker 1981, 91.

4. At least, this is our sense of what is presently a muddle of findings about the effects of schema relevance and schema consistency on perception. See Rumelhart 1984 and Markus and Zajonc 1985 for recent summaries.

5. Schema development in this sense is the same as the person's *expertise* in the schema's domain and nearly the same as the schema's *availability* (Higgins and King 1981; Srull and Wyer 1980). It is also closely related to the schema's chronic *accessibility* (which might, for some purposes, be worth distinguishing as a separate target).

6. The measure also involves questions about the respondent's interest in parties and elections, an odd intrusion. Interest is not cognition.

7. Erber and Lau (1990) now describe these as measures of accessibility (see n. 5). More precisely, however, they are measures of *relative* accessibility, a less interesting variable. A respondent who has only one comment to offer on each presidential candidate but for whom that one comment is party-related will achieve a maximum on Lau's party schema measure. Should we expect such a respondent to be doing a lot of party-schematic processing? It is much likelier to be true of a respondent who makes a large number of comments divided equally among the group, party, issues, and candidate categories, receiving a much lower score on Lau's measure.

8. Conover and Feldman's (1984) use of Q- instead of R-factors is particularly inapt. The transportation of the data matrix yields person- rather than item-factors (condensations of people, not opinions), which may plausibly be construed as personality types but cannot plausibly be taken as schemas, attitudes, or other mental constructs.

9. A similarly strange business is Lau's (1986) claim that "theoretically one would not expect anyone to hold all four political schemata because of cognitive limitations" (p. 112). Leaving aside the implication that there are only four political schemas to be held, the confusion here is that the limited capacity to which Lau refers does not apply to long-term memory, where schemas reside. Since what *is* true is that his measures stand in near-fixed-sum relationships to one another (*near* because of a small residual category), Lau would seem to be making a virtue of operational necessity.

10. An older tradition viewed attitudes as triune—composed of affect, cognition, and behavior. Nowadays, the tendency is to exclude the behavioral component, more sensibly leaving the attitude-behavior relationship for empirical investigation (see Bagozzi and Burnkrant 1979; McGuire 1969; Zajonc and Markus 1982). Fishbein and Azjen (1975) have urged paring the concept further to pure affect, but this remains a minority view.

11. Studies of expertise include Larkin et al. 1980 and Fiske, Kinder, and Larter 1983; studies of cognitive complexity include Tetlock 1983 and 1984. On the equivalence of these terms and what students of public opinion tend to call sophistication, see Luskin 1987. It is also important to note that sophistication about concepts as widely and heavily cognized as the Democratic and Republican parties should be highly correlated with sophistication about politics as a whole. Thus, both Luskin (1987) and Zaller (1986), independently of both the Stony Brook studies and of each other, have adopted variables extremely similar to Hamill, Lodge, and Blake's *partisan schema usage* (1985) as measures of political sophistication.

12. Other "schema development effects" are eviscerated by the close relationship between the development of party and perhaps certain other schemas and overall sophistication (see n. 11). Lodge and Hamill's (1986) finding that subjects who score higher in party schema development can more accurately identify policy statements as characteristically Democratic or Republican is less evidence of schematic processing than confirmation that both the party schema development score and the identification of policy statements as Republican or Democratic measure political sophistication.

13. Psychology, like political science, is fad-prone. Thus, Neisser quotes one of the items from Wyer's (1980) inventory of propositions in social cognition: "the concepts or schemata that are most likely to be retrieved from long-term memory for use in interpreting new information or making judgments are those that have been most recently activated in the past." He adds drily that while this "may or may not describe social perception . . . it surely describes psychology" (Neisser 1980, 601).

14. Conover and Feldman (1986a) find affect outpointing cognition even in evaluations of government economic performance, normally considered one of the blander portions of the political domain.

15. Erber and Lau (1990), having first cited an earlier version of the present paper, go on to echo one of its themes: "There is a limit to how much cognitive psychology can contribute to political science . . . for much of what the cognitive sciences are interested in occurs at a level well below anything remotely political" (pp. 251-52; see also Hastie 1986).

16. These theories are just beginning to surface in the study of mass politics. See Marcus 1988; Masters and Sullivan 1989; Quattrone and Tversky 1988; Rosenberg et al. 1986; Sullivan and Masters 1988.

17. The trend, in this regard, is in the right direction: see Beer et al. 1987; Kuklinski et al. 1991; Lodge and Hamill 1986; Hamill, Lodge, and Blake 1985; Quattrone and Tversky 1988; Rapoport, Metcalf, and Hartman 1989; Rosenberg et al. 1986; Rosenberg and McCaffery 1987; and Sullivan and Masters 1988.

18. People also seem to store and sometimes use information about particular category members; and one current question in this literature is under what conditions people use individual-level rather than prototypical information. See Messick and Mackie 1989.

19. Variations in which the subjects are asked instead to distinguish the adjectives aloud work similarly (see Dovidio, Evans, and Tyler 1986; Gaertner and McLaughlin 1983). These measures have problems—but surmountable ones. See Messick and Mackie 1989 for a review.

20. For feasibility, the issue positions would have to be defined dichotomously (which, even so, would make for 16 combinations) and the sample would have to be reasonably large (which is why we suggest this for an experimental *survey*).

21. Ascertaining not only *what* people say but *how* they say it could play a big role in future public opinion research.

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WHERE IS THE SCHEMA? CRITIQUES

This symposium features three critiques of the argument about schema theory proffered by Kuklinski, Luskin, and Bolland. First, Milton Lodge and Kathleen M. McGraw, of the State University of New York at Stony Brook, respond from the perspective of cognitive psychology. Then Pamela J. Conover, of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, and Stanley Feldman (also of Stony Brook) consider schema conceptualization mainly in terms of problems of measurement. Finally, Arthur H. Miller, of the University of Iowa, offers an information-processing approach to political schemas.

Kuklinski, Luskin, and Bolland's essay "Where Is the Schema?" makes some good points and some original points. Unfortunately, paraphrasing some curmudgeon, the good points are not original, and the original points are not very good. More than a decade ago, Fiske and Linville (1980) published a thoughtful analysis of the strengths and liabilities of the schema concept, addressing issues of relevance to both political and social psychologists. In that paper Fiske and Linville considered each of the three central criticisms raised by Kuklinski, Luskin, and Bolland: (1) schemas are ill defined and poorly measured, (2) schemas are "old wine in new bottles," and (3) schema research is impoverished because of its neglect of important variables such as affect, motivation, and social context. "While finding elements of truth in each criticism," Fiske and Linville conclude, "the strengths of the schema framework more than outweigh the liabilities associated with these criticisms" (p. 543).

Rather than refuting the authors with point-by-point responses to their critique, we refer readers to the Fiske and Linville piece. Nor do we wish to repeat old definitions of the schema construct or devise a new one to add to the definitional morass. We agree that the schema concept is fuzzy, although no more so than many other metaconstructs commonly employed in the political behavior literature (e.g., ideology, belief system, or attitude). We believe that reference to a schema "theory" is inappropriate. As Hastie notes, "There is no unitary theoretical entity that deserves the label *schema theory* extant in current information-processing psychology" (1986, p. 21).

All well and good were it not for the subsequent pages, where we see that underlying their critique of research employing the schema concept is a more general criticism of the value of cognitive psychological approaches to political phenomena—specifically that branch of political psychological research "concerned with the effects of largish memory structures on the processing of new information" (p. 1342). Here is where we part company with the authors. Our theme is simple and straightforward: some notion of schematic knowledge structure is necessary to understand how people think about and evaluate political issues, candidates, and events.

In our view, political cognition represents not so much a specific domain of inquiry within political science as a metatheoretical approach and set of assumptions guiding research on more basic substantive topics. The substantive problems remain the enduring concerns of many political scientists: How do citizens evaluate and choose among political candidates? How do citizens attribute responsibility for political problems? What impact does sophistication have on the comprehension and utilization of new political information? The cognitive approach to these perennial questions is characterized by the deceptively simple premise that information about the world outside is stored systematically in memory structures and that these memory structures ("pictures in the head"—Lippmann 1922) determine how one interprets reality, makes decisions, and chooses among behavioral alternatives. The cognitive message is clear: if we want to understand why people act as they do, we must understand how they picture the world around them.

Because mental activity cannot be observed directly, a set of postulates describing basic processing mechanisms must be put forth to support a process model of the mind (see Judd and Krosnick 1989; Lodge and Stroh 1990). Human thinking can be modeled in terms of "elementary information processes" operating on a set of "functional components" (Ericsson and Simon 1984; Payne 1982; Sanford 1987). Contemporary models of human information processing typically assume two functional components: (1) a very large permanent memory, called *long-term memory,* and (2) a small, temporary memory store called *working memory.* Long-term memory can be thought of metaphorically as a library of information whose main property is the more or less permanent storage of vast amounts of data, whereas working memory is the "place" where information is consciously attended to and actively processed. One of the indisputable findings on long-term memory is that information is not stored in a random fashion but organized meaningfully in packets of semantic associations (Rumelhart and Norman 1983; Rumelhart and Ortony 1977). We will simply refer to these "bundles of information" as knowledge structures, although (as will soon become clear) the network of associations representing concepts in memory can only be described as *schematic.*

We are advocates of an information-processing perspective that draws on semantic network models in cognitive psychology (Anderson 1983; Collins and Quillian 1969), where knowledge structures in long-term memory are represented as configurations of nodes linked to one another in a network of associations. A variety of politically relevant objects can be represented in a network memory structure, including individual actors (e.g., George Bush, Mario Cuomo), groups (Republicans, Democrats), issues (affirmative action, defense spending), specific events (the assassination attempt on Reagan, the Persian Gulf War), generic scripts (political debates, going out to vote) and symbols (the flag, yellow ribbons). These structures can exist in isolation or be linked and embedded within complexly interwoven networks. Moreover, although the basic structural components of a network model can characterize most types of political memory, we do not assume that all citizens will exhibit the same levels of representational complexity. Rather, we assume that those who are poorly informed about the world of politics will have less-developed political knowledge structures than will "sophisticates," who are more interested in, and knowledgeable about, political affairs.

To illustrate more clearly the mental representation and inferential consequences of an associative network knowledge structure, let us walk through a "paper-and-pencil" simulation of "schematic information processing," based on a

22 January 1991 newspaper article written by staff correspondent Marilyn Milloy and published the day after Martin Luther King, Jr. Day in the Long Island newspaper *Newsday.* This article read as follows:

> King's Vision Cited as Reply to Gulf War
>
> On the sixth federal holiday honoring the Rev. Martin Luther King Jr., the Persian Gulf war provided an emotional banner under which people across the country yesterday urged loyalty to the vision of the slain leader, one of the world's most celebrated advocates of peace and non-violence.
>
> Here in the birthplace of King, hundreds packed the Ebenezer Baptist Church as Andrew Young, former Atlanta mayor and U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, called for a ceasefire so that a negotiated end to the war could be sought.
>
> Echoing the message the night before by King's widow, Coretta Scott King, Young, who was the keynote speaker at the ecumenical service, said the destruction had already gone too far. He added that the costs would almost certainly affect the ability of the government in the United States to help the nation's cities and its poor.
>
> "It seems to be that for all our tactical superiority, for all the precision of war being waged, we don't seem to be getting any closer to peace," said Young, who earlier last week had expressed strong support for the war effort. "In fact we seem to be getting closer to that time when people start talking about setting oil wells on fire."
>
> "We have to try to find every possible means" to get [Iraqi leader] Saddam Hussein out of Kuwait, continued Young, one of King's "lieutenants" in the civil rights movement. "But when we talk of all means necessary, we don't just mean violence because violence is not producing the exit. The violence is producing the very chaos we're trying to avoid."
>
> In Arizona, one of three states which does not have a paid state King holiday, a rally in Phoenix drew an estimated 20,000 people. The event was held both in honor of King and to push for passage of a paid state holiday.
>
> In New Hampshire, another state lacking a King holiday, two-time presidential hopeful Rev. Jesse Jackson observed King's birthday Sunday and criticized the gulf war. "We all support the troops. We reserve the right to challenge the policy," Jackson said. "Was it necessary to draw a line in the sand on a certain date, which happened to be Doctor King's birthday?"

This story will help illustrate some of the critical concepts involved in information-processing models and portray how our understanding of judgment and choice depends directly on cognitive psychological constructs associated with the literature on schemas.

A few moments reflection after reading the news article should underscore how a great deal of prior knowledge about the political domain is necessary even to begin to understand this relatively simple news report. This prior knowledge is of two types, declarative and procedural (Anderson 1983). *Declarative knowledge* consists of "factual" information about some domain. This knowledge includes specific concepts (here, e.g., *federal holiday, ambassador to the United Nations, presidential hopeful, the civil rights movement),* as well as more abstract constructs (e.g., the metaphors referring to Young being one of King's "lieutenants" and to drawing "a line in the sand"). *Procedural knowledge* consists of "production rules," which connect the cognitive associations between and among specific concepts in the form of if–then propositions. In this story, procedural knowledge would allow the reader to draw the inference that "if defense and military spending increases, then spending on social services will decrease," an inference that is necessary if we are to understand the trade-off implicit in Young's expressed concerns about helping "the nation's cities and its poor."

The value of an information-processing approach is that it leads to testable predictions concerning how new information is represented in memory, as well as the ability to trace the inferential processes involved in judgment and choice. Of course, specification of the representational structure is necessary before these predictions can be tested; and the actual modeling of the representation of complex political information, such as that contained in this article, requires a "bootstrapping cycle" (Hastie 1986) of testing and revision of hypotheses.

Figure 1. Hypothetical Memory Structure


MARTIN LUTHER KING +
race=black +
ex-mayor, Atlanta +
ex-UN ambassador +
C.S. King +
slain -
advocate of nonviolence +
Civil Rights Movement +
race=black +
ANDREW YOUNG?
Federal, State Holiday +
Democrat -
JESSE JACKSON -
GULF WAR +
in Kuwait -
Arizona +
New Hampshire +
SADDAM HUSSEIN -
Democrat -
race=black +
1992 President candidate? -
past President candidate -
leader of Iraq -
(+)
(-)

How would a reader store the information in this article? To explore this, we could ask the reader to recall what he or she can remember. We know from the cognitive literature that it is highly unlikely that the information would be recalled verbatim. Rather, the information would be represented in memory in conceptually linked bundles of association, the existence of which can be inferred by a variety of measures, chief among them being reaction time measures (Fazio 1990) and the analysis of clustering patterns in free recall (McGraw, Pinney, and Newman 1991). Imagine that we conducted a simulation exercise where we instructed a hypothetical reader, "Recall what you can about the article," and the reader "output" the representational structure displayed in Figure 1. This reader's memory structure proves to be fairly complex and well integrated, characteristic of a person of some political sophistication who read the news story with some care. We hasten to add that knowledge structures for complex material are to some degree idiosyncratic to the individual perceiver, dependent upon prior knowledge about the domain and specific interests. Our reader's memory structure would certainly include a number of smaller knowledge structures, some of which are activated from long-term memory while others are created upon reading the article. For example, we suspect that the majority of citizens in the United States in early 1991 have rather elaborate knowledge structures in long-term memory representing *Jesse Jackson* and *Saddam Hussein*, but that far fewer people have *Andrew Young* plugged into an existing knowledge structure. Assuming that *Andrew Young* is a fuzzy, ill-defined concept, our good citizen could, if sufficiently motivated, now make the mental effort required to construct a new node in memory or link an attribute to an existing node. Of course, if the effort is lacking or the existing knowledge structure too impoverished to readily connect Young to Martin Luther King or perhaps add Young as an exemplar of the Civil Rights movement, the new information may not be linked to anything meaningful and, having not been stored in long-term memory go unheeded.

Evidence from the social cognition literature (Wyer and Srull 1989) suggests that the associative network will include a superordinate *node*, as well as subordinate nodes representing specific bits of information about the target. Nodes have two characteristics. The first is *strength*, which represents the node's accessibility from long-term memory, that is, the ease with which a stored attribute can be retrieved. Node strength in Figure 1 is indicated by the thickness of the line enclosing the concepts. The *accessibility* of a given node is a function of such factors as the frequency and recency of prior activation (Fazio 1989), its subjective importance (Krosnick 1989), and the number and strength of linkages to other nodes in the associative network (Higgins and King 1981; Judd and Krosnick 1989). The extensive media coverage of the Gulf War would implicate most of these principles—recency, frequency, and importance—suggesting that the *Gulf War–Saddam Hussein* nodes would have particularly strong values as this article was read. In contrast, the holiday status of Martin Luther King Day would probably be of negligible strength for a New York reader, since it was not a particularly momentous event.

A second node characteristic is its associated *evaluation*. Following Fiske and Pavelchak (1986) and Lodge and Stroh (1990), we assume that each node has an "affective tag" representing the valence of the evaluation (positive or negative), and that the strength of the evaluation varies in intensity.[1] Our hypothetical respondent has strong, positive affect toward the Gulf War and negative reactions to Hussein—characteristic of the majority of citizens at this time—but also negative reactions to Jackson and Young (a consequence, perhaps, of ideological and partisan inferences).

Nodes become *linked* to each other in long-term memory when they are brought into working memory simultaneously, the long-term effect of such repetitions being a schematic representation of one's prior experiences. The lines in Figure 1 are represented by solid lines. The links between nodes have two characteristics: strength and information about their implicational relations. The *strength* of a link is a function of the strength between two nodes and is dependent on the simultaneous prior activation of the linked nodes. For example, the link between *Saddam Hussein* and *Gulf War* is particularly strong, indicating that those two constructs had been repeatedly connected and are now inscribed in long-term memory. *Implicational relations* describe the nature of the node-to-node relationship. Implicational relations can be positive, meaning that one represented node implies the other linked nodes, or negative, meaning that the nodes imply the converse of each other (Judd and Krosnick 1989). For example, in their King memorial speeches, both Young and Jackson criticized the Gulf War, as indicated by the negative implicational links. Earlier, however, Young had voiced support for the Gulf War, as indicated by the second positive implicational link.

Nodes and links, with their associated strengths and affective connotations, form the skeleton of a knowledge structure that gives meaning to information. Skeptics, including Kuklinski, Luskin, and Bolland, might respond at this point, "So what?" The answer is that the value of knowledge structures lies in their dynamic implications for information processing. At this point, we outline three such implications: (1) the interpretive and inferential functions of knowledge structures, (2) the impact of knowledge structures on memory for information, and, (3) their implications for impressions and evaluations.

One of the oft-cited inferential functions of knowledge structures is that they are called into play to fill in missing data from input stimuli through *default options* (Minsky 1975), which develop with experience in that stimulus domain. These default inferences are illustrated in Figure 1 by dotted lines. It is noteworthy that this newspaper article does not mention race, even though all of the cited individuals, other than Hussein, are black. We suspect that most citizens are aware that King and Jackson are black—that there are links connecting both leaders to an African-American node somewhere in their knowledge structure—but that only more sophisticated citizens are aware of Young's race. But the placement of Young in the same context as King, Jackson, and the Civil Rights movement should lead to the default inference—correct in this case—that Young is black, which could now be "written" to memory as an attribute node in the Young substructure. Moreover, if our reader assumes that most black political leaders are also Democrats, the additional inference that Young is a Democratic politician is likely to occur. These inferences—made immediately and "automatically," that is, without conscious effort or awareness—enrich the news report and allow our good reader to make sense of this news article by embellishing its relatively sparse content with inferential linkages to established concepts.

"Going beyond the information given" by making default inferences can also serve to resolve inconsistencies and ambiguities. Comprehension of the *Newsday* article requires many such resolutions. For example, the articles does not state why Martin Luther King is honored by state and federal holidays; the reader may reasonably draw the inference—from the information in the article—that it is because he was slain and/or because he advocated nonviolence. In addition, there is the interesting inconsistency in Young's position on the Gulf War: where he had earlier voiced "strong support," he now appears critical of the war. If the reader noticed this "inconsistency" and was motivated to resolve it, an attributional analysis would likely result (Crocker, Hannah, and Weber 1983; Hastie 1984). Plausible solutions are that Young's position has really changed (an internal attribution) or that Young voiced an opinion at the King service that was congruent with the positions of those gathered (an external attribution requiring an additional inference about the political leanings of the audience).

A final set of ambiguities in the article concerns the status of Jesse Jackson. A number of inferences, some correct, some erroneous, could be drawn. What is Jackson's tie to the Civil Rights movement or to Dr. King? Political sophisticates could have these associations encoded in long-term memory or could automatically forge these links because of their prior knowledge about Jackson's career, whereas nonsophisticates might not be able to make use of the contextual cues provided in the article. Does the speech signal that Jackson is a New Hampshire politician? Nonsophisticates might erroneously think so. Does the fact that he is making speeches on federal policy signal a third presidential bid? Sophisticates may assume so.

We hope that we have made clear that information processing is an active, constructive process in which one tries to make sense of the stream of information impinging on the senses by integrating facts, figures, and images into existing knowledge structures. This constructive aspect of comprehension is the hallmark of the information-processing approach and the premise underlying virtually all work on schemas. This is *not* part and parcel of the attitude theories favored by Kuklinski, Luskin, and Bolland (see, e.g., Pratkanis, Breckler, and Greenwald 1989).

The associative network formulation also leads to clear predictions about what and how information will be retrieved from memory—an obviously important issue given that political knowledge is assumed to be a critical component of democratic citizenship. The attributes that are most accessible—be they important, frequently thought about, recently learned, vivid, or surprising—will be retrieved most readily. Moreover, associative network models assume that additional information is then retrieved from long-term memory via *spreading activation* principles (Anderson 1983). Once a particular concept is retrieved, additional attributes are retrieved by traversing from node to node along the established links in the network.

Various measures of recall can be used to divine how information is organized in a knowledge structure, and verbal protocols can be used to track the inferential processes leading to an evaluation (see Ericsson and Simon 1980). For example, response latencies can be used to infer the strength of linked nodes and to predict attitude-behavior relations (Fazio and Williams 1986); the clustering of conceptually similar attributes in recall products can be used to infer the dimensions underlying memory for political figures (McGraw, Pinney, and Neumann 1991). We see as one of the important contributions of the contemporary political cognition literature the identification of a number of different "schemas" that can be used to organize political memory and belief systems beyond Converse's (1964) ideological dimension, including issue positions, partisanship, social groups, character traits, and values (e.g., Conover and Feldman 1984; Hamill, Lodge, and Blake 1985; Lau 1986, 1989; Lodge and Hamill 1986; Miller, Wattenberg, and Malanchuk 1986), thereby expanding our understanding of the structural bases of political memory.

A related characteristic of human memory (and a key component of any process model of human choice) is the fact that memory is fallible, that is, that over time, memory traces fade and thus some of the "evidence"—some of the pros and cons that once informed a judgment—are no longer available. By introducing "decay curves" into associative network models, we may be able to account for why it is that people can oftentimes tell you how much they like one candidate or another but not be able to recount the reasons why.

The associative network model can therefore provide a basis for understanding the impression formation process involved in evaluations of political figures. We have recently (Lodge, McGraw, and Stroh 1989) put forth what we called an "on-line, impression-driven" model of candidate evaluation holding that under many conditions, evaluations are made initially and updated subsequently (at the time of exposure to information), not computed at some later time from the memory traces available in long-term memory, as memory-based models assume (e.g., Kelley and Mirer 1974). In the case of on-line processing, an "on-line tally" is thought to be appended to the superordinate node of a person-knowledge structure. This affective tally, being activated along with the conceptual node, anchors all subsequent person-relevant judgments and is continuously updated as new information is encountered. This updating process culls the affective value from each piece of newly encountered information, with subjectively important information contributing more weight to the tally than less important attributes (McGraw, Lodge, and Stroh 1990). When a judgment is required (e.g., in the voting booth or in reply to a pollster's question), it is this on-line tally rather than specific pieces of information that originally contributed to the evaluation that is retrieved from long-term memory.

In contrast, under memory-based processing, the "evidence" needed to make a judgment is thought to be residing in memory; and whatever pros and cons can be recollected are summed into an evaluation. Given that one of the most pervasive characteristics of human memory is that people apparently forget much of what they read, see, and hear, the evidence available in memory is likely to be but a faint reflection of all the information the citizen was exposed to, so that the resulting representation is less well organized, with fewer nodes, as well as fewer and weaker links among the nodes. When a judgment is required, some subset of these stored attributes—those that are most accessible—are retrieved from long-term memory in order to compute an evaluation.

On-line and memory-based processing can be illustrated with the network model of our hypothetical respondent. Being moderately sophisticated, we can assume that the reader already has an impression of Jesse Jackson because of his high-profile political status, and encodes new information with an eye to updating that impression. Accordingly, Jackson's statement criticizing the Gulf War will decrement the existing on-line tally, since our respondent strongly supports the Gulf War. However, asked at some later point about his or her impression of Jackson, only the on-tally need be retrieved. The specific Gulf War speech is forgotten.

The same person may be less interested in Andrew Young and, consequently, perhaps not have an evaluative tally tied to Young. If asked for an impression of Young, this reader would likely say, "no opinion," or now have to search memory for relevant information. An effortful search might turn up (1) his speech critical to the Gulf War, a negative attribute; (2) his ambassadorship to the United Nations, a weakly positive attribute; and (3) the inferred Democratic partisan label, a negative attribute. The on-the-spot integration of these three attributes in working memory would yield a negative evaluation.

This simulated trip down "memory lanes" shows that information processing is an active, dynamic reconstructive process that—if modeled as a schematic bundle of experiences—can help us understand how and why citizens make one judgment or choice instead of another. This cognitive approach focuses attention on the question of "representation"—on how one's thoughts and feelings are represented in memory. The simple set of assumptions put forth here—none of them, as far as we can tell, stemming from the alternatives suggested by Kuklinski, Luskin, and Bolland—offers a valuable perspective and a rich font of approaches to some of the central concerns of our discipline.

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Schemata are taking over political psychology. Like the alien pods in the movie *Invasion of the Body Snatchers,* these diabolical concepts assume the identities of respectable psychological concepts while our backs are turned. Soon, a debilitating conformity will paralyze the field. Luckily, a few brave souls—Kuklinski, Luskin, and Bolland—have alerted us to the dangers.

Before we follow the script further to see which of our colleagues have been absorbed into the mindless ranks of schema theorists, we suggest a quick reality check. The reality we see is quite different from that described by Kuklinski, Luskin, and Bolland (in "Where Is the Schema?"). They overstate the extent to which schema theory has "taken over" political psychology or even political cognition.[2] Their dissatisfaction with current measurement strategies is based on unrealistic expectations. Their critique of the schema concept and schema theory is superficial. And, their conclusion that schema theory has not made a significant contribution to political psychology is based on a lack of understanding of the role of theory in social research.

"Vagrant Measures?"

Kuklinski, Luskin, and Bolland argue that none of the empirical applications they review have yet to measure schemata successfully. Yet they may never be satisfied, for they are demanding schema measures that not only do not exist but that cannot exist. They have, in effect, missed a critical point about social measurement. Concepts like *schemata* (and attitudes) are hypothetical constructs—theoretical devices created to help understand human behavior. As such, their measurement must be indirect; indicators can only provide empirical evidence consistent with the hypothesized construct. Thus, no one ever has measured or ever will measure a schema directly, just as no one ever has measured, or ever will measure an attitude directly. We can only observe the empirical consequences of schemata and attitudes, not schemata and attitudes themselves.

It is neither surprising nor disturbing, therefore, that different approaches have been used to measure the characteristics of schemata. (Certainly, a catalog of measures of attitudes would look at least as varied to someone in search of direct evidence of the "attitude"). What is critical is that researchers choose as the focus of their measures theoretically defensible indicators of a schema or its functioning. For the most part, that is exactly what researchers have done. Moreover, if these schema indicators resemble measures of attitudes it is only because Kuklinski, Luskin, and Bolland have so thoroughly stripped them away from their theoretical foundations. Indicators of abstract concepts have no meaning in and of themselves; their interpretation *always* depends on the meaning of the underlying theoretical construct. And if these schema measures appear very unschemalike, it is only because the authors have forgotten that they are only indicators of the empirical consequences of a schema, not measures of the schema itself. Many of these measures could no doubt be improved upon, but they have already proved a reasonable beginning and, given the limitations of secondary research, sometimes much more than that.[3]

Schemata Versus Attitudes

Perhaps the chief criticism leveled against the entire schema theory enterprise is that it is "old wine in new bottles" (see Wildavsky 1987). Thus, schemata are dismissed as nothing more than attitudes in "drag," measures of schemata are really measures of attitudes, and the hypotheses generated by schema theorists could be just as easily derived from attitude theory. Unfortunately, a careful review of the evolution of social psychological theory suggests otherwise: schemata are *not* the same as attitudes any more than red wine is the same as white wine. Psychologists have no trouble distinguishing the two concepts; nor would political scientists if they focused more closely on the theoretical traditions from which they were borrowing.

Let us be quite clear about the difference between attitudes and schemata. Two conflicting definitions have dominated recent discussion of the attitude concept (see Zanna and Rempel 1989): the traditional multicomponent model, in which an attitude consists of affective, cognitive, and behavioral responses to an object, and an increasingly popular one-component model, in which an attitude is only the affective (evaluative) response to an object (e.g., Fishbein and Ajzen 1975; Fazio and Williams 1986).[4] Regardless of the specific definition of an attitude, "the evaluative dimension has been the focus of most past attitude research" (Ostrom 1989, 21). Thus, the central meaning of the attitude concept—the meaning common to all competing definitions—is fundamentally *affective* in nature. At its core, an attitude is "a person's evaluation of an object of thought" (Pratkanis and Greenwald 1989, 247).[5] The central meaning of the schema concept stands in sharp contrast. Though it, too, has been defined in a variety of ways, at its core a schema is fundamentally a *cognitive* structure, one that "contains a concept's attributes and the links among those attributes" (Fiske 1986, 41; see also Hastie 1986).[6] Thus, it is far more than the "difference in emphasis" noted by Kuklinski, Luskin, and Bolland that separates schemata from attitudes: the two are fundamentally different theoretical concepts.

It is true, as they claim, that cognition has often played a key role in treatments of the attitude concept (see Fiske and Taylor 1984). It is not true, however, that definitions of attitude that contain cognitive as well as affective components necessarily suggest schemalike cognitive structures. Attitude structures characterized by the sum of all beliefs about an object are *not* the same as schematic structures characterized by categories and hierarchical structures. They are not the same in their form; nor, more importantly, are they the same in their purported effects.

Kuklinski, Luskin, and Bolland's mistake is understandable. Definitional confusion often results when concepts are extracted from their theoretical frameworks, as they have done with the schema and attitude concepts. In fact, these two concepts are associated with theoretical traditions so distinct that the shift from one to the other has been described as "metatheoretical" (Taylor 1981).[7] Traditionally, attitudes have been linked to consistency theories while schemata are tied to information-processing theories (Fiske and Taylor 1984). The difference in the two theoretical frameworks is immense. The strong motivational basis of consistency theories directs attention away from the nonmotivational operating principles of attitude or cognitive structures that are the central focus of information-processing models (Fiske and Taylor 1984; Taylor 1981). Thus, schema theory provides a direct link between cognitive structures and information processing that is absent in the attitude theories typically evoked by political scientists.

The concepts of knowledge structures and of information processing are the heart of schema theory. In fact, schema theory is just one of several models that specify how knowledge is organized in memory and how it guides the processing of new information (see Hastie 1986). It is important to recognize that whatever the specific evaluation of schema theory, the information-processing approach *is* the major driving force behind much of contemporary social and cognitive psychology. Many of the "other borrowings" promoted by Kuklinski, Luskin, and Bolland (e.g., cognitive heuristics, social categories, prototypes, and stereotypes) fall easily within the realm of information-processing models. Given many of the central concerns of political psychology (the structure of belief systems, the evaluation of political figures, the formation of political attitudes and opinions), theories concerning knowledge structures and information processing will continue to be attractive to those working in this area. Moreover, employing an information-processing approach in political psychology need not make us lose sight of the role of affect and emotions in politics; nor (despite Kuklinski, Luskin, and Bolland's claims to the contrary) has it done so.

Data in Search of Meaning

In their attempt to show that schema theory is really nothing more than a new name for attitude theory, Kuklinski, Luskin, and Bolland "summarize" the findings of several studies that have drawn upon schema theory, concluding, "These summaries do not sound very schema-theoretic; nor do the analyses themselves" (p. 1344). But was schema theory really so superfluous in these studies?

In the absence of new theories that bring about radical paradigm shifts, it is always possible to abstract empirical results from their theoretical framework and thus make them sound compatible with other approaches. It is also possible to strip empirical results of their theoretical foundation altogether—as Kuklinski, Luskin, and Bolland do to these studies—and thus trivialize them by making them sound "commonsensical." But, such an ex post facto repackaging of empirical findings reveals very little about the actual role of schema theory in the research process. This is akin to Monday morning quarterbacking—an entertaining diversion but not particularly useful for playing the game on Sunday.

More importantly, by focusing solely on the empirical findings of these studies Kuklinski, Luskin, and Bolland have lost sight of key aspects of the research process—the identification of the problem to be explained and the generation of hypotheses. As we have detailed, schema theory represents a major shift in theoretical focus away from attitude theory. This shift has served a very valuable heuristic function in directing the attention of political scientists to new approaches and new theoretical insights. For example, research influenced by schema theory has examined the structure of beliefs within substantive domains (Conover and Feldman 1984; Hamill, Lodge, and Blake 1985; Sears, Huddy, and Schaffer 1986), the information-processing role of cognitive structures (Conover and Feldman 1986; Graber 1984; Lau 1986; Lodge and Hamill 1986), how people deal with the ambiguity of political information (Conover and Feldman 1989; Graber 1984); and individual differences in political judgments (Lau 1986; Erber and Lau 1990). Although Kuklinski, Luskin, and Bolland claim that many of the interesting political applications of schema theory "might as easily have been done . . . had schema theory never existed" (p. 1345), the fact is that these studies were *not* done until schema theory redirected our attention to these particular research problems and hypotheses. The real issue is not whether the research *could* have been done under some other framework but which approach has actually motivated and theoretically structured the research.

The authors' confounding of attitude theory with schema theory reflects an implicit assumption that is potentially dangerous, namely, the assumption that empirical findings can stand on their own without any theoretical assistance. With the significant exception of their shopping list of theoretical approaches from social and cognitive psychology, their discussion seems insensitive to the role of theory in empirical research. From their perspective, it is the empirical relationships that are important, not the evaluation of theories.[8]

We strongly disagree with this position. The interpretation of data is *always* ambiguous. Theories are essential to understand the meaning of any pattern of empirical relationships. Where data are consistent with two or more theories, interpretations of the same empirical results can be substantially different. For example, Kuklinski, Luskin, and Bolland point out that we have long studied selective perception. But they fail to note that schema theory provides a new and radically different understanding of the phenomenon. Whereas before we assumed that selective attention was an irrational manifestation of affective bias, we now recognize that often it may simply be a rational shortcut in information processing. The fact that critical experiments have not yet clearly distinguished between these two explanations does not diminish the importance of the alternative interpretations.[9]

Kuklinski, Luskin, and Bolland's position glorifies data at the expense of theory. They want to "take inspiration" from theories and to "let our knowledge of psychology inform our work in a general way" (p. 1350) but not to take theories any more seriously than that. This is why they miss the fact that one of schema theory's important contributions to political psychology is its alternative *understanding* of public opinion and political behavior. Consider, for example, the structure and function of belief systems. It has been known for many years that close attention to politics, high levels of information, and unidimensional attitude consistency are not widespread among the U.S. public. But what does this mean? According to one perspective "it means that we are naive and inconsequential if we waste time with mass belief systems and mass attitudes" (Hennessy 1972, 36). Schema theory (or, more generally, models of information processing) provides a very different perspective. People may not have belief systems with strong liberal-conservative constraint, but they can still possess smaller cognitive structures that organize knowledge in particular substantive areas (Conover and Feldman 1984; Graber 1984; Hamill, Lodge, and Blake 1985). These structures allow them to deal with information they receive from the media (Graber 1984), to organize their issue preferences (Hamill, Lodge, and Blake 1985; Peffley and Hurwitz 1985), and to make assessments of candidates for political office (Conover and Feldman 1986; Lau 1986; Miller, Wattenberg, and Malanchuk 1986). Even the venerable party identification may turn out to be more than a simple affective tie to a party. It, too, may be a knowledge structure that facilitates political information processing (Lodge and Hamill 1986). Research based on schema theory does not lead to the conclusion that the American public is made up of highly attentive ideologues. It does suggest, however, that people with limited levels of "political sophistication" may be more capable of dealing with the flow of political information than many political scientists have thought. Perhaps all these empirical relationships would have emerged without the help of schema theory. But would the connections among them and the theoretical interpretation of their significance have emerged as well? We think not.

Concluding Thoughts: On the Nature of Political Psychology

We are quite frankly perplexed by the hostile reaction that schema theory has prompted among these colleagues. The introduction of schema theory into political psychology simply is not one of the serious problems confronting the field. We agree with Kuklinski, Luskin, and Bolland that applications of psychological theory to political phenomena should be motivated by a desire to understand the political phenomena in question and not by a desire to apply a particular psychological theory. There are enduring substantive issues that political psychology is concerned with, and these must remain central to the enterprise. But we also believe that psychological theories are a key part of the study of political behavior. Such theories should play a central role in concept formation, measurement, and interpretation. The major concerns of political psychology have much in common with research in social and cognitive psychology. Political psychologists are *not* responsible for developing general models of cognitive structures and information processing. But they will always be interested in how *political* cognitions are structured and how people make sense of *political* information. It is hard to imagine that general models developed in social and cognitive psychology would not be vitally important to this work. Do we really need to reinvent the wheel?

As Kuklinski, Luskin, and Bolland argue, schema theory is, indeed, a limited theory. But it is in good company. All of the current theories in political psychology—and in social psychology for that matter—are limited theories, including those advocated by them as alternatives to schema theory. Schema theory was never presented as the answer to all of our questions. It is one of a number of different theories that can contribute to the study of political cognition and behavior. Our "closing plea" is for a more *pluralistic* (and tolerant) political psychology that explores the full range of approaches to understanding political cognition and behavior. We have a long way to go to comprehend the complexities of political behavior. At this time it is premature to cast off potentially useful approaches and alternative understandings.

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A theory about the mental processes of human actors is necessary to answer many of the questions examined by political scientists. Even studies of institutions such as Congress, the courts, or the presidency require that we understand how the individuals who fill the offices of those institutions make decisions. Similarly, the interactions between nations are heavily influenced by the perceptions and misperceptions of individual political leaders (Jervis 1976). Likewise, decision making by the average citizen is an important area of research, since the selection of political leaders by the populace provides the basis upon which any representative democracy rests. Given the central role of the individual decision maker in the political process, political scientists need a theory of how individuals perceive and structure the social world in which they participate as political actors.

Until the early 1980s, the predominant psychological construct used to describe one's orientation to the political world was *attitude.* Attitudes reflected a combination of beliefs (cognitions) and feelings (affects) toward some specific object. The object or target of the attitude (as applied to the political arena) varied from abstract ideas like communism to concrete topics (e.g., an individual candidate, a policy, a political party, or a group). The object could vary in saliency depending on how aware of the object the individual was or how important it was to them. Different attitudes could be correlated, thus forming belief systems; and some attitudes, central ones, were more enduring than others.

Despite the argument that some attitudes could change more readily than others, the concept of attitude was quite static. Change in attitude was motivationally based—most generally explained by feelings of consistency or inconsistency of different attitudes and a human need for consistency. Given this drive for consistency, discrepant information was avoided, so that attitude change was unlikely or very slow to occur.

Starting in the early 1980s, new research from cognitive psychology began to influence theories of mental processes and to challenge some of the earlier assumptions of attitude consistency theories. Information-processing theories in general and the concept of schema in particular provide us with the best description of mental processes that is currently available (Hastie 1986). These theories do not, however, provide an agreed-upon list of principles or hypotheses or even a single model of human cognition that can be directly applied and tested by political scientists. Rather, what they do provide are some correctives on our previous thinking about decision processes and some metaconstructs (e.g., the notion of *schema)* that integrate such processes as perception, memory, inference, and evaluation (Fiske and Linville 1980).

Kuklinski, Luskin, and Bolland argue in "Where Is the Schema?" that the schema concept, as applied in recent political analysis, is merely attitude research with a new label attached. More specifically, they contend that my previous research on public judgments of presidential candidates (see Miller, Wattenberg, and Malanchuk 1986) could have been done and reported without the existence of schema theory by simply utilizing the concept of attitude. A response to these claims forms the focus for this comment.

Science is presumably cumulative. It advances by building on previous research and ideas. To find some similarities in major scientific constructs is, therefore, not surprising. Nevertheless, to label them as equivalent simply because there are some similarities is a mistake. In this case, there are major differences. The conceptual approaches of attitude and schema are based on different assumptions, direct our attention to different research questions, and can lead to very different substantive interpretations and conclusions from similar empirical results.

Rather than a point-by-point refutation of their argument, I will provide some examples of how the information-processing approach has influenced the investigation of, and our knowledge about, the public's cognitions and assessments of political leaders. I will briefly highlight some of the strengths and weaknesses of the schema approach, as well as some of the methodological implications that arise from the application of this approach (as opposed to the concept of attitude) in the study of political candidates.

Candidate Schema As the Focus of Political Cognition

An increasing amount of research has been focused on the question of which are the most prevalent political schemas that people use in organizing their thinking about the political world (Conover and Feldman 1986; Hamill and Lodge 1986; Lau 1986). While the answer to this question is still unresolved, it has become increasingly apparent that political leaders are not only a salient feature of the political environment but that for many people they provide a central focus for making sense of political events and issues.

The rise of political candidates or leaders as an important political schema is consistent with research that shows a deterioration in party identification as the citizen's major organizing political construct (Miller 1986; Wattenberg 1984), as well as with the accumulating evidence that evaluations of presidential candidates have some causally prior impact on both party identification and issue preferences (Markus and Converse 1979; Page and Jones 1979). In addition, other work has demonstrated that at the individual level both cognitions and affect with respect to candidates have been more stable across time than those related to parties or issues (Lau 1986; Miller, Wattenberg, and Malanchuk 1986; Wattenberg 1984).

The study of candidates or leaders as a central focus of political cognitions has, however, lagged behind the investigation of parties, issues, and ideology. *The American Voter* (Campbell et al. 1960) treated candidate assessments as dominated by more enduring attitudes toward parties and issues. The attitude consistency theory underlying *The American Voter* model suggested that party identification acted as a prior perceptual screen and that the human need for consistency would result in attitudes toward less central political objects, such as candidates, being brought into affective harmony with party identification. Alternatively, rational choice models have argued that available information is dealt with in a piecemeal, algebraic fashion by the citizen to calculate overall utilities, which are then employed to select the candidate who would optimally satisfy the voter's self-interest (Downs 1959; Fiorina 1981).

With a decrease in the predictive power of party identification, *The American Voter* model has come under increasing criticism as a valid description of reality. More fundamentally, the assumption that people have a need for consistency has been challenged (Kiesler, Collins, and Miller 1969; Lau and Sears 1986). In addition, the notion of a "perceptual screen" is a rather static and limited view of cognitive processes. The metaphor of a screen suggests that some information passes through while other information does not, and it focuses our attention on the acquisition of information while ignoring its storage and retrieval from memory. Rational choice models have also been criticized as requiring a mental procedure far too complex to represent a realistic theory of how people actually process information (Fiske 1986; Herstein 1981).

Current theories of information processing provide an alternative view that treats the individual as a cognitive miser (Taylor 1981). This theory contends that people categorize objects and simplify information as a result of general limits to human cognitive capacity. The complexity of the real world becomes simplified in our minds through a dynamic process that combines experience of real-world occurrences (and co-occurrences of objects and events) with the results of active mental processes, including the inferences we make to fill in missing information or to go beyond information that is directly available to us (Fiske and Taylor 1984). These mental representations of the world —frequently called *schemas*—function cognitively to direct our attention and aid in the storage and retrieval of information in a manner that influences both our cognitions of previous experience and the acquisition of new information (Fiske and Linville 1980; Taylor and Crocker 1981).

The application of these information-processing principles to the study of political leadership directs our attention to certain questions. Of particular importance is a concern with the content and structure of schemas which focus on political leaders. For example, what is the substantive content of the cognitions that individuals have regarding each candidate? How detailed or abstract and impressionistic are these cognitions? (See Lodge, McGraw, and Stroh 1989.) Are inferences made from one content area to another, thus going beyond available information? If there is differential content to political cognitions, does that variation in content influence political decisions and political behavior? These questions differ from those previously asked by attitude research in that they direct our attention first and foremost to a concern with cognitions rather than with evaluations and emphasize certain dynamic processes (e.g., drawing inferences) that embellish or go beyond available information.

Content of Candidate Schemas

Most of our knowledge about the content of public cognitions focused on political candidates comes from the open-ended questions about presidential candidates which have been asked in the Michigan National Election Study (NES) surveys. Schemas presumably affect the retrieval of information from memory; thus, the content and structure that appear in recall statements should reflect the abstract impressionistic representation of this information in memory. Analyses of these questions range from reporting the frequency of specific comments on particular candidates to more general clusters of comments (Miller and Miller 1976; Miller, Wattenberg, and Malanchuk 1986; Nimmo and Savage 1976; Page 1978; Shabad and Andersen 1979). At the more general level of abstraction, these studies agree that candidate-related public cognitions of candidates over the years have focused on party labels, group attachments, policy and personal attributes associated with each candidate.

In fact, an investigation of the NES questions reveals that cognitions about the personal attributes of the candidates have been predominant over other judgmental criteria throughout the entire period from 1952 to 1984 (Miller, Wattenberg, and Malanchuk 1986). Given that politicians are persons in a role, it is not surprising that the content of cognitions that others have of political leaders are heavily laden with references to personal attributes or traits. After all, the candidate's personal features, behaviors, and mannerisms are more apparent and less abstract than issues, ideology, or even party labels. Moreover, personal characteristics and attributes frequently appear to predict real-world behaviors and performance. In addition, media reports of candidates are heavily focused on their personal characteristics (Graber 1976, 1980).

The personal attributes (or "personality") of the candidates have generally been treated as shallow, idiosyncratic, emotionally laden, and irrelevant features in the selection of democratic leaders because they are presumed to be devoid of policy implications (Page 1978; Stokes 1966). Rather than dismissing the role of personal attributes in candidate assessments, more recent work has attempted to elaborate and understand these cognitions from the broader perspective of information-processing theories. Some of this work has borrowed the concepts of prototype and trait clusters from person perception and implicit personality theories (Kinder et al. 1980; Kinder 1986), while others focus more specifically on the concept of schema (Miller, Wattenberg, and Malanchuk 1986; Tyler 1986). One of the convergent findings of these studies is that the presumed "personality" features of candidate-related cognitions are predominantly focused on criteria relevant to performance in the office rather than on the appearance or superficial characteristics of candidates. For example, the most prevalent content of these cognitions focus on competence, trustworthiness, responsibility, and compassion—characteristics that are all very relevant to the conduct of public affairs.

The Structure of Leadership Cognitions

Considerably less work has been done on how the cognitions we have of political leaders are structured. Similar clusters of various role or person attributes have been isolated with both open-ended and structured questions (Kinder et al. 1980; Miller, Wattenberg, and Malanchuk 1986). Moreover, the high degree of clustering across specific like-and-dislike comments suggests that (1) these are not simply veridical accounts of piecemeal recollections about each candidate, (2) the reports are abstracted impressions formed about the candidates over some period of time, and (3) a dynamic mental process (e.g., inferential or associational reasoning) produces interconnections among the specific impressions reported. Yet it is unclear whether this structure arises because people have developed in memory a set of character traits that they employ when thinking about themselves or forming impressions about others, including political candidates (Kinder 1986), because an image of an ideal or exemplary candidate is abstracted from prior knowledge of past candidate and presidents, or because of the campaign process and what the candidates or media emphasize.

In what form candidate representations are actually stored in memory is currently unclear, although information-processing theories suggest a number of alternatives that could be considered. For example, they may be stored in the form of hierarchical mental representations, ordered lists, elaborate scripts or frames, general bundles or chunks of abstracted information plus inferences, or nodes of stored information that become activated and associated when primed by particular cues in the environment (Lodge and Stroh 1990). The form in which information is stored is an important question, since it will partly determine what associated schemas or cognitions become activated and employed in thinking about and evaluating candidates. For example, were Republicans in 1964 or many Democrats in 1972 dissatisfied with their party's respective candidates because they did not fit with their schema of an ideal or exemplary Republican or Democratic candidate? Or do people focus on a central attribute, which may be made most salient by the current campaign or particular historical context (e.g., *integrity* following Watergate) and then compare the two candidates on that criterion? Again, the information-processing approach calls our attention to these questions; but at the moment our research is insufficient to answer them.

Factors Influencing the Acquisition and Development of Candidate Schemas

Previous research on cognitions has emphasized in-the-head processes, thus presenting an image of a person as an isolated thinker. This may be an appropriate view for the cognitive psychologist, but politics is clearly a collective endeavor located within an institutionalized framework that may itself influence cognitions. Although the research of cognitive psychologists has emphasized microlevel cognitive processes, theories of information processing have suggested that both factors in the environment and mental processes influence the content and structure of cognitions.

Factors in the political environment that help to structure political cognitions include the leaders themselves, the media, and campaign events. One aspect of political leadership is the active striving toward the use of rhetoric and symbols to structure the public's political beliefs (Edelman 1971; Miller and Levitin 1976). Meaning is brought out of the disparate and complex realities of the world for the public by the political leaders through the topics they address, the groups they embrace or reject, the values they evoke and the manner or style in which they conduct themselves and the affairs of state. This influence on our political cognitions is doubly great for incumbents, since not only do their pronouncements and actions become the authoritative cues that create the news and what we know of politics but those cues are embedded in a political context that their very actions have helped to create and structure.

Politics is primarily a mediated experience. The complexity of political decisions and events are thus doubly filtered, first by elites, then by the media. For example, most of the information reported by the media about the competence, character, or policy programs of candidates comes from the candidates themselves, rather than from the independent judgment of reporters (Brody 1985; Robinson and Sheehan 1983). Incumbents, as a consequence of their position and greater resources, have more access to the media. Thus, they appear in the news more frequently and are usually presented in a more positive manner than the challenger. The prevalence of certain issues in the assessment of candidates is also influenced by the media, which helps to set the agenda through focusing on some topics and excluding others. Similarly, an emphasis on the "horse race" tends to develop cognitions more about the candidates' performance characteristics than their policy proposals. Moreover, the media use certain role schemas (incumbent, challenger, front-runner, underdog) to interpret (structure) the news and set public expectations about each candidate, thereby promoting a particularly structured set of political beliefs among media consumers.

Campaign process and events add structure to political cognitions in a very similar manner. An experiment by Herstein (1981) is particularly suggestive of how individual information processing may interact with campaign events to structure political cognitions and candidate selection. He found that organizing available information by candidate (a candidate-salient display) leads to a vote choice based on an overall impression formed about each candidate separately. Organizing information about candidates according to an item-salient display, on the other hand (i.e., by issue area, party label, personal attributes, or policy orientations), the assessment of the candidates was piecemeal rather than global. Fiske (1986) has noted how these two conditions reflect actual campaign settings. A candidate-salient view of a political leader would occur in campaign literature, a political commercial, or a news story that focused on a single candidate. An item-salient display would occur in a debate context or in literature like that distributed by the League of Women Voters, where each candidate, in turn, is compared in terms of—or asked to address—a particular issue. Of course, this does not mean that people actually make these two different types of comparisons when judging candidates in different situations, as they could focus on one particular candidate even in a debate. Nonetheless, the experiment does suggest how real-world situations may structure political cognitions, a topic in need of further research.

Further investigation of inferential processes is also important, since this is an area that sharply differentiates the attitude and schema approaches. Cognitions represent a combination of abstracted instances of information from prior experience and the inferences made when interpreting or explaining those instances (Carlston 1980). The types of inferences people make about candidates are therefore an important topic for future research. Others have also suggested that more attention be given to causal reasoning as a form of inferential thinking. This form of inference may be particularly relevant to the study of candidate cognitions, since research on causal attributions suggests that people generally emphasize the presumed dispositions of the actor over aspects of the situation or particulars of the task when explaining an event. However, Hastie and Carlston (1980) have pointed to other forms of inferential reasoning that also deserve consideration. For example, people often use categorical reasoning to make inferences. Labeling Walter Mondale a "big spender" cues other unstated or inferred properties of that category, such as being inefficient, sympathetic toward those on welfare, indecisive, a weak leader and (of course) a Democrat. Hastie and Carlston (1980) also differentiate relational reasoning, that is, abstract inferences about a class of traits or behaviors (Is a good Christian an honest person?) from referential reasoning, that is, reasoning about a particular person (Is Jimmy Carter a good Christian? Is Jimmy Carter honest?).

Different types of inferential reasoning may be used at different times depending on the decision task the citizen is performing. For example, choosing between two candidates may be based on categorical or relational inferences; but trying to understand or explain a recession may be influenced more by causal reasoning. Similarly, future research is needed to determine whether different kinds of voters use different types of inference processes in their judgments of candidates.

Lastly, the influence of individual affect and feelings on political cognitions remains to be fully elaborated. Sniderman and Tetlock (1985) have argued that affect may act as the basis for political inferences. They posit a *likability heuristic* and maintain that cognitive structure and consistency is the result of affective consistency. Building on the work of Zajonc (1984), they argue that how voters feel about liberals and conservatives (or implicitly liberal and conservative candidates) determines their other political choices and preferences, as well as the structure of their political cognitions. Other work on schemas also suggests that once a candidate becomes categorized, the voter's overall affective assessment may influence the response to any new instance or piece of information having to do with the candidate. The simple act of categorizing, then, would assign an affective evaluation to the new information (Fiske and Linville 1980, 551). How affect gets combined with cognitions or influences inferences is, however, still a controversial issue in cognitive psychology, as well as political science (Abelson et al. 1982; Fiske and Taylor 1984).

Methodological Implications

The differences between attitude and schema approaches to research also raise methodological implications. Individuals may differ in the number and types of schemas they employ in structuring their political cognitions. Research, therefore, can be more sensitive to individual differences by employing methods that are less structured (e.g., open-ended questions, rank-ordered lists, free selection of *n* choices from a longer list). We need to be aware, however, in using open-ended questions, that much of schematic processing is automatic and not readily verbalized, even if properly primed.

Information-processing theories also emphasize dynamic processes such as the acquisition of information or inferential reasoning. Clearly, methods that capture change and allow for reciprocal connections are required. In addition, these processes direct our attention to a necessity for finer measurement of the information that is available in the environment. Questions about the acquisition and encoding of information, as well as inferential reasoning that goes beyond the available data, place a great premium on knowing far more accurately the content, frequency, availability, and structure of information in the environment.

Far too many of our research methods, especially surveys, are oriented toward the retrieval of information rather than aimed at studying the acquisition and encoding stage of political cognitions. We need to combine experimental, intensive, small group studies and survey work. Experiments can help sort out the cognitive processes, and the intensive studies can elaborate the richness of political schemas. Both of these can help in developing survey instruments that are valid and reliable surrogates for latencies or for the speed of information processing, which acts to differentiate schematic from aschematic processing in experiments.

With respect to candidate or leadership schemas in particular, the addition of trait lists to the 1984 and 1988 NES questionnaire was a major improvement, since it fits with the emphasis given to attributes in the traditional *like/dislike* questions. Further refinements to this approach are, nevertheless, still possible. The specific wording of the traits, as well as what characteristics are included in the list, could be further revised. Another possible revision would be to use a list of attributes that the respondent orders in terms of how relevant they are to an overall impression of a candidate. Also, recalling the Herstein (1981) experiment, it is worth noting that the approach used in the NES studies employs a candidate-salient display rather than an attribute-salient approach (which would ask the respondent to compare the various candidates with respect to each attribute in turn). These are very different approaches. They prime potentially different schemas that may give rise to very different results. Thinking about our research methods from an information-processing framework makes us more sensitive to these differences.

In summary, the application of information-processing concepts to the study of political phenomena is growing rapidly. (See Lau and Sears 1986 for an overview of these applications.) As a guide to research, the information-processing approach is giving rise to new hypotheses, calling attention to different concepts and variables, providing reinterpretations of previous findings and pointing to the need for alternative research methods to those employed in the past. Information-processing theories also provide a different view of political cognitions from those presented by previous theories, such as cognitive consistency or rational choice models of decision making.

In short, contrary to what Kuklinski, Luskin, and Bolland suggest, the concept of schema is not merely (in Wildavsky's words) "old wine in new bottles."

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Notes

1. In theory, all stimuli can elicit some affective reaction, but the strength or intensity of the reaction might be so small as to render it essentially equal to zero.

Our reading of the recent social and psychological literatures is that the concepts such as affect and emotion are fast achieving lead actor status rather than serving as "ancillary" participants (Kuklinski, Luskin, and Bolland, p. 1346). Interestingly, much of the impetus for according affect a more prominent role in cognitive theories has come from scholars actively involved in political psychological research (e.g., Fiske and Pavelchak 1986; Judd and Krosnick 1989; Lodge and Stroh n.d.; Lusk and Judd 1988; McGraw and Pinney 1990; McGraw, Pinney, and Neumann 1991; Sears, Huddy, and Schaffer 1986; Sniderman, Brody, and Tetlock 1991). Rather than merely the result of "thirdhand borrowing" of other disciplinary concepts and theories, this political psychological research can be considered original contributions that have had an impact on mainstream social psychological research.

2. A review of political psychology papers presented at recent American Political Science Association and International Society for Political Psychology meetings, as well as recent issues of *Political Behavior* and *Political Psychology*, shows that schema theory is but one of many theoretical frameworks currently in vogue. A relatively small proportion of these papers draw upon schema theory.

3. The authors find the measurement strategy we used (Conover and Feldman 1984) "particularly inapt" (p. 1351). Since they seem to have misunderstood the logic of our design, let us clarify it. We began by identifying various domains of political thought that might be organized schematically. Next, for each substantive area we assembled a list of statements that represented the range of beliefs in that domain. In effect, we sampled the range of elements that might be included in people's schemata. Each subject then completed a Q-sort of the set of statements for each domain, thus revealing what they most believed (and disbelieved) in each area. Are the individual Q-sorts schemata? Of

course not. We assume that they are *indicators* of the contents of the schemata that the subjects hold in each substantive area. If we had wanted 59 idiosyncratic indicators of people's schemata in each area we would have stopped there. Our argument, however, was that schemata development is not totally idiosyncratic. Patterns of rhetoric and communication in society should lead to shared patterns of belief and thus communalities in schema development. We therefore computed correlations among the individual Q-sorts and factor-analyzed that correlation matrix. What are the resulting factors? Again, they are not schemata. Rather, they represent our *estimates* of common patterns among our subjects. This is not an ideal schema measure or even necessarily the best one. It is pointless to think about an ideal measure of such a concept. But it does provide an *indication* of the contents of people's schemata and provides evidence of shared patterns of schemata in a manner between unstructured (and often idiosyncratic) depth interviews and the overly structured traditional scaling methods that locate all respondents on identical dimensions (like traditional "R" factor analysis).

4. The two-component (affect and cognition) model of attitude suggested by Kuklinski, Luskin, and Bolland is a minority view.

5. In light of Kuklinski, Luskin, and Bolland's criticisms of schema theory, we are surprised to see them refer favorably to "attitude theory." We wish they had discussed the basic elements of this theory. In the social psychology literature there is extensive discussion of the characteristics of attitudes, the functions of attitudes in decision making, and the interrelationships among attitudes (consistency theory). Thus, there are many theories of attitudes, their effects, and their interrelationships. A formal statement of "attitude theory" would be difficult to find.

6. Or, to be more precise, a schema is a "hierarchical organization of knowledge in a particular domain, which includes a category label, generic descriptions of the stimulus domain, particular instances of it, and interconnection among these" (Lau 1986, 349).

7. Kuklinski, Luskin, and Bolland argue that "schema theory" is a collection of propositions, but our argument does not rest on the assumption of a tightly knit theory. Also, our characterization of attitude theory refers to the traditional attitude theories that dominated the work of political scientists at the time schema theory was introduced to the discipline (early 1980s). In the last decade, this traditional view of attitudes has undergone a substantial transformation as social psychologists have sought to use the insights from information-processing theory to construct a new theoretical foundation for the attitude concept. This "new" attitude theory is more cognitive and less motivational; it provides closer links between schemata and attitudes though the two are still quite distinguishable concepts (Pratkanis, Breckler, and Greenwald 1989; Pratkanis and Greenwald 1989). Thus, at the same time that the authors argue that schema theory has nothing to offer beyond traditional attitude theory, social psychologists are actually substantially reworking attitude theory to incorporate the insights of schema theory.

8. Given their disinterest in the relative merits of alternative theories, it is unclear why Kuklinski, Luskin, and Bolland have a consistent preference for attitudinal explanations. If schema theory is nothing but attitude theory, then schema theory is no better or worse than attitude theory as a basis for political psychology.

9. The relative validity of these two explanations should not depend on which one "came first."

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RESEARCH NOTES

COUNTING THE NUMBER OF PARTIES: AN ALTERNATIVE INDEX

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I propose an alternative index to operationalize the variable number and size of parties *in a party system. To support it, I present a critical overview of the two most common indices, Laakso and Taagepera's* effective number of parties *and Kesselman and Wildgen's* hyperfractionalization, *showing the causes of their weakness. Then I explain the computational logic of my alternative, "number of parties," and compare it with the other two, using hypothetical cases. After that, I contrast the Laakso–Taagepera index with mine, using data from actual elections between 1945 and 1981. I conclude that my index outperforms the other two as an operationalization of the variable number and size of parties.*

Since the classic works of Duverger (1954) and Rae (1967), the number of parties has been used as the basic criterion to classify party systems, and as a variable to explain several of their features. But counting the parties in a system has not been easy, and a considerable number of indices have been proposed.[1] I will review and critique the two most commonly used indices and introduce a new one. The reviewed indices are *effective number of parties* (N) and *hyperfractionalization* (I). The new one is *number of parties* (NP).

Index N is a derivation of the *fractionalization index* (F) proposed by Rae (1967), which in turn is derived from the *concentration* index (HH) (Herfindahl 1950; Hirschman 1945). Applied to parties, HH is defined as follows:

$$HH = \sum_{i=1}^{n} P_i^2$$

where P_i is proportion of votes (or seats) of the ith party.

HH is the probability that two randomly chosen voters vote for the *same* party.[2] The limits of HH are one if there is only one party and zero if the number of parties tends to infinity. F was introduced later as the probability that two randomly chosen voters vote for *different* parties. Index F, thus, is equal to $1 - HH$. Index F has limits in zero if there is only one party and one if the number of parties tends to infinity. HH provides a nonarbitrary way to weigh parties so that the larger ones count more than the smaller. Laakso and Taagepera (1979) reformulate HH as N to get numbers that make more intuitive sense. Thus, *effective number of parties* (N) has limits in one if there is only one party and infinity if the number of parties tend to infinity.

$$N = 1/\sum_{i=1}^{n} P_i^2$$

$$= 1/HH = 1/(1 - F)$$

On the other hand, the *hyperfractional-*

Table 1. Values of *N* and *I* for Several Hypothetical Cases

								Indices	
Case	Division of Vote (or Seats) Among Parties (in %)							*N*	*I*
1	100							1.00	1.00
2	50	50						2.00	2.00
3	33	33	33					3.00	3.00
a	51	42	5	1	1			2.28	2.58
b	51	26	11	11	1			2.84	3.41
c	40	37	11	11	1			3.11	3.55
d	40	37	9	9	5			3.17	3.73
e	51	49						2.00	2.00
f	70	5	5	5	5	5	5	1.99	3.15

ization index (*I*) was introduced in communication studies as a measure of entropy (Shannon 1948; Shannon and Weaver 1959; Theil 1972). In political science literature it is also known as the Kesselman–Wildgen index (Kesselman 1966; Wildgen 1971). Index *I* has the same limits as *N*, and it is defined as follows:

$$I = \text{antilog}[-\sum_{i=1}^{n} (P_i^2 \log P_i)],$$

where P_i is proportion of votes (or seats) of the *i*th party.

The advantages and weaknesses of *N* and *I* are clearly shown with the cases included in Table 1. For the formats of *k* parties of the same size (cases 1–3), both *N* and *I* work well, delivering precisely *k*; but they do not behave well when applied to less obvious cases. Consider cases a–f, which are the same examples that Taagepera and Shugart use to illustrate the *N* index (1989, 80): Taagepera and Shugart affirm that cases a–d might be classified as two-party systems and that cases c and d, at most, might be considered two-and-a-half-party systems. But *N* and *I* yield higher values. The problems of *N* and *I* are not restricted to those cases. As can be seen in comparing cases e and f, *N* gives the same value to a single-party as to a two-party system. The performance of *I* is worse: it returns the higher value to the single-party system case. The evidence found in cases a–f suffices to show that *N* and *I* do not discriminate between different party systems and that *I* is worse than *N*. They perform poorly for different reasons: *N* counts the largest party as more than one in certain situations, and *I* is too sensitive to small parties.

Table 2 makes clear what is wrong with *N* and *I*. Notice that the square of the winning party size is .49, or 97.5% of the sum of P_i^2, that is, .49/.5025. Thus, 97.5% of the value of *N*, 1.99, is explained by the winning party alone, which is counted as 1.94 parties. That is why *N* does not work well. A similar analysis of the computation of index *I* for case f shows that the winning party contributes 22% of the value of the index *I* for case f (3.15), that is, −.245/−1.148. This means that the winning party is counted as only .68 of a party. In contrast, each small party, which contributes 13% of the index *I*, that is, −.145/−1.148, is counted as .41 parties.

Index *NP* avoids both problems ("overcounting" of large parties and excessive sensitivity to small ones). The overcounting of the winning party can be avoided through a reformulation of *N*, as follows:

$$NP = 1 + N \frac{\left(\sum_{i=1}^{n} P_i^2\right) - P_1^2}{\sum_{i=1}^{n} P_i^2}$$

Table 2. Detail of the Computation of N and I for the Hypothetical Case f

		Computation of N	Computation of I
Case f	(P_i)	P_i^2	$(\log P_i)P_i$
Winning party	.70	.49	−.250
Minor party	.05	.0025	−.150
———	—	—	—
———	—	—	—
———	—	—	—
Minor party	.05	.0025	−.150
Total	1.00	.5025	−1.148
		$N = 1.99$	$I = 3.15$

where

$$N = 1/\sum_{i=1}^{n} P_i^2$$

and P_i^2 is proportion of votes of the winning party, squared.

The trick in NP is to count the winning party differently from the rest, *counting the winning party as one* and weighting N by the contribution of the minority parties,

$$\left(\sum_{i=1}^{n} P_i^2\right) - P_1^2.$$

Coming from N, index NP is also a probability measure: it weighs the probability that two randomly chosen voters belong to the same minority party by the probability that two randomly chosen voters belong to the same party (winner or not). Although NP comes from N, it carries an extra bit of information—the distinction between the winning party and the rest, which is a key feature of party systems.[3] The conventional counting of the winning party as one is intuitively clear: even if a coalition of minority parties exclude the winning party from government, a good counting rule should always count the winning party as one, regardless of its size. That clear advantage of NP over N and I is not its only edge. Consider Table 3, where all previous cases and their indices values are presented, sorted by their NP values.

NP adequately captures the different

Table 3. Sorting of Cases by the Value of Index NP

Case	Division of Vote (or Seats) Among Parties (in %)							N	I	NP
1	100							1.00	1.00	1.00
f	70	5	5	5	5	5	5	1.99	3.15	1.06
b	51	26	11	11	1			2.84	3.41	1.74
a	51	42	5	1	1			2.28	2.58	1.93
e	51	49						2.00	2.00	1.96
2	50	50						2.00	2.00	2.00
c	40	37	11	11	1			3.11	3.55	2.56
d	40	37	9	9	5			3.17	3.73	2.61
3	33	33	33					3.00	3.00	3.00

Figure 1. Performance of the Index *NP*
(389 cases)



cases. It gives values around 2.6 to cases c and d, which Taagepera and Shugart considered two-party or, at most, two-and-a-half-party systems. *NP* also distinguishes single-party from the two-party systems (compare case f with cases a and e). In short, *NP* smoothly sorts the array of cases reflecting the increasing number of relevant parties. To show that the edge of *NP* over *N* and *I* is general, a comparison of the indices is made using a model of formats of party competition. The model is a systematic set of 389 cases that starts with a format of 95–5, moves to 90–5–5, then to 90–10, to 85–15, to 85–10–5, and so on, including cases with up to eight parties (its last case is 15–15–15–15–15–15–10). The rationale of the model is that the operationalization of the variable *number of parties* should consider at least three features of a party system: size of the winning party, gap between the two larger parties, and degree of concentration of the minority parties. It is intuitively clear that the number of relevant parties in a system will be inversely related to the size of the winning party. Figure 1 presents the values of *NP* for the 389 cases as a function of the size of the winning party. Similar plots for *I* and *N* are not shown for the sake of brevity.

The three indices are highly correlated and they vary, as expected, in an inverse relation with the size of the winning party. But *I* and *N* return higher values, and have higher variance, than *NP*. It is the case that *N* and *I* (but especially the latter) "overreact" to small changes in the size of the winning party. Both *I* and *N* return values of two or more *too soon*—*N* at the level of 65%, and *I* at 80%. Worse, *I* delivers values of three or more when the winning party is as large as 70%. Indeed, *I* is a very disorderly, almost atonic statistic; for the sake of brevity, I shall therefore now concentrate on *N* and *NP*.[4] *NP* stays low until the size of the winning party decreases substantially: it delivers values of two or more until the winning party size drops below 50% and values of three or more until it drops to around 33%. In this respect, the three indices vary as expected; but it is clear that *NP* behaves better.

Regarding the other two aspects of party system, the contrast is sharper. If

Figure 2. Comparison of *N* and *NP*, Holding Winning Party Constant at 50%



the size of the winning party is not controlled, the indices vary inversely with the gap between the two largest parties, as expected; but if the size of the winning party is controlled, the behavior of *NP* and *N* differs qualitatively.[5] While *NP* *decreases* if the gap between the two largest parties widens, *N* tends to *increase*. This behavior is plotted in Figure 2.

Generally, *NP* captures better the number and relevance of parties, because, ceteris paribus, an increase in the gap between the two largest parties in a system means a reduction of its competitiveness; and that, in turn, implies a decrease in the relevance of minority parties. Yet competitiveness and number of parties are related, but not identical, concepts; and there are situations where the supriority of *N* or *NP* might be controversial and subject to external considerations, such as coalition possibilities or spatial distributions of parties. I discuss this point using the cases shown in Table 4.

The first three cases of Table 4 form a sequence of swings from the second party to a third, holding the size of the winning party constant. *N* follows this sequence, departing from two- toward three-party-system values, while *NP* values decrease. Which is better? Some will prefer the increase in values because a third party has appeared; but others may prefer the decrease, because the swing produces a format that resembles a dominant party system. Both things happen. In general, when the winning party holds a majority, *NP* captures the changes in the format better than *N*; but if the winning party is only a plurality, the evaluation is more controversial.

Now consider cases j and k of Table 4:

Table 4. Comparison of Indices *N* and *NP* in Several Hypothetical Cases

Case	Division of Vote (or Seats) Among Parties (in %)				Indices	
					N	*NP*
g	55	45			1.98	1.79
h	55	35	10		2.30	1.70
i	55	25	20		2.47	1.62
j	41	39	20		2.78	2.48
k	41	20	20	19	3.52	2.44
l	41	39	12	8	3.28	2.49
m	41	39	10	10	3.30	2.49

Table 5. Comparison of Indices *N* and *NP* in Several Actual Cases

	N and *NP* Values for Six Countries (Means for the 1945–1981 Period)			
	Seats		Votes	
Country	*N*	*NP*	*N*	*NP*
Japan (1958–72)	2.5	1.5	2.5	1.5
Norway	3.2	1.8	3.9	2.1
Sweden	3.2	1.9	3.4	2.0
France (Fifth Republic)	3.6	2.3	4.9	3.7
Israel	4.5	2.5	4.8	2.7
Italy	3.5	2.2	3.9	2.5

Source: Data from Mackie and Rose 1984. Author's computations.

case j is a clear two-and-a-half-party system; and case k, which shows a swing from the second party to a fourth, presents four relevant parties, because all of them are large enough to be included in minimal winning coalitions. In this sequence, *NP* remains stable, while *N* jumps toward four. Again, some observers may prefer the increase in the index because the additional party is relevant; then again, stability may be justified because the position of the winning party as the pivotal (dominant?) party has been enhanced.[6]

The indices also differ in their variation against changes on the concentration of the minority party votes, holding the level of the winning party constant.[7] *NP* is less sensitive than *N*, and it varies in the opposite direction. Again, it is possible to argue for either *N* or *NP*. Compare the sequence from case j to l with that from case j to m in Table 4. In the former, the swing from the third party to a fourth changes nothing, because the fourth cannot join any minimal winning coalition while the third party remains relevant. The rise in *N* is misleading and the stability of *NP* is adequate. Yet in the sequence from j to m the fourth party is as relevant as the third, and the increase in *N* might capture the change better; although it is possible to argue that m is still a two-and-a-fragmented-half-party system.

The Indices in Empirical Cases

It is useful to compare *N* and *NP* in real situations. In some cases, like the two-party systems of Austria, New Zealand, the United States, and the United Kingdom, the difference between indices is negligible. In others, such as Finland, the French IV Republic, Netherlands, or Switzerland, the difference is relatively large, but it would not lead to different classifications of party systems. But there are cases where the difference in index value is very significant, suggesting a change in the classification. Table 5 presents a summary of the more interesting of them.

Japan after 1955 is a case that clearly supports *NP*, because its values (around 1.6) make more sense than those of *N* (around 2.5). Japan has properly been classified by observers and by Japanese politicians as a one-and-a-half-party system (see Figure 3). Other cases may be controversial: Sweden and Norway, which are usually classified as multiparty systems, would have to be reclassified as dominant party systems. Albeit debatable, such classification is not baseless. Despite the persistence of several parties, Sweden and Norway have been dominated by one party, the Social Democrats and Labour, respectively. This dominance is reflected in the infrequency of coalition cabinets. Besides, *NP* shrinks toward 1.5 when the dominant parties get majorities and surpasses two whenever alternative coalitions governed or could have governed.[8] In this, *NP* supports Sartori's contention that "it is only banal to say that both are multiparty systems. The question is, instead, whether Norway and

Figure 3. Differences Between *N* and *NP*: Parliamentary Seats in Japan



Sweden should not be assigned to the predominant party systems" (1976, 174). *NP* captures the distinction between multiparty systems with or without dominant party. This is relevant, because the mechanics of a system is at least as determined by the saliency of a party as by the multiplicity of parties (Blondel 1968).

NP also makes sense in the French case. *NP* values for votes between 1958 and 1981 vary between 5.2 to 2.1, reflecting the totality of the electorate.[9] The contrast of *NP* and *N* in the French case is larger with regard to seats: while the lowest *N* is 2.5 in 1968, *NP* yields 1.3 and 1.4 in 1968 and 1981 (see Figure 4). These values conflict with the multiparty classification of France, but they reflect the dominance of the Gaullists in 1968 and of the Socialists in 1981. *NP* captures what

Figure 4. Differences Between *N* and *NP*: Parliamentary Seats in France



Sartori describes as "the persistence and coexistence of opposite pulls: the traditional voting distributions of the Fourth Republic, as against the constraints of the [Fifth Republic] constitution" (1976, 179).

Israel and Italy are the most difficult cases, because they are usually classified as extreme examples of multiparty systems. However, recent studies have emphasized the dominance of one party in each of these systems, and the alternation of party in government in Italy (Aronoff 1990; Di Palma 1990). In both cases, *NP* values would suggest a reclassification as two-and-a-half-party systems. The values of *NP* for Israel vary between 3.1 and 1.8. In this case, despite the remarkably high number of parties and factions that get seats in the Knesset, two great blocks, the Labor and Likud camps, have dominated the system and have interacted with the small parties that enter in the alliances or alter the strategies of competition.[10]

As for Italy, *NP* has been stable at around 2.4 between 1963 and 1979. Such numbers certainly seem both very low and very stable, but some features of the Italian support the two-and-a-fragmented-half-party count: the Christian Democrats always had the option of building several alternative coalitions without requiring the participation of the Socialists (who did join the government coalitions when required). The left pole has never been large enough to build an alternative majority coalition even if all the socialists parties joined a Communist-led coalition. The fragmentation of both the Socialist party and of the rest of the small parties resembles the fragmented half.[11]

Conclusion

N and *I* are weak indices of the variable number and size of parties. *N* is weak because in certain situations it overstates the size of the largest party, while *I* overstates the relevance of small parties. To solve these problems, I propose a modification of the *N* index, in which a value of one is conventionally assigned to the winning party and the other parties are weighted using a nested *N* formula that is normalized with *N*. Index *NP* outperforms *N* and *I*. The advantage of *NP* relative to *N* and *I* is that *NP* behaves better in relation to the size of the largest party and to the gap between the two largest parties.

Notes

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1. See Elkips 1974; Laakso and Taagepera 1979; Pfeiffer 1967; Rae 1967; Rae and Taylor 1970; Sartori 1976; Taagepera 1979; Taylor and Herman 1971; Theil 1969, 1972; Waldam 1976; Wildgen 1971.

2. Or that two randomly chosen legislators belong to the *same* party, when applied to parliament members.

3. *NP* can be expressed in terms of *N* as follows:

$$NP = 1 + N^2 \left(\sum_{i=2}^{n} P_i^2 \right),$$

where

$$\sum_{i=2}^{n} P_i$$

stands for the sum of all the minority parties.

4. When compared to *NP*, *I* is similar to *N* but with higher variance and higher values.

5. The decision to hold the size of the winning party constant is based on the assumption that the size of the winning party is the most relevant of the three analyzed features of party systems. The behavior of the indices is similar holding constant the size of the winning party at any level.

6. Three different minimal winning coalitions may be formed in case j, and the winning party is in two of them; in case k four different minimal winning coalitions are possible, the winning party is in three of them, and the fourth one consists of the three minority parties.

7. Again, the behavior of the indices is similar holding constant the size of the winning party at any level. *Concentration* is defined as *HH* but applied only to the nonwinning parties.

8. Berglung acknowledges that "five parties and two political blocs have long dominated the Scandinavian political landscape" (1981, 80).

9. Interestingly, while in general N has greater variance than NP, in the French case NP has greater variance than N.

10. Elazar, for instance, distinguishes these three great "camps" and asserts that "government coalitions generally consisted of some two thirds of the Labor camp, plus two thirds of the religious camp, plus a small crossover element from the civil camp" (1979, 10).

11. Only in 1983 did such a coalition become feasible, since a coalition of the parliamentary fractions of the Communists, the Socialists, and the Social Democrats would have been a majority. For that year, NP returns 3.0.

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THE EFFECT OF REGISTRATION LAWS AND EDUCATION ON U.S. VOTER TURNOUT

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I show that restrictive registration laws do not dissuade individuals with lower levels of education from voting any more than individuals with higher levels of education. This finding contradicts the result reported in Wolfinger and Rosenstone's classic analysis of turnout. I show that their conclusion was actually an artifact of the methodology they employed. Examining predicted probabilities generated by a nonlinear model such as probit or logit may produce spurious results when used to determine interactive effects between two independent variables. By respecifying the model of turnout to explicitly include terms to test interactive hypotheses and reanalyzing the data from the 1972 Current Population Survey (as well as data from the 1984 survey), I show that in fact, no such substantive interactive effect between registration laws and individuals' level of education exists at the micro level.

I shall address a simple question: Do voting laws affect poorly educated individuals' turnout more than highly educated individuals' turnout? In their seminal work, *Who Votes?*, Wolfinger and Rosenstone (1980) noted that according to their estimates of a multivariate model of voter turnout in the 1972 presidential election, the severity of the voting law restricion had its largest impact on the least educated. They interpreted this to mean that there is an interactive effect at the micro level between the two factors. They explained that "formal education increases one's capacity for understanding and working with complex, abstract, and intangible subjects—that is, subjects like politics" and that "this heightened level of understanding and information would also reduce the cost of registering" (pp. 79-80).

Such a conclusion is seductively appealing. The idea that an individual facing a high cost of voting is less likely to vote is consistent with Anthony Downs's assertion that "a rational man decides whether to vote just as he makes all other decisions: if the return outweighs the costs, he votes; if not, he abstains" (1957, 260). However, I shall demonstrate exactly how Wolfinger and Rosenstone reached this conclusion. I show that it does not necessarily follow from the data analysis and is instead an artifact of the methodology used. Correcting the specification of their model, I show that increased education does not enhance individuals' abilities to comply with complex registration requirements any more than does any other variable Wolfinger and Rosenstone considered.

In most work on the effects of registration laws on voting turnout, it is not really the individual who is the center of attention. Rather, the substantive interest is in groups of individuals sharing a common trait: blacks, poor people, women, and so on. Groups sharing such traits are also likely to share preferences on policy issues, hence serious normative issues are raised if

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an institutional feature of the political system affects one group's propensity to vote more than another group's. The question becomes how to show the effect of registration laws on a *group* of individuals—in this case the group with a low level of education.

Interpreting Estimates from Nonlinear Models

While groups of individuals are ultimately of interest, actual analysis of voter turnout frequently proceeds at the individual level. Estimating the effects of several independent variables on a dichotomous (0/1) variable, such as the decision whether or not to vote, is usually done with either probit or logit analysis. Both the probit and logit models assume that while we only observe the values of zero and one for the variable Y, there is a latent, unobserved continuous variable Y^* that determines the value of Y.[1] We assume that Y^* can be specified,

$$Y_i^* = \beta_0 + \beta_1 x_{1i} + \beta_2 x_{2i} + \ldots + \beta_k x_{ki} + u_i$$

and that

$$Y_i = 1 \text{ if } Y_i^* > 0,$$
$$Y_i = 0 \text{ otherwise,}$$

where $x_1, x_2, \ldots, x_k$ represent vectors of random variables and u represents a random disturbance term.

If we make the usual assumption that the disturbances u are normally distributed then we can derive the probit model:

$$Pr(Y_i = 1) = \Phi(\beta_0 + \beta_1 x_{1i} + \beta_2 x_{2i} + \ldots + \beta_k x_{ki}) = \Phi(X_i\beta), \qquad (1)$$

where Φ represents the cumulative normal distribution function.

In common parlance, both models assume an S-shaped response curve such that in each tail of the curve the dependent variable, $Pr(Y_i = 1)$, responds slowly to changes in the independent variables, while toward the middle of the curve (i.e., toward the point where $Pr[Y_i = 1]$ is closest to .5), the dependent variable responds more swiftly to changes in the independent variables (see Figure 1). Using maximum likelihood techniques we can compute estimates of the coefficients (βs) and their corresponding standard errors that are asymptotically efficient. However, these estimates cannot be interpreted in the same manner that normal regression coefficients are. These coefficients give the impact of the independent variables on the latent variable Y^*, not Y itself. To transfer Y^* into a probability estimate for Y we compute the cumulative normal of Y^*.

Because of this transformation there is no linear relationship between the coefficients and $Pr(Y_i = 1)$. Hence, the change in $Pr(Y_i = 1)$ caused by a change in x_{ji} will depend upon the value of all of the other xs and their corresponding coefficients, or, more precisely, on the value of the sum $X_i\beta$, as well as the change in x_{ji}. To simplify things, assume there is only one independent variable and that $\beta_0 = 0$, and $\beta_1 = 1$. Hence, the expression in equation 1 simplifies to $Pr(Y_i = 1) = \Phi(x_1)$. As the points on Figure 1 indicate, a change in x_1 from 0 to 1 causes a change in $Pr(Y_i = 1)$ of .34 (.84 − .50); while a change in x_1 from −1.65 to −.65 (also a change of only one unit) causes a change in $Pr(Y_i = 1)$ of .21 (.26 − .05). Hence, simply knowing the change in x cannot tell us the predicted change in $Pr(Y_i = 1)$; that change depends on where on the curve we start.

Imagine now that Figure 1 represents a model with two independent variables, x_1 and x_2. Now the effect of a given change

Figure 1. Predicted Probabilities Using the Cumulative Normal Distribution



in x_1 upon $Pr(Y_i = 1)$ will depend upon the sum $(x_1\beta_1 + x_2\beta_2)$. The effect of x_1 will be greatest when the sum $(x_1\beta_1 + x_2\beta_2)$ is closest to zero and weakest as $(x_1\beta_1 + x_2\beta_2)$ approaches $\pm\infty$. But this means that the effect of x_1 depends on the value of x_2. Or, without making any substantive inference about the relationship between x_1 and x_2, we have been able to conclude that they "interactively" affect $Pr(Y_i = 1)$. This interactive effect is assumed in the model specification. And the interaction is assumed to be greatest when $(x_1\beta_1 + x_2\beta_2)$ is closest to zero, or, when $\Phi(x_1\beta_1 + x_2\beta_2) = Pr(Y_i = 1)$ is closest to .5. This suggests the hazards of drawing inferences about relationships among independent variables from probit estimates of predicted probabilities. And this is precisely what confounds Wolfinger and Rosenstone's (1980) analysis.

Education and Closing

According to Wolfinger and Rosenstone's (1980) estimate of a subsample of the 1972 Current Population Survey, reported in Table 1, column 3, changing the registration laws would raise the average turnout rate of respondents with zero-to-four years of education by 8.2%, while the average turnout rate of respondents with five-plus years of college would go up only 1.9%. Wolfinger and Rosenstone (1980) used a complicated, but effective, technique to estimate these effects. First, they estimated a probit model to predict turnout with education, education-squared, age, age-squared, a dummy for the South, a dummy to denote the presence of a gubernatorial election in the state, and four measures of registration laws as independent variables: (1) a dummy to denote irregular hours for registration, (2) a dummy to denote the availability of Saturday and/or evening registration, (3) a dummy to denote the unavailability of absentee voting, and (4) the number of days before the election that registration closes.[2] They then used the estimated coefficients to compute a predicted probability of voting, $\widehat{Pr}_i = \Phi(X_i\beta)$ for each individual i in their sample. Following this, they made the appropriate change in the explanatory variable of interest (they reset the number of days to registration closing to zero) and recomputed the probability of voting for each individual. Call this new hypothetical probability $\widetilde{Pr}_i$. $\widetilde{Pr}_i$ gives the estimated probability of the i^{th} individual voting *if* there were no registration requirement. Each individual's actual values of the other independent variables are used to compute their own hypothetical probabilities; there is no reason to substitute values for any of the independent variables besides days to closing. In other words, $\widetilde{Pr}_i = \Phi(\tilde{X}_i\hat{\beta})$, where $\tilde{X}_i = [X_i | x_{ji} = 0]$, and x_j is the variable of interest (closing) that is being hypothetically set to zero. The impact of the registration requirement on the i^{th} individual is arrived at by subtracting the first number ($\widehat{Pr}_i$) from the second number ($\widetilde{Pr}_i$).

Table 1, columns 4 and 6 show the results I obtained by applying the probit model just described to the entire sample and computing the change in expected voting rates for different education groups (as well as different income and age groups) under two different assumptions: (1) that the closing requirement for registration is removed (i.e., set to zero) and (2) that all states allow some form of absentee voting. Since hypothetical probabilities and actual probabilities have been computed for everyone in the sample, it is simple to present the results aggregated over any subsample, as opposed to presenting the result for the entire sample. According to these estimates, if the closing date were eliminated, an additional 6.2% of persons with four or fewer years of education would vote, while turnout would increase among those with five or more years of college by only 2.2%. The 6.2% and 2.2% figures are arrived at by averaging the change in probability experienced by each individual in the respective categories (and multiplying by 100).

To make individual-level inferences from these results would, however, represent a misinterpretation of the probit estimates. As we know, because of the shape of the cumulative normal distribution, probit estimates are most sensitive to the impact of any variable for the respondents closest to probability .5 of voting. The effect of changes in the closing date Wolfinger and Rosenstone (1980) report are biggest within each category for the lowest turnout group; that is, the effect is biggest on the least-educated, lowest-income-earning, and youngest (Table 1, col. 3). Coincidentally, for two of the three categories in Table 1 (income and age) the lowest turnout group was also the group closest to 50% in turnout. Among the education groups, the group closest to 50% in expected voting rate was the next-to-least-educated group: those with five to seven years of education, whose expected voting rate was 42.2%. That Wolfinger and Rosenstone report a larger increase for the least-educated group, whose predicted voting rate was 32.2%, rather than the second-least-educated group, who had a predicted voting rate of 42.2%, can only result from differing predicted voting rates for these groups within the subsample of the data set they used for their analysis.[3]

Table 1, column 4 reports the predicted change in voting rates based on analysis of the entire sample rather than the subsample used by Wolfinger and Rosenstone (1980). These figures correspond with the predicted voting rates offered in column 2. The predicted change for the least-educated group is less than the predicted change for the next-least-educated group, which is higher than the predicted change for all other education groups. Thus, to the extent that those with less education are nearest to the .5 mark in their expected probability of voting (or become nearest to the .5 mark in their expected probability of voting after altering a different independent variable), they will be more affected than those with higher education levels by changes in *any* independent variable.

This problem is easy to see if one considers it in terms of the normal density curve illustrated in Figure 1. Since persons with the lowest education level are those who on average are closest to having .5 probability of voting, estimates of change based on that group will necessarily be larger than estimates of change for any other group. Thus, the smaller effects of closing on better-educated groups is simply an artifact of the changing slope of the normal density curve, not a result of a unique relationship between individuals' education and state registration requirements. Hence, to infer substantive interaction between registration laws and education based on the differing estimated impacts is incorrect. This interaction is *assumed* by the model specification. This

Table 1. Predicted Change in Voting Rate for Selected Samples of the Population Based on Changes in Voting Laws

			Predicted Change			
			Closing Days Set to Zero		Absentee Balloting Allowed	
Group	CPS Sample Voting Rate	Predicted Voting Rate[a]	*Who Votes?*[b]	Final Model, 1972	*Who Votes?*[b]	Final Model, 1972
Education (years)						
0–4	32.9	32.2	8.2	6.2	1.0	.209
5–7	44.9	42.2	7.9	6.4	.9	.229
8	57.0	56.2	6.9	5.8	.6	.124
9–11	53.7	59.0	7.0	5.7	.6	.142
12	66.1	66.1	6.1	5.2	.5	.111
1–3 college	76.0	72.1	5.4	4.8	.4	.094
4 college	83.6	83.2	3.8	3.6	.4	.088
5+ college	87.4	90.8	1.9	2.2	.1	.046
Income						
Under $2,000	45.1	54.7	7.1	5.7	1.0	.221
$2,000–7,499	55.1	59.9	6.6	5.5	.6	.150
$7,500–9,999	63.3	63.6	6.3	5.3	.5	.115
$10,000–14,999	71.6	67.7	5.8	5.0	.4	.099
$15,000–24,999	79.7	73.0	5.1	4.5	.3	.072
$25,000+	83.4	76.7	4.3	4.0	.2	.072
Age						
18–24	51.9	52.7	7.2	5.9	.5	.128
25–31	60.0	61.2	6.7	5.6	.6	.132
32–36	64.3	65.6	6.0	5.2	.5	.130
37–50	70.5	70.2	5.5	4.8	.5	.112
51–69	73.0	70.7	5.3	4.6	.5	.111
70–78	66.5	65.5	6.0	5.0	.5	.116
79+	50.9	60.2	6.8	5.4	.5	.118

[a] Predicted voting rate for entire CPS sample based on replication of Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980, App. F.
[b] From Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980, Table 4.2.

result is not an artifact of the averaging procedure used by Wolfinger and Rosenstone. If we compared the changes caused by the closing law on individuals with mean or modal values for all variables except education, we would still find a larger change for the little-educated individual than the well-educated individual when the value of the registration requirement increases.[4]

For comparison, examine the estimated effect of the availability of absentee voting. It is unlikely that absentee voting is primarily a tool of the poorest and least-educated. It seems far more likely that absentee voting is utilized most by the well-educated and affluent. However, examining the results in Table 1, we observe the most severe effect on the poorest and least-educated. Again, we are merely observing an artifact of the methodology. It would be wrong to change prior beliefs about the relationship between absentee voting and socioeconomic status based on these results. I shall respecify the model to allow for an explicit test of the hypotheses that registration laws most severely affect poorly educated individuals.

Two Proper Interactive Tests

I use two statistical tests to determine whether registration requirements depress turnout for little-educated groups more than would be predicted based simply on the aggregate turnout level of the group (i.e., based on the group's proximity to a 50% turnout rate). The most common technique used to test for interactive effects between two variables x_j and x_k is to assume that such effects are multiplicative and to add a term equal to the product of the two variables ($x_j \times x_k$) as an independent variable (Jaccard, Turrisi, and Wan 1990). A second technique is to disaggregate the data based on the value of x_j (or x_k) and compare the coefficients of x_k (or x_j) for the different samples. To add to the reliability of the results and because of the counterintuitive nature of the findings for 1972, I also analyze census data from 1984 using both techniques.

Consider a simple model of turnout where education and closing are the only independent variables, and an interactive term is included in the model:

$$Y_i^* = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \text{education}_i + \beta_2 \text{closing}_i + \beta_3(\text{education}_i \times \text{closing}_i) + u_i. \quad (2)$$

The total effect on Y_i^* of a one-unit increase in the closing variable is given by

$$\Delta Y_i^* = \beta_2 + \beta_3 \times \text{education}_i.$$

Since β_2 is conjectured to be negative (the further from the election registration closes, the less likely an individual is to vote), if β_3 is positive, then the contribution of the last term will *decrease* the total effect of closing on Y_i^*. And the larger this last term is (i.e., the higher the individual's level of education), the more the effect of closing will be attenuated. Table 2 reports estimates of the Wolfinger and Rosenstone model with the addition of (1) the multiplicative interactive term *education × closing,* (2) the multiplicative interaction term *education-squared × closing,* and (3) both multiplicative interactive terms.

Looking at the third column of Table 2, the estimated value of the coefficient of the interactive term is negative and significant ($t = -3.38$).[5] This is a perverse result, suggesting that the higher an individual's level of education, the more the effect of closing will be *increased.* The estimates of the model including *closing × education-squared* offer similar results; the coefficient of the interactive term is again negative and significant ($t = -2.97$).

Interpretation of the fuller model including both interactive terms is slightly

Table 2. Estimates of the Final Model, 1972

	Wolfinger & Rosenstone[a]		Replication of Wolfinger & Rosenstone		Inclusion of Interactive Term(s)					
					First		Second		First & Second	
Independent Variable	Estimated Coefficient	*t*-ratio	Estimated Coefficient	*t*-ratio	Estimated Coefficient	*t*-ratio	Estimated Coefficient	*t*-ratio	Estimated Coefficient	*t*-ratio
Intercept	-2.7001	-11.20**	-2.4928	-53.74**	-2.6562	-39.62**	-2.5759	-47.55**	-2.7597	-26.51**
Education	.1847	15.39**	.2635	20.52**	.3003	17.83**	.2654	20.65**	.3544	7.90**
Education-squared	.0120	2.40**	.0035	2.56**	.0033	2.36**	.0067	3.83**	-.0029	-.59
Age	.0707	15.71**	.0653	48.69**	.0652	48.63**	.0653	48.66**	.0652	48.60**
Age-squared	-.0006	-6.00**	-.0005	-35.93**	-.0005	-35.83**	-.0005	-35.86**	-.0005	-35.79**
South	-.1371	-3.32**	-.1935	-15.03**	-.1936	-15.05**	-.1934	-15.03**	-.1939	-15.07**
Hours	.0336	2.11**	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Gubernatorial election	.0634	1.88*	.0682	6.66**	.0683	6.67**	.0682	6.66**	.0686	6.70**
Irregular registration hours	-.1005	-2.29**	-.0155	-.97	-.0137	-.86	-.0141	-.88	-.0134	-.84
Evening/Saturday registration	.1253	3.63**	.1009	10.10**	.1009	10.10**	.1009	10.10**	.1010	10.11**
No absentee registration	-.0909	-2.26**	-.0291	-1.92*	-.0295	-1.95*	-.0296	-1.95*	-.0293	-1.94*
Closing date	-.0073	-4.87**	-.0062	-10.27**	-.0005	-.26	-.0033	-2.93**	.0032	.96
Closing date × education	—	—	—	—	-.0012	-3.38**	—	—	-.0032	-2.07**
Closing date × education-squared	—	—	—	—	—	—	-.0001	-2.97**	.0002	1.30
Number of cases	7,936		90,279		90,279		90,279		90,279	
Percent voting	66.7		65.30		65.30		65.30		65.30	
Correctly predicted	71.4		70.62		70.63		70.64		70.61	
Log-likelihood	-577		-51,915		-51,909		-51,911		-51,909	

[a] From Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980, App. F.

**$p \leq .05$, two-tailed test.

*$p \leq .10$, two-tailed test.

more complex because of the opposite signs of the coefficients of the terms. Here the change in Y_i^* based on a one-unit increase in closing can be given by

$$\Delta Y_i^* = .0032 - .0032 \times \text{education}_i + .0002 \times \text{education-squared}_i. \quad (3)$$

First, since education is only scaled from zero to eight, the value of ΔY_i^* given by the right-hand side of equation 3 will be negative for any value of education. Hence, increases in closing have the predicted effect of decreasing the probability of voting. Second, over this range of possible values of education, any increase in education levels will *decrease* the value of the right-hand side of equation 3. This means that an additional unit of education will again result in an *increase* in the tendency of closing to decrease an individual's likelihood of voting; or, individuals with higher levels of education will be more affected by the closing date than will individuals with low levels of education. (See Appendix for a more technical discussion of this model.)

I estimated similar models for 1984.[6] The pattern of the coefficients of closing and the interactive terms is identical (Table 3). When added individually each interactive term has a negative coefficient. And when both interactive terms are included in the model, increased education still *increases* the effect of closing over the relevant range of the variable. Log-likelihood ratio tests also indicated that the full models with interactive terms are significant improvements over the initial specification. The calculated chi-squared statistic is significant at the 99% level for 1972 and 95% level for 1984.

Disaggregation

A simpler alternative to specifying the multiplicative interactive term is to disaggregate the sample by the variable of interest. By estimating the same model for the entire sample, one is assuming that the effects of each independent variable are fixed across all members of the sample or, in the case of probit, across all members of the sample with the same initial probability of voting. Disaggregating the model explicitly allows the coefficients to vary. Given a large-enough sample, this method allows us to examine the conjectured pattern of interaction much more closely. Table 4 presents the results of the same models presented in Tables 2 and 3; but the education terms are removed and, instead, the model is estimated at 10 different levels of education: 0–4 years, 5–7 years, 8 years, 9–11 years, 12 years, 1–3 years of college, 4 years of college, 5+ years of college, 0–11 years, and 12+ years. Rather than presenting all the coefficients for the 20 different sets of estimates, only the coefficient of interest (i.e., closing) is presented for each subsample.

These results are consistent with the counterintuitive result from the interactive terms. Comparing the last two groups—those without a high school degree and high school graduates—we see that the magnitude of the coefficient of closing is larger in the *latter* group for both 1972 and 1984: −.00574 versus −.00669, and −.00598 versus −.00726, respectively. This suggests that more-educated persons have a *harder* time than less-educated persons in dealing with the burden of registration. The first eight rows of the table explain this result in more detail. The effect of the registration requirement generally increases as respondents' education levels approach a high school education and does not tail off until individuals acquire some college education. Individuals with a high school education are more affected by registration requirements than individuals without high school degrees. Yet individuals with college degrees are less affected than individuals with only high school degrees. The pattern is identical for both years.

Table 3. Estimates of the Final Model, 1984

	Replication of Wolfinger & Rosenstone		Inclusion of Interactive Term(s)					
			First		Second		First & Second	
Independent Variable	Estimated Coefficient	*t*-ratio	Estimated Coefficient	*t*-ratio	Estimated Coefficient	*t*-ratio	Estimated Coefficient	*t*-ratio
Intercept	-2.5241	-51.47**	-2.5919	-39.78**	-2.5501	-47.04**	-2.7565	-25.68**
Education	.1806	12.42**	.1941	11.51**	.1806	12.42**	.2673	6.44**
Education-squared	.0124	8.63**	.0124	8.61**	.0133	8.01**	.0048	1.17
Age	.0696	53.10**	.0696	53.09**	.0696	53.09**	.0695	53.06**
Age-squared	-.0005	-37.47**	-.0005	-37.45**	-.0005	-37.46**	-.0005	-37.41**
South	-.1129	-10.81**	-.1127	-10.79**	-.1128	-10.80**	-.1124	-10.76**
Gubernatorial election	-.0213	1.97**	.0211	1.95**	.0211	1.95**	.0218	2.01**
Closing date	-.0076	-17.20**	-.0050	-2.88**	-.0066	-6.50**	.0014	.37
Closing date × education	—	—	-.0005	-1.58	—	—	-.0034	-2.23**
Closing date × education-squared	—	—	—	—	-.0004	-1.12	.0003	1.93*
Number of cases	98,860		98,860		98,860		98,860	
Percent voting	67.01		67.01		67.01		67.01	
Correctly predicted	71.04		71.04		71.05		71.05	
Log-likelihood	-55,375		-55,374		-55,374		-55,372	

**$p \leq .05$, two-tailed test.
*$p \leq .10$, two-tailed test.

Table 4. Comparison of the Effect of Closing for Different Education Levels

	1972			1984		
Education Level (years)	Coefficient of Closing	*t*-ratio	*N*	Coefficient of Closing	*t*-ratio	*N*
0–4	−.00121	-0.37	3,216	−.00296	-0.72	1,495
5–7	−.00335	-1.40	5,234	−.00530	-1.97**	2,995
8	−.00279	-1.56	8,922	−.00701	-4.20**	5,459
9–11	−.00425	-2.84**	14,234	−.00463	-3.61**	11,784
12	−.00807	-8.17**	32,471	−.00872	-12.85**	38,389
1–3 college	−.00705	-4.42**	14,487	−.00764	-7.82**	20,522
4 college	−.00724	-2.86**	6,910	−.00769	-4.83**	10,510
5+ college	−.00679	-2.04**	4,805	−.00538	-2.65**	7,706
0–11	−.00574	-5.92**	31,606	−.00598	-6.52**	21,733
12+	−.00699	-9.19**	58,673	−.00726	-14.55**	77,127

Note: The model from Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980, App. F (with the education variables omitted) was used to generate these coefficients.

$^{**}p \leq .05$, two-tailed test.

Such a pattern sharply contradicts the theory that an increase in an individual's level of education increases his or her ability to adapt to registration requirements.

Conclusion

We generally think of interactive effects as having substantive meaning. When we say that there is an interactive effect between education and registration requirements, we want it to mean that an individual's level of education will determine how he or she is affected by registration requirements. And we ought to have a meaningful explanation as to why there should be such an interaction. One is readily available in this case, that poorly educated individuals will have difficulty with a complex registration requirement.

However, once such a relationship has been specified, we need to test it *explicitly* within the estimation framework we are using. Nonlinear models impose an "interactive" relationship on all of the independent variables. We are not interested in this assumed relationship among all the independent variables. We are interested in the relationship between only *two* independent variables: education and registration requirements. To disentangle this relationship requires adding an interactive term involving only these two variables to the underlying model or disaggregating the sample and comparing estimated coefficients rather than predicted probabilities. The analytical and quantitative analyses have demonstrated that using nonlinear models to show substantive interactive effects between independent variables is a hazardous exercise. I have also shown a straightforward method of overcoming this hazard while retaining the use of common nonlinear models such as probit and logit.

The modest contribution of the empirical research presented here is to show that what was thought to be a fact, namely, that poorly educated persons are more deterred from voting by registration laws than well-educated persons, is not a fact. This claim has become commonplace in introductory texts on U.S. government (e.g., Johnson et al. 1990, 244; Patterson 1990, 207). However, for 1972 and 1984 both tests of the differential effects of closing on education groups lead us to reject the contention that there is an individual-level interaction between education and the closing date that makes little-educated individuals more sensitive to registration impediments. Use of an interactive term did not produce the predicted coefficient. And when individuals were broken down by level of education, the less-educated individuals were not found to be especially sensitive to changes in the closing date.

The broader substantive point argued here is that if we accept the assumptions of the probit model, changes in *any* systemic feature that raises turnout will raise it disproportionately among less-educated individuals. To concentrate on registration laws as a means to address the imbalance in voting rates between the poorly educated and well-educated would be a potentially inefficient means of achieving a specified public policy outcome.

I have concentrated on refuting the individual-level assertion made by Wolfinger and Rosenstone (1980). However, the aggregate assertion—that the less-educated as a group are more affected by restrictive registration laws—is no less a result of Wolfinger and Rosenstone's assumption of the probit specification. This specification assumes that individuals at the extremes are fixed in their propensity to vote. However, if one wishes to test *which* individuals are most affected by changes in explanatory variables, then the probit model is not the answer; for when using probit, any grouping procedure that segregates people based on their value of the dependent variable (or based on a characteristic correlated with the dependent variable) will produce a predetermined result: the group closest to .5 probability on the dependent variable will experience the largest impact of any group for changes in any independent variable.

Should there be a reason to question the assumptions of the probit or logit model substantively, the researcher may wish to explore other functional forms. The probit model is a result of assuming normality of the disturbances. Going back to equation 1, *any* cumulative density function could have been assumed for the disturbances. This includes cumulative density functions that are not symmetric about zero. In other words, this includes cumulative density functions that would correspond to situations where individuals with very low or very high—rather than close to .5—probabilities of voting respond most to changes in the independent variables. The exploration of such models would allow us to test an important, but currently untested, behavioral assumption.

Appendix: Testing for Interaction

We say that there is an interactive effect among x_1 and x_2 if the effect of x_1 on Y depends upon the value of x_2. Technically, this means that there will be an interactive effect if either $\partial Y/\partial x_1$ is dependent upon x_2 or

$$\frac{\partial(\partial Y/\partial x_1)}{\partial x_2} = \frac{\partial^2 Y}{\partial x_1 \partial x_2} \neq 0.$$

In the probit specification, where the dependent variable is $Pr(Y_i = 1)$, this is given by

$$\frac{\partial^2[Pr(Y_i = 1)]}{\partial x_1 \partial x_2} = \frac{\partial^2[\Phi(X_i\beta)]}{\partial x_1 \partial x_2}$$
$$= -\beta_1\beta_2(X_i\beta)\phi(X_i\beta).$$

As this is generically nonzero, there is generally an interactive effect between *any* two variables x_1 and x_2 in the probit model. However, this is not the case for the underlying linear model. Now consider the general linear model with multiplicative interactive terms:

$$Y_i^* = \alpha_0 + \beta_1 x_{1i} + \ldots + \beta_k x_{ki} + \beta_{k+1}(x_{li} \times x_{ji}) + u_i.$$

Here the interactive effect between x_l and x_j is given by

$$\frac{\partial^2 Y^*}{\partial x_1 \partial x_2} = \beta_{k+1}.$$

If β_{k+1} is positive, it indicates that the effect of x_l on Y^* increases as x_j increases. If β_{k+1} is negative, it indicates that the effect of x_l on Y^* decreases as x_j increases. Now consider the specific case of the complete model from Table 2. We had

$$Y^* = Z + \text{closing} \times (.0032 - .0032 \times \text{educ} + .0002 \times \text{educ}^2).$$

Therefore,

$$\frac{\partial Y^*}{\partial \text{closing}} = .0032 - .0032 \times \text{educ} + .0002 \times \text{educ}^2. \qquad \text{(A-1)}$$

This is the effect of closing on Y^*. This effect clearly depends upon education. To see how the effect of closing *varies* with education, we want to see how the right-hand side of equation A-1 changes as education changes, that is, we want to evaluate

$$\frac{\partial^2 Y^*}{\partial \text{closing}\ \partial \text{educ}} = -.0032 + .0004 \times \text{educ}.$$

We are only interested in the sign of this expression. For educ < 8, it is negative. This indicates that as education increases, the effect of closing on Y^* is decreasing, or becoming *more* negative. In other words, as education increases, the magnitude of the deterrent effect of closing on voting is *increasing*.

Notes

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1. See Madalla 1983 for a discussion of limited dependent variable models generally; see pp. 22–27 for a concise exposition of probit and logit. Goldfeld and Quandt (1972, 132–34) offer some empirical comparisons of probit and ordinary least squares estimates.

2. The only variable from Wolfinger and Rosenstone's model omitted here is the number of hours that the polls are open on election day. This number was not readily available for all 50 states; and since the estimates generated without it are quite close to Wolfinger and Rosenstone's own estimates, I did not feel that the expense of collecting the additional data was justified.

3. Barely 3% of the sample is in the least-educated category, so that of the 7,936 cases Wolfinger and Rosenstone used to generate their estimates, only 240 of them would be expected to be in this category. It is thus well within reasonable sampling error to think that the least-educated group in their subsample had a higher predicted voting rate than the next-least-educated group in their subsample.

4. Jacobson uses an equivalent graphical technique with a logit model to show which voters are more affected by challenger campaign spending (1990, 353–55). He recognizes the problem with the technique and offers the appropriate caveat on interpretation.

5. Adding the interactive term *education* × *closing* and removing the *education-squared* term gave the same result: the interactive term was again negative and significant ($t = -3.52$). The same was true for 1984 ($t = -1.70$); thus, the perverse result cannot be attributed to the presence of the quadratic education term. This is reinforced by the disaggregated estimates reported in Table 4, where the *education-squared* term is also absent. Finally, log-likelihood tests indicate that including the *education-squared* term did yield the significantly better ($p < .05$) specification.

6. Three additional measures of registration laws—irregular hours, evening or Saturday registration, and absentee balloting—were absent from these models. Since Wolfinger and Rosenstone showed that closing is by far the most important of the registration variables, I do not think that this is a major omission. In addition, the 1984 estimates omit noncitizens from the sample.

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MEASURING INTERNAL POLITICAL EFFICACY IN THE 1988 NATIONAL ELECTION STUDY

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Political efficacy has been studied extensively since the 1950s, but analysts have never been fully satisfied with its measurement. After considerable testing, four new questions tapping internal political efficacy were added to the 1988 National Election Study. Our investigation shows that inter-item correlations among these questions indicate high internal consistency, that by both exploratory and confirmatory factor analysis the items measure a single concept distinct from external efficacy and political trust, that the measurement model is robust across major subgroups, and that the overall scale is externally valid and provides a good distribution of efficacy scores across the population. Further, the results of an order experiment in the survey suggest that responses are unaffected by mode of presentation. In short, the four new questions constitute the most satisfactory measure of internal political efficacy to date.

As our discipline continues to mature, it is encouraging that we see increasingly thoughtful and systematic efforts to improve the quality of conceptualization and measurement in political research, for example, with regard to partisanship, ideology, political tolerance, system suppport, and numerous other constructs used in the study of public opinion and electoral behavior. Yet an obstacle to further progress in many of these areas stems from our reluctance to abandon indicators for which a lengthy time series (such as that provided by the National Election Study surveys) is available. While change is admittedly not without costs, often our research findings are compromised by the necessity of employing measures whose chief virtue is their longevity. An excellent example is the case of political efficacy.

Of the many indicators of general political attitudes developed in the 1950s, *sense of political efficacy* is one of the most theoretically important and frequently used. At the same time, however, there has been considerable dissatisfaction with the manner in which efficacy is measured. One problem was solved in the 1970s, when scholars (following Lane 1959) came to recognize that political efficacy contains at least two separate components: (1) *internal efficacy,* referring to beliefs about one's own competence to understand, and to participate effectively in, politics, and (2) *external efficacy,*

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referring to beliefs about the responsiveness of governmental authorities and institutions to citizen demands (Balch 1974; Coleman and Davis 1976; Converse 1972). With this distinction in hand, attempts were made to salvage the Center for Political Studies/National Election Study (CPS/NES) time series by dividing the traditional six-item scale in various ways (Acock and Clarke 1990; Acock, Clarke, and Stewart 1985; Craig and Maggiotto 1982; McPherson, Welch, and Clark 1977; Miller, Miller, and Schneider 1980). Although some improvement did result from such efforts, a fully satisfactory solution proved elusive. As a consequence, several of the old items were dropped from NES surveys, an action that ultimately led to renewed calls for the development of alternative measures.

In response to these concerns, it was decided that political efficacy (along with political trust and other related orientations) would be among the topics examined in the NES 1987 Pilot Study; a battery of some 35 old and new items was tested. Our subsequent analysis showed that internal efficacy had been especially well measured in the pilot study (Craig, Niemi, and Silver 1990); and four of the new questions were selected for inclusion in the postelection wave of the 1988 NES survey. We report here on the performance of the new indicators in 1988. Specifically, we have three goals: (1) to validate the success of the internal efficacy items using a larger and more representative sample than that of the pilot study, a test that does not merely select the best items out of a long list, and a multivariate technique (an updated version of LISREL) designed for categorical variables; (2) to validate the new items across various subgroups of the population; and (3) to report on an "order" experiment for Likert-type questions that was built into the 1988 election study (our results suggesting only minor effects attributable to mode of presentation).

The Internal Efficacy Items

The four new internal efficacy items tested in 1987-88 read as follows:

1. "I consider myself to be well qualified to participate in politics." (SELFQUAL)
2. "I feel that I have a pretty good understanding of the important political issues facing our country." (UNDERSTAND)
3. "I feel that I could do as good a job in public office as most other people." (PUBOFF)
4. "I think that I am better informed about politics and government than most people." (INFORMED)

Response options are *agree strongly, agree somewhat, neither agree nor disagree, disagree somewhat,* and *disagree strongly*. In each case, agreement with the statement is the more "efficacious" answer.[1] Retained in the 1988 election study were three items drawn from the original CPS efficacy scale:

5. "Sometimes politics and government seem so complicated that a person like me can't really understand what's going on." (COMPLEX)
6. "People like me don't have any say about what the government does." (NOSAY)
7. "I don't think public officials care much what people like me think." (NOCARE)

Response options are the same as for the new questions, with *dis*agreement being the more "efficacious" answer in each instance. Our previous work (Craig, Niemi, and Silver 1990) suggests that all three original items tap some combination of internal efficacy, external efficacy, and political trust (though COMPLEX does appear to be at least a weak measure of the internal dimension). The 1988 NES also contained traditional questions tapping perceived governmental responsiveness (Bennett 1984) and political trust/cynicism. We shall draw on these in the following analysis for purposes of external validation. (Complete wording can be found in Craig, Niemi, and Silver 1990.)

For half the 1988 sample, all of the efficacy items were administered together as a group, all of the trust items as a group, and so on. For the other half of the sample, all Likert-type items in the survey were "scrambled" and administered in several batteries. The purpose of this exercise was to see whether the internal consistency of certain scales could be attributed to respondents answering a series of content-similar questions in sequence.

Results

Our initial look at the 1988 results is in the form of two correlation matrices, one for the grouped items and one for the mixed items. Each matrix consists of the seven questions we have listed (i.e., three original and four new efficacy measures; see Table 1).[2] Consider, first, the effects of the order experiment. That the manner of item presentation does make some difference can be seen by the fact that in 16 of 21 instances, the correlation is higher when efficacy items are presented together as a group. The overall effect is not great, however, with an average difference between 21 pairs of correlations of just .03. More to the point, new items are *least* affected by being asked in sequence: three coefficients are higher in the grouped presentation, three are higher when the order is mixed. As a consequence of this and similar results in checks on later analyses, we do not report further on differences according to the form of the questionnaire.[3]

Table 1 also provides strong initial support for the quality—and distinctiveness—of the new efficacy questions. It shows, for example, that the internal consistency of our proposed four-item scale is

Table 1. Polychoric Correlations among Original Center for Political Studies and New Efficacy Items, by Placement in Questionnaire

	NOCARE	COMPLEX	UNDERSTAND	SELFQUAL	PUBOFF	INFORMED
Grouped[a] (N = 849)						
NOSAY	.65	.44	.24	.21	.04*	.20
NOCARE	—	.46	.19	.19	.01*	.12
COMPLEX	—	—	.34	.43	.26	.36
UNDERSTAND	—	—	—	.60	.46	.56
SELFQUAL	—	—	—	—	.59	.59
PUBOFF	—	—	—	—	—	.61
Mixed[b] (N = 873)						
NOSAY	.51	.33	.19	.19	.08	.14
NOCARE	—	.31	.13	.12	.00*	.10
COMPLEX	—	—	.32	.39	.25	.37
UNDERSTAND	—	—	—	.52	.50	.63
SELFQUAL	—	—	—	—	.56	.64
PUBOFF	—	—	—	—	—	.60

Source: 1988 National Election Study.

Note: Items recoded, as necessary, to account for direction of wording. Listwise deletion of missing data.

[a] All efficacy items administered together as a group.

[b] All Likert items randomly "scrambled" and administered in several batteries.

*$p > .05$.

quite good (correlations ranging from .46 to .64), while correlations between the new and old items are considerably lower in most cases (correlations from .00 to .43). Of particular interest is the irregular pattern exhibited by the original CPS scale: whereas NOSAY and NOCARE are associated either weakly or not at all with the new items, COMPLEX is moderately correlated with both the new measures (.25–.43) and the two older questions (.31–.46). These findings are consistent with our earlier research (Craig and Maggiotto 1982; Craig, Niemi, and Silver 1990), which suggests that NOSAY and NOCARE primarily tap external efficacy[4] and that COMPLEX falls between the two stools, capturing aspects of both the internal and external dimensions.[5]

Next, we conducted an exploratory factor analysis (results not shown) of 13 variables (the three original and four new efficacy items, plus six standard measures of governmental responsiveness and political trust). What stands out, again, is the clarity of our new internal efficacy battery, with all four items having very high loadings on a single factor. The four political trust questions also form a reasonably clear factor, as do two external efficacy items (NOSAY and NOCARE), though neither of these is as well measured as internal efficacy. Just as in the simple correlation matrix, COMPLEX loads weakly on both internal and external efficacy. The responsiveness items likewise fall on two dimensions.

In light of the positive results obtained thus far, we undertook a final assessment of the pilot study questions by means of confirmatory factor analysis and subsequent checks for consistency across subgroups and for external validity. The confirmatory approach requires, of course, that a specific model be tested. Since the most crucial part of the model for our purposes is internal efficacy, we concentrate mainly on the performance of five indicators (the four new items plus COMPLEX). In addition, trust is represented by the four traditional questions (TRUSTDC, WASTETAX, BIGINT, CROOKED); and responsiveness (ELECRESP, GOVRESP) is grouped with NOSAY and NOCARE as "external efficacy."[6] We also include three variables that tap an individual's psychological involvement in politics (general political interest, frequency of talking about politics, frequency of using television to follow politics), an index of political action (based on a simple count of several forms of conventional, campaign-related participation), and respondent's education.

The LISREL estimates, which can be found in the following list, corroborate our earlier findings. Most importantly, all four of the new questions appear to be measuring a single construct (presumably internal efficacy). COMPLEX does not fare quite as well: deleting COMPLEX produces minor changes in the estimated loadings for the remaining indicators (loadings given below in parentheses) and yields a better fit for the overall model.[7]

Internal Efficacy	
COMPLEX	.54
UNDERSTAND	.72 (.73)
SELFQUAL	.77 (.77)
PUBOFF	.61 (.64)
INFORMED	.81 (.83)
External Efficacy	
NOSAY	.65
NOCARE	.70
ELECRESP	.66
GOVRESP	.68
Political Trust	
TRUSTDC	.72
WASTETAX	.51
BIGINT	.80
CROOKED	.65
Psychological Involvement	
INTEREST	.87
TALKPOLIT	.68
TELEVISION	.75

Political Participation	
PARTICIP	1.00
EDUCATION	1.00

The overall model also fits well when one considers males and females, blacks and whites, and those with no college and at least some college education (not shown) separately. We compared the results when coefficients for individual items were constrained to be equal across groups and when they were allowed to vary. In the unconstrained versions, individual coefficients differed, but usually by no more than .05 and rarely by more than .10; the goodness-of-fit measures differed by no more than .015. Coefficients for internal efficacy items were especially close for the groups compared (see Acock, Clarke, and Stewart 1985; Jacob 1971). Thus, the items appear to work similarly; and the overall model fits well both for the population as a whole and for groups within it.[8]

The loadings shown in the list for trust and external efficacy are considerably less impressive (see also Craig, Niemi, and Silver 1990) than those for internal efficacy, but they are adequate for the task of evaluating the external validity of our four-item internal efficacy battery. Previous research suggests a number of theoretically based expectations about a valid measure of internal efficacy. It should, for example, be moderately correlated with external efficacy but weakly or not at all related to feelings of political trust/cynicism (Balch 1974; Craig and Maggiotto 1982). It should also be associated with higher levels of political involvement (though perhaps somewhat more so with psychological involvement than with actual participation) and with higher educational attainment (Craig, Niemi, and Silver 1990). Each of these expectations is met very handsomely with the new indicators (Table 2),[9] just as they were in the 1987 NES Pilot Study.

A final test, of sorts, is to confirm that our internal efficacy scale provides an adequate distribution of respondents, that is, sufficiently distinguishing levels of very low to very high faith in one's competence as a political actor. Scoring answers of 0–4 for each question, creation of an additive scale yields a potential range of 0–16. The 1988 NES respondents are spread over the theoretical range as follows (N = 1,735):[10]

Score	*Percent*
0–1	7.5
2–3	9.8
4–5	15.1
6–7	17.2
8–9	19.5
10–11	15.1
12–13	9.8
14–16	5.9

Table 2. External Validity of New Internal Efficacy Scale

	External efficacy	Political trust	Psychological involvement	Political participation	Education
Internal efficacy	.26	.09	.56	.40	.20
External efficacy	—	.71	.35	.32	.20
Political trust	—	—	.07	.15	.08
Psychological involvement	—	—	—	.44	.19
Political participation	—	—	—	—	.21

Source: 1988 National Election Study.

Note: Figures in this table are correlations with the factors identified in the confirmatory factor analysis ($p <$ .05). Positive correlations reflect higher involvement, participation, and education among the more efficacious or trusting. Internal efficacy is based on the four new items only. N = 1,271. Listwise deletion of missing data.

This distribution is surely satisfactory for most descriptive and analytical purposes.

Conclusion

Thanks to a series of small-scale tests culminating in the 1987 NES Pilot Study, we were able to develop a set of four items that seemed to constitute a valid and reliable measure of internal political efficacy. We have reported on the performance of these items in the 1988 NES survey. Happily, the results of our investigation are precisely as expected, matching the pilot study findings in every key aspect. Not only does the new scale pass the kinds of tests ordinarily required of high-quality measurement, it is also far superior to the indicators used previously by CPS/NES. While further refinement is certainly possible, scholars now have a viable means for tapping citizens' beliefs about their competence to understand, and play an active role in, the political life of the nation.

Notes

We acknowledge Richard D. Shingles's substantial contribution to the pilot study. Simon Jackman and Glenn E. Silver contributed generously to the analysis. The data were made available by the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research. Neither the original collectors nor the Consortium bear any responsibility for our analyses or interpretations.

1. Two additional questions were not included in the 1988 NES: (1) "I often don't feel sure of myself when talking with other people about politics and government" (NOTSURE); and (2) "Other people seem to have an easier time understanding complicated issues than I do" (OTHERS). The former performed fairly well in pilot study tests, the latter somewhat less so. As we suggested in our earlier report (Craig, Niemi, and Silver 1990), part of the problem with OTHERS—and also with COMPLEX from the original scale—undoubtedly stems from the effects of *response set*. Yet the negatively worded NOTSURE achieved a reasonably close fit with the remaining new items in 1987 (average $r = .36$ for the four listed), and we were unable to find much evidence of correlated error terms in our final, confirmatory factor analysis. On balance, then, it does not appear that the magnitude of error due to response set is very large after all. See Craig et al. (1990) for a more detailed discussion of this issue.

2. Polychoric correlations are shown because they are more appropriate for categorical data than are Pearson correlations. Assuming interval measurement for both the initial correlation matrix and the confirmatory factor analysis yields very similar patterns, although (as one would expect) the coefficients throughout are lower. Still, the internal consistency of our proposed four-item scale is quite good (Cronbach's alpha = .80).

3. Differences are larger for NOSAY, NOCARE, and COMPLEX (all from the original battery), perhaps because they are negatively worded.

4. Acock and Clarke (1990) argue that NOSAY and NOCARE measure internal efficacy, while the responsiveness items (GOVRESP and ELECRESP in the confirmatory factor analysis) measure external efficacy. While we do not insist on assigning all four of these indicators to a single dimension (as in the following analysis), all of our evidence suggests that NOSAY and NOCARE are tapping something quite different from the new efficacy questions. Moreover, results reported in Craig, Niemi, and Silver 1990, as well as examination of the present data (e.g., external validity), lead us to conclude that whatever they do measure (and regardless whether paired with the responsiveness items), they do *not* measure internal efficacy.

5. Although COMPLEX appears to be more internal than external, its fit with the new scale is clearly limited. The pilot study findings we reviewed (Craig, Niemi, and Silver 1990) lead us to speculate that COMPLEX may be measuring the "ability" or "skills" component of internal efficacy, while our own questions are better able to capture the "interest" component that sometimes develops even in the absence of formal skills.

6. Although the responsiveness items load moderately well with indicators of political trust in the exploratory factor analysis, our earlier work (Craig, Niemi, and Silver 1990), as well as "face" validity, suggest that they primarily measure external efficacy.

7. Figures in this list are weighted least squares estimates of factor loadings based on polychoric correlations among the ordinal variables (with participation and education represented by single indicators). The weighting matrix used is the inverse of the estimated asymptotic covariance matrix of the polychoric correlations (see Jöreskog and Sörbom 1988, 1989). Numbers in parentheses are the factor loadings after eliminating COMPLEX. The analysis was performed using PRELIS 1.12 and LISREL 7.16 implemented in SPSSX 4.1. Data are from the 1988 National Election Study.

Goodness-of-fit indicators. With COMPLEX: chi-square = 731, degrees of freedom = 122 ($p < .001$), adjusted goodness-of-fit index = .951, root mean square residual = .074. Without COMPLEX: chi-square = 405, degrees of freedom = 106 ($p < .001$), adjusted goodness-of-fit index = .970, root mean square residual = .058. N = 1,271.

8. The chi-square values in the list are relatively high, but chi-square is affected by a variety of factors, including sample size. In response to this, users of confirmatory factor analysis often look at the chi-square/degrees-of-freedom ratio. Some suggest that a ratio of less than five indicates a good fit, a level that we achieve after deleting COMPLEX. Also, the degree of fit is affected by inclusion of external efficacy and political trust, two concepts that are essential parts of our analysis, though we do not claim (especially in the case of external efficacy) they are measured adequately by standard NES questions. Finally, we (Craig, Niemi, and Silver 1990) performed a variety of tests to study the possibility, for example, that certain items tapped more than one concept. The results lend further support to the model shown here.

9. While they are not our main focus here, it is important to note that the other correlations in Table 2 are also as expected, including the fact that external efficacy is less strongly associated with involvement and participation than is internal efficacy. Unfortunately, we cannot be sure of the extent to which this is due to poorer measurement of external efficacy versus a good fit to our theoretical expectations.

10. A density plot using factor scores likewise shows a wide range of values for internal efficacy, distributed nearly symmetrically.

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CONTROVERSY

WHAT SHOULD RATIONAL COGNITIVE MISERS DO?

In the June 1991 issue of this Review *John Orbell and Robyn Dawes have argued that prisoner's dilemma games are shaped, in part, by "cognitive misers"—players who assume other players are like themselves. In such games, this results in more play and in a higher expected payoff by cooperators than by defectors. Iain McLean agrees with the conclusions of Orbell and Dawes but takes issue with their reasons and their model. In turn, Orbell and Dawes retort, arguing that players in prisoner's dilemma games do not respond as McLean assumes they will.*

Orbell and Dawes (1991) advance an attractive new model to explain cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma. Cognitive misers assume that other people are like themselves; therefore habitual cooperators (Poohs?) assume that most other people are cooperators, and habitual defectors (Eeyores?) assume that most other people are defectors: "Cooperators offer to play more often, and fellow cooperators will more often accept their offer; when certain boundary conditions are met, this results in cooperators' having a higher expected payoff for cooperators than for defectors" (p. 515). I believe that this conclusion is correct, but not for the reasons that Orbell and Dawes give, nor do I agree as to the specification of the boundary conditions.

What follows discusses only the general model put forward in the first part of the Orbell and Dawes paper, since the variant discussed later may be subsumed under it. The general model "assume[s] a population of n people who have the capacity to play two-person prisoner's dilemma games with each other, the games having payoffs $t > c > 0 > d > s$ (with the standard meanings)" (p. 517). Cooperators think that the proportion of cooperators in the population is q; defectors think the proportion is r. The true proportion is p. $1 > q >> r > 0$.

It is not entirely clear whether Orbell and Dawes envisage that each player makes a once-for-all decision whether or not to enter a round-robin tournament in which each plays every other who enters (this is implied by "Each person makes a single decision whether to cooperate or defect across the set of games—if they play them," p. 517) or that each player makes a decision whether or not to cooperate every time a new potential opponent is met. This seems to be implied by "Our model assumes that . . . judges . . . make their individual-by-individual play–no play decisions on that basis," that is, their projection of their own characteristics on to the other (p. 517). However, this distinction does not matter for our purposes, since the following argument applies to each case.

Orbell and Dawes specify players' strategies as follows: "A cooperator proposes play to another person with a probability q. . . . In contrast, a defector who meets another person proposes play with probability r" (p. 521). But these are dominated strategies. Rational players would not choose them. This is easily demonstrated. For a cooperator, the expected value of the strategy *always play* is

$$qc + (1 - q)s. \qquad (1)$$

The expected value of *play with probability q* is

$$q\{qc + (1 - q)s\}. \quad (2)$$

The expected value of *never play* is 0. As $1 > q > 0$, expression 2 is always dominated either by expression 1 or by never playing, except when $qc = -(1 - q)s$, when a player should be indifferent among all three strategies. Analogously, it is never best for a defector to follow the strategy *play with probability r*, which is weakly dominated by the strategies *always play* and *never play*.

The boundary conditions under which players enter are, for cooperators,

$$q(c - s) > -s \quad (3)$$

and, for defectors,

$$r(t - d) > -d. \quad (4)$$

The parameters of the model allow for both, just one, and neither of expressions 3 and 4 to be satisfied. If neither is satisfied, no play takes place, and cooperators do (trivially) exactly as well as defectors. If both are satisfied, everybody will always enter, and defectors will do better than cooperators because of the basic logic of the nondiscounted prisoner's dilemma. If expression 3 but not 4 is satisfied, cooperators will enter and defectors will not. Each player (= cooperator) will get c, and each nonplayer (= defector) will get zero. Therefore, cooperators will do better than defectors. If expression 4 but not 3 is satisfied, defectors will enter and cooperators will not. Each player (= defector) will get d, and each nonplayer (= cooperator) will get zero. Therefore, again, cooperators will do better than defectors.

Thus, in two out of the three nontrivial cases, Orbell and Dawes's conclusion is sustained by a route different from the one that they take in their paper. Note that these results do not depend on the value of p—the true proportion of cooperators—which nowhere enters these inequalities. Thus, we have a result that is thoroughly in the spirit of theirs, avoids reliance on an irrational strategy, and is algebraically simpler.

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The first assumption of our simple model is that subjects have a propensity to cooperate or defect in a game with particular payoffs *if* they play it. This propensity is a joint function of the payoffs in the game, the relative weight the player places on own, other, and joint payoffs and the degree to which the player is motivated by the payoffs versus by "doing the right thing" (which, most people believe, is cooperation, although some may have a quasi-ethical commitment to selfishness, or "looking out for number one," as a mandate).

Certainly, we would expect very few people to have a propensity to cooperate if, for example, joint cooperation yielded one dollar to each player, joint defection a fine of one dollar, and unilateral cooperation a transfer of ten thousand dollars from the person who cooperated to the person who defected. Thus, McLean is quite correct in interpreting our model to apply to a single choice concerning a single game. We regret it if our wording led to an impression that we were hypothesizing that some people always have a propensity to cooperate independent of payoffs, others a propensity to defect. In fact, these propensities may even be situation-specific, as in our prior experiments indicating that group identity and universal promising substantially enhance cooperation rate in games without changing their payoff structures (Orbell, van de Kragt, and Dawes 1988).

We model a single choice on a game that is not repeated (hence, no possibility of reciprocal altruism), where people have no direct information concerning the other player's propensities. Thus, consistent with the principle of accurate projection (Dawes 1988, 1990), our second assumption is that players use their own propensity to cooperate or defect as a cue to what the other is likely to do if the game is played. It may not be the only cue that people use. In general, however, we assume that cooperators judge this propensity of others to be higher than do defectors. That assumption is consistent with the results of all our experiments (summarized in Dawes, van de Kragt, and Orbell 1990), which uniformly find a positive correlation between own behavior and expectations about others' behavior. It is also consistent with what we observe outside the laboratory (i.e., that uncooperative people are less optimistic than cooperative people about *eliciting* cooperation); and, alas, it is consistent with the principle underlying paper-and-pencil "honesty tests" that score a point for dishonesty whenever the subject believes that other people have a high rate of dishonesty in a particular situation (Sackett, Burris, and Callahan 1989), even if the test-taker is correct! (To conclude, in contrast, that self-interested people will cooperate *because* they expect others to cooperate entails the contradiction that a truly self-interested person would always defect, independent of expectations.)

Our third main assumption is that the difference in potential cooperators' versus potential defectors' estimates does not imply that they project their differential expectations to all other potential players in a blanket manner. Again consistent with both our experimental results and everyday observation, people believe that they can use cues other than their own propensities to assess others' likely behavior even when they cannot. Thus, I may believe that the base rate of cooperation is 80% for a particular game in a particular situation, and you may believe it is 30%. Nevertheless, looking at the same potential partner, I may conclude that the person will probably defect, you that the person will probably cooperate. (We wish to avoid the complications of "secondary probabilities," which may be incorporated into the original judgment.) People do apparently use cues such as gender and clothing and general demeanor; but the contingent judgments made on the basis of these cues were found unrelated to the actual choices other made (e.g., Dawes, McTavish and Shaklee 1977). (On the other hand, the general principle that other people will do as I do was accurate, because some conditions led to a great deal more cooperation than did other conditions.)

McLean's alternative model is that people judge the probability that the other will cooperate in a noncontingent way, applying the same estimate to everyone, which in fact they should (at least in our experiments). But they do not. If cooperators judged the probability of cooperation to be q for *all* other potential players, while defectors judged it to be r ($q >> r$), then McLean's model would be superior to ours. What we have tried to do, however, is to develop a model that, while admittedly a simplification, is consistent with our observations.

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Forthcoming in March

The following articles, research notes, and controversies have been tentatively scheduled for publication in the March, 1992 issue:

Theodore J. Lowi, "The State and Political Science: How We Became What We Study." Presidential address to the American Political Science Association.

Paul R. Abramson, John H. Aldrich, Phil Palonio, and David Rohde. " 'Sophisticated' Voting in the 1988 Presidential Election."

Charles D. Brockett. "Measuring Political Violence and Land Inequality in Central America." A research note.

Donald Philip Green. "The Price Elasticity of Mass Preferences."

Robert Huckfeldt and John Sprague. "Political Parties and Electoral Mobilization: Political Structure, Social Structure and the Party Canvass."

David A. Lake. "Powerful Pacificists: Democratic States and War."

Stephen R. McCarl. "Eric Vogelin's Theory of Consciousness."

Calvin Mouw and Michael MacKuen. "The Strategic Agenda in Legislative Politics."

Carole Pateman and Nancy J. Hirschmann. "Political Obligation, Freedom and Feminism." A controversy.

Duane H. Swank. "Politics and the Structural Dependence of the State in Democratic Capitalist Nations."

Mark Warren. "Democratic Theory and Self-Transformation."

M. Stephen Weatherford. "Measuring Political Legitimacy."

Jerry Weinberger. "Politics and the Problem of Technology: An Essay on Heidegger and the Tradition of Political Philosophy."

BOOK REVIEWS

BOOK REVIEW CONTENTS

NEW POLITICS IN THE SOVIET UNION

Brown, Archie, ed. *Political Leadership in the Soviet Union*
  Clark, William A. *Soviet Regional Elite Mobility after Khrushchev*
  Hazan, Baruch A. *Gorbachev and His Enemies: The Struggle for Perestroika*
  Taras, Raymond C., ed. *Leadership Change in Communist States*
  Urban, Michael E. *An Algebra of Soviet Power: Elite Circulation in the Belorussian Republic, 1966–1986*
  White, Stephen. *Gorbachev in Power* .... John P. Willerton 1427
Almquist, Peter. *Red Forge: Soviet Military Industry since 1965*
  Cooper, Leo. *The Political Economy of Soviet Military Power*
  Herspring, Dale R. *The Soviet High Command, 1967–1989: Personalities and Politics*
  Green, William C., and Theodore Karasik, eds. *Gorbachev and His Generals: The Reform of Soviet Military Doctrine*
  Maddock, R. T. *The Political Economy of Soviet Defense Spending* .... Matthew Evangelista 1433

POLITICAL THEORY

Ball, Terence. *Transforming Political Discourse: Political Theory and Conceptual History*
  Ball, Terence, James Farr, and Russell L. Hanson, eds. *Political Innovation and Conceptual Change*
  Ball, Terence, and J. G. A. Pocock, eds. *Conceptual Change and the Constitution* .... Tracy B. Strong 1437
Blank, Robert H. *Regulating Reproduction* .... Raymond Tatalovich 1439
Ceaser, James W. *Liberal Democracy and Political Science* .... Thomas A. Spragens, Jr. 1440
Dryzek, John D. *Discursive Democracy: Politics, Policy, and Political Science* .... Douglas J. Amy 1441
Entman, Robert M. *Democracy Without Citizens: Media and the Decay of American Politics* .... Doris A. Graber 1443
Forde, Steven. *The Ambition to Rule: Alcibiades and the Politics of Imperialism in Thucydides* .... David Lewis Schaefer 1444
Hartigan, Richard Shelly. *The Future Remembered: An Essay in Biopolitics* .... Samuel M. Hines, Jr. 1445
Johnson, Curtis N. *Aristotle's Theory of the State* .... Thomas C. Brickhouse 1446
Knoke, David. *Political Networks: The Structural Perspective* .... Matthew J. Burbank 1447
Melzer, Arthur M. *The Natural Goodness of Man: On the System of Rousseau's Thought*
  Douglass, R. Bruce, Gerald R. Mara, and Henry S. Richardson, eds. *Liberalism and the Good*
  Wallach, Michael A., and Lise Wallach. *Rethinking Goodness* .... Daryl H. Rice 1448

Oldfield, Adrian. *Citizenship and Community: Civic Republicanism and the Modern World* . . . . Alan Wertheimer 1450
Pontuso, James F. *Solzhenitsyn's Political Thought* . . . . Stephen K. Carter 1451
Ross, Dorothy. *The Origins of American Social Science* . . . . James Farr 1452
Scott, James C. *Domination and the Arts of Resistance: Hidden Transcripts* . . . . Timothy J. Lukes 1454
Shulman, George M. *Radicalism and Reverence: The Political Thought of Gerrard Winstanley* . . . . David Wootton 1455

AMERICAN POLITICS

Arkes, Hadley. *Beyond the Constitution* . . . . Gary J. Jacobsohn 1456
Bellush, Jewel, and Dick Netzer, eds. *Urban Politics: New York Style* . . . . Peter J. Steinberger 1457
Bennett, Linda L. M., and Stephen Earl Bennett. *Living with Leviathan: Americans Coming to Terms with Big Government* . . . . William D. Berry 1458
Burns, James MacGregor, with L. Marvin Overby. *Cobblestone Leadership: Majority Rule, Minority Power* . . . . Roger H. Davidson 1459
Clarke, James W. *On Being Mad or Merely Angry: John W. Hinkley, Jr. and Other Dangerous People* . . . . David A. Rothstein 1461
Eisenstein, James, Roy B. Flemming, and Peter F. Nardulli. *The Contours of Justice: Communities and Their Courts* . . . . G. Alan Tarr 1462
Enelow, James M., and Melvin J. Hinich, eds. *Advances in the Spatial Theory of Voting* . . . . Joon-pyo Jung 1463
Ginsberg, Benjamin, and Martin Shefter. *Politics by Other Means: The Declining Importance of Elections in America* . . . . David R. Mayhew 1464
Gurin, Patricia, Shirley Hatchett, and James S. Jackson. *Hope and Independence: Blacks' Response to Electoral and Party Politics* . . . . Dianne M. Pinderhughes 1465
Ippolito, Dennis S. *Uncertain Legacies: Federal Budget Policy from Roosevelt through Reagan* . . . . James D. Savage 1466
Lynn, Naomi B., and Aaron Wildavsky, eds. *Public Administration: The State of the Discipline*
  Perry, James L., ed. *Handbook of Public Administration*
  Rabin, Jack, W. Bartley Hildreth, and Gerald J. Miller, eds. *Handbook of Public Administration* . . . . Deil S. Wright 1467
Miller, Penny M., and Malcolm E. Jewell. *Political Parties and Primaries in Kentucky*
  Baker, Tod A., Charles D. Hadley, Robert P. Steed, and Laurence W. Moreland, eds. *Political Parties in the Southern States: Party Activists in Partisan Coalitions* . . . . L. Sandy Maisel 1469
Perrow, Charles, and Mauro F. Guillén. *The AIDS Disaster: The Failure of Organizations in New York and the Nation*
  Patton, Cindy. *Inventing AIDS* . . . . Christopher H. Foreman, Jr. 1471
Reid, John Phillip. *The Concept of Representation in the Age of the American Revolution* . . . . Peter Dennis Bathory 1472
Rose, Richard, and Ian McAllister. *The Loyalties of Voters: A Lifetime Learning Model* . . . . Helmut Norpoth 1473
Russell, Louise B. *Medicare's New Hospital Payment System: Is It Working?* . . . . Lawton R. Burns 1475
Smith, Carolyn. *Presidential Press Conferences: A Critical Approach* . . . . James A. Davis 1476

Book Reviews

COMPARATIVE POLITICS

Desai, Padma. *Perestroika in Perspective: The Design and Dilemmas of Soviet Reform*
  Kornai, Janos. *The Road to a Free Economy: Shifting from a Socialist System: The Case of Hungary*
  Nelson, Joan, ed. *Fragile Coalitions: The Politics of Economic Adjustment*
  Nelson, Joan, ed. *Economic Crisis and Policy Choice: The Politics of Adjustment in the Third World*
  North, Douglass C. *Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Performance* . . . . Ernest J. Wilson III 1477
Beissinger, Mark R. *Scientific Management, Socialist Discipline, and Soviet Power* . . . . Herbert J. Ellison 1480
Carter, Stephen K. *Russian Nationalism: Yesterday, Today, and Tomorrow* . . . . James Butterfield 1481
Chehabi, H. E. *Iranian Politics and Religious Modernism: The Liberation Movement of Iran under the Shah and Khomeini*
  Siavoshi, Sussan. *Liberal Nationalism in Iran: The Failure of a Movement*
  Hunter, Shireen T. *Iran and the World: Continuity in a Revolutionary Decade* . . . . Bahman Baktiari 1482
Chilcote, Ronald H. *Power and the Ruling Classes in Northeast Brazil: Juazeiro and Petrolina in Transition* . . . . Frances Hagopian 1484
Curry, Jane Leftwich. *Poland's Journalists: Professionalism and Politics* . . . . Paul J. Best 1485
Lal, Victor. *Fiji: Coups in Paradise* . . . . Jeffrey D. Sadow 1486
O'Furner, Mary, and Barry Supple, eds. *The State and Economic Knowledge: The American and British Experiences* . . . . Sidney Weintraub 1487
Reich, Simon. *The Fruits of Facism: Postwar Prosperity in Historical Perspective* . . . . Frank Peter Wagner 1488
Richards, Alan, and John Waterbury. *A Political Economy of the Middle East: State, Class, and Economic Development* . . . . Jill Crystal 1489
Suleiman, Ezra N., and John Waterbury, eds. *The Political Economy of Public Sector Reform and Privatization* . . . . Paul Teske 1490

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Birch, Anthony H. *Nationalism and National Integration*
  Mayall, James. *Nationalism and International Society*
  Ryan, Stephen. *Ethnic Conflict and International Relations* . . . . Yosef Lapid 1492
Goldstein, Joshua S., and John R. Freeman. *Three-Way Street: Strategic Reciprocity in World Politics* . . . . James Lee Ray 1493
Haas, Peter M. *Saving the Mediterranean: The Politics of International Environmental Cooperation* . . . . Marvin S. Soroos 1494
Lebovic, James H. *Deadly Dilemmas: Deterrence in U.S. Nuclear Strategy*
  Glaser, Charles L. *Analyzing Strategic Nuclear Policy* . . . . Gary J. Buckley 1496
Melanson, Richard A. *Reconstructing Consensus: American Foreign Policy since the Vietnam War*
  Wittkopf, Eugene R. *Faces of Internationalism: Public Opinion and American Foreign Policy* . . . . William O. Chittick 1497
Russett, Bruce. *Controlling the Sword: The Democratic Governance of National Security* . . . . Michael P. Sullivan 1498

Smith, Brian H. *More Than Altruism: The Politics of Private Foreign Aid* .... Louis W. Pauly 1500
Stuart, Douglas, and William Tow. *The Limits of Alliance: NATO Out-of-Area Problems since 1949* .... Deborah Avant 1501
Vertzberger, Yaacov Y. I. *The World in Their Minds: Information Processing, Cognition, and Perception in Foreign Policy Decisionmaking* .... Philip A. Schrodt 1502

NEW POLITICS IN THE SOVIET UNION

Political Leadership in the Soviet Union. Edited by Archie Brown. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1989. 256p. $35.00 cloth, $12.95 paper.
Soviet Regional Elite Mobility after Khrushchev. By William A. Clark. New York: Praeger, 1989. 206p. $42.95 cloth.
Gorbachev and His Enemies: The Struggle for Perestroika. By Baruch A. Hazan. Boulder: Westview, 1990. 335p. $49.50 cloth.
Leadership Change in Communist States. Edited by Raymond C. Taras. Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1989. 210p. $39.95 cloth.
An Algebra of Soviet Power: Elite Circulation in the Belorussian Republic, 1966–1986. By Michael E. Urban. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989. 183p. $34.50 cloth.
Gorbachev in Power. By Stephen White. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990. 268p. $39.50 cloth, $12.95 paper.

Perestroika has been an exciting and challenging time to study the Soviet polity and society. There has been a certain headiness for those long-accustomed to the humdrum pace of political life in the pre-1985 period as they investigate the political and socioeconomic consequences of an unpredictable reform process. Yet after six years of Gorbachevian reforms, all observers of the Soviet scene find themselves in a complex transitional period. Simultaneous reformist and conservative tendencies reveal a moving object whose speed and trajectory are far from clear. Past theories and "common wisdom" no longer obtain, but insufficient time and contradictory developments make contemporary theory building risky. New sources of information haphazardly emerge in many unexpected settings, but students of Soviet politics continue to wrestle with a traditional dilemma: how to generate long-term systematic data suitable for rigorous scholarly study.

What have five years of perestroika revealed about a changing USSR? Developments of the late 1980s and early 1990s have challenged or altered most of our assumptions about the Soviet Union and the Soviet-type system. The cumulative impact of Gorbachevian reforms has been to squeeze party and state bureaucracies and decentralize decision making. For the first time in Soviet history the dominant *nomenklatura* system is under serious assault. The Soviet political system can now be accurately said to have real "institutional pluralism." Meanwhile, we have witnessed the emergence of numerous informal actors and nascent political parties that are increasingly influencing the policy process. There has been a concomitant decline in the relative importance of the traditional political elite. Indeed, we may need to redefine the country's political elite in the wake of mounting bottom-up pressures.

These and other developments constitute a changed Soviet polity and are critical not only to the books considered here but to the role of Soviet studies in broader comparative analysis. Soviet studies have long been on the *periphery* of cross-national comparative literature for analytical and methodological reasons. The transformation of the Soviet-type system through perestroika and glasnost is altering both the conceptual and data bases upon which our thinking and work rest. The potential for serious cross-national analysis including the societies of the USSR and Eastern Europe is growing. The six volumes examined here have chronicled and investigated many of the important political changes underway in the initial Gorbachev period. All of these works focus on the Soviet elite—whether at the national or subnational level—and reveal both continuity and change in elite politics of the 1980s. Taken together, the studies reveal that the roots of Gorbachevian change were to be found in both the Khrushchev and Brezhnev experience and that early Gorbachev period practices were tied to the thinking and experience of the immediate past. They further suggest the profundity of the reform process now underway and anticipate dilemmas that have become core to developments in the 1990s. Yet a number also indicate important continuities in Soviet political life during the early phase of perestroika, consequently revealing the deep contradictory nature of forces now unleashed in the country.

It is useful to have benchmarks when considering current changes, and many benchmark norms of the established Soviet system are succinctly captured in the volume edited by Archie Brown. The more we recall traditional norms, the more able we are to see continuities in contemporary developments in Gorbachev's USSR. Most of the studies in the Brown volume adopt a conventional analytical focus in examining Soviet "high politics"—the investigation of institutional arrangements and elite recruitment and behavior. An underlying assumption of the individual chapters is the concentration of political power at the highest levels, a fundamental assumption of the traditional Soviet system that is now under attack. Analyses in the volume confirm that the distribution of power and influence among national agencies has varied over time. Throughout Soviet history real constraints have operated on the individual national leader himself. Gorbachev's embattled position is nothing new, even if it is more publicly evident than in the past. The seventy-plus years of Soviet power have been characterized by constant, almost routine, bureaucratic reorganization and personnel rotation. As is documented in this volume, such reorganization and rotation have occurred regardless of the leadership style and policy-making preferences of the individual general secretaries who have governed the USSR. They have contributed to what Seweryn Bialer *(Stalin's Successors,* 1980) termed a Soviet "bureaucratic shapelessness"—a phenomenon that clearly haunts the USSR today and will continue to haunt the country's political life for years to come.

Another preoccupation of the Soviet politics literature is given considerable attention in the Brown and other volumes—leadership succession processes and regime formation norms. The absence of institutionalized means by which power is transferred from one leader to another is a core weakness in all Soviet-type systems. National leadership succession is a moment of potential system crisis and has predictably been given much attention by scholars. Individual chapters in the Brown collection and the volume edited by Taras (with their focus on post-Brezhnev developments) should prove interesting even to those left unenthusiastic by the prospect of yet more Soviet leadership and succession studies. The 1982, 1984, and 1985 successions entailed different dynamics in a deteriorating political environment; and leadership norms were in the process of changing. An especially noteworthy study of the 1980s Soviet successions is presented by George Breslauer in the Taras volume. He demonstrates the utility of model building in studying communist elite politics. Rather than adopt a traditional Kremlinological approach, Breslauer attempts to reconstruct developments surrounding leadership changes from a succession model. His approach not only illuminates the substantive policy biases built into the traditional Soviet political process but suggests how the Soviet political order was evolving through the 1980s. Kremlinological and journalistic studies can fill in the particulars, but one is left less than fully convinced of their veracity in chronicling elite politics; such studies offer little or nothing in the way of comprehensive or cross-case explanation. Breslauer's work is a laudable corrective to these dilemmas.

Unfortunately, most of the work done on past leadership successions and regime formation norms has been unsystematic and Kremlinological in approach. It is hardly surprising that such analyses should appear for the Gorbachev period, as well. Baruch Hazan's study of the early perestroika period adopts such an approach, with a focus on national elite maneuvering and policy cleavages as the reform program emerged. Glasnost has yielded much elite attitudinal information, and Hazan is able to illuminate debates within the leadership in greater detail than was generally true in the past. He is at his best in discussing the bureaucratic opposition to the reformers and in identifying the tactics used by those opponents. Yet many of the same old bugaboos of traditional Kremlinology are to be found here. The availability of more attitudinal and career information does not signify more definitive conclusions regarding the political interests or long-term policy preferences of politicians. For instance, Hazan reports constant seemingly contradictory statements by Soviet politicians, where an official appears to be here a reformist and there orthodox. But how is one to understand the important Gorbachev–Ligachev relationship, which is the focus of Hazan's first chapter and which reappears throughout the volume? Theirs was a complex relationship as they worked as both allies and adversaries. Beyond chronicling public stances and policy shifts, can an explanation be offered of how these and other competing politicians came together to form a governing coalition and to initiate a root-and-branch reform process? By identifying norms of the evolving leadership we would be better able to understand, for example, Ligachev's ability to maintain a national profile in the wake of his July 1990 ouster. But an illumination of system norms (comparable to Breslauer's illumination of 1980s succession norms) is no more forthcoming here than in past Kremlinological studies.

Soviet elite politics merit serious attention, but they must be examined in more multifaceted and rigorous ways. Stephen White's book on the initial Gorbachev regime is suggestive. He deals with the elite but balanced by institutional, policy, and broader societal developments. His volume provides a fine overview of domestic and foreign developments for the 1985–90 period. He casts a wide net in investigating the emergence of a reformist regime; but his institutional, policy, and elite focus enables him to assess the dilemmas of the Soviet shift from a totalitarian system to what Kurashvili has called a "democratic–authoritarian regime" (p. 55). White's treatment of the elite maneuverings and policy debates of the Gorbachev regime complements those of the Brown and Hazan volumes, but his analysis entails a more-developed consideration of an emergent Soviet checks-and-balances system. This is one of the most important results of the perestroika period; and White enables us to see how it began to be institutionalized with the establishment of a constitutional review committee and the upgrading of the national parliament at the Nineteenth Party Conference in 1988. Unlike the other volumes, White's study provides a useful overview of the policy debates among academics that were so critical to the emergence and evolution of the Soviet reform program.

White's probing of important issue areas provides the necessary perspective for understanding Gorbachev period elite politics. He has a firm command of contemporary institutional, policy, and elite issues, so he is in a good position to illuminate these matters. If there is a weakness in this volume, it is linked to the author's efforts to transcend the limits of a traditional Kremlinological analysis: White should have given more attention to the all-important *nomenklatura* system—the pressures on it and the prospects for its destruction or modification in light of democratization. The *nomenklatura* system is arguably the key political obstacle to fundamental root-and-branch reform. It would have been useful to balance a policy focus with a discussion of organizational issues. A discussion of the (lack of) emergence of a new elite cohort fully committed to democratization and fundamental reform would have been most rewarding. All accounts of the Gorbachev period have noted the extensive turnover of personnel, but what has that turnover yielded?

The areas of elite recruitment and regime formation have been a primary focus for those studying Soviet high politics, with Kremlinological approaches preeminent in the pre-Gorbachev period. During the past decade, however, Western scholarship has experienced considerable advancement as recruitment and power consolidation processes are studied more systematically. John Miller's contribution to the Brown volume entails an innovative look at an old concern: *patronage* as a basis for career mobility and coalition building. Patronage, long-associated with the totalitarian model, has been systematically studied only in the past dozen years; but it has remained a controversial approach in explaining Soviet regime norms. Miller's study reminds us of the complexities inherent in assessing the impact of patronage on elite recruitment and coalition formation. His analysis of the Brezhnev to early Gorbachev periods reveals the critical role of the top leader in structuring high-level recruitment: most protégés advanced to high national office were connected to the party leader and his entourage. Miller develops a typology of political appointments, and his analysis reveals an identifiable logic to patron–client relations. More important than Miller's findings is his plea for the demystification of Soviet elite and patronage studies. He approaches his subject matter as a universal phenomenon with particular Soviet nuances.

What has distinguished the Soviet case is the USSR's high degree of power concentration and absence of competition. These conditions are now giving way under the weight of Gorbachevian reforms, with the *rationality* of Soviet informal politics moving toward that of other (Western) systems. Miller's work suggests the continued importance of both informal and meritocratic factors to Soviet elite mobility and coalition-building practices; but cross-national comparative research that includes the Soviet case is clearly merited.

Until recently, Soviet subnational elite recruitment and regime formation processes received scant attention. This reflected both the lack of hard data and an absence of theoretical interest (we assumed that important developments only occurred in Moscow). The 1980s and early 1990s have remedied this lacuna with several commendable studies. Among these is William Clark's analysis of provincial Party first secretaries' mobility patterns for the 1964–87 period. The virtue of Clark's work is that he augments the traditional focus on individual-level demographic and career attributes with a systematic analysis of the institutional and regional structures through which provincial leaders advance. The diversity of Soviet subnational settings makes simple explanation difficult; but Clark's study reveals that institutional and regional structures account for much of the variance in the mobility of aspiring subnational officials. Given the dilemmas inherent in collecting and manipulating systematic regional and individual-level economic and career data, Clark's results must be taken seriously. Unfortunately, in his zeal to address the inadequacies of past studies that concentrated exclusively on individual-level factors, he leaves out of his analysis certain potentially important individual-level factors. Thus, patronage, given considerable attention in the narrative text, is missing from the analysis. There is little surprise that in this study, patronage proves to be unimportant and of diminishing relevance in structuring the mobility prospects of aspiring officials.

A sophisticated, single-republic analysis that more successfully integrates regional and individual-level factors in explaining elite mobility and regime formation is found in Michael Urban's study of Belorussia. Urban focuses on the mobility system, not personnel, in studying a republic's political elite circulation during the 1966–86 period. His approach is systematic and innovative in applying "vacancy chain analysis" (a variant of Markov chains) to an analysis of positional changes in a republic's political hierarchies. By specifying the probabilities of change from one state to another state, Urban can generalize about mobility ladders and regime formation norms.

Urban's impressive merging of careful quantitative and qualitative analysis yields important findings. And while primarily grounded in preperestroika data, a number of these findings are quite relevant to Soviet politics of the 1990s. Subnational mobility patterns reveal the importance of bottom-up influences in the recruitment of cadres—and this before Gorbachevian democratizing measures! While there is some evidence of means by which Moscow authorities can direct subnational mobility arrangements (e.g., the use of "stepping-stone" jobs, the dispatching of trusted outsiders to regional posts), different regional configurations of job vacancies reveal considerable lower-level institutional discretion in filling posts. Moscow may control the formal levers of power and mobility, but there is much momentum from below. Urban reveals a rhythm to political events in Belorussia that is not orchestrated by national authorities.

Urban gives attention to patronage politics; but unlike Clark, he finds patron–client relations of continuing importance to mobility patterns. Indeed, the interests of identified regional machines fit nicely with the mobility ladders found in the Belorussian republic. Urban's study reveals that both positive and negative incentives for career advance are tied to patronage. Other factors (termed *rational-technical*) are also tied to mobility patterns. But rather than counterpoise rational-technical and patron–client factors, as Clark tends to do, Urban integrates them into a more effective whole. In fact, Urban's conclusions nicely fit with those offered by Miller, who found it confusing and theoretically inappropriate to distinguish between exclusively meritocratic and exclusively patronage considerations in explaining recruitment decisions. Urban's and Miller's approaches are quite varied in method and focus, but their studies result in a cumulation generally absent in the Soviet politics literature. Patron–client relations are shown to be of continuing relevance to national and subnational Soviet politics, even in the 1980s.

Both Urban's and Clark's findings demonstrate that regional structural factors are key to officials' mobility prospects; and any changes in those underlying structures will be of fundamental importance to Soviet regional and national politics. Subnational political structures are changing as centrifugal pressures mount. The imperatives directing regional leaders' behavior and career-building strategies are being transformed. Many past subnational patterns are under severe pressure and may no longer obtain in the 1990s. New career opportunity structures are emerging, as are new norms in the conduct of Soviet center-periphery relations. Urban's and Clark's work sensitizes us to the importance of subnational political structures, but Gorbachev-period development necessitates new and innovative research in this area. Electoral processes, the transformed system of soviets, and redefined lines of national ministerial and local governmental political jurisdiction all merit scholarly attention as we redefine our assumptions about the evolving Soviet system.

As the volumes considered here reveal, most of the work on Soviet elites and the policy process has concentrated on the national and Russian experience. Seldom have non-Russian elite populations been considered in comparative studies, and only rarely have cross-national elite studies spanned the Soviet Union and other communist countries. The absence of cross-national comparative work has been a primary weakness of the communist politics literature, making the appearance of the Taras edited volume all the more welcome. Beyond the already-mentioned Breslauer chapter, this book's contents will prove useful to general comparativists and students of the Soviet-type system even given the dramatic developments of the past few years. What makes the volume doubly useful is both editor's and individual contributors' attention to the policy implications of elite politics.

The various country studies help us to understand how factionalism can be both beneficial and harmful to the politics of Soviet-type systems. They reveal a certain "rationality" in communist elite factionalism. We find a discernable cross-national pattern of hard-line, or conservative, factions winning out in power struggles. Both the Breslauer chapter and a chapter on the downfall of Hu Yaobang by David Bachman reveal that aspiring officials challenging established traditions and pressing reform have a difficult time surviving the succession period to consolidate power. Alfred Meyer ultimately explains why in the volume's concluding chapter, noting an apparently universal propensity for politicians to favor short-term "muddling through" solutions to societal problems. Yet as he ponders, if conservative factions tend to win the power struggles in traditional communist systems, can they *govern*? If by *governing* we mean the ability to address socioeconomic dilemmas, then the record suggests they cannot—at least not in the long run! Contemporary developments throughout much of the communist world corroborate Meyer's observation; they suggest a new political logic at work in a disintegrating communist world. Yet the political resilience of conservative forces that is identified in these individual studies (not only in the USSR and China but also in Cuba, Eastern Europe, and Vietnam) must be acknowledged. Could the ongoing political struggles in the USSR and elsewhere once again result in a victory for conservative forces, even if those forces are not labeled communist and even granting that some reformist policies are advanced through the process of struggle?

The scholarship considered here is reflective of the broader literature on Soviet elites and the policy process and reveals our mounting ability to explore Soviet institutions and political actors. A number of the authors demonstrate careful, and at times innovative, use of available information through Western social-scientific techniques. Urban's methodological approach is suggestive, as is Breslauer's model building. Much has changed in the Soviet and communist world during the past six years, yet these studies indicate that Soviet elites and political institutions continue to make an important difference in the conduct of that country's political and economic life. These works not only capture the essence of the traditional Soviet-type system but suggest important norms of the system in transition. They may only intimate the broad contours of institutional arrangements and norms for a new (postcommunist?) *order*; but they do set the stage for a serious Gorbachev-period of scholarly *literature*.

As we look to the future of a dynamically evolving USSR and our own scholarly efforts to understand the reform process and its consequences, we must be flexible and patient. As of this writing, the total impact of Soviet domestic crises and reforms has been a political gridlock that ironically leaves many of the long-established actors and system norms of continuing central importance to the conduct of Soviet political life. Soviet political tendencies of the 1990s reflect the incrementalist and confused bureaucratic conditions that were effectively illuminated in earlier scholarly work. Much of the logic of contemporary Soviet political gridlock is explained in the midlevel theories advanced in several works reviewed here and in the broader literature. The Brown, Taras, and Urban books all anticipate, if at times indirectly, selected institutional, elite, and policy dilemmas now commanding so much public attention in the USSR. The fact that our macro-level theories (e.g., the totalitarian, directed society and institutional pluralist models) did not predict the profound changes of the past years should not obscure the utility and effectiveness of these midlevel theories. There is a clear need for new theory building—though a decade or more of Gorbachev and post-Gorbachev experience may be necessary before we can generate definitive results. But mandatory for any new theory building is the collection of richer and more varied information and the generation of systematic cross-time data (for both the Russian and non-Russian peoples).

Unfortunately, to date, our expectations of new political information and systematic data have far outrun the actual results. The works reviewed here were not grounded in new types of data (though, to be fair, most of these studies were completed before the fruits of glasnost were available). In some cases—White, for example—scholars were helped by more open Soviet media; but in fact, rather traditional information sources were used. After five years of perestroika, there is growing uncertainty as to how much relevant information will become available in the immediate future. Annual statistical yearbooks *(narodnoye khoziaisvto)* are still disappointing in their lack of detailed economic and other data at the national, republic, and provincial levels, with relatively few new statistical categories included. True, there are important areas where new information and data are emerging: cumulating survey data are already allowing us to explore many important sociopolitical issues previously illuminated only through anecdotal or emigré sources. White bolstered a number of arguments through references to Soviet survey results. As yet, perestroika has yielded only modest amounts of new information, with today's uncertainties and tomorrow's looming political crises casting doubt over at least the short-term prospects of major new sources.

The contemporary transition period is an appropriate moment for taking stock of our past efforts at making sense of the Soviet system as we think about new methods and approaches in the study of the Soviet and post-Soviet system. The volumes considered here reveal considerable intellectual payoff from our traditional research approaches. It is true that the political realities of the Soviet-type system limited us in the methods we employed and the information and data upon which we relied. Soviet system constraints encouraged idiosyncratic and pseudoscientific work; but those constraints also encouraged resourcefulness, thoughtfulness, and creativity—as revealed in a number of pieces reviewed here. That system is being transformed, and Soviet political and elite studies will change accordingly. Perhaps one result will be an end to the ghettoization of Soviet studies and the emergence of comparative studies that include the societies and peoples now comprising the USSR. New theoretical interests and burgeoning research opportunities in what was once the Soviet bloc should be conducive to, among other foci, comparative policy and comparative elite studies. Joint Soviet-U.S. survey research is already yielding comparative insights about both societies. Perhaps a more subtle result of these changes will be the reconsideration of Soviet-based findings in a broader theoretical perspective. Breslauer, Miller, Taras, Urban, and White join countless other scholars in Soviet area studies whose work has advanced general comparative theory. Now we are presented with the exciting prospect that cumulating studies partially grounded in the Soviet and post-Soviet experience will refine or perhaps redefine our political theories and hypotheses. Gorbachevian developments may alter more than the Soviet political landscape; they could help move

Soviet-based findings into the theoretical mainstream.

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Red Forge: Soviet Military Industry since 1965. By Peter Almquist. New York: Columbia University Press, 1990. 227p. $35.00.

The Political Economy of Soviet Military Power. By Leo Cooper. New York: St. Martin's, 1989. 263p. $49.95.

The Soviet High Command, 1967-1989: Personalities and Politics. By Dale R. Herspring. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990. 322p. $39.50 cloth, $14.50 paper.

Gorbachev and His Generals: The Reform of Soviet Military Doctrine. Edited by William C. Green and Theodore Karasik. Boulder: Westview, 1990. 239p. $26.50 paper.

The Political Economy of Soviet Defence Spending. By R. T. Maddock. New York: St. Martin's, 1988. 224p. $49.95.

In recent years traditional Kremlinological approaches to Soviet security policy have come under challenge from scholars who emphasize the importance of economic and organizational factors grouped loosely under the rubric *political economy.* Life itself, as Mikhail Gorbachev is fond of saying, has reinforced this trend. The coincidence of internal Soviet economic crisis and external retrenchment—including withdrawal of Soviet troops from East Central Europe, unilateral force reductions, and major concessions in arms negotiations—calls attention to the importance of economic conditions for understanding Soviet security policy. Yet despite the popular wisdom, there is nothing inevitable or deterministic about the relationship between Soviet economic stringency and the apparent end of the Cold War. Attention to the *politics* of Soviet security policy is still warranted. The traditional focus on coalition building, civil-military conflict and collaboration, and the interplay of personalities within the Soviet political elite has a lot to contribute to understanding both the origins and prospects of the current trend in Soviet security policy.

Among the works under review, Dale Herspring's book and the collection of essays edited by Green and Karasik represent the traditional approach. Both books do touch on the links between the economy and security policy, especially on competing views about how much is enough to spend on the military, yet they present no systematic assessment of the way economic conditions affect Soviet policy. The books by Cooper and Maddock, by contrast, identify themselves explicitly with the political economy school and take an interdisciplinary approach to Soviet security policy. Peter Almquist's book offers an innovative mix of the two approaches by analyzing the role of individuals in the Soviet military-industrial sector to evaluate the extent to which they constitute a "military-industrial complex." Comparing the books within each approach is as revealing as comparing the two approaches themselves: authors who adopt the same method or framework do not necessarily draw the same conclusions.

Dale Herspring seeks to place his book in the tradition of works by Kolkowicz, Colton, Odom, and Warner and to bring the study of Soviet civil-military relations up to date. For his conceptual framework and the justification for his focus on individual personalities, Herspring draws loosely on Robert C. Tucker's work on Soviet political culture and leadership. He traces the views of all of the individuals who have served as defense minister and chief of the Soviet general staff from 1967 to 1989 and shows how those views correspond to the policies promoted by the top Soviet leaders—mainly, the general secretaries of the Soviet Communist party. Herspring does not devote equal attention to each person; he relies mainly on the published articles, books, and speeches of his subjects, some of whom had more to say about security policy than others.

Marshal Nikolai Ogarkov, chief of the general staff from 1977 to 1984, clearly emerges as the hero of Herspring's story. The author portrays Ogarkov as a kind of John the Baptist to Gorbachev's Jesus, although he admits that there is no evidence of a personal tie between the two and that Ogarkov's tenure as chief did not overlap with Gorbachev's job as top leader. Nevertheless, in Herspring's view, both men shared a concern about the state of the Soviet economy, both could be considered "technological determinists," both emphasized the role of individual initiative and responsibility (pp. 169, 178, 189-92, 293). "One cannot help but wonder," he writes, "what the situation would have been like if Ogarkov had been ten years younger and had appeared on the scene at the same time as Gorbachev. . . . [Ogarkov] would have been faced with a general secretary who was everything he had been seeking in the late 1970s" (pp. 292–93).

On this central contention Herspring fails to convince. The differences between the preferred policies of Ogarkov and Gorbachev far outweigh the superficial similarities Herspring identifies. Most analysts agree that Ogarkov was fired by Gorbachev's predecessors in 1984 for insisting on immediate increases in military spending (also a militarization of scientific research) and comparing the international environment to that of the 1930s—among other reasons. Gorbachev, by contrast, sought to portray the Reagan administration in a favorable light in order to justify reducing the military budget and reorienting the Soviet economy to focus on civilian needs. Ogarkov, as Herspring discusses, was a highly innovative military theorist; he anticipated a new revolution in military technology that would put demands on Soviet armed forces to execute high-speed offensive operations throughout the entire depth of the enemy's territory. Gorbachev has undermined the basis for Ogarkov's military plans in almost every respect by promoting a posture of "nonoffensive defense," by seeking to curtail the technological arms race through negotiation, by unilateral reductions in troops and military spending, by overseeing the disintegration of the Warsaw Pact and the pull-back of Soviet forces. Ogarkov, despite his prescient understanding of the implications of future military technologies and his sometime support for modest measures of arms control, was by no means an adherent of Gorbachev's "new thinking" in foreign policy.

Herspring argues that Ogarkov's successors as chief of the general staff, as well as the current defense minister, have all supported Gorbachev's policies of reform. This contention is crucial to the author's attempt to relate his work to current policy concerns. Herspring mocks Western analysts "who see Gorbachev as a modern-day Sir Galahad out to slay the evil military-industrial complex" and maintains that "despite some occasional disagreements, the West is confronted with a relatively united national security apparatus in the Soviet Union" (p. xi). Thus, his policy prescription consists of a warning that "unilateral concessions to the Soviet Union aimed at strengthening Gorbachev against hard-line marshals would be self-defeating" (p. xi). (Of course, any conciliatory U.S. responses to Gorbachev's initiatives could not be called *unilateral* concessions, given the extent of the previous Soviet concessions.

In the wake of Eduard Shevardnadze's December 1990 resignation as Soviet foreign minister, it is easy to criticize Herspring's insistence on a harmony of views between the civilian reformers and the military hierarchy. Military officers and hard-line communists had accused Shevardnadze—the main executant, and perhaps architect, of the new thinking—of "appeasement" and the selling-out of Soviet interests. Yet long before Shevardnadze gave up the fight against the "reactionaries" (as he called them), many Western analysts had identified sharp debates within the Soviet security policy community on fundamental issues. These debates are described in several of the essays in the Green and Karasik volume (the contributions by Thomas Nichols are particularly valuable). Most of the authors posit the existence of several competing viewpoints on Soviet security policy. In his interesting discussion of the future of Soviet nuclear strategy, for example, Daniel Gouré identifies three groups: reformers, modernists, and conservatives. The contributors are not all of one mind, however. A couple of the volume's authors are closer to Herspring's position that the Soviet military recognize the need for a "breathing space" to repair the economy and that the political leadership looks forward to meeting the military's every requirement once perestroika succeeds. The evidence for this interpretation is rather thin, however, and depends on two dubious assumptions: (1) that Soviet commanders are willing to take the long view and tighten their belts rather than succumb to the immediate parochial interests (like increasing their budgets) that are typical of most bureaucracies and (2) that Soviet political leaders would gladly squander the fruits of economic reform, if ever it succeeds, on a new arms race.

The ability of the Soviet Union to sustain an arms race with the United States is a central focus of the works by Cooper and Maddock; and on this relationship between the economy and Soviet security policy, the books diverge sharply. Cooper argues that "the defence burden does not appear to be a vital issue in Soviet political and economic analysis of the present situation" (p. 12). He draws this conclusion on the basis of a reasonable assumption that it is unlikely that "the Soviet leaders themselves are aware of the real cost of the military effort and of the extent of the defence burden that these costs entail" (p. 96). Furthermore, he argues that "transferring resources from military purposes to civilian use will not materially improve the economic situation because of the inefficiencies that are inherent in the Soviet system"; and that therefore, the Soviet leaders won't do it (p. 225). Finally, he notes that Western intelligence assessments of Soviet military spending during the first years of Gorbachev's tenure suggested an increase, rather than a decrease.

Again, it is easy to criticize an author for faulty predictions (an occupational hazard of Sovietology these days). Since 1988, Gorbachev has cut the Soviet military budget considerably and launched a major campaign for conversion of Soviet military facilities to civilian production. Although we may excuse Cooper for not having foreseen these particular developments, we should still consider why his analysis led him to dismiss their likelihood. The main problem is his failure to understand the link between Soviet military spending, productivity, and economic performance. Cooper recognizes that the decline in the Soviet growth rate owes mainly to declining factor productivity (a given input of labor or capital produces less output per unit than it used to do). Therefore, he argues, Soviet leaders will gain more for the economy by improving productivity than by decreasing military spending. Yet military spending itself affects productivity by diverting capital investment from the civilian sector to the military. Resources that could be used to boost productivity by improving transportation and infrastructure, for example, are used unproductively for military purposes, thereby lowering the overall growth rate.

Unlike Cooper, Maddock understands and explains the relationship quite well. He is particularly sensitive to the opportunity costs of diverting spending from consumption and investment to the military sector and his frequent comparisons of the Soviet experience to that of the United States and Japan are instructive. Maddock highlights the extent to which the nature of the Soviet economy (especially its reliance on investment as the main source of growth) exacerbates the trade-offs between military and civilian spending. By robbing the civilian sector of needed capital investment, high military spending contributes directly to a long-term secular decline in Soviet growth rates. In particular, Maddock argues, much of the capital investment in machine tools necessary for production of modern military weapons is precisely what the civilian sector needs to boost factor productivity in the absence of additional inputs such as labor. Thus, with Maddock's framework, we can understand Gorbachev's incentives for seeking an end to the Cold War and the arms race. There is nothing deterministic about his argument, however. He maintains that the military's hold on the centrally planned Soviet economy contributes to long-term secular decline; but he does not say at what point Soviet leaders would try to stem that decline by reallocating resources to the civilian sector and decentralizing the economy. That, as Maddock understands, is a matter of politics—in both its internal and external dimensions.

One prominent political explanation for how the defense sector has maintained its dominant position in the Soviet economy focuses on the role of a Soviet military-industrial complex, the subject of Peter Almquist's book. Almquist attempts to discover whether it makes sense to speak of a military-industrial complex (managers of enterprises that produce military goods, weapons designers, and officials of the defense industrial ministries) that exerts influence on Soviet security policy on behalf of its component members. He seeks to ascertain whether representatives from these groups promote policies that favor the military-industrial sector and whether they collaborate with the military to secure political support for such policies. His main means of addressing the question is an extensive search of the published writings of the members of these groups and a tracing of their career paths (summarized in two highly informative appendices), combined with an understanding of political and economic structural characteristics of the Soviet system. In sum, Almquist produces "negative evidence" that runs contrary to what is probably the common wisdom about the Soviet military-industrial sector. He finds that members of the hypothesized military-industrial complex in their public writings tend to focus on day-to-day issues of management relevant to their narrow technical expertise and rarely venture into policy advocacy in the broader strategic issues which are the purview of the political leadership. Nor do the careers of the officials examined suggest anything resembling the "interlocking directorates" of a military-industrial complex. These conclusions and the author's method make this an original and interesting work.

Although there may be no Soviet military-industrial complex, in the sense that Almquist defines it, there is certainly a powerful constituency in the Soviet Union for maintaining the existing system with its high-priority status for the defense sector. That is why, as Almquist points out, Soviet reformers frequently employ the expression *military-industrial complex* as an epithet against their opponents. In their view, representatives of the heavy industrial ministries, the armed forces, and the party apparatus have a stake in the perpetuation of the highly centralized, party-dominated economic system, without which the skewed distribution of resources to the military sector would have been unlikely. Elucidating the symbiotic relationship between the system of central planning and Soviet militarization is a key contribution of the political economy approach to Soviet security policy. Yet without the insights of traditional Kremlinology, it would be difficult to understand the zigzags and reversals that frequently characterize Soviet foreign and security policy.

Consider the case of Gorbachev. When his main constituency was the reformist intelligentsia and his adversaries were the conservatives, he promoted decentralization and demilitarization. By the fall of 1990, however, having alienated his reformist supporters and unlocked a Pandora's box of ethnic unrest, Gorbachev began to seek support from the military and the upholders of the status quo. During 1991, he turned to the reformers again and attempted to work out an agreement with leaders of the 9 (out of 15) republics that might be willing to remain in, and reconstitute, the Soviet Union. Economic pressures undoubtedly played some role in Gorbachev's recent policy initiatives and reversals. It is of considerable relevance, for example, that the conservatives offered no compelling solution to the economic crisis. Yet why Gorbachev chose a particular course and certain allies at a given point in time cannot be reduced to economics. Much less can the implications of those choices for foreign and security policy be understood solely on economic grounds. An analysis of economic conditions must be combined with an understanding of Gorbachev as politician, as well as the influence of the international environment.

Both traditional Kremlinology and the political economy approach offer important insights into Soviet security policy. The task for future research is twofold. First, Kremlinology must take greater advantage of the existing political science literature on coalition politics. Fortunately, this process is under way and is well represented by the work of Richard D. Anderson, James Richter, and Jack Snyder, among others. Second, Sovietologists must begin to bring economic factors systematically to bear on their analysis of Soviet politics, including Soviet security policy. As economic considerations come to play an increasingly explicit role in Soviet foreign and security policy, political scientists must be prepared to integrate them into their theories of Soviet politics and international relations.

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POLITICAL THEORY

Transforming Political Discourse: Political Theory and Conceptual History. By Terence Ball. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1988. 199p. $37.50.

Political Innovation and Conceptual Change. Edited by Terence Ball, James Farr, and Russell L. Hanson. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989. 366p. $49.50 cloth, $15.95 paper.

Conceptual Change and the Constitution. Edited by Terence Ball and J. G. A. Pocock. Lawrence: University of Kansas, 1988. 218p. $12.95 paper.

The project that informs these volumes is conceptual history. The focus is Western political discourse. Discourse (or most often, language) is understood as "moral and political" and constitutes a "medium of shared understanding and an arena of action" that is "communicatively . . . preconstituted" (*Conceptual Change and the Constitution,* 1). When discourses change, so does politics.

The intellectual ancestors of this project are several. The first is the presence of "Berkeley metaphysics." Politics is most often presented as shared participation and conflict, as by nature an amateur nonspecialist activity (see *Transforming Political Discourse,* 12). The sense that the availability of the full meanings of *politics* has changed over time (and not always for the good) is often very present: the reader feels the weight of the classic last chapter of Sheldon Wolin's *Politics and Vision* (1960). Second, the impact of ordinary language philosophy, more or less informed by Austin or Wittgenstein, is strong. Here, the recognition is of language as an activity of human beings—not just as a tool but as constitutive of a world—is prominent. Third, all of the editors and most of the authors feel the impact of, and/or participate in, "Cambridge history"—the deeply contextualized study of the understandings available to authors and readers at different historical periods.

The basic elements of the position are laid out in the introductions, especially in the first chapter of Terence Ball's own book. This volume includes essays on the conceptual history of *party* and on civic republicanism, power, authority, the infiltration of economic discourse into democratic discourse, and justice between generations. In *Political Innovation and Conceptual Change,* a group of distinguished political theorists contribute individual essays on important political concepts (the state, representation, corruption, etc., though not gender). The volume on the Constitution, in turn, presents a variety of essays on various matters pertaining to the writing and adoption of the U.S. Constitution.

It should be said that not all the essays are written from exactly the same mold. Some emphasize concepts in historical context; others are more struck by "innovation"; some look more at change over time, with little concern for synchronic context. Some (not many) are clearly the response to the acceptance of an invitation to appear at a conference.

Taken together, however, the volumes form a powerful argument for the feasibility and possible superiority of the study of conceptual change as a way of approaching the tasks of political theory and, indeed, of politics. The volumes are an impressive achievement; and of all the contributors to, and editors of, these volumes, Ball, Farr, and Hanson are the ones who have brought them into being. In what follows I shall speak of these three collectively as *the editors,* overlooking what differences exist between them.

What, then, are the elements of "conceptual history?" The architecture of the approach has the following claims:

1. Language is not only the medium by which we describe politics, it makes politics possible (*Conceptual Change,* 15).
2. Moral and political language can be differentiated, to some degree at least, from natural language (*Transforming Political,* 2).
3. As moral and political language ("concepts," *Transforming Political,* 15) is the central medium of shared experience, should two groups not share the same concepts (not use them in the same way, or perhaps not use a concept at all), they would then not be able to

understand each other (*Political Innovation,* 15).

4. The discourse of a period is seen as loosely causal (it at least sets boundaries) of future developments. (Skinner is concerned with "the process by which the [late medieval] usages . . . gave rise to recognizably modern notions" [*Political Innovations,* 95].)

5. Lastly, there is (sometimes explicitly) an acceptance of historical relativism, without, however, the conclusion that this entails a nihilistic trans- or postmoral stance. It is certainly no accident that Ball's book ends with the famous passage about the absurdity of thinking one could "jump over Rhodes" from the preface to Hegel's *Philosophy of Right.*

What are we to make of this? First, at the level of individual essays, the books are enormously fruitful. Whatever one's attitude towards the theoretical blueprint, anyone can profit from reading Skinner on the state; Euben on corruption; Ryan on property; Howe on faculty psychology in the Federalist papers; Pocock on states, republics, and empires; and Ball on intergenerational justice—as well as many others.

Second, the project as a whole brings back to us an important and controversial contention. The categories in which the world makes itself available to us, these authors argue, are themselves mutable. If this is true, then the pursuit or assertion of constants (rationality, self-interest, community, revealed preference) that would lie at, or as the foundation of, politcal life is not only impossible but wrong. The foundation of any political science is change, not permanence. What something is not is not necessarily something it might not become. This approach raises significant questions about approaches dominant in other parts of political science, the broaching of which will be profitable to all that can be concerned.

Third, while I share the sense in these volumes of the importance of language, there is nonetheless a nonresolved tension in the approach advocated here. At times, the editors write as if language were identical to politics and, indeed, to life itself. "As we speak, so we are. . . . The limits of my moral and political language . . . mark the limits of my moral and political world" (*Transforming Political,* ix, 4). Yet one page later, language is said to be "partly constituitive" of my world. Or take this statement: "To imagine politics without these linguistic actions [the various verbs of political life] would be to imagine no recognizable politics at all. At best there would be silence; at worst, a politics rather like Hobbes's war of all against all—missing only its taunts and insults" (*Conceptual Change,* 16). Now aside from the fact that, to my recollection, Hobbes does not say much about "taunts and insults" in the state of nature, the sentence is, strictly speaking, in tension with its point. If there are no recognizable politics without these actions, then Hobbes's state of nature cannot be called politics. What the author wants to do, I think, is to make the modernist point that Hobbes's state of nature is a limiting case of what we might recognize as politics, in the way, say that some of John Cage's compositions raise the question, Is this music?

The tension here comes from wanting things to be too neat. Some philosophers (Pole, Winch) think, for instance, that Wittgenstein tells us that use *is* meaning, as if that is the heart of the matter. What Wittgenstein says, however, is that the use should show us the meaning (see here the work of Cavell and Pitkin). This is not totally different; but it does imply that language also carries within it the capacity to understand both other cultures and its own, and possibly others', pasts (as well as the capacity to refuse such recognition). Austin wrote in "A Plea for Excuses" of words as "trailing clouds of etymology." At times, the editors present us with persons more threatened with being cut off from others than is necessary.

Let us look at the question in a bit more detail in Ball's provocative essay, "Justice between Generations," which closes his own volume. Ball argues against both those who think that we owe justice to future generations (often on the grounds that they will be beings like ourselves) and against those who argue that we do not on the grounds that nonexistent individuals cannot be bearers of rights and that justice has to do with rights. Ball's position is that since there is no "transhistorically true" theory of justice, there can be no coherent version of a duty to behave in a just manner toward distant future generations. The reason for this is that "we can know very little about remote future generations, save they will probably be composed of beings quite unlike ourselves and with a different mix of claims and dissimilar conceptions of the human good" (p. 150). Ball, however, concludes from this that we ought to behave justly toward future generations, whether or not they will understand us. Justice (our justice) is part of who we are; it is therefore something that we ought to do, not because it will be recognized as just in heaven or by some future generation but because it is just.

There is something very attractive in this historicized combination of Aristotle (justice is constituitive and expressive of the human) and Kant (we should do the just because it is just). But again, Ball's edges are too sharp. And they are sharp because he is letting history do his thinking for him here. Consider the statement: "Plato's understanding of justice . . . is not ours." Surely, though it provokes us, we find ourselves in it and it in us. Everything Ball has written about figures in political theory indicates that he thinks this, that he is provoked. But for the future, it is different: "Because we cannot know what men and women in distant generations will mean by 'justice', we cannot know what they will regard as just and unjust." So the problem is that we can know the past (somewhat) but not the future at all.

But this is wrong. Surely, we know the future somewhat. The fact that we do not know it completely is no more threatening than the fact that I am not you. Surely, what even Ball calls "humans" in the future will by *virtue of the fact that they are human* share *something* with us; then they will also find themselves in us and be moved by us, perhaps to refuse us. One can no more accept as meaningful the claim that future beings will be completely different from us than accept the claim that Hitler was completely different from us or that Southern slaveowners were, even in their slave holding, in a world morally incommensurable to ours. (That is *not* a moral statement.) Thus, it seems to me, we do have something to say to future generations: they do not have to be us to find that we have something to say to them. All they—and we—have to do is to resemble each other as humans.

That these volumes provoke these issues is a testimony to the importance of the project.

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Regulating Reproduction. By Robert H. Blank. New York: Columbia University Press, 1990. 272p. $27.50.

This volume gives an overview of such "technology-mediated reproduction" (TMR) techniques as artificial insemination (AI), in vitro fertilization (IVF), surrogate motherhood, sex preselection, DNA probes, prenatal diagnosis, contraception, and sterilization. The author, a political scientist, gives a comprehensive review of state-of-the-art technology and its possible long-term effects on children, parenthood, the (traditional) family, and society, as well as the policy dilemmas that, he feels, must be faced but have not been addressed to date by our political leadership.

The beginning chapter argues that two social revolutions—the first removing "reproduction from sex" and then removing "sex from reproduction"—created the demand for TMR. A survey of TMR techniques and their "commercialization" through for-profit sperm banks, private IVF clinics, surrogate mother enterprises, and sex preselection and generic screening kits are the subject of chapters 2 and 3.

Most stimulating is "Designing Our Children: At What Cost?," where Blank visualizes TMR being used by (Yuppie?) parents to assure the creation of the "perfect" child. If that ethic comes to pass, will doctors be sued for "wrongful life"? Will children hold parents legally accountable for making the wrong genetic choices? Will the mentally and physically handicapped be relegated to second-class personhood? The moral dilemma is that while TMR "promise[s] to alleviate the individual and social costs of genetic disease and give us more control over the destiny of future generations," its widespread use could also result in the "danger of altering our definition of humanity so as to minimize the 'human' aspects" (p. 55).

The existing state laws on TMR are surveyed in chapter 5, while chapter 6 gives a comparative review of those statutes in 35 nations. In the next chapter, a summary of the contextual variables affecting the U.S. policy process is used to assess the range of options (*prohibit, discourage, encourage, mandate*) with respect to TMR. The conclusion, "Toward a Rational Reproductive Policy," is almost a utopian expression that there ought to be a federal policy on TMR, despite the various political constraints that were identified in earlier chapters.

Blank does not embrace any Brave New World scenario; but moral issues do cause him to be overly concerned—to the point of creating a straw man to press the urgency for national planning. Why are we supposed to favor a rational and coherent policy when, in reality, TMR is essentially a marginal political issue for the public (and anyone concerned about too-high U.S. infant mortality rates)? The political establishment clearly does not recognize a policy crisis demanding action. The call for federal action is more a preference statement than the logical extension of analysis.

Incrementalism, not national planning, is the usual method of policy making, given the fragmented public authority and pluralist politics in the United States; and it happens to be working here fairly well. The wealth of information on state policy and cross-cultural experiences implicitly undercuts the argument that Blank is trying to advance. At least 30 states have enacted laws on the paternity of children conceived through AI, and 25 now regulate fetal research. Professional standards for TMR have also been formulated by the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, American Fertility Society, and American Association of Tissue Banks. In a short period of time there has been a "diffusion" of laws based on the existing political consensus with respect to acceptable TMR methods. A national plan always seems so tidy; but no compelling reasons are given why a federal solution is not adequate to the problem (if indeed there is a problem) at hand.

We ought not dismiss federalism based upon recent experiences with abortion, particularly the RU-486 morning-after pill—the latest medical advance and cause for political turmoil. Though barely touched upon in this volume, abortion is the clear analogue that should have driven this analysis. Abortion, like TMR, is a moral issue; as with TMR today, the 1960s agitation for therapeutic abortions yielded legislative success in many states and consensus levels of public support. But then, a national abortion policy was promulgated, everything came undone, and we are now deeply embroiled over this divisive issue. This policy analysis would have been immeasurably strengthened had that extensive literature on abortion politics been utilized as a reference point. And with respect to prolife opposition to fetal research (a topic mentioned only in passing), the future is here. The debate over fetal research may well be the leading indicator of what the next generation of TMR political battles may become and thus should have warranted substantial coverage as a case study.

In sum, as a policy study, more insights could have been derived from a comparative perspective. As a sourcebook on the topic, however, this volume is an engaging and well-written treatment. I highly recommend it to any scholar or layperson.

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Liberal Democracy and Political Science. By James W. Ceaser. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1990. 210p. $29.95.

The hero of this book is Alexis de Tocqueville. Ceaser's volume comprises a number of essays rather than a single linear argument. The essays, however, cluster around a coherent perspective on a central problem: the nature of contemporary political science and its role in contemporary U.S. politics. It is Ceaser's thesis that political science as an intellectual enterprise is inevitably—even if not by design—an important part of political life and that political science as currently practiced at best falls short of its promise and at worst is positively pernicious.

In Ceaser's account, contemporary political science should be seen as "suffering from acute schizophrenia." The two halves of its split personality are "the Dr. Jekyll of pure science" and "the Mr. Hyde of the new normativism." The result, as he puts it, "is a discipline that risks swinging between a barren concern for the trivial and a dangerous quest for the utopian." Separated by the scientists' focus on value-free facts and the normativists' focus on empirically unconstrained values, the two parts of contemporary political science share in common an excessive degree of abstraction that inhibits their usefulness and distorts their practical effects.

The solution, according to Ceaser, would be for political science to emulate the *methodos* of Aristotle, Montesquieu, and Tocqueville. Theirs, in Ceaser's illuminating reconstruction, is a form of inquiry that focuses empirically upon existing regimes and normatively upon the art of the possible. The result is a cautiously reformist pragmatic science that could be said to be governed by a particular form of knowledge-constitutive interest. Specifically, it takes its shape from an intent to provide the kind of political knowledge appropriate for the maintenance of a liberal democratic regime and for the guidance of its legislators.

The least convincing part of Ceaser's argument is its generalized critique. Partly because his treatment of the overall logic and goals of contemporary political science is highly compressed, it becomes something of a caricature. As a normative theorist, I find it hard to take too seriously a critique of contemporary normative theory that, for example, puts critical theory and deconstructionism into the same category, lumps all the categories from deontological liberals to Marxists together under the rubric of *the* new normativism, and then focuses on a single recent essay by Robert Dahl on the grounds that it "brilliantly encapsulates the overall spirit of this approach." I would be inclined to demur that contemporary normative theory is not a single approach, that it is not "new" in its concern with the abstract features of a good and just politics, and that Robert Dahl, whatever his many virtues, cannot be taken as paradigmatic. Empirical political scientists would likely have similar reservations about Ceaser's characterization of their own enterprise.

These doubts about the force of Ceaser's general critique, however, should not detract from an appreciation of the book's many virtues. Foremost among these is the persuasive and illuminating exposition of Tocqueville as a social scientist. Ceaser's succinct and lucid account deftly explains the logical relationship and complementarity between Tocqueville's methodological, scientific, theoretical orientation and his political, ideological, activist concerns. Second, Ceaser provides his readers with thoughtful criticism of those who would, in his view, tamper too cavalierly with the U.S. liberal-constitutional regime. In particular, he raises objections pertinent to those who advocate making the current regime less liberal and more unadornedly democratic and to those who would like to tinker with the Constitution's separation of powers on behalf of a more parliamentary-style responsible government. Finally, he offers a vision of organizing political inquiry from a particular point of view that would render it both "relevant" and scientific—albeit in a mode that is probably too Burkean and too politicized to be widely accepted as a comprehensive model.

In short, this is a book that in its entirety will convince few but in its parts will interest and instruct many.

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Discursive Democracy: Politics, Policy, and Political Science. By John D. Dryzek. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990. 254p. $39.50.

In recent years, a handful of scholars have begun to forge links between the leading edges of political theory and the more practical forms of political analysis. In *Politics, Values, and Public Policy* (1980), Frank Fischer applied advances in normative reasoning to public policy evaluation; and in *Critical Theory and Public Life* (1985), John Forester explored the interconnections between critical theory and urban planning. John Dryzek's new book is in this same vein. It is an intriguing and ambitious attempt to apply the insights of critical theorists like Jürgen Habermas to the practice of politics, policy analysis, and political science.

As Dryzek observes, critical theorists have often made little effort to explore the practical political implications of their work. They usually have been content to work largely on the metaphilosophical level. Even when these theorists have turned their attention to modern political institutions, their perspective has been almost entirely "critical"—aimed at exposing the subtle forms of domination fostered by these institutions. Dryzek wants to push critical theory in a more "constructive" direction by exploring how it can inform the design of better political institutions and lead to more useful approaches to the analysis of policy and politics.

The book begins with a critique of the instrumental form of rationality that underlies much of our current practice of politics and political analysis. Predictably, Dryzek argues that instrumental rationality encourages a form of politics that is bureaucratic, technocratic, and ultimately antidemocratic. As an alternative, he offers the notion of "communicative rationality"—a process in which individuals analyze and coordinate their actions through a free and open discussion of both the empirical and normative issues that confront them. The institutional manifestation of communicative rationality is what Dryzek calls "discursive democracy," and this political paradigm becomes the central theme of the book.

In the first part of the book, Dryzek explores how discursive democratic institutions might be designed and why they would be superior to bureaucracy or liberal polyarchy. Here he makes what is probably his most interesting claim—that discursive political institutions are not only more democratic but also better able to solve our most pressing policy problems. He argues that many of these lingering problems (e.g., pollution) are characterized by an elaborate tangle of competing interests and conflicting values, which make them too politically and normatively complex to be solved by current political institutions or by the application of instrumental rationality. Dryzek argues that the only practical way to solve them is through discursive democracy, which brings together various political interests for joint analysis and cooperative actions. As an example of this approach, he cites the use of environmental mediation—where environmentalists, business interests, and government officials come together to negotiate effective solutions to environmental controversies. To his credit, Dryzek is well aware of the possible pitfalls in such participatory approaches—such as the cooptation that has taken place in some experiments in environmental mediation and workplace democracy. But he remains cautiously optimistic about the political potential of these discursive approaches.

The second part of the book explores the role that policy analysts could play in promoting communicative rationality and discursive democracy. Not surprisingly, Dryzek argues that analysts should not "engineer and effect policies at the behest of the powerful" (p. 147) but that their main role should lie "in the creation and sustenance of conditions and institutions for free discourse" (p. 126). An example is the innovative work of Thomas Berger, a Canadian judge who headed the Alaska Native Review Commission and the MacKenzie Valley Pipeline Inquiry. Berger continually encouraged participation and analysis by ordinary citizens, requiring his staff to provide them with information and educational materials.

The third part of the book, which addresses the role of political scientists in a discursive democracy, is the least persuasive. Dryzek argues that political science should be primarily concerned with encouraging democratic discourse, but there is little indication of what that would mean in practice. His one concrete suggestion is that political scientists should abandon the use of opinion surveys and embrace an alternative technique (Q-methodology) that he believes is "more conducive to the egalitarian discourse sought by discursive democracy" (p. 24). However, the conventional way that Q-methodology has been used in other social sciences, such as psychology, suggests that although it has some discursive potential, there is nothing inherently more democratic about this technique.

Clearly, the main strength of this book is the broad sweep of its analysis. Dryzek has mastered a truly impressive range of literature; and he successfully blends an analysis of current theoretical and methodological issues with an examination of how those issues might inform the practices of a wide variety of political actors. At times, however, this broad scope is something of a drawback. In trying to cover such a large territory, Dryzek's arguments often are only sketchy or suggestive and, as a result, may be unconvincing to readers who do not already share his sympathies for critical theory and democratic participation. But to be fair, Dryzek's primary goal in this book is to provide an initial vision, not a detailed blueprint, of the connections that exist between critical theory and more practical political activities; and in this he succeeds admirably.

DOUGLAS J. AMY

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Book Reviews: Political Theory

Democracy Without Citizens: Media and the Decay of American Politics. By Robert M. Entman. New York: Oxford University Press, 1989. 232p. $22.50 cloth, $9.95 paper.

U.S. politics is caught in a vicious circle when it comes to assuring that the public receives the information that it needs to make decisions. Citizens need politically sophisticated, ample news to make sense of their world. Yet they are not prepared to process that kind of news. That puts the media in a bind. When they supply the kind of news that their readers want and can handle, they do a disservice to the goals of good citizenship. Democracy decays. If they supplied the kind of news that their readers need, it would go for naught because the audience lacks the intellectual skills and inclination to use it. Besides, media as a business enterprise would suffer.

Robert Entman, a political communication scholar at Northwestern University, contends that the media face other major problems, as well. In theory, they are free to choose their sources and use information according to their own inclinations. In reality, they are beholden to sources. The professional culture of U.S. media dictates that news must come from "credible" individuals. Since that has become equated with elites, they control the kinds of information that gets on the public agenda. Since elite newsmakers are limited in numbers, especially at the highest levels, journalists cannot afford to alienate them for fear of damaging future access to information. News quality also suffers because U.S. media prize news for its recency and human interest qualities more than for its substance. Political elites, for their part, feel compelled to abide by the journalistic norms that lead to shallow, sensationalist news. The consequences are demogogic appeals and seriously flawed election campaigns.

The book analyzes numerous important news events, such as coverage of President Carter's failed hostage rescue effort in 1980, which earned him a lot of criticism from the media, and coverage of the 1983 attack on U.S. marines in Lebanon, for which President Reagan garnered little blame. Using such illustrations, Entman makes it clear that the nature of coverage often depends as much on how well journalists like a particular president and on the president's poll ratings as on the situation that is being reported. The skill with which politicians manipulate news dispatches is another important factor in shaping the news. When it comes to serving as the proverbial watchdog that protects the public from corrupt government, the media rarely do well. The dog barks only after the crime has occurred. Media do not usually ferret out wrongdoing before it happens.

Greater media competition will not necessarily lead to better journalism. The media, as others have said, are rivals in conformity. However, Entman believes that newspapers would do a better job if they were controlled by political parties, as they once were. Government should subsidize such media and should also strengthen public television through more money and less political control. Better journalism should be complemented by better-educated and better-motivated citizens.

Democracy without Citizens is a book with many facets that makes numerous contributions to contemporary thinking about media and politics. It performs its tasks deftly, using a broad array of quantitative and qualitative methodological tools. It is both idealistic and realistic. It presents a critique of the media that is damning yet fair because it is sensitive to the realities of the U.S. political scene. The criticism hits its mark squarely because it does not simplistically paint politicians as manipulative villains, the media as venal junk merchants, and the public as disinterested dunces. Yet there are problems, unless one is willing to buy all of the books' underlying assumptions.

Entman postulates a number of ideals that fly in the face of realities or strain democratic principles. For example, his ideal citizen seems beyond human capabilities. Even professional students of politics find it difficult to become as fully informed as Entman deems essential. If everyone spent sufficient time to match Entman's ideal, who would do the other work that needs to be done in a democracy? How much citizen knowledge and what kind is really essential for a well-functioning democracy? Other questions relate to the role of the media. Aside from exposing outright corruption, should media in a democratic society really second-guess government on public policies, as Entman suggests? Would newspeople really know, and agree on, which policies are best (as Entman believes they would)? Would their judgments necessarily reflect the public's wishes better than the judgments of elected public officials? By what right are media personnel spokespersons for the public? Whom do they represent? What assurance is there that these guardians are, indeed, laboring disinterestedly for the public's good? Though by no means perfect, is not the electoral process still the best mechanism to select public policy decision makers? These important questions are not as settled as Entman's thought-provoking, tightly reasoned book suggests. The fact that it raises such profound questions is a tribute to the author's achievements.

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The Ambition to Rule: Alcibiades and the Politics of Imperialism in Thucydides. By Steven Forde. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989. 216p. $27.95.

Although Thucydides' *History of the Peloponnesian War* (a subsequent title, the author having given it none) is cited with some frequency by political scientists, the lessons typically drawn from it are limited ones; that is, the work is viewed as a lengthy case study in realpolitik (exemplified by the Athenians' blunt "amoralism" in the Melian dialogue) andor an expression of political pessimism, demonstrating anew the futility and horror of war. These now-trite "lessons" fall well short of justifying Hobbes's judgment that Thucydides was "the most politic historiographer that ever writ."

In *The Ambition To Rule,* Steven Forde demonstrates how a careful reading of the history can provide more specific and illuminating insights into the possibilities and the limits of politics—and the nature and problems of political leadership—than most contemporary scholars have recognized. Without denying Thucydides' "allegiance to the ideal of factual accuracy," Forde emphasizes that the history is considerably "remove[d] from the genre of history as we conceive of it today," inasmuch as it is "governed by an investigative and didactic purpose" that "dictates the striking omissions and emphases" it contains "and is meant to be revealed indirectly through them" (pp. 2-3). Forde interprets "Thucydides' educational project . . . as directed primarily to practical political men." This didactic purpose explains the apparent inconsistencies of language and perspective that some interpreters have attributed "to changes in Thucydides' own understanding that are incompletely integrated" into the text. To educate readers effectively with regard to moral and political subjects, an author (as Thucydides recognized) must take account of his audience's "moral and intellectual presuppositions and proceed cautiously . . . to overcome or transform them." In accordance with this principle, Thucydides "seems to begin with relatively greater sympathy for Sparta, the bastion of the conventional moral outlook" of his time, and moves only gradually "toward a greater appreciation of Athens," a city built on principles that challenged conventional morality. Similarly, he seems initially to express greater sympathy for the pious but ineffectual Athenian leader Nicias and "disdain" for his daring yet morally questionable rival Alcibiades, only gradually revealing "the inadequacies of that point of view" (pp. 9-10, 146n).

Forde argues that in Thucydides' view, the people's abandonment of their city during the Persian War in order to fight the Persians at sea was of decisive importance in shaping the distinctive Athenian character: "In becoming, however briefly, men without place, the Athenians severed . . . their connections with all the fixed things that the life of a city normally revolves around, that normally serve as its stable, conservative base"—most importantly the sacred sites. The resultant liberation from tradition created an "enormous potential for power connected with becoming a nation of seamen" that Themistocles was the first to perceive and to develop (pp. 23-25). Alcibiades, as the most "liberated" Athenian leader, exemplifies the extreme (hence the theoretically most interesting) consequences for Thucydides of building a city anew on the foundation of freedom and individualism, encouraging the fullest "development of individual human faculties" but thereby engendering the potential detachment of individual ambition from the city itself (p. 8).

The exemplar of statesmanship for Thucydides is commonly thought to have been Pericles, who counseled the Athenians to adopt a moderate, defensive policy in the war so as to preserve their empire. In his eulogy of Pericles in book 2, Thucydides seems to attribute the Athenians' ultimate downfall to their failure after Pericles' death to heed his advice. The expedition to conquer Sicily, launched at the urging of Alcibiades, constitutes the most direct violation of that advice. However, as Forde points out, Thucydides neither unambiguously endorses Pericles' moderate policy nor calls the expedition a mistake; indeed, he "insists throughout his presentation of the expedition that Athens could easily have prevailed if it had not removed" Alcibiades from his command and exiled him. Pericles himself, by Thucydides' account, "failed to foresee the extent and duration of the war, two things that doomed his cautious policy to failure." Ironically, the daring Alcibiades is in a sense the true Athenian "conservative," inasmuch as the bold policy he advocates best conforms with his city's way of life (p. 14).

Thucydides, then, is not the simple conservative or moralist he is often made out to be. Although his character Alcibiades is not, Forde stresses, a Machiavellian (pp. 171n, 187), Thucydides allows us to foresee the basis of the Machiavellian transformation of the meaning of virtue and the phenomena that make that transformation plausible (pp. 146n, 195, 209). Perhaps what most fundamentally distinguishes his teaching from Machiavelli's, however, is his demonstration, through Alcibiades, that politics does not do full justice to human nature.

Forde's masterful study, combining a sensitivity to the nuances of Thucydides' language with an appreciation of the problems of politics, helps us to learn from Thucydides. One might only wish that he had departed from his own Thucydidean reserve by adding a conclusion to his book that would have drawn out the lessons of Thucydides' history for the U.S. regime, which recalls Athens in its liberation of human nature from traditional political and moral restraints but does not (according to Tocqueville) encourage the grandeur of ambition that Alcibiades exemplified.

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The Future Remembered: An Essay in Biopolitics. By Richard Shelly Hartigan. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1988. 150p. $18.95.

Hartigan's essay on human nature in light of contemporary theory and research in the life sciences and the social and behavioral sciences is a welcome addition to the growing literature in the discipline's organized subfield, *politics and the life sciences.* A political philosopher by training and inclination, Hartigan offers a serious interpretation of contemporary scientific research on human nature set against the backdrop of a rich tradition of philosophical examination of the nature of man. In his view, a comprehensive approach to the development of political theory, reminiscent of Aristotle, requires that we take careful note of new knowledge and theory in the life sciences. I would certainly concur with this view.

There is nothing new or significantly reinterpretive in this slim volume; but it is well written, and the author does an excellent job of recapitulating the tradition of human nature inquiry. Perhaps the greatest contribution of the essay is that it can serve as a good entry point for a political scientist trained as a political philosopher who seeks to learn something about what the contemporary life sciences can offer a political theorist. But Hartigan's essay is not merely an overview. He has an argument to make—a controversial one, but one with which I am fundamentally in agreement; that is, Hartigan argues that there is a human nature and that "human normative systems and beliefs can be shown to possess a primary, empirical base which underlies their secondary, subjective articulations" (p. 27). Hartigan wishes to show that there is a scientific basis for human morality. Clearly, that is a tall order. In my view Hartigan has made a good effort but not as persuasive as he would hope. For example, Hartigan does not deal with ethical naturalism as a philosophical position that has been well-considered among philosophers for some time. To make a convincing case, it would be necessary for him to confront the naturalistic fallacy successfully.

Nonetheless, I applaud the serious effort to settle a long-standing debate about human nature and moral behavior. It would be unreasonable to expect that in 132 pages of narrative the author could give a full account, for example, of why explicating the biological bases of behavior need not be overly reductionistic. In fact, Hartigan deals with this very serious problem in only two pages! As might be expected, this is not adequate to stem the critics. Accordingly, I would argue that Hartigan's essay is a fine place to begin but that then other recent contributions to the literature (e.g., Roger Masters's *Nature of Politics)* can provide a more detailed defense of a very limited reductionism. Since Hartigan makes the claim that man is naturally social, it would have been useful to include some discussion of the biology of cooperation and the extent to which cooperation is in evidence nearly as much as competition for most species.

Another controversial point that Hartigan makes and then leaves quickly is his analogy between the womb and the polis. He says, "The polis is truly the human womb that replaces and transcends the biological womb of human gestation" (p. 57). I am not sure but what he presses this analogy too far and in fact mixes the environmental and biological factors to the point where it would be difficult to separate out their causal influence. This is a serious problem, given his stated views about the empirical reality of human nature. Exactly what he means by "transcends the biological womb" is not clear, but one interpretation would be that biology is clearly superseded by environment. But that contradicts the position he has previously taken.

Hartigan goes on to say that the polis, or community, gives rise to a general body of values (p. 59) and that these values constitute a public morality that is innate among human groups. Rejecting the relativist tradition, Hartigan embraces a version of ethical naturalism and goes even further to claim that "a political system, though ultimately much more, is first of all, a breeding system" (p. 61). Hartigan does an excellent job of succinctly describing the historical trends in interpreting man as individual and group member (noting the limitations of each interpretation) and concludes that man is an "ambivert," that is, "an organism that strives to maximize its own individual needs and desires as it perceives these, while at the same time carrying on this pursuit in the company of others like itself, all doing the same as it" (p. 67). This constitutes the biological basis of both cooperative and conflictual behavior and gives rise to the need for politics as an activity. He says, "The distinguishing feature of a political system is, therefore, the presence of political activity, which must be viewed as the human effort directed at the control of aggression or violence" (p. 71). The fundamental value that emerges from this view is the value of survival, supplemented by a second value of procreation. Hartigan is at his best in reviewing the Decalogue as an example of the fundamental unity of human values and the consistency of those values with a biopolitical perspective. Hartigan concludes that the primacy of the values of survival and procreation has "expressed itself in a handful of general, universal principles relating to lineage, property and truth" (p. 105).

Hartigan concludes with a strong recommendation that the science of ethology, the study of animals in their natural habitats, offers great promise for our understanding of *homo politicus.* There should be little doubt among those at all familiar with the increasingly large body of ethological research that Hartigan is correct and that political science would do well to incorporate this and other related bodies of research into the study of politics. If Hartigan's slim volume convinces readers of this necessity, then his effort will have been most worthwhile.

SAMUEL M. HINES, JR.

College of Charleston

Aristotle's Theory of the State. By Curtis N. Johnson. New York: St. Martin's, 1990. 194p. $49.95.

The notorious difficulty of Aristotle's *Politics* is due in part to the apparent inconsistencies among many key discussions. To explain this incoherence, many commentators have argued that the conflicting passages belong to different periods in Aristotle's philosophical development. With this book, Johnson argues against the *developmental* interpretation of the *Politics.* If Johnson is right, many of the particular discussions Aristotle takes up are in fact intended to help us answer, in one way or another, a cluster of related questions: What is the essential nature of the state? What varieties of states exist? What is the natural order among these varieties? Once the central place of these questions in Aristotle's overall project is brought to light, Johnson argues, the need to seek evidence of developmentalism evaporates.

As an attempt to make clear the basic coherence of the *Politics*, *Aristotle's Theory of the State* probably promises more than it delivers. Nevertheless, this book has many virtues that make it an important addition to the literature on Aristotle's political thought. In contrast to commentators who would have us believe that Aristotle often means more or less or something other than what he actually says, Johnson insists that we always test the adequacy of a particular interpretation against what we find in the text. Johnson's exposition of particular arguments is unusually lucid and invariably defended by means of novel, carefully crafted arguments. The reader may not always be convinced by Johnson's conclusions but will not find it easy to escape them.

Although Johnson's accounts of how states are to be assessed and where sovereignty is to be located within a *polis* will repay especially careful attention, perhaps the most interesting discussion centers around Johnson's thesis that the "ideal" regime discussed incompletely in books 7 and 8 is to be identified with the *middle constitution* described in book 4. This thesis may seem implausible on its face, since sovereignty in the middle constitution belongs not to individuals of exceeding virtue but to *the many*. But how, one might ask, can a regime be called "ideal" when rule is in the hands of individuals of no special moral attainment? Johnson's answer is that Aristotle never loses sight of the distinction between what is the "best state absolutely" and what is the best state of those "within our reach." Rule by persons possessing virtue to an unusually high degree may be best absolutely, but no such persons are likely to be found. The best political arrangement that is "within our reach" is rule by persons who have been made as good as they can be by the institutions of the city. Moreover, Johnson argues, perfection to a degree sufficient for good rule according to the middle constitution is open to the many, although Aristotle is less than optimistic about such perfection's being realized.

The principle value of this book is not in its attack of the developmental view of the *Politics*, but in its analyses of particular topics that Aristotle considers. Hence, it is unfortunate that it contains no *index locorum*.

THOMAS C. BRICKHOUSE

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Political Networks: The Structural Perspective. By David Knoke. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990. 290p. $42.50.

The purpose of David Knoke's book is to convince political scientists that political networks are a useful and necessary addition to the standard theoretical approaches in the field. Networks, of course, are not a new concept in political science. They have been used (if only as metaphors) at least since the Columbia studies of political behavior conducted in the 1940s. Yet Knoke's book fills an important gap in the political science literature by presenting the network concept as part of a coherent theoretical perspective.

A network model has two basic components: a set of objects, namely, political actors (e.g., individuals, groups, nations) and the set of relations between these objects, whether informal links like conversations or more formal ties (organizational membership, treaty obligations). As Knoke points out, the focus of these models is neither the individual actors nor the social aggregates (like social class) to which they may belong, but the varying interactions that link actors to each other. By elaborating on these basic components, network models provide a flexible and powerful means for representing and analyzing social structure. Such an approach is particularly valuable for studying politics, Knoke argues, because the exercise of power is inherently contingent upon both the actors involved and their relationship in a given situation. Knoke distinguishes two dimensions of power—an *influence* dimension based upon the control of information and a *dominance* dimension based upon the use or promise of sanction—as the basis for assessing power relations between political actors. Thus, for Knoke, "the basic objective of a structural analysis of politics is to explain the distribution of power among actors in a social system as a function of the position that they occupy in one or more networks" (p. 9).

Having set out the rationale for a structural perspective, Knoke examines the use of network models in a variety of substantive areas including voting and political participation, social movements, organizations, community and national elites, and international relations. Knoke presents a brief theoretical overview in each substantive area and assesses how network models have been used (or in some cases could be used) to contribute to a more complete understanding of the subject. Knoke concludes each chapter with a short "Looking Forward" section intended to summarize the advantages of the structural perspective and point the way for new research.

The strengths of this work are readily apparent. The first chapter is an excellent presentation of the need for a structural perspective in the study of politics. Further, by covering a broad spectrum of topics, Knoke makes a convincing case that the structural perspective has much to offer as an alternative or supplementary theoretical approach. In keeping with this objective, Knoke emphasizes the theoretical significance of the empirical studies under consideration and incorporates the methodological details only when necessary. As a result, Knoke's work is highly readable and the relevant fundamentals of network methodology are included in a short appendix.

The very breadth of Knoke's undertaking, however, also creates important limitations. Given the paucity of network research on some topics, Knoke is hard pressed at points to maintain his thesis that a structural perspective contributes to the understanding of a particular substantive concern. The strongest chapters in the book, in addition to the first, address topics with a sufficient base of empirical network literature. The chapters on organizations and elites are the most convincing because enough empirical work (a fair bit by Knoke and his colleagues) has been conducted to clarify how network models produce more complete or theoretically compelling explanations. The least convincing chapters lack the necessary empirical groundwork to sustain the claim for the utility of the structural perspective. In particular, the concluding chapter suffers from this limitation. Despite its impressive range, from transformations in the workplace to the restructuring of the post-Cold War international order, the discussion adds little beyond highly speculative remarks concerning possible future research. A concluding chapter offering a more detailed picture of the theoretical and methodological requirements for advancing the structural perspective would have served Knoke's objectives far better.

Nonetheless, the strengths of this work easily outweigh such limitations. Knoke's book is not intended as a primer on network methodology (several good presentations are readily available). It is, more importantly, an argument for establishing a structural perspective within the study of politics. As such, Knoke's book deserves a wide audience among theoretically oriented political scientists.

MATTHEW J. BURBANK

University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill

The Natural Goodness of Man: On the System of Rousseau's Thought. By Arthur M. Melzer. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990. 308p. $51.00 cloth, $18.95 paper.

Liberalism and the Good. Edited by R. Bruce Douglass, Gerald R. Mara, and Henry S. Richardson. New York: Routledge, 1990. 289p. $49.95 cloth, $15.95 paper.

Rethinking Goodness. By Michael A. Wallach and Lise Wallach. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990. 156p. $44.50 cloth, $14.95 paper.

The editors of *Liberalism and the Good* view the 10 contributors to their volume as responding to a dilemma: to the extent that liberalism argues for the superiority of its own normative assumptions over others, its commitment to toleration is threatened; if liberalism refuses to defend its normative assumptions, it has no basis on which to reject others. Can liberals provide more than a "thin" conception of the good without undermining their commitment to toleration of a plurality of conceptions of the good? Bruce Ackerman says *no*, arguing that liberalism consists precisely of the refusal to talk about the good in the public forum, and defends his principle of "neutrality" *(Social Justice and the Liberal State,* 1980) against critics who, he believes, misconstrue it. Brian Berry calls for explicit recognition of the skepticism upon which liberalism's embrace of toleration rests and finds futile the hope of formulating some metaliberal conception of the good that could be used to convert nonliberals. William E. Connolly contends that all conceptions of the good inevitably posit some contestable normal/abnormal duality and brutalize the abnormal, so that task is to assert conceptions of the good only to move on and "unsettle" them.

Other contributors see themselves as providing solutions to the editors' dilemma. Stephen Salkever, for example, argues that embedded in liberal education and judicial tradition are the values of open and unending Socratic dialogue. Liberal theory need only catch up with liberal practice and institutions if it is seeking norms thicker than toleration. Similarly, Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson argue that liberalism can move beyond mere toleration by making its highest good public deliberation in a context of mutual "respect." Martha Nussbaum suggests that liberals appropriate Aristotle's conception of the good, claiming that it is substantive enough to counter communitarian criticisms but "vague" enough to allow for toleration of diversity on particulars.

The editors are justly skeptical about the accomplishments of their contributors. Those who, rather than simply accept liberalism's dilemma with all its paradox, attempt to get beyond it lapse back into formalism, conceiving liberalism's good as the agreement to disagree and to continue to talk about the good.

The brief Wallach book also sees an impasse between liberalism's "minimal" conception of ethics as mere toleration and more substantive but "authoritarian" accounts. Both views, the authors contend, rest on a confusion between *autonomy* ("deciding for oneself") and *personal preference* ("deciding in favor of oneself"), which resulted from an accident in the history of thought.

Plato and Aristotle conceived of the ethical life as something we all really desire, although we frequently lose sight of it. The Judeo-Christian tradition severed ethics from human desire and conceived of it as something God demands of us. This "externalization" of ethics lived on in subsequent secular visions. Authoritarians substitute society for God and affirm the need for external restraint. Liberals, who also continue to see ethics as an external imposition, while rejecting all threats to autonomy, are forced to the minimal ethic of toleration. The ethical is whatever each autonomous self says it is, plus the injunction of toleration that results from the recognition of this fact. The authors propose that liberalism can recover a transpersonal ethics while preserving individual autonomy by recovering the Greek insight that promotion of the common good is not an external imposition but one of our deepest desires.

The thesis is very poorly argued. The authors draw ideas from a variety of sources without concern for context. They move gingerly from asserting that cooperativeness is biologically rooted (apparently to corroborate the Greek notion that we desire to be virtuous) to invoking superficially "Gadamerian conversation" without hinting that naturalism and the hermeneutic tradition conflict. Alasdair MacIntyre (whom the authors credit for much of their inspiration) makes a much better case for the more plausible points of the book in his own work. The authors charge MacIntyre with succumbing to relativism by tying the content of the common good too closely to particular cultural practices. They demand universal content but then confess that we must settle for the aim rather than the achievement of discovering such content. They, too, end with a formalism—in which the good becomes the search for the good through open and respectful dialogue—that is as empty of universal content as the relativism they so decry.

Arthur Melzer's primary aim is to demonstrate that the notorious contradictions and paradoxes pervading Rousseau's texts can be resolved by grasping his thought whole. In doing so, he offers a far meatier account than do the other two books, not only of the origin and predicaments of liberalism but of much other modern thought as well. Melzer proposes that we take seriously Rousseau's own claim that his works taken together are a systematic elaboration upon the single thesis of the natural goodness of man. The interpretive key to Rousseau is to view him as an *idealistic realist.* Rousseau shares with Hobbes a realistic skepticism toward classical thought's faith in the noble, disinterested, idealistic and rational side of humans. He goes beyond Hobbes, however, in blaming *the high* in humans for all their vices, thereby exculpating the nonrational, physical, and natural in humans. *The low,* recovered as naturally good, serves as a basis for renewed idealism but on very different terms than those of classical thought. Contra the classics, the key to the good rests in our lower nature; contra Hobbes, a good that is loftier than the mere avoidance of violence is possible.

The "idealistic realist" formula not only mediates the tension between the modern and classical elements of Rousseau's thought but unlocks the rest of his political argument. Society (part and parcel of the high) causes vice by rendering humans utterly dependent upon each other. Solitary self-love is innocent; self-love in the context of society results in hypocritical and contradictory "selfish selflessness"; for we seek to serve ourselves by controlling others; but in the context of interdependency, "to control, we must obey."

To escape personal dependency, one can withdraw from society completely; but this option is open to a few at best. Or one can enter into a society governed by the general will. In submitting to the general will (whose value lies completely in its formal generality, rather than in any particular content), I obey no other particular person and, in fact, obey only my own will properly generalized. Thus, the individualist and collectivist aspects of Rousseau's thought cohere. Rousseau is a democrat—but an "authoritarian democrat," not a liberal one. There can be no holding a private realm of individual rights against the state that would avoid reintroducing the struggle of selfish selflessness. Rousseau "defects" from liberalism not because it is too hardheaded in its insistence on our self-interestedness but because it is not realistic enough. He is concerned, too, for the welfare of the individual; but the way to health—including the soul's—is by collectivist means.

Melzer fills out his argument in elaborate detail, pulling from Rousseau's entire corpus and attempting to draw virtually every nuance of Rousseau's political doctrine into systematic coherence. The concluding chapter, in which Melzer offers an explicit and "empirical," brief evaluation of Rousseau's thought is a disappointment. Melzer's contention, for example, that something must be askew in Rousseau's thought, since his predictions regarding population growth have not panned out, is grotesquely out of proportion with the subtlety of the rest of his argument. Melzer's real criticism runs from cover to cover—but between the lines. It is that the consequences of modern thought are so dire that the ancients must have been right, after all. This typically Straussian resentment of modernity will be irksome to some readers, but Melzer's book is a must for Rousseau scholars and has much to offer anyone interested in the history of thought.

DARYL H. RICE

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Citizenship and Community: Civic Republicanism and the Modern World. By Adrian Oldfield. London: Routledge, 1990. 196p. $52.50.

This is communitarianism without apology. Unlike many contemporary liberals for whom citizenship is not central and unlike many contemporary communitarians who seek to reconcile their preferred version of communitarianism with a commitment to individual rights, Adrian Oldfield seeks to defend a traditional ideal of citizenship—civic republicanism, pure and simple. I say *seeks to defend* because the passion of the vision notwithstanding, there is less argument for the vision than one would like and even less sensitivity to the problems that it raises.

The dust jacket states (Did I miss it in the text?) that the central argument of the book is that "citizens have duties, rather than rights." This claim might be understood in two ways. It might be advanced as an analytical claim as to what "it would mean to take civic republicanism seriously in the modern world" (p. ix)—that is, if one wanted to take it seriously. But it might also be advanced as a normative claim, to the effect that all adults *should* regard themselves as citizens and that such persons *do* have duties rather than rights. The first claim presents us with a picture that we might or might not want to accept; the second claim presents us with a moral demand. I believe that Oldfield wants to advance the second claim but comes closer to making good on the first.

Oldfield begins by presenting the standard picture of liberal individualism, a vision that accords ontological, epistemological, and moral priority to the individual and under which the purpose of the state is entirely instrumental. This contrasts with the preferred picture, in which individuals acknowledge "more than instrumental attachment to collective forms of life" (p. 6) and in which they can reach "a degree of moral and political autonomy" that liberalism can never provide.

But what, precisely, does this civic republicanism look like in the modern world? Interestingly, there are virtually no references to modern forms of social life in the entire book and few references to the features of modern life that might make it difficult to realize this conception of citizenship. Instead, the picture is developed through a survey of the views of four political philosophers: Machiavelli, Rousseau, Hegel, and Tocqueville. In these chapters Oldfield presents reasonably standard and straightforward accounts of the conception of citizenship that is intrinsic to these difficult moments in the history of political thought. Thus, while Machiavelli stresses the importance of the war and aggressiveness, Rousseau stresses the importance of a common commitment to law. Whereas Machiavelli and Rousseau stress the affective dimension of citizenship, Hegel stresses the cognitive and rational. And whereas Hegel sought to defend citizenship in the modern nation-state, Tocqueville argues that citizenship must be nurtured in the local community.

One can and does learn from these summaries, but it is not clear just how they connect to Oldfield's larger aims. Indeed, he does not seem to realize that there is a need to connect them. This is particularly troublesome, given that Oldfield recognizes that "a conception of citizenship appropriate for the modern world must be somewhat broader than that which is revealed in the civic-republican tradition" (p. 158); for citizenship is "exclusive" and draws on a sharp distinction between members of one's own society and "strangers" (p. 8), but many contemporary political, economic, and environmental problems are fundamentally transnational. One can *say* that a modern conception of citizenship must be broader, but it is by no means clear just what that conception look like and whether it is realizable.

There are other problems. Oldfield argues that duties, rather than rights, are central to communitarian citizenship. At the same time, he says that citizenship "is not about altruism" (p. 8). Altruism involves sacrificing one's interest for another and citizenship is about making the community's interest one's own. But if this identity-of-interest claim goes through, it seems out of place to talk about the *duties* of citizenship; for one does not have a duty to pursue one's own interests. The identity-of-interest claim raises another problem, namely, that Oldfield's vision is surprisingly and suspiciously tension-free. Thus, while communitarianism does without liberal rights, it claims to secure the autonomy and freedom that is at the center of the liberal vision—albeit a different and (of course) higher form of autonomy and freedom. Maybe, but I doubt that the tension can be so easily resolved. Unabashedly resurrecting the view that we should "force people to be free," Oldfield acknowledges that many "will not choose this level of agency and form of consciousness unless they are educated into it" (p. 153).

It is not that Oldfield is wrong about all this (although I suspect he is at least partially wrong). It is that there is no irony, no doubt, no worry. Oldfield notes that "liberal individualists object to having their characters systematically mutilated" by the perfectionist paternalism he supports but that "civic republicans know that it is worth paying the price" (p. 154). Some of us may be less sure.

ALAN WERTHEIMER

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Solzhenitsyn's Political Thought. By James F. Pontuso. Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1990. 272p. $30.00.

Alexander Solzhenitsyn may not be so visible as he was in earlier times in the Western world; and his latest works, including *The Red Wheel,* are largely ignored. However, he continues to enjoy a high reputation not only in Russia but in the whole USSR. Most of Solzhenitsyn's works, including *The Gulag Archipelago,* are now available there and are creating a sensation. What, then, is the exact nature of Solzhenitsyn's ideology? James F. Pontuso sheds considerable light on this question.

Pontuso's book is arranged with great clarity, and his chapter headings deal with large issues, such as Solzhenitsyn's relations to Stalin, to Lenin, and to Marx. It is salutary to be reminded of Lenin's appalling legacy (p. 29); and it is helpful that Pontuso is able to relate some of Solzhenitsyn's ideas to Western thinkers such as Alexis de Tocqueville (p. 58). The book is well researched, annotated, and presented. The bibliography is comprehensive.

Chapter 6 ("Solzhenitsyn on the West") is correctly and fully reported. Solzhenitsyn believes that the West relies far too heavily on a post-Enlightenment philosophy and that for this reason, the Western world is permeated with a nonreligious attitude that Solzhenitsyn believes to be catastrophic to social life, morality, and the natural environment. Not unnaturally, Solzhenitsyn reaches some pessimistic conclusions and makes apocalyptic predictions. It should be noted that he also makes some erroneous predictions. In 1980, Solzhenitsyn commented that "Western intellectuals still look at [communism] with considerable interest and empathy, and this is precisely what makes it so immensely difficult for the West to withstand the East." This does look a bit silly in the light of events since the collapse of the Berlin Wall in 1989. Interestingly, Dostoevsky once also erroneously predicted revolutions in Western Europe, while Russia, he thought, would remain a stable autocracy!

This brings me to a large gap in Pontuso's treatment of Solzhenitsyn. It must be clear to scholars of Russian intellectual history that Solzhenitsyn is a neo-Slavophile. For this reason, he is bound to disapprove of Western liberalism and to reject political science in favor of religious or moral absolutism. (It is no surprise to see that Pontuso's final chapter is "The Revival of the Spirit." I do not underestimate the importance of this in modern life, but it is difficult to envisage that the political economy of a modern state can be based solely upon a spiritual or theological revival.) Like Slavophilism of the nineteenth century, such visions may be termed "a conservative utopia." Pontuso does attempt to repudiate Solzhenitsyn's connections with Slavophilism, but I find this attempt to be superficial and excessively brief (pp. 182–3). As a result of failing to appreciate Solzhenitsyn's intellectual antecedents, Pontuso apparently finds himself endorsing some wild ideas about the necessity for Russia to isolate itself from the world economy and international relations. However, Pontuso does at least add that he finds Solzhenitsyn's strictures against the West hard to take (p. 191). In general, this book is a model of clarity and seems to be the product of deep study.

Finally, although Solzhenitsyn's Slavophilism is not adequately addressed, the fact remains that many Russians see Solzhenitsyn as a prophet; therefore, his views merit very close attention. Western political scientists may be puzzled about the emergence of Slavophile Russian nationalism and even the (serious) talk about the restoration of a Russian monarchy in the coming post-Soviet era; but if these ideas, stimulated and informed by Solzhenitsyn's political thought, become operational, then we had better try to understand what is going on. James Pontuso's book goes some way to help us in this important endeavour.

STEPHEN K. CARTER

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The Origins of American Social Science. By Dorothy Ross. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991. 528p. $29.95.

The social science disciplines in the United States have not infrequently been diagnosed as being ahistorical, scientistic, liberal, and in a state of nearly permanent crisis. But they have rarely had this diagnosis issue from a painstaking study of their origins; and they have until now never had their origins traced to the national ideology of U.S. exceptionalism.

In this powerful and provocative book, Dorothy Ross has accomplished precisely this. With special attention to economics, sociology, and political science, she argues that the social sciences emerged out of collegiate moral philosophy in the antebellum United States as an attempt to understand the fate of modern society, committed to the belief that the United States occupied an exceptional place in history due to her republican government, economic opportunity, and open space. But the hopes of nascent social scientists to establish fixed laws of history and nature in order to perpetuate a millenial republic in the New World were utterly dashed after the crises of civil war and rapid industrialization. Consequently, the Gilded Age witnessed the individuation of the social sciences into separate academic professions that each struggled to understand the United States in terms of broader historical forces, especially those attendant to democracy and capitalism. No longer exempt from time, the United States was exceptional, nonetheless, because it led or exemplified the qualitative historical changes unleashed in modern society as a whole.

Social scientists at the turn of the century confronted historical change as Progressive reformers or Deweyan pragmatists who saw beneath history a realm of nature, the social control of which promised to bring about a future harmonious liberal society of U.S. exceptionalist dreams. After the disillusionment of world war and the failure of domestic reform, U.S. social scientists at last distanced themselves from the self-conscious articulation of the national ideology. Nonetheless, they reduced modern history to a model still embraced—a natural process of individual choice and group conflict amenable to technological forms of scientific control—in short, to the liberal, scientistic, and ahistorical terms of U.S. exceptionalism itself. Thus the ideology of U.S. nationalism shaped—and continues to shape—the contemporary social sciences.

Given the exceptionalist background, Ross highlights special features in the history of political science. In the works of Francis Lieber in the 1830s, political science was the first social science to appear in the United States, she argues, although it was to remain less developed than economics or sociology. In the form of "historico-politics," it was, through the late 1880s, more decidedly historical (even historicist) than the others; and it remained so even after Bentley and Lasswell. Down through the 1920s, its liberalism was more conservative, its adherence to exceptionalism more nationalistic, and its reformism not at all socialistic. Although all the social sciences embraced exceptionalism in its various forms, political science appears to have been paradigmatically preoccupied with the fate of the U.S. republic in time. Exceptionalism thus found its voice in the various theories of the administrative state, civic education, and political process found in the works of Adams, Beard, Bentley, Burgess, Dewey, Ford, Goodnow, Lasswell, Lieber, Lowell, Macy, Merriam, White, Willoughby, Wilson, Woolsey, and numerous others that Ross discusses or cites.

The level of detailed scholarship that Ross brings to bear (equally on her three social sciences) lends tremendous support to her general thesis about U.S. exceptionalism. (It also challenges the reader or to query particular interpretations, e.g., whether Burgess was really a Hegelian, Bentley so single-handedly destructive of tradition, or Merriam lacking in analytical depth.) But the very generality of the thesis will invite debate. Ross acknowledges that there are simpler explanations of the origins of scientism. The many theoretical texts she interprets (sometimes peremptorily, sometimes equivalently to a mere letter or book review) display a nearly boundless diversity. On occasion, this diversity seems to match the complexity of U.S. experience that Ross rightly argues undermined yesterday's liberal-consensualist interpretation of U.S. history. Moreover, the exceptions to exceptionalism that are allowed (e.g., antebellum Southern sociologists, Thorstein Veblen) are so few and far between that one wonders whether the general thesis is supported by, or immunized from, the (interpreted) evidence. When, for example, social and political scientists spoke of their "new" sciences in the "new" world, could they not have had in mind a plainer novelty than the one that finds in the United States the exception to world history?

For all that, the thesis is very compelling—arguably the most convincing one yet in terms of its synoptic power and the scholarship backing it. *The Origins of American Social Science* deserves to become the subject of considerable debate not only because of its thesis but also because of its author's broader intentions. An intellectual historian influenced by the historiography of J. G. A. Pocock and holding a professorship named after Arthur O. Lovejoy, Ross treats social science and U.S. exceptionalism critically (but not unsympathetically). She openly sides with historicists against presentists, interpretivists against positivists, socialists against liberals. In historicizing U.S. exceptionalism, she hopes to render it less effective on any future social science and to reexamine choices made in the past (about historical method, disciplinary boundaries, and national ideology). These are choices that indeed deserve reexamination and debate. In helping to make this possible, Ross will have helped not only to raise the critical standards of disciplinary history but also to show the palpable bearing of the history of the social sciences on their present shape and identity.

JAMES FARR

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Domination and the Arts of Resistance: Hidden Transcripts. By James C. Scott. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990. 251p. $29.95.

This book opens and closes with the mild-mannered Mrs. Poyser, a character from George Eliot's *Adam Bede,* who, Thrasymachuslike, erupts in the face of her greedy landlord, thereby inspiring her more timorous peers to disobedience. Mrs. Poyser's deferential and confrontational miens represent the two endpoints on the continuum of relationships available to the dominated.

Yet just as Tom Stoppard was unfulfilled by the "public transcript" of the travails of Hamlet's school chums, so Scott is dissatisfied with social science's preoccupation with the more formal and accessible exchanges between the oppressed and their masters. The purpose of the book is to highlight the unexplored subtlety and ambiguity that flourishes between sycophancy and truculence. The book spies on Mrs. Poyser and her ilk in that interim between dutifully paying the rent and ripping into the landlord.

These are the "hidden transcripts" of power relationships, and they are published in divers media. We learn about sanctuaries (like pubs and markets) where the oppressed gather to exchange blasphemies with impunity. We learn about "coded" public behavior, the derogatory intention of which is clear to the initiated but baffling to the elite. And we learn about the relentless, popular encroachments on privilege, like poaching and pilfering, that deplete hegemonic resources and retard aristocratic adventure.

The strength of the book is in the detailed recitation of the transcripts. There is a fascinating discussion of "world-upside-down" drawings and stories, popular among lower-class audiences in sixteenth-century Europe, where a pretense of harmless fun tenuously disguises more devious calculations. We thus encounter a parallel world where "mice ate cats, children spanked parents, the hare snared the hunter, . . . and so on in seemingly endless profusion" (p. 167). Likewise, seventeenth-century Japanese peasants celebrated the martyrdom of Sakura Sagoro, who was crucified after having submitted a petition of grievances to the ruling lords. The lords tolerated the ceremony only because it purportedly celebrated their wisdom in removing corrosive influences.

In a book about resistance, it is ironic that Scott pays gratuitous lip service to the postmodernist vernacular. (Indeed, he may have been too receptive to some of the 130 scholars he mentions in his acknowledgements.) We are told that "there is no social location or analytical position from which the truth value of a text or discourse may be judged," preparing for the bold assertion that "given the choice of structures explored here, it is apparent that I privilege the issues of dignity and autonomy" (pp. x–xi). This is not worthy of the compassionate, committed scholarship that follows.

More troubling, though, is Scott's slapdash attempt to link the hidden transcripts to extemporaneous insubordination and finally to overt political rebellion. With no more than seven pages to go in the book, he admits, "What we have yet to explain is how an initial act of defiance that may originate in bravado, anger, or gestures can occasionally bring on an avalanche of defiance" (p. 220). Needless to say, the discussion that follows is hardly satisfying, made more problematic by its romanticization of defiance. Scott speaks of the rarity of singlehanded insubordination and of its exhilaration. But such acts are not rare—they only seem so because so few live to tell about them. For the successful rebel, the experience may have been exhilarating; but for the many more who are beaten back, there is only humiliation and death.

The final problem, related to the previous, is that Scott knows much more about the arts of resistance than he knows about domination. Certainly, those of the Frankfurt tradition and more generic "false consciousness" theorists will have to deal with his meticulous scholarship; there may be many more pockets and havens of resistance than Horkheimer and Adorno ever imagined. But Scott never mentions *The Dialectic of Enlightenment* or its authors; rather, to dismiss those who portend the totality of oppression, he mysteriously turns his arsenal on Gramsci. And Scott is similarly antiquarian in his selection of power relationships; he dwells on lord-serf and master-slave interactions, where the source of domination is easily identifiable. Perhaps he should have consulted Kafka, who, in depicting *The Castle,* conjures an image of power the source of which is imperceptible and more disorienting than oppressive. Without an identifiable source of domination, the hidden transcript can become inchoate and incoherent. It is difficult to share the author's confidence that "if domination is particularly severe, it is likely to produce a hidden transcript of corresponding richness" (p. 27).

TIMOTHY J. LUKES

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Radicalism and Reverence: The Political Thought of Gerrard Winstanley. By George M. Shulman. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989. 269p. $35.00.

Shulman's book is not a conventional work in the history of ideas or in political theory. He seeks to show the relevance of Winstanley (a millenarian, Utopian, and communist who was the founder of the Digger movement during the English Civil War) to contemporary concerns with feminism, ecology, nonviolence, and direct democracy. In particular, he makes a study of Winstanley's use of excremental, oral, and parental metaphors in order both to understand Winstanley's own drives and to elucidate Winstanley's account of the nature of Puritanism. By establishing a dialogue with Winstanley, he hopes to clarify the nature of radical political action. Particularly interesting are Shulman's account of Winstanley's use of the two-brothers theme (Cain and Abel, Esau and Jacob) from the Old Testament and his reinterpretation of Winstanley's last work, *The Law of Freedom,* in the light of J. D. Alsop's discoveries regarding Winstanley's final years (*Historical Journal,* 1985).

Unfortunately, Shulman is not a careful scholar. He describes at length Winstanley's transformation of Puritan themes, but he never quotes a Puritan author from a primary source. One may reasonably wonder whether the Puritanism he describes ever existed. He details Winstanley's hostility to the Ranters, but his account of their views is based on a single secondary source. He takes no account of J. C. Davis's book, published in 1986, arguing that there was no Ranter movement, or of earlier works on Civil War radicalism (e.g., Underdown's *Revel, Riot, and Rebellion,* 1985). He has read little about the central subject of millenarianism and, indeed, scarcely mentions it.

These defects are not necessarily disastrous; and what one makes of the book, which is much influenced by Eric Erikson and Norman O. Brown, will depend in large part on what one thinks of the techniques of psychohistory. Skeptics will think that Winstanley's interest in manure does not reflect an anal preoccupation so much as a concern with effective agriculture (cf. pp. 78 and 123) and will find Shulman's concern with Winstanley may have suppressed his inner pride and anger an entertaining example of what Michel Foucault termed "the Californian cult of the self."

What is disastrous is the sloppiness with which the book has been put together. We are told that Winstanley "accepted the equality of women" (p. 251); this is markedly at odds with the only relevant previous discussion of the subject (pp. 227–32). At a quick glance, one would think that the quotations from Winstanley that appear on every page simply modernize his spelling and punctuation (although Shulman irritatingly retains *propriety* for *property).* In fact, the apparent quotations are best described as paraphrases, in which the order of words, the tense of verbs, and the construction of sentences differs markedly from that of Winstanley's text. Of more than 30 I checked, only one was accurate. Usually, Shulman's page references are accurate to within a page either way, so that one can at least turn back to the original text; but not always. The quotation described as the epigraph to Winstanley's *New Year's Gift* (p. 209) is in fact a garbled version of the epigraph to *A Watch-Word to the City of London.* Similarly, the bibliography is riddled with errors: *Jerrold Seigel* becomes *Gerrold Siegel, Petegorsky* (the author of the first major study of Winstanley) becomes *Petergorsky,* and so on. I stopped counting after a dozen.

These may be dismissed as problems of form, but they leave the reader dismayed. At one point Shulman walks straight into an error of substance. One of his central claims is that

Winstanley can usefully be contrasted with Hobbes: Hobbes prefigures the modern world, Winstanley the alternative that was never realized. At the core of his argument (which he has also presented in two articles in *Political Theory)* is a quotation (or, rather, *paraphrase)* from *De cive,* in which Hobbes discusses the fable of Prometheus and turns it into an attack on the politics of "the dirt and dregs of men." Shulman states that this passage was written "in 1642, at the outset of the Civil War" (p. 8). In fact (as all modern editions note), it dates to 1647 (the *second* edition of *De cive);* and since the whole first civil war lies between these dates, this makes a fundamental difference to any account of the political point Hobbes means to make when he attacks democracy.

In short, readers who want to learn about Winstanley would be better advised to read T. Wilson Hayes's *Winstanley the Digger* (1979).

David Wootton

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AMERICAN POLITICS

Beyond the Constitution. By Hadley Arkes. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990. 278p. $24.95.

Hadley Arkes is not the first person to urge that we look beyond the Constitution. Indeed, at a time when it has become fashionable to question the authority of texts, looking beyond the Constitution may be taken as a euphemism for giving the document a passing glance before getting on with what is really important, namely, power, class, or whatever. Thus, for many there is no fixed meaning in the Constitution, only variable meanings that acquire definition outside the textual boundaries of the law.

For Arkes, too, it is necessary to go outside these boundaries; but in his case the goal is to discover—or recover—the principles of natural justice, the understandings of right and wrong, that precede constitutional government. His book represents the continuation of the scholarly project begun so provocatively in his last work, *First Things,* and encapsulated so succinctly in the teaching of Justice William Johnson that "the security of a people . . . must lie in a frequent recurrence to first principles." What this means, as far as constitutional interpretation is concerned, is that "the various clauses of the Constitution and the Bill of Rights can be established, in their meaning, only by attaching them to the properties of a moral argument" (p. 19). To appreciate what such properties entail, Arkes directs the reader's attention to the founders (most prominently James Wilson), who rightly grasped what has eluded both liberals and conservatives of today, that it is only the "laws of reason" that provide the basis for a just regime.

It is one of the strengths of this book that Arkes avoids the Olympian posturing of someone who, having glimpsed the promised land of universal justice, need not descend to the nitty-gritty of constitutional politics. Rather, he places himself amid the controversies of several landmark cases, and applies his natural rights approach to questions of due process, equal protection of the laws, privileges and immunities, self-incrimination, and double jeopardy. Underlying his discussion of these issues is a theme that is explored in greatest depth in a very important chapter on the Bill of Rights. In brief, it is that the actual mention of a right in the Constitution is ultimately not what is important, that the appropriate tests for determining the existence and extent of any freedom under the Constitution reside in canons of moral reasoning that take precedence over the fact of a right's specific enumeration. According to Arkes, those who were "skeptical about the prospect of reducing our rights to a compressed inventory" (p. 56), have been vindicated by the modern spectacle of an incredibly shallow jurisprudence and of sophistical lawyers who, lacking the ability any longer to deliberate about questions of justice, reflexively recite constitutional language to produce contrived legal fictions. We are reminded in this context of Kant, who "articulated the categorical imperative . . . [without] the benefit of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment" (p. 109).

The problems in Arkes's position do not negate the considerable worth of his bold effort. His depiction of the founders' constitutional jurisprudence is surely open to challenge. For every James Wilson, there may be several James Iredells, founders, that is, who are more skeptical than those cited by the author about juridical appeals to principles of moral reasoning not explicitly indicated by the text. More significantly, extending the logic of Arkes's argument may lead one to wonder whether there is in fact any need for a written constitution. Why, it may be asked, are any written constraints on the exercise of power necessary if, in the end, all acts are to be judged by their compatibility with first principles of moral reasoning—in other words, principles antecedent to constitutional government? If, for example, unjustified discriminations are wrong because they do not comport with the logic of administering justice, what is to be gained from having an equal protection clause, a clause that can be (and has been) easily interpreted to mean more or less than that there must be good reasons to distinguish among people?

Whatever the merit of this objection, it may actually obscure the central thrust of Arkes's work. Focusing on the logic of the broader theoretical claim may deflect one from the restorational features of the book, of the effort to infuse contemporary constitutional interpretation with a healthy dose of old-fashioned commonsense moral reasoning. Arkes is not interested in questioning the wisdom of constitutionalizing our rights as a step toward the repeal of the Bill of Rights. His intention is to revive a tradition of jurisprudential thought that will elevate judicial understanding of the nature and scope of those rights. *Beyond the Constitution* is the most illuminating reconsideration of natural rights jurisprudence produced in many years. It deserves to be taken seriously, for it takes rights more seriously than do other books that only purport to.

GARY J. JACOBSOHN

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Urban Politics: New York Style. Edited by Jewel Bellush and Dick Netzer. Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1990. 467p. $24.95.

Fourteen authors, writing 15 chapters, offer different glimpses of Gotham's political history from 1960 to 1990—from riots to near-anarchy to the election of a black mayor, from fiscal collapse to the greatest building boom since the time of the pharaohs, from Ocean Hill–Brownsville to Howard Beach and Bernhard Goetz. New York had four mayors in 30 years (Wagner, Lindsay, Beame, and Koch), and who could imagine four such wildly different individuals? Many of the other principles were, of course, household names: Abzug, Cuomo, Bess Myerson, to pick but three. But real New York politics addicts will revel in the memory of those less widely known: Mike Quill, the crusty leader of the transit workers who insisted on calling the mayor "Mr. Lindslay"; Donald Manes, the Queens borough president whose extraordinary ride to power ended in the most bizarre and grisly of tragedies, the victim of a parking violations scam and a kitchen knife in the belly; Percy Sutton, Frank Serpico, Paul O'Dwyer, and Felix Rohatyn of the *World Journal Tribune;* Mario Procaccino.

The book is divided into four main parts. "Governance" includes chapters on the mayors, interest groups, and other relevant actors; "The Dependent City" looks at intergovernmental relations; "Politics" considers the role of parties, groups, and the media; and "Demography as Politics" examines racial and ethnic factors. An introductory chapter outlines the economic contexts of New York politics; and an epilogue describes some of the political implications of the new city charter especially, including the demise of the Board of Estimate. Virtually all of the contributions are, in a word, informative. David Rogers's essay on community control gets my nomination for best chapter; but there are, as far as I can tell, no real lemons in the group.

As a general contribution to our understanding of urban politics, however, the book must be considered a disappointment. Sayre and Kaufman's magisterial study, *Governing New York* (1960), looms over virtually every page, often quite explicitly. Indeed, the editors describe *Governing New York* as their "intellectual point of departure"; and there is a sense in which the present volume is an effort to do for the study of New York politics in 1990 what Sayre and Kaufman did in 1960. But where Sayre and Kaufman sought to provide a relatively coherent theoretical account of the admittedly complex vicissitudes of politics Gotham-style, Bellush and Netzer, along with their contributors, merely stand before the task and blink.

The problem is not a lack of focus. Given the diversity of authors and subjects, the book is extraordinarily coherent; it does argue—albeit in many different ways and with many caveats—a certain point of view. Unfortunately, that point of view is that New York politics is, in an important sense, theoretically inexplicable. Understanding New York requires "an eclectic, even disorganized, theoretical edifice," a jumble of conceptual and analytic materials whose interrelationships are fundamentally obscure. The upshot is an unsatisfying intellectual stew, indeed, a failure to explain. At best, the authors seem to imply that the world of urban theory, like much of urban politics itself, involves a kind of "street-fighting pluralism."

One can well sympathize. It is surely the case that simple, parsimonious theories are unlikely to account for the "kaleidoscopic" nature of the city's power game (p. 334). But I detect here little effort at integration and little success in suggesting and testing broader theoretical generalizations about what kinds of political resources are most likely to be effective in which arenas and why. Indeed, the conceptual apparatus of many of the chapters is itself quite narrow, relying heavily on standard and rather staid pluralist works of the 1960s and 1970s and ignoring those very powerful synthetic approaches that in certain circles are thought to compose the intellectual core of contemporary urban political analysis. Spatia/ecological theories figure hardly at all here; the same goes for structuralist interpretations that focus on the role of urban politics in the system of commodity production and distribution. The closest one gets to a broad theoretical perspective is in Jewel Bellush's interesting essay on "clusters of power." But even here, one would think that theorists like Castells and Harvey might have something useful to tell us about Baghdad-on-the-Hudson.

Ultimately, this volume is less an exercise in systematic social theory than a history book. As such, it provides a wealth of data—anecdotes, savvy and informed analysis, genuine insight—that comprise a persuasive and compelling description—though a rather less good explanation—of the political Apple.

PETER J. STEINBERGER

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Living with Leviathan: Americans Coming to Terms with Big Government. By Linda L. M. Bennett and Stephen Earl Bennett. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1990. 189p. $29.95 cloth, $14.95 paper.

This book offers impressive and detailed analysis of U.S. public opinion about *big government* over the last 25 years. The Bennetts identify trends during this period in the proportion of the public willing to express an opinion about the proper size for government, and among those with an opinion, the proportion that believes government has become too powerful. Employing multivariate discriminant analysis, they also seek to determine the factors influencing an individual's opinions about the appropriate role for government.

The authors conclude that the two principal determinants of the degree to which an individual accepts big government are trust in government and assessment of the president's job performance. The ironic implication is that despite the fact that Ronald Reagan won the presidency by denouncing big government, his affability convinced the public that they could trust government, thereby contributing to a growing acceptance of federal government power. The Bennetts also find that partisan identification and liberal-conservative ideological orientations no longer serve as clear guides for attitudes about governmental power; whereas liberals and conservatives once debated how active government should be, the dispute now is confined to *which* activities should be undertaken. Indeed, its most disturbing finding (from the perspective of implications for the possibility of democratic governance) is that while young adults (i.e., baby-boomer and "postboomer" cohorts) have greater *acceptance* of federal power and greater *expectations* about government's obligation to citizens than previous generations of citizens, they have a lower degree of *civic* *obligation* (i.e., the duty to keep informed, participate, and serve the nation) than their elders.

The Bennetts make a valiant effort to produce a book with appeal to advanced undergraduates, as well as graduate students and professional political scientists. To keep the book accessible to undergraduates, they restrict the quantitative treatments in the text to univariate analysis of public opinion data and bivariate analysis of the relationship between opinion and a variety of individual characteristics (all multivariate analyses are presented in an appendix). As a consequence, the Bennetts have produced a volume that will reward undergraduate students handsomely with a wealth of data and theory about public opinion, as well as valuable methodological lessons (e.g., about the impact of question wording on responses to survey questions), without frightening them with sophisticated quantitative analysis. Unfortunately, professional political scientists pay some cost for the authors' attempt to appeal to such a broad audience, since the book's arguments could have been presented more forcefully had the multivariate analysis of the factors influencing attitudes about the federal government been woven into the volume's text.

Apart from its segregation in the appendix, my chief concern with the authors' multivariate analysis is the insufficient concern for direction-of-causation issues. A number of the factors included in the discriminant analysis as predictors of attitudes about big government (e.g., presidential approval, trust in government, opinions about the proper level of spending for specific government programs) could easily be viewed as effects, as well as causes, of the degree of acceptance of big government. Perhaps a causal modeling approach would have encouraged the Bennetts to take a more explicit stance about the "causal process" underlying attitudes about the appropriate scope of government.

I also challenge one of the concluding characterizations. In the book's final sentence (and in its subtitle) the Bennetts pronounce that "Americans have come to terms with big government." I find this an odd characterization, given a series of contradictions in public opinion that are so clearly documented (e.g., support for spending but not taxation, greater expectations from government but a declining sense of civic obligation, a willingness to grant the federal government broad regulatory powers but a concern that government infringes on personal privacy). Such ambivalence, along with an increased tendency by the public to express no position about the appropriate size of government, suggests that the public has not so successfully come to terms with big government.

There have been two research programs in political science concerning the size of the public sector. One—significantly enhanced by *Living with Leviathan*—explores public opinion about big government. The second, reflected in studies by Cameron, Lewis-Beck, Rice, as well as my work with Lowery, seeks to measure and explain cross-sectional or longitudinal variation in the size of government, typically relying on public-sector-spending-as-a-percentage-of-national-income as the indicator of government size. These two literatures have developed in virtual isolation. This is unfortunate, because each could be informed by insights from the other. Students of the causes of public sector growth in democracies could undoubtedly enhance their explanations of growth by assessing the influence of changing public attitudes about big government. The Bennetts' insights about the ambivalence of public opinion about big government should also prompt students of the causes of government growth to question their newly exclusive reliance on a narrow conception of the size of government based on public sector spending. In turn, the analysis of the determinants of public opinion about big government would be improved if the empirical analysis took into account changes in the spending, taxing, and regulatory activities of government over time.

WILLIAM D. BERRY

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Cobblestone Leadership: Majority Rule, Minority Power. By James MacGregor Burns with L. Marvin Overby. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1990. 160p. $17.95.

Mainstream political science in the United States has become a complacent and conservative enterprise—in a word, academic. Some of its practitioners collect mountains of empirical data; others spin elaborate theories about how those data ought to behave; rarely do the two camps talk to one another. Even more rarely do scholars take a genuinely critical approach to the subject under investigation—whether it be voting arrangements, campaign finances, or the distribution of benefits.

This uncritical stance is of relatively recent origin. When it emerged as an organized discipline around the turn of the present century, political science was closely linked with the moralist-reformist proclivities of U.S. intellectuals. Influenced by Progressive Era movements and the revelations of muckraking journalists, political scientists displayed reformist biases in approaching such diverse topics as municipal corruption, electoral defects, lobbying abuses, and partisan manipulation. As late as 1950, the American Political Science Association's Committee on Political Parties published a report, *Toward a More Responsible Two-Party System,* advocating reconstructing party government in the United States. (It is hard to imagine an official professional body today playing such a role.)

James MacGregor Burns remains an exemplar of the reformist tradition of political analysis. Throughout his career he has argued consistently for responsible parties in order to join the Federalist ideal of "energetic government" with the Jeffersonian demand for democratic practices.

Cobblestone Leadership (referring to grassroots reformers of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, whose applicability to the United States is unclear) is based on Burns's 1987 Rothbaum Lectures at Oklahoma's Carl Albert Center. The lectures were fleshed out by L. Marvin Overby of Loyola University, Chicago.

Speaking of the bicentennial of the U.S. Constitution, Burns expresses dismay that *celebration* was not accompanied by *cerebration*—that worship, more than critical examination, was the order of the day. There were solemn ceremonies and colored balloons (albeit a modest display compared to the publicity that accompanied the Statue of Liberty refurbishment); there were precious few sober appraisals of this document that is more praised than understood, and that has been altered more by historical circumstances than by formal amendment. The reverential timidity of today's commentators contrasts dramatically with the framers themselves, daring innovators with little faith that their handiwork would outlast them.

The original Constitution, an "antimajoritarian charter" (p. 93), was, in Burns's account, radically altered in an egalitarian direction—first by the Bill of Rights, then by successive expansions of citizenship and participation. Yet the enlarged citizenry, far from being radical or factionalized, proved to be "a largely quiescent, mild, and tolerant people, more interested in economic enterprises than political rabble-rousing" (p. 94). This balance between majority power and minority rights cannot persist, because "public expectations have been heightened, resulting in increasing demands upon the governmental structures" (p. 95).

One of Burns's remedies is predictable enough: stronger political parties, which embraces more reliance on party conventions, overhaul of campaign financing, return to party-bloc ballots, and strengthening of the minority party's role (this last is left as only a vague prescription). Constitutional changes are also advanced to promote "effective party control." These include allowing joint executive-legislative appointments, four-year terms for members of Congress, an expanded impeachment power to permit removal of a "failed president," and repeal of the 22nd Amendment.

These prescriptions reflect some subtle shifts from Burns's first reformist manifesto, *Congress on Trial* (1949). The British parliamentary system no longer provides a model for reformers. The presidency, which once attracted Burns and other liberals into its orbit, is now conceded to be part of the problem. Formal constitutional amendments, once shunned in favor of extraconstitutional changes, now seem inescapable. Finally, a skeptical note creeps in: no one knows what will really work, and even the best-intentioned reforms may be spoiled by unanticipated results.

One wonders whether the Madisonian society of pluralist minorities may not have outrun majority rule. Today's citizens may be too fragmented in their interests, and too distracted by extrapolitical diversions, to harbor the kind of stable loyalties Burns and other party advocates yearn for. With his two landslide victories and resilient personal support, Ronald Reagan is our most popular recent president; yet surveys showed that his policies were unpopular, and the opposition Democrats secured their beachhead on Capitol Hill. Where are the political or policy majorities to underpin the kind of regime envisioned by the party government advocates? Would constitutional tinkering—unlikely to be approved in any event—make any difference? One is entitled to be skeptical, but Burns is right to make the effort. Indeed, critical reappraisal is the only appropriate way to honor the framers' achievement.

ROGER H. DAVIDSON

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On Being Mad or Merely Angry: John W. Hinkley, Jr. and Other Dangerous People. By James W. Clarke. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990. 152p. $14.95 cloth.

We can take the title of this book to represent the central core of the author's thesis. Clarke believes that John Hinkley was "emotionally disturbed" but not "insane," that he was "angry" but not "mad." This continues the theme of his earlier book, *American Assassins, the Darker Side of Politics* (1982).

Clarke devotes the first portion of this current book to a summary of the history and background of John Hinkley and the events leading up to the attempt to assassinate President Reagan. One might have wished for a somewhat more detailed biography, but Clarke does a creditable job of setting forth the basic information. In the preface, Clarke indicates that he plans to use the story of John Hinkley as a stepping-stone to discuss the larger issues of the insanity defense and the determination of dangerousness. The book is not a bad introduction to these important issues; and by using the Hinkley case as a focus, it may attract more public attention to the issues than would a more comprehensive study. But it is far from a definitive statement.

James Clarke thinks he has discovered something new: that the behavior and actions of people who are considered mentally ill can usually be seen to stem from the same kind of feelings and motivations that animate ordinary people. He then draws the wrong conclusion: they must not be mentally ill, after all; and those who have diagnosed the subjects are in error.

But Clarke's discovery is not new. It has been one of the great accomplishments of psychoanalysis and modern psychiatry to recognize that "mental illness" does not exist in a universe by itself, that there is a continuum, that psychiatric symptoms involve mental processes that differ in degree but not in kind from those which exist in other people, and that symptoms have their own "logic," which can be understood even if it may be unrealistic or maladaptive.

Clarke also confuses, and plays loose with, the terms *mentally ill, psychotic,* and *insane,* often equating the last two. Clarke overlooks the fact that psychosis is a medical concept and insanity a legal concept. Neither one implies the other. The decision as to whether a defendant is insane is not a psychiatric decision. The psychiatrist can provide to the jury a description of the defendant and the defendant's mental state from a medical standpoint. It is then up to the jury to decide what this implies.

According to the law, there are two elements of guilt. The first is the question of whether the defendant actually did commit the action. The other deals with the question of whether the defendant intended to commit the action. Both the action and the intent are necessary for there to be a finding of guilt. The law recognizes the concept that the defendant may have lacked the *ability* or *capacity* to form the intent. The hope is to avoid offending the community's sense of order either by punishing those whom the community would not consider capable of guilt or by absolving those whom the community would consider capable of guilt. But there is no objective way to make this determination. Juries simply must decide whether they, as representatives of the community, feel that the defendant is so substantially different from themselves that their sense of order would not be offended if he or she were not punished.

Clarke takes the opposite position. He assumes that the question of sanity is valid as an objective question and that somebody is answering it incorrectly. For example, he points out that after a verdict is rendered, the parties often seem to switch sides. "Government attorneys who argued during his trial that Hinkley was sane and responsible now claim that he is a dangerously sick person, an utterly irresponsible threat to the public and himself. Hinkley's doctors and parents, who earlier testified to the severity of his mental and emotional impairment, now insist that his condition has improved and recommend 'therapeutic releases' into the community."

Clarke tries to explain this contradiction without realizing that the issue has shifted from an attempt to answer one unanswerable question to another. Now, instead of trying to know what the subject could have done in the past, we are trying to know what he or she will do in the future. He accurately points up the poor track record in what he calls the "actuarial and clinical approaches" and suggests what he calls a "situational approach." This approach is not entirely new either; aspects of what he describes are used in attempting to evaluate dangerousness. But Clarke does provide a structure and framework with which to conceptualize the approach, and that is a valuable contribution.

Clarke recognizes that degree of dangerousness has little to do with whether the individual is sane or insane, and he endorses the suggestion in a court decision that it is the danger posed by a mental patient rather than his sanity or insanity that should be of primary concern in determining what restrictions the state might appropriately apply on his liberty. Actually, degree of dangerousness has little to do with whether the individual is mentally ill or not, and it seems logical that it is the danger posed by any individual, mental patient or not, that should be of primary concern in determining what restrictions the state can appropriately apply on his or her liberty.

But that leads to deep water. It has been a tradition in this country that citizens not be subject to preventive detention. One sneaky way that society has got around this without offending our sense of order unduly has been to allow what is, in effect, preventive detention, providing that the subject can be identified as mentally ill. I had hoped that Clarke, a professor of political science, would address these kinds of issues in more depth and enlighten us on such broader questions. Maybe he will in his next book.

DAVID A. ROTHSTEIN

Chicago

The Contours of Justice: Communities and Their Courts. By James Eisenstein, Roy B. Flemming, and Peter F. Nardulli. Boston: Scott, Foresman, 1988. 317p. $18.50.

Over the past two decades, numerous scholars have studied the disposition of criminal cases in state trial courts. Among the noteworthy contributors to this literature have been Eisenstein and his coauthors, who in this volume examine the processing and outcomes of criminal cases in nine middle-sized courts in Illinois, Michigan, and Pennsylvania. Their ambitious research combines questionnaires and interviews with judges, prosecutors, and defense attorneys, as well as intensive examination of court records. Although their fieldwork was completed in 1980, it is only with the publication of this and a companion volume (*The Tenor of Justice,* 1987) that the complete results of their research have become available.

Given the excellent studies already published on state trial courts, one might well ask what this volume adds. The authors identify two distinctive elements: their conceptualization of courts as "communities" (i.e., groups of individuals whose occupations lead to interdependence) and their focus on medium-sized courts. Viewing courts as communities, they argue, permits consideration of the full range of factors pertinent to understanding courts: the backgrounds of key decision makers, the organizational dynamics of the court, and the influence of the court's environment on its operations and decisions. One can hardly dispute the importance of any of these factors, but it is not clear that viewing courts as communities helps to clarify their impact. Moreover, although the authors caution that a community need not be harmonious, the word seems to connote a commonality of perspective. Yet, as the case studies of the Kalamazoo and DuPage county courts illustrate, conflict and antagonism between prosecutors and defense attorneys can predominate on a court.

In depicting courts as communities, the authors are consciously rejecting what they claim is a widespread view of courts as merely applying a preexisting set of rules. However, it is unlikely that social scientists, the primary audience of this volume, hold this view. (Indeed, it is hard to believe that a general public familiar with *Hill Street Blues* and *L.A. Law* continues to accept this "legal metaphor.") Yet in rejecting the legal metaphor, the authors run the risk of underestimating the importance of law in structuring and guiding the operations of courts. Obviously, law establishes the court's jurisdiction and the procedural rules by which it operates. It also determines the range of behavior that is criminalized and the legal limits on punishment. Perhaps less obviously, law also influences the attitudes that judges and attorneys bring to their work. Although the authors emphasize the importance of county legal culture in explaining court operations, that legal culture is decisively influenced by the law. So, too, are the role conceptions of judges and attorneys. One need not subscribe to the legal metaphor to recognize the decisive importance of law.

The second distinctive feature of this study is its focus on medium-sized courts. Most previous research has examined large courts in metropolitan areas, and their valuable analysis of court operations in quite different settings underscores the diversity among U.S. courts. Their case studies reveal that differences in the size of court and in the community served influence court operations and outcomes. In chapter 10 the authors systematically compare their findings regarding medium-sized courts with the findings of scholars who have studied large metropolitan courts and small rural courts. They conclude that the size of the court has an effect on a wide range of factors, including the influence of external elites, the structure and influence of sponsoring organizations (e.g., public defenders' offices), the degree of mass media scrutiny, and the severity of sentences. Future scholars will wish to build upon the authors' efforts to disentangle the effects of size and other contextual factors on a court's operations and outputs.

G. ALAN TARR

Rutgers University, Camden

Advances in the Spatial Theory of Voting. Edited by James M. Enelow and Melvin J. Hinich. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990. 240p. $42.50.

In the editors' words, "This volume is intended to bring the reader up to date with some of the more important research areas in the spatial theory of voting" (p. 5). The eight areas reviewed in this volume are, indeed, important. However, given that the volume largely ignores the models of incomplete information and endogenous selection of rules and agendas that received much attention in the latter half of the 1980s (apart from a brief mention in the introduction), I cannot share the editors' belief that the eight essays in this volume "provide a comprehensive overview of work in spatial theory in the 1980s" (p. 9). Nonetheless, most of the essays in this volume are of high quality in that the authors offer good summaries and discussions of major results and provide reasonably comprehensive bibliographic references in their review areas.

The essay by Shepsle and Cohen on multiparty competition with entry is perhaps the most interesting and of an exceptionally high quality; the authors provide intuitive and informal discussion of previous results and suggest future research topics that are extremely valuable. The essay by Cox on multicandidate competition without entry is also an excellent piece, though this essay has been rendered somewhat obsolete by the recent publication of his "Centripetal and Centrifugal Incentives in Electoral Systems" (*American Journal of Political Science* 34 [1990]). These two review essays are most timely, in that I expect a continued and growing interest in the operations of electoral systems other than the Anglo-American types in the 1990s.

The essay by Riker reviews the art of "heresthetics" and turns to the other method called "rhetoric," which involves changing the tastes of voters. I am not exactly sure about what changing the tastes of voters means. But in the example used by Riker, which involves the alternative space and the outcome space, it seems that voters' preferences over outcome remain fixed and the rhetor tries to change the voters' beliefs about how alternatives and outcomes are related. Thus, the induced preferences over alternatives does not seem to change preferences over outcomes. The second half of Riker's essay about rhetoric is not a review but seems to call for more research in the information transmission process.

The essay by Wittman reviews policy implementation models very well and, unlike all other essays in this volume, provides full proofs for the theorems. Although these proofs make for difficult reading, they are necessary if we are to follow his discussions fully. Wittman's essay directs readers who want to stick to the assumption that the goal of candidates is winning elections to turn their attention to possible asymmetries between candidates caused by institutional structures (e.g., party nomination processes, informational asymmetries, and/or nonpolicy characteristics of candidates). The essay by Coughlin summarizes the major equilibrium results in probabilistic voting models and specifies conditions for equilibrium in various probabilistic voting models. He does not, however, discuss Feldman and Lee's "Existence of Electoral Equilibria with Probabilistic Voting" (*Journal of Public Economics* 1988), which raises serious questions about the existence of equilibria in probabilistic voting models. The essay by Enelow and Hinich reviews several models of predictive mapping. It would be helpful to extend this essay to review the empirical studies based on spatial voting models to complement the essay by McKelvey and Ordeshook, which reviews only the experimental research on spatial models. The final essay by Rosenthal summarizes results in the Romer–Rosenthal setter model. Its extensions incorporate dynamics, as well as imperfect and incomplete information; and the result is a highly useful overview for those interested in the setter model.

Although I cannot recommend this book to those outside the field, it does have something of value to readers with considerable familiarity with the spatial theory of voting and a desire to deepen their understanding of the eight important areas that are reviewed in this volume.

JOON-PYO JUNG

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Politics by Other Means: The Declining Importance of Elections in America. By Benjamin Ginsberg and Martin Shefter. New York: Basic Books, 1990. 226p. $19.95.

The expressed aim of this book is to show a displacement effect: "American politics has recently undergone a fundamental transformation: other forms of conflict have grown in importance relative to electoral competition. Rather than seeking to defeat their opponents chiefly by outmobilizing them in the electoral arena, contending forces are increasingly relying on such institutional weapons of political struggle as legislative investigations, media revelations, and judicial proceedings to weaken their political rivals and gain power for themselves" (p. x). Another such weapon is "alliances with foreign governments" (p. 11). To put the case another way, "Institutional combat has increased in importance relative to electoral competition" (p. 31). That has happened during the last two decades.

Confronted by these claims, one's mind immediately turns to historical comparisons and test cases. As a spur to policy change, how does the 1980 election stack up against past rivals? What would be the standards for deciding? Media routines and technologies change; but for punchy revelation have we done better lately than, say, the Hiss-Chambers "pumpkin papers" story or Drew Pearson's leak-and-tell industry of the 1940s and 1950s? (Imagine how a lively Pearson might have handled "Silent Sam" Pierce or savings-and-loan regulation in the 1980s.) How does one deal with the likely fact that the Truman administration suffered more from congressional corruption probes—conducted by Democrats—than did Reagan's? How about the era beginning around 1937 when New Deal liberals could ordinarily win the presidency but not Capitol Hill majorities? Did not that era provide inconclusive elections and a world-class exhibit of "institutional combat," what with the conservative coalition, Senate filibusters, and the House Rules Committee to block presidential initiatives and endless scrapping over control of agencies? How about the decade-and-a-half of loyalty investigations of the executive branch conducted by the House Un-American Activities Commission, McCarthy, and others? Particularly interesting is the authors' idea that judicial proceedings have cut into electoral politics, given the workout the courts have recently got in so many policy areas. But how do we compare? What would be a historical baseline or average for the judicial sector? To take perhaps the extreme case, how do we deal with Franklin Roosevelt's first term, when so much important legislation ended up in the courts? What about pre-1932 labor injunctions?

Unfortunately, this book does not wrestle with these questions or others like them. There is not a hint of a research design that would seriously compare recent times with the past. We are not told what evidence would be needed for such an effort or how it should be used. Instead, the discussion centers on classes of events during the last two decades, asserts them to be exceptional, and gives only cursory attention to what came before. As a result, the null hypothesis—that is, no displacement effect—does not have a chance. My guess is that it would win if given a fair shot; but that has to remain an open question.

Take away the title and chapter 1, which dwell on the displacement idea, and the book is a highly readable work that has its own kind of integrity. What it presents is a series of deftly told accounts of recent political developments. Chapter 2, for example, discusses changing Democratic and Republican electoral coalitions since the 1960s. Chapter 3 tells of increasing liberal Democratic entrenchment in Congress and the social welfare and regulatory bureaucracies; it is particularly good on the local constituency base for that entrenchment. Chapter 4 discusses the Reaganite offensive as a matter of institution building (and destroying), as well as policy and coalition. Chapter 5 has nice material on the Reaganite fiscal regime and national security apparatus, as well as the liberals' inventive resort to the courts. Chapter 6 introduces the pathologies of support shopping, burden shifting, and weapon forging and provides an interesting discussion of mobilizing, as opposed to demobilizing, solutions to government ineffectiveness.

In short, there is a lot of good accessible material and intelligent discussion. Sometimes a certain political economy intrudes. Economic interests lurk. Defense policy boils down largely to who gets the contracts. Industrial policy can be seen as a "compact" between organized labor and "middle-class liberal activists (who would gain influence over the allocation of capital)" (pp. 57-58). But this is a minor feature. If severed from the displacement idea, several chapters of the work seem to me to be good bets for classroom use.

DAVID R. MAYHEW

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Hope and Independence: Blacks' Response to Electoral and Party Politics. By Patricia Gurin, Shirley Hatchett, and James S. Jackson. New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1989. 356p. $37.50.

This book is a landmark study. First, it integrates distinctive methodologies, including quantitative analysis of attitudes of the African-American population toward the party and electoral system and qualitative, specifically historical, examinations of the same topic. Second, the authors report on the results of interviews of 1,151 black respondents before the 1984 election and reinterviews of 871 of the same individuals afterward. The interviewees were questioned on their support for the candidacy of Jesse Jackson for the Democratic presidential nomination and for an independent black political voice as bases to understand their attitudes toward the party and electoral system. The study thereby created a statistically significant sample of black interviewees, highly atypical of most studies, on which analyses of black political attitudes and participation and comparisons of black and white participation are based. Third, the authors analyze the data through a uniquely interactive multidisciplinary examination of theoretical work in the fields of psychology, sociology, and political science on African-American political participation, as it applies both to black political behavior and attitudes and to these disciplines' more general theories of U.S. political attitudes and behavior. Although the authors are psychologists and a sociologist, they offer significant new data, use that data to introduce new interpretations of political behavior, and settle issues about which there has been considerable controversy in political science and in the general public domain. The authors' skillful integration of these differing methodological, disciplinary, and knowledge bases has produced a book that anyone must read who wants to understand the simultaneously distinctive and homogeneous political attitudes and partisanship of the African-Americans relative to the whites, and the crucial philosophical distinctions within the African-American population.

The authors identify four contradictory but continuing themes in the attitudes of blacks toward the system of partisan and electoral politics: "hope for eventual inclusion," perseverance in the face of continued exclusion, "expectations of betrayal," and independence as a means rather than an end (p. viii). The ability to sustain these seemingly contradictory political elements is what explains the almost universal interest in electoral and party politics in the black population in the face of historical and contemporary exclusion. That same population is divided most consistently between those whose group identification can be defined as having a sense of a common fate (90% of the sample) and those who identify themselves as being black, rather than "American." The *common fate* identifiers were politicized, more discontented about their political and economic status, and more concerned about racial discrimination. They were also more likely to have more income and more education, to be from urban areas, and to have access to organizational resources. These were the strongest supporters of Jesse Jackson. The other group, characterized as *advocates of a black voice,* were at the lower end of all of these measures. They were also less politicized, although even among this group those with access to organizational resources were more—in fact, *very*—likely to be supporters of Jackson. Blacks from both groups were supporters of the Democratic party and electoral politics, though they use a variety of strategies to facilitate political entrance and participation.

A significant dimension of the study is the comprehensive use and integration of African-American academic writing from a variety of disciplines and of nonacademic writing. This knowledge combined with survey data gives the authors access to the philosophical and political beliefs of African-Americans at a level of subtlety that has typically eluded researchers in the field of political science. The authors mine a vast array of writing to ground and center their interpretations and explanations of the political behavior and attitudes of African-Americans.

There are some inevitable limitations to the study. The interviews were conducted over the telephone, which tends to underrepresent the portions of the black population that are at the lowest socioeconomic levels and that also participate less in politics; the authors discuss these methodological difficulties and their own speculations on the accuracy of their conclusions in the text and in an appendix. The tables are not always closely linked to the text and sometimes do not include as much information as they ought. For example, the distribution of those interviewed ought to be reported more consistently in the tables. The authors' argument that the data from the Civil Rights movement of the 1950 and 1960s shows that class had a much greater influence within the African-American population then than in the years after is sure to generate considerable discussion and controversy.

In conclusion, the study is so packed with information that it is not easily digested. But that speaks more to the richness of the data, the conceptual complexity of the approach, and the volume of material handled than to any stylistic limitations of the authors. The task for scholars in political science will be to attempt to live up to the demanding standards reflected in this study.

DIANNE M. PINDERHUGHES

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Uncertain Legacies: Federal Budget Policy from Roosevelt through Reagan. By Dennis S. Ippolito. Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1990. 297p. $37.90.

Dennis Ippolito's latest budget book is a very readable analysis and history of fiscal policy from the New Deal through the Reagan administration. What Ippolito brings to this history is his argument that the 1974 Budget and Impoundment Control Act not only failed to control deficit spending, it contributed to the contentiousness and uncertainty surrounding the annual budget process.

Budgeting prior to 1974 was largely the result of incrementalism, fair shares, support for a balanced budget norm, and limited but expert participation within the Congress. The act resulted in expanded participation, the creation of budget committees, and the relative weakening of executive branch as compared to congressional branch budgeting. The decline of incrementalism, particularly the executive budget, writes Ippolito, diminished the "comprehensiveness and predictability of the annual budget" (p. 19).

Ippolito is most troubled by the inability of the president to control indexed social insurance entitlement programs. The author is at his best when he outlines the effects of indexing on entitlement spending and taxes and the resulting trade-off between entitlements and appropriations. Social Security and Medicare not only continue to grow and crowd out other types of spending, but the size of the Social Security trust fund surplus also masks the size of the budget deficit.

To reform and restrain the cost of these programs, Ippolito offers one significant change in the budget process. This revision would require that the executive budget include reconciliation instructions that Congress must consider and that reconciliation be revised to include the currently exempt Social Security trust fund. Thus, the president would be brought into the beginning of the reconciliation process, not merely at the end when a final reconciliation bill requires a signature. As a result, the reconciliation measure could "force major policy options onto the political agenda," and "important policy differences between the two branches would be clarified" (p. 252).

Aside from this procedural reform, however, Ippolito states that other proposals offered to strengthen the executive budget, such as a line-item veto and enhanced recision authority, are difficult to justify. The budgetary outcomes of the Reagan years indicate that appropriated defense and domestic accounts are controllable.

This conclusion is particularly noteworthy, as Ippolito has been an advocate for a balanced budget amendment. Presumably, the restraint in defense and domestic spending has been sufficient to convince Ippolito that such an amendment is unnecessary. Whatever the reason, it would have been interesting for the author to explain why he now offers only a brief mention of the amendment as a form of spending control.

More important, Ippolito's assessment that appropriated expenditures are essentially under control conflicts with his argument that the 1974 act is basically flawed. It is doubtful that the old incrementalism would have significantly altered the expansion of domestic discretionary and entitlement spending, or the decline in defense spending during the mid and late 1970s—both of which worry Ippolito, particularly since these trends were set in motion prior to 1974.

Nor has the act hamstrung the executive branch (as Ippolito is forced to concede). Certainly, Ronald Reagan would have had a much more difficult time in limiting domestic spending in 1981 without the reconciliation process created in 1974. Moreover, the phrase "dead on delivery" stems from Reagan's submission of executive budgets that were considered unreasonable even by congressional Republicans. In addition, as Ippolito points out, it was Reagan who failed to support the Senate Republicans in their efforts to restrain the growth in Social Security. Reagan's decision was obviously a political one that had little to do with the nature of the budgetary process.

These comments aside, Ippolito's book is a well-written and useful addition to the budgetary literature and would be appropriate for upper-division and graduate students. For example, Ippolito correctly notes that contrary to the argument that congressional credit claiming and pork-barrel distributive politics have been responsible for the nation's fiscal problems, "the spending patterns of the Reagan years . . . did not conform very well to the prospending bias theories" (p. 194). In addition, the author's description of the politics of social welfare policy, which clearly distinguishes the fate of public assistance as compared to social insurance programs, is concise and even-handed. Altogether, *Uncertain Legacies* provides a valuable review (particularly for upper-division students) of the major trends in fiscal policy that have emerged during the past 50 years.

JAMES D. SAVAGE

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Public Administration: The State of the Discipline. Edited by Naomi B. Lynn and Aaron Wildavsky. Chatham, NJ: Chatham House, 1990. 540p. $24.95 paper.

Handbook of Public Administration. Edited by James L. Perry. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1989. 660p. $49.95.

Handbook of Public Administration. Edited by Jack Rabin, W. Bartley Hildreth, and Gerald J. Miller. New York: Marcel Dekker, 1989. 1,095p. $165.00.

"It cannot be said that we are self-satisfied." With this opening (and understated) assertion

Aaron Wildavsky introduces the first of these three volumes. But Wildavsky's concise characterization is equally apt in describing the diverse scholarly, political, policy, and practitioner ferment that separately congealed to produce these three hefty books.

The Lynn-Wildavsky volume cultivates old, and breaks new, ground in several respects. One new departure is organizational. This volume is without precedent in the sense that it is jointly sponsored by the American Political Science Association and the American Society for Public Administration, having emerged from the simultaneous presidencies of Wildavsky and Lynn, respectively.

The joint venture, initiated by Lynn, had multiple aims. These purposes, stated broadly in her preface, were intended to "meet the need for public administration to do some stock taking of its intellectual development, help the two associations identify some mutual interests, and serve as an important resource for students and practitioners who seek a better understanding of the administration [*sic*] process." The volume partially meets the first and last of these three aims. With regard to the second aim (and given the respective size and diversity of APSA and ASPA), identifying "mutual interests" between the two associations is both prodigious and problematic, to say the least.

The editors assembled an impressive array of 23 contributors, all of whom are members of both APSA and ASPA. They are, unquestionably, among the leading scholars in public administration within the political science field.

The 20 essays are grouped into six broad parts: (1) history and theory, (2) organization and management issues, (3) intergovernmental and comparative, (4) methodology, (5) public policy, and (6) looking to the future. Both the titles of these parts and the distribution of essays among them suggest some structural difficulties—of the book and of the public administration discipline. The first two parts include six essays each; the remaining four contain two essays each, some far less compatibly paired than others. This distribution is indicative of one of the book's problematic features—uneven and unbalanced coverage of the field. As might be expected, the areas most solidly and suggestively covered are the first two parts.

The spareness of the contents of parts 3–6 does not imply the absence of significant and stimulating issues, however. One author (Goodsell) argues that public administration (and public administrationists) should be "teacher(s) of governance." He states, "It is public administration alone that possesses the potential to teach society how to govern itself beyond the year 2000" (p. 505). To Wildavsky's opening about the lack of satisfaction, we might add, "Neither does the field lack ambition!"

How are we to rate the volume in relation to the three aims offered by Lynn? It meets least of all, in my estimation, the objective of serving or shaping the "mutual interests" of the two professional associations (ASPA and APSA). It is also unlikely to serve as a useful resource for "practitioners" in search of administrative understanding. The volume is more likely to "serve as an important resource" for scholars and graduate students in covering several significant intellectual issues. More than anything else, this is a set of essays by academics aimed chiefly at other tillers of the academic soil. The pieces are generally lively and provocative. On balance, however, the book neither represents a scholarly integration of public administration within political science nor achieves fully the first-stated aim, "stocktaking of the intellectual development" of the field.

The Perry *Handbook* is consciously targeted toward the practitioner. It is "intended to help public administrators cope with the many challenges facing them and to update or fill gaps in their knowledge base" (p. xiii). The book bears the official sponsorship of the ASPA. In contrast to the predominant retrospective orientation of the Lynn-Wildavsky volume, this set of 43 essays is strongly contemporary and issue-oriented. Major sections (eight in all) include public administration in a new era; relationships with legislatures, elected officials, and citizens; managing fiscal and human resources; and professional practice. Several of the 53 contributors are practitioners, and most of the academic-based authors have a strong feel for the "sweat of the shop" or the reality of the "decision desk."

The editor maintains that "the handbook offers a unified picture of public administration" (p. xiv). The precise shape and hue, or configuration and content of this picture, however, remain elusive. The problematic character and focus of the field is recognized by such terms as *diverse, fragmentation,* and *overlap.* More to the point and substance are the observations that "effective public administration is built on many disciplines" and that a "mutual dependence of many perspectives [is necessary] for a healthy public service." Regrettably, these perspectives and disciplines are more implicit than explicit and are not directly confronted or consistently addressed throughout the volume.

In contrast to the associational sponsorship of the first two volumes, the other *Handbook* emerged from long-standing professional links among the three editors. Not only in size but also in content this volume aims at what one commentator has called "an elephantine contribution" to the teaching of public administration. Its 27 essays (by 33 scholars) spread across eleven hundred pages to provide breadth, balance, and depth well beyond the other two books under review.

The design of this text-oriented volume is both clear and standardized. Two essays focus on each of 13 topical areas. (One topic, public administrative history and theory, rates three.) The first of each pair of essays is a historical, developmental, bibliographic overview of the topic. The second (by a second author) addresses five "great issues" permeating the particular topic or field. Illustrative topics are decision making, budgeting, personnel, policy science, public law, and comparative administration. This fixed format has some evident assets; it also has some distinct disadvantages. On balance, the advantages outweigh the limitations of this lock-step approach.

This book is avowedly instructional; it aims to "organize the literature particularly relevant to the study of public administration" (p. iii) as a service to "graduate students, professors, scholars, and public administrators" (p. iv). How well does it achieve these instructional aims? Like most books, it cannot be classified as an unqualified success. But among the three books clustered here, it has the greater instructional utility (based on my usage of it in a small doctoral seminar).

This volume is the 35th in a series on public administration and public policy under the general editorship of the lead editor of this handbook. This decade-long collaboration and output demonstrates an intensive commitment to the enterprise of public administration. It also attests to the tremendous scope and significance of that enterprise, whether its formal nomen be *field, subfield, discipline,* or *profession.*

Deil S. Wright

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Political Parties and Primaries in Kentucky. By Penny M. Miller and Malcolm E. Jewell. Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1990. 336p. $30.00.

Political Parties in the Southern States: Party Activists in Partisan Coalitions. Edited by Tod A. Baker, Charles D. Hadley, Robert P. Steed, and Laurence W. Moreland. Westport, CT: Praeger, 1990. 264p. $42.95.

For more than 40 years, at least since the publication of V. O. Key's *Southern Politics in State and Nation* (1949)—the most influential, if not the first, systematic study of politics in the southern states—students of electoral politics have been fascinated by the characters and the characteristics of politics in the United States' politically most unique region. These two books, examining different problems from different perspectives, add significantly to the profession's knowledge of southern politics.

Penny Miller and Malcolm Jewell's study of Kentucky begins with the premise, central to the body of Jewell's earlier work, that the study of state politics can best be done comparatively. In order to do comparative studies, analysts need a corpus of data at the state level so that they can make comparisons. Miller and Jewell provide those data for Kentucky in a detailed study of politics in that commonwealth, particularly of Kentucky gubernatorial politics for the past two decades. As such, it is a follow-up to Jewell and Cunningham's *Kentucky Politics* (1968). Comparisons with the earlier study allow for analysis of change over a considerable period of time.

This book is nothing if not exhaustive. Miller and Jewell administered questionnaires, completed by nearly a thousand individuals active in Kentucky gubernatorial primaries between 1979 and 1987. They supplemented these data with interviews with candidates, campaign managers, and party leaders. And the authors clearly have an encyclopedic knowledge of the events—large and small—that have proved influential on each election within the commonwealth. The result is a study that emphasizes change and development in Democratic party politics (the focus of 7 of the 12 chapters, compared to 2 on the Republicans and 3 on less party-specific topics) and more fragmentation and emphasis on individuals in Republican party politics. The book features 44 tables and 10 figures, which provide much of the basis for analysis and enough information to satisfy even the most curious scholar. But while these data may be most useful for the scholarly community, in some ways they also detract from the book. Miller and Jewell overwhelm the reader with data; but unfortunately, some of their insights about Democratic-Republican differences, the individual nature of Kentucky politics, and nationalizing effects in recent years are difficult to find among the mass of tables. Just as important, the color of Kentucky politics—of Martha Layne Collins, John Y. Brown, and Wallace Wilkinson as the heirs to Earle Clements, Bert Combs, and Happy Chandler—is all but lost in the much-too-routine reviews of every candidate who has sought statewide office in recent decades. Thus, Miller and Jewell certainly provide the information that researchers need for further comparative study of changes in state politics—perhaps more than anyone could *ever* need—but in their desire to be comprehensive and analytical, they deprive us of some of the joys of studying their topic.

Baker, Hadley, Steed, and Moreland take a very different approach. Their book consists of 11 articles based mainly on a survey of delegates to state party conventions in the six southern states that used the caucus/convention method to send delegates to national nominating conventions in 1984. The data set is actually a subset of the Comparative State Party Activist Survey, administered in 12 states in 1984, itself an outgrowth of a similar 1980 study reported in Ronald Rapoport, Alan Abramowitz, and John McGlennon's edited *Life of the Parties* (1986). The history of this project is important because among the main questions raised is one concerning how much can be learned about political change from a study of elites chosen in this fashion.

In a real sense this work has an advantage over the previous studies of state convention delegates: the data set constitutes the complete universe of such delegates within the region under study. The editors do not, therefore, need to justify their sample. Furthermore, party activists in the South, particularly within the Democratic party, have traditionally played a leadership role in directing political activities, perhaps more than in any other region. But the impact of this study goes further. The study of elites demonstrates that the reforms of the national nominating process have led to remarkable changes in the composition and views of southern political elites. The prominence of African-Americans within the Democratic party elite, for example, stands out. Furthermore, as William Crotty comments in his introductory chapter, suggestions in this book lead one to ask whether "the immediate future will see the americanization of southern politics . . . or a southernization of national politics" (pp. 11–12). In addition to raising questions about the conclusions to be drawn from elite studies and the extent to which southern politics have lost their regional distinctiveness because of reforms in the presidential nominating system, the scholars represented here also speculate about a possible realignment in southern politics and about the development of revitalized programmatic parties (at least in the South).

While the contributions of *Political Parties in the Southern States* are important, like the Miller and Jewell book, this book tends to overwhelm the reader with data almost to the point of obscuring analysis. Chapters look at the demographic makeup of the convention delegations (with individual chapters taking up the roles of blacks, civil rights activists, women, and individuals of differing ages) and at the cultural changes in the party coalitions that these delegates form (with examinations of ideological and issue compositions of the parties and of the impact of the religious Right, urbanization, and immigration on party coalitions). Ninety tables and figures dominate the 11 substantive chapters. However, analysis of the meaning of these data is largely left to Crotty's introduction and a concluding chapter by Lewis Bowman; and in each case the real conclusion is that this work is a start—presenting data and raising questions but settling few issues.

Southern politics remains a fertile field for future research. These two books provide future scholars with a wealth of information and with a structure for pursuing additional research; but they leave us with enough questions to fill the research agenda plate for some time to come.

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The AIDS Disaster: The Failure of Organizations in New York and the Nation. By Charles Perrow and Mauro F. Guillén. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990. 206p. $25.00 cloth, $9.95 paper.

Inventing AIDS. By Cindy Patton. New York: Routledge, 1990. 176p. $42.50 cloth, $13.95 paper.

Unlike the perennially contentious issues of health care financing and health-oriented regulation, "public health," especially at the local level, has generated remarkably little academic political analysis. Until recently, superb historians like Elizabeth Fee, John Duffy, Charles E. Rosenberg, and Allan M. Brandt had the infectious disease beat largely to themselves. AIDS is changing this. For rousing interest in policy analysis, nothing succeeds like evidence of policy failure.

Failure is a key theme in both of these volumes, as is the unique blend of policy challenges and grass-roots responses associated with AIDS. Both books display an assertiveness—even passion—often lacking in scholarly work. In other respects, the books differ considerably. Though both books are stridently critical of the "establishment" response to AIDS, Perrow and Guillén ground their work in the more readily accessible terms of organizational sociology, while Patton pursues the less familiar route of critiquing AIDS discourse using conceptual tools borrowed from contemporary literary analysis and the work of Michel Foucault. Both books richly reward a close reading, though Perrow and Guillén will doubtless find the larger audience.

The strongest part of the Perrow and Guillén volume—where the authors concentrate the bulk of their research firepower—is in the local (especially New York) case material heavily derived from interview data. Their handling of national-level political dynamics early in the book is strikingly weaker—even a bit naive in places. The farther one reads, the better the book gets (though many will surely find the final recommendations troubling).

Their basic argument is threefold. First, not only did government failed catastrophically (research was tardy, foundations stingy, regulation weak, and education reticent) but (and this claim may someday merit a separate book) the record of poor response is even now being massively altered and refurbished. Second, this record derives not just from "normal" organizational failures, the resistance of vested economic interests and a budget-cutting president, or from the influence of traditionalist moral ideologues. Rather, characteristics of AIDS make it a peculiar hazard; no other ailment imposes such a painful crown of policy thorns. Third, this unique disease is virulent in an institutional sense, overwhelming common defenses against organizational pathology; HIV renders both victims and organizations prone to "opportunistic infections."

Organization theorists have too rarely trained their sights on the challenges posed by public health threats. In this respect, the Perrow and Guillén offering makes a nice companion to Harvey M. Sapolsky's edited *Consuming Fears* (1986). But, at least in discussing national-level dynamics, the authors fail to put to rest convincingly the "normal" sorts of organizational failures they are so anxious to look beyond. In second-guessing the early performance of the Centers for Disease Control (CDC), they do not inquire much into the agency's political context. The then-recent memory of the swine flu embarrassment, along with insecurity about the support of a new conservative adminstration, could well have affected executive and managerial judgment. To have argued that AIDS would be the public health calamity of the decade, and perhaps the century, could reasonably have seemed imprudent. Moreover, unlike the CDC, the National Institute of Health and the Food and Drug Administration (product recalls aside) were never intended to be mechanisms of quick response to sudden public health emergencies; their respective histories incline them quite differently. The organizational focus also obscures a simple but potentially powerful problem: in the modern U.S. polity, a very long roster of issues (e.g., deficits, urban poverty, etc.) come garbed in the rhetoric of "crisis." It is a currency now much devalued by overspending. The authors also naively make much of a "deception" whereby the CDC, the assistant secretary for health, and others claimed repeatedly to Congress that they did not need more money for AIDS while strenuously lobbying their executive branch superiors for more funds (pp. 17–21). But this game (albeit with more benign outcomes) is routine in Washington, where the Office of Management and Budget controls spending requests. Arguably, the alternative to such "deceptions" is chaos.

Cindy Patton displays a striking command of the history of the AIDS epidemic. But even more useful is her central focus: how we describe the epidemic and its components. The failures of policy she alleges are often more subtle—and thus more interesting—than those taken up by Perrow and Guillén. Hers is not a straightforward plea for more money or for more careful bureaucratic decision making. Patton sees everything we discuss about AIDS (i.e., testing, research, modes of prevention, etc.) as presented, comprehended, and acted upon within the confines of multiple collective contexts. Like others, such as Paula A. Treichler, who have approached the epidemic in roughly similar terms, Patton's mission is to highlight these contexts of discourse and their potential both for distortion and for undergirding the power of some interests while weakening others. Patton is especially apprehensive of science, which has, among other things, "[made] people dependent on the medical bureaucracy instead of pursuing their own strategies for social change" (p. 54) and helped propel an utterly racist misconstruction of African AIDS.

The books also differ in normative thrust. One clear implication of Patton's work is that formal authorities and large institutions (especially in the West) ought to be supplanted to a far greater extent in battling the epidemic, a stance that may pit her against some other AIDS activists. Alternatively, Perrow and Guillén complain that "none of the commissions studying the AIDS problem has been willing to recommend a 'crash' program, a 'war,' a 'crusade' " (p. 180). They have no such hesitation. Their crash effort would suspend obsession with the contextual goals (such as efficiency and fiscal integrity) that so often complicate policy implementation. Doubters will object that this is either unnecessary or unrealistic. Their invocation of the Polaris system development as a successful example of such a "crusade" may also strike some readers as forced, for obvious reasons; any serious comparison between the policy dynamics of a major Cold War weapon system and those of AIDS invites extreme skepticism. Patton's work, on the other hand, invites fear for the continued legitimacy of the very institutions most of us are counting on to address the epidemic.

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The Concept of Representation in the Age of the American Revolution. By John Phillip Reid. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989. 251p. $32.00.

This analysis of the concept of representation in Great Britain and America can be read with profit both by those interested in Reid's specific study of eighteenth-century constitutional history *and* those with broader interest in democratic theory. Though the author insists from the beginning that "people in the 18th century did not ask if representation was 'democratic' " (p. 2), his study raises issues central to those who will later ask this very question.

Placing the discussion clearly in its eighteenth-century context, Reid reminds us that the representative did *not* have the power to make laws but, rather, the "power to prevent law from being made: prevention and protection against arbitrariness" (p. 20). Both American and British constitutional theory, he allows, were consistent with this understanding. Discussion of representation was, however, more sharply drawn in America than in Great Britain, where there were, he suggests, fewer occasions for public reflection about the concept. American "reflection" did not, however, follow carefully developed theoretical premises but, rather, tended to grow from practice. Americans arrived at their "law of representation not by theory but by experience," he notes (p. 6), confirming Alexis de Tocqueville's more general observations and adding an interesting footnote to Louis Hartz.

This comparative perspective further elucidates the American case through an interesting examination of *virtual representation.* The author contends that the British insistence that America was "virtually represented" initiated U.S. discussion of representation and led them to insist that they were not, in fact, represented. British legislators "represented" nonelectors in Great Britain by "sharing their burdens." Failing to share these "burdens" with the American colonists, the British failed to "virtually represent" them. Americans, he claims, did not so much challenge the idea of virtual representation as claim that they were not virtually represented.

Furthermore, if one is to understand the development of the idea of representation in the late eighteenth century, one must, Reid asserts, recognize that all discussion was undertaken within the purview of a distinctly eighteenth-century notion of "constitutionalism," where *constitution* was defined as a standard of what law *should* be, not what was lawful. That standard included a notion of "balanced government"—the legislative restraint of the power of government. The debate over taxation without representation was thus a fundamental debate over the most basic principles of eighteenth-century constitutionalism.

It is *this* aspect of the debate that invites students of democratic theory into Reid's more narrowly conceived analysis. The discussion is also broadened by Reid's own insightful and tantalizing comments suggesting the parallels between American "public interest" litigators of the twentieth century and eighteenth-century virtual representation (p. 7) and, even more, by his provocative conclusion describing the nineteenth-century United States as the final home of "restrained English constitutionalism" in contrast to its "democratic, egalitarian society of the 18th century." Great Britain, on the other hand, became "by any definition the more representative of the two nations" (p. 145).

Though not the stated subject of this work, the author's concluding comments in fact reveal significant limitations of his study. The image of eighteenth-century American republicanism on which Reid seems to rely has been profoundly questioned by recent important work (some of which antedates Reid's analysis). Steven Dworetz's *Unvarnished Doctrine* (1990) has demonstrated that the Lockean content of eighteenth-century American sermons should refocus our understanding of American political and legal thought in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, while Thomas Pangle's *Spirit of Modern Republicanism* (1988) even more broadly questions the supposedly non-Lockean republicanism of these years.

More to the point, however, Reid's analysis fails to foreshadow the debates of the postwar years between Federalist and anti-Federalist (though he has freely quoted from future members of both sides). A more direct focus on the precursors of these debates would have more adequately framed Reid's closing assertion, that "it is in America that the 18th century concept of rule of law retains its constitutional sway as a check on the caprice of the people" (p. 146). It is a Federalist America that he foresees in the nineteenth century. His reliance on legal documents, more plentifully available in Great Britain than in the United States, he tells us, may have restricted his view. In any case America's more "experimental" politics developed a notion of constitutionalism that apparently eludes the legal historian's sources.

The Federalist's "new science of politics" introduces an element into the American constitutional debate that checks "caprice" just as surely as the "ancient constitutional barrier" the author finds reconstituted in the United States' nineteenth-century "balanced constitution" (p. 146). The anti-Federalist argument, which challenged both the assertion of the capriciousness of the people and the "mechanics" of the new Constitution, similarly finds echoes in the nineteenth- and twentieth-century United States and begs for some mention.

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The Loyalties of Voters: A Lifetime Learning Model. By Richard Rose and Ian McAllister. Newbury Park, CA: Sage, 1990. 219p. $45.00 cloth, $19.95 paper.

Many readers will agree with the lament voiced by Rose and McAllister that the study of electoral behavior suffers from overspecialization. Their book is a bold, if sometimes brutal attempt at putting the electoral Humpty Dumpty back together again. The Lifetime Learning Model is based on the not-unreasonable premise that a voter's decision in a particular election embodies the cumulative influence of experiences going back to childhood. Operationally speaking, the sequence begins with family loyalties, runs through socioeconomic interests, political values, and the social context and ends with the current performance of parties. The Rose-McAllister scheme evokes the image of the "funnel of causality"; indeed, their book is dedicated to the authors of *The American Voter.*

As so often in studies of electoral choice, the proof is in the method. Ideally, Rose and McAllister would want to follow voters on their trails through the various stages of learning right to the voting booth; a test of a lifetime model, strictly speaking, requires a lifetime of research. This being rather impractical, Rose and McAllister took some shortcuts to get reasonable results. They compressed the time dimension into the point of a single election, measured all the various stages at the same time and then entered the various stages of learning into the vote regression in the order in which they had occurred in real life. In other words, each new stage of learning registers its effect subject to the control of all previous ones. Underlying this procedure are at least two big *ifs.*

For one thing, Rose and McAllister assume that the learning stage as ascertained at the time of an election is a true replica of the real thing when it occurred in a voter's life. For example, the family loyalties of a 50-year-old Briton in 1987 is measured not by what he experienced when he was in his teens but how he recalls it 30 or 40 years later. The other heroic assumption is unidirectional causation. It is in the nature of hierarchical regression that the order of introduction pays a heavy premium. Joint claims are awarded to whoever comes first. Whenever there is some reason for disputing a claim, this method of allocation explanatory shares is brutally arbitrary.

Rose and McAllister's findings, I would bet, will upset many students of British voting, as it has me. The results are bound to enrage the legions who accept the dictum that all British politics is class politics. The class factor (part of socioeconomic interests) weighs in with less than 10% of explanatory variance. If that is fitful for 1987, it was not any more substantial in other elections since 1964, according to Rose and McAllister. The book will win no friends, either, among those placing great stock in retrospective valuations. Current performance of parties on such issus of public concern as unemployment, prices, defense, law and order, and social services registers an extremely meager share. There is no way, the authors conclude, that "ordinary voters [in Britain] are voting in accordance with a short-term calculus of the costs and benefits."

One wonders what is left. After all, it would be too depressing to conclude that a lifetime of learning leads to no learning at all. In light of the dedication of their work to *The American Voter,* one might surmise that Rose and McAllister would extoll the virtue of party identification. Far from it: This concept is not even singled out among their stages of learning. Instead, it is relegated to a residual status. Party identification is allowed to bid for voting variance after all others have collected their claims. Predictably, that is a thankless job yielding a minuscule payoff.

In the end, the opening of the electoral envelope reveals the winner to be *values.* Rose and McAllister conclude that "voters are increasingly relying on durable political values that are developed through a lifetime of political learning." Values, however, have proved to be a slippery concept in the study of political behavior; and Rose and McAllister do not really provide a new handle on it. Instead, their values refer to old-fashioned policy attitudes (regarding nationalization, social welfare, unions, national defense, etc.). It remains to be seen how many voters hold "durable" attitudes toward those policy issues or how impervious those attitudes are to perceptions of government performance (nationalization being a prime example for the changeable nature of policy opinions). How and where, in fact, did voters acquire their values?

In the final analysis, it must strike one as highly ironic about this book that it places the major burden of proof on something defined as highly *durable* in coming to terms with something so *volatile* in recent years. If values (or whatever one wishes to call those attitudes) are, indeed, so stable, how can they account for the electoral swings from Labour to Conservatives and back, and back again?

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Book Reviews: American Politics

Medicare's New Hospital Payment System: Is It Working? By Louise B. Russell. Washington: Brookings Institution, 1989. 114p. $22.95 cloth, $8.95 paper.

In 1983, Congress enacted the first major change to the Medicare program, the Prospective Payment System (PPS). The PPS implemented prospective reimbursement rates for groups of similar illnesses known as diagnosis-related groups in order to contain the escalating costs of in-patient hospital care for the elderly. Russell promises to undertake a comprehensive assessment of the PPS's impact on health care services received by the elderly, the financial health of hospitals, and federal spending. As a second agenda, Russell promises to relate what is known, or not known, about the PPS's impact to a key policy issue facing the United States today: How much should we, as a country, spend on health care, and what trade-offs do we face between spending and the quality of care? Russell succeeds admirably in her first aim but fails to pursue the implications of her findings in the second fully.

Russell's book provides a very readable description of the complexity of the PPS. Readers unfamiliar with prospective payment will learn a great deal about the program's workings in just a few short pages. Readers may not fully appreciate the speed with which the prospective payment legislation passed through Congress. The rapid passage of the PPS was nearly as revolutionary as the legislation itself, impelled by increasing budget deficits and rapid increases in governmental costs for hospital care. Quick passage was also facilitated by packaging the PPS within the 1983 changes to Social Security and by the hospital industry's desire to replace the 1982 cost controls imposed by the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act. The various national health insurance proposals currently before Congress may not enjoy the same confluence of events to ensure their passage.

Russell next reviews the literature published through 1988 on the impact of the PPS during its first two years of operation (1984–85) and discusses the difficulties in conducting such an evaluation. Her basic conclusions are that the PPS decreased hospital admissions and length of stay, increased the use of home health care and out-patient surgery, and slowed the escalation in Medicare program expenditures with no apparent harm to either the physical health of the elderly or the fiscal health of hospitals.

Research findings published since her review (e.g., in recent issues of *Inquiry*) corroborate her conclusions in most respects. Three recent findings deserve some mention. First, inconsistent with the goals of the PPS, hospital length of stay for Medicare patients has *increased* since 1985. This may reflect increased hospital confidence about making money under the PPS despite longer stays and/or hospital fears of increased malpractice risks due to shorter stays. Second, the profit margins of hospitals have been sharply reduced by the PPS in the last few years, although government and industry figures diverge sharply on the magnitude of the decline. Third, consistent with Russell's findings, recent evidence published in the *Journal of the American Medical Association* (*JAMA*) of 17 October 1990 suggests that the introduction of the PPS had no deleterious effects on the quality of care between 1981–86 and, indeed, may have positively influenced patient outcomes.

Surprisingly, Russell neglects to bring her findings regarding quality to bear on the book's second agenda: the trade-offs (if any) between quality and cost that our country might consider in future decisions about how much to spend on health care. The book's introduction gives the impression that it will assist the debate. Instead, Russell sidesteps a discussion of the issue, claiming that it needs "regular debate" and "a more complete foundation of information about the effectiveness of medical care" (p. 90). The omission is more keenly felt because the evidence Russell reviews suggests the intriguing possibility that cost reductions do not harm quality and may actually be accompanied by quality improvements. Such a possibility becomes more credible, given the recent evidence published in *JAMA* and the early experiences of health care organizations (e.g., the Harvard Community Health Plan) in applying continuous quality improvement techniques such as the Deming management method.

The failure to seriously address the issue of spending versus quality constitutes the only flaw in this otherwise well written and informative analysis of the PPS. Anyone seeking to participate in this key policy debate will be richly rewarded by starting with Russell's book.

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Presidential Press Conferences: A Critical Approach. By Carolyn Smith. New York: Praeger, 1990. 259p. $45.00 cloth, $16.00 paper.

Neither political science nor journalism has provided much systematic research on presidential press conferences. Carolyn Smith is one of the few authors to do just that. Her latest work provides a methodology for critically analyzing press conferences as they serve the competing purposes of presidents (persuasion) and the press (accountability).

Smith's impressive research demonstrates that presidential relations with the press have been adversarial from Washington's day to the present. Persuasion is the essence of presidential leadership. Mediation by the press may hold the president to account, but it inevitably results in tension. Whether the message as mediated is recognizably the president's or not, the skill and character shown in exchange affects the public's assessment of the president's leadership. The press conference is an inexact reflection of specific public concerns. But the public (and democracy) benefits by this "semi-institutionalized, quasi-spontaneous, and inherently adversarial" (p. 66) exchange to the extent it serves both persuasion and accountability.

The author's methodology classifies types of questions and then supplies evaluative criteria for both questions and answers. Some questions request new information. Others probe presidential attitudes, check administrative consistency, or put the president "on record." Still others advocate press members' positions or even go on the attack. According to Smith, the best questions are accurate, economical, and sufficiently "warranted" to compel the president to answer along the lines intended by the questioner. The best answers are reasonable and couched in good humor. They demonstrate the president's understanding of both the question and the answer.

Smith evaluates every question and answer of President Reagan's first two press conferences. She also assesses the net effect of specific exchanges as indicated by the news coverage of them. President Reagan was good at catchy word-pictures to capture headlines. The sincerity of his hard-line attitude about the Soviets was clear from early press questioning, as was his need for additional homework on economic policies. Reagan could usually rely on his disarming humor, oftentimes avoiding the degeneration of an adversarial relationship into hostility. The greater depth of information in particular responses sometimes heightened their importance and thus asserted the president's agenda. On the other hand, the president's uneven preparation and inability to remember details were long-term minuses for him, as was the impression of a hands-off administrative style. Ronald Reagan succeeded to a significant extent in asserting his purposes—until his attempt in 1986 to defend the secret sale of arms to Iran.

Smith felt that the first press conference was successful in striking a balance between persuasion and accountability. However, the second was less successful. A "reform" instituted in the second conference predetermined questioners by lot. It precluded some of the more experienced questioners, who were better able to ask compelling questions that test administrative attitudes or consistency. The president and the press agreed that the lottery had to go. Apparently, tepid questions and answers serve neither press nor presidential purposes.

The early anecdotal and historical chapters of Smith's book seem more critical of presidents than of the press as compared to the later, more analytic chapters. There could be more elaboration on exceptions to the adversarial relationship. There is a clear typology of questions but not of answers (although evaluative criteria are provided for both).

Some readers may feel that the discussion drags a bit in scrutinizing every question in two press conferences. But Smith intends to be rigorous. While assessments of questions and answers will always rely more on common sense than strict empiricism, the author has taken a clear step toward a more systematic evaluation of press conferences.

Presidential Press Conferences is a fresh, knowledgeable and diligent analysis. One wonders if its methodology might actually be put to good use by press conference participants. Carolyn Smith is to be commended for her superb addition to our means of understanding the intricacies of informing the public in a democracy.

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COMPARATIVE POLITICS

Perestroika in Perspective: The Design and Dilemmas of Soviet Reform. By Padma Desai. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989. 128p. $14.95.

The Road to a Free Economy: Shifting from a Socialist System: The Case of Hungary. By Janos Kornai. New York: Norton, 1990. $16.95.

Fragile Coalitions: The Politics of Economic Adjustment. Edited by Joan Nelson. Washington: Overseas Development Council, 1989. 224p. $24.95 cloth, $15.95 paper.

Economic Crisis and Policy Choice: The Politics of Adjustment in the Third World. Edited by Joan Nelson. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990. 406p. $45.00 cloth, $14.95 paper.

Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Performance. By Douglass C. North. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990. 160p. $10.95 paper.

The movements of economic liberalization now under way throughout the world hold tremendous opportunities for research and theory building in the social sciences. But how successfully are political scientists and economists grappling with economic reform, especially the thorny problem of the politics of economic liberalization? Several recent books look at this subject in a variety of empirical sites, examined through different theoretical lenses. They include analyses of "structural adjustment" in developing countries (the Nelson volumes); one study each of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, especially Hungary (Desai and Kornai, respectively); and a more general study of the role of institutions in economic change (North).

The term *economic reform* is generally a euphemism for *economic liberalization*, that is, reducing and redefining the role of the state to permit markets to operate with fewer governmental controls. Economists typically try to fit their explanations of reform into neoclassical notions of chronic undersupply and unmet demand, lack of firm-level skills and efficiency incentives, and excessive state intervention in markets. Political scientists tend to focus on other issues, such as the uses and abuses of power in the economic transition, the role of political coalitions, problems of program design and implementation and the search for winners and losers in the reform process. Each discipline brings its own predispositions and blind spots.

If there is a single, accepted approach to understanding economic reform, it is the intellectual framework built around concepts of stabilization and adjustment. This is by far the most widely accepted analytic framework employed across many countries and regions. Developed originally by the International Monetary Fund and World Bank in the late 1970s and early 1980s, it is represented by the two volumes edited by Joan Nelson. This approach argues forcefully that under current international conditions countries with severe internal and external disequilibria must implement two major reform steps: stabilization and then structural adjustment proper. The "adjustment" writers in these two volumes—political scientists like Stephan Haggard, Robert Kaufman, Thomas Callaghy, and Joan Nelson—broadly accept the bank's notion that the two-step stabilization-adjustment sequence is, at the most general level, the most useful way of organizing our thinking about reform. Even when quite critical of some of the more orthodox formulations of the model, the adjustment writers share its focus on external disequilibria and largely agree that reform is usefully understood through the stabilization–adjustment perspective that frames relations between the multilaterals and national governments.

At the same time, however, Nelson's thorough and accessible introductory essays in her two volumes are state-of-the-art criticisms of the overall logic of the adjustment model, especially its lapses of implementation. The two edited volumes are also nicely complementary. *Fragile Coalitions* is organized entirely around thematic chapters, especially the mutual impacts of politics and reform. Does democracy impede deflationary reform? (Whitehead). Does authoritarianism promote reform? (Haggard and Kaufman doubt it). What political coalitions underlie government reform programs? (Waterbury). The other Nelson volume, *Economic Crisis and Policy Choice*, consists mostly of country or regional chapters that examine how the goals of economic adjustment confront obdurate political realities. These two collections, which will become standards for teaching and research, are fine efforts to tease out the intersection of politics and economics by examining pressure by the World Bank and the IMF to impose policy-based conditionality on Third World borrowers. What are the weaknesses and strengths of the stabilization–adjustment approach?

First, the adjustment school pays close attention to the actual activities and pressing concerns of many governments in many countries from West Africa to Eastern Europe. Today, more governments than not are undertaking some kind of structural adjustment. Second, the adjustment model provides political science with a consistent vocabulary and a set of concepts for analyzing important political economic transitions. Also, there is a theoretical assumption that can be empirically tested: *if* a country successfully engages in stabilization and adjustment, *then* it will restore economic growth. This is a proposition that can be confirmed or disconfirmed through rigorous comparative analysis. Finally, one finds in these works a healthy degree of balanced skepticism about the self-interested claims of both the multilaterals and the national elites.

However, there are drawbacks. Like its very distant cousin, the dependency model, adjustment is very much of an "outside-in," top-down perspective. Most of the intellectual energy goes to analyze bargaining between elites in multilaterals and elites in national governments. The approach does not begin with village life and village needs and work upward to national and international levels. Also, like neoclassical economists and rational choice political scientists, women and men in the world of adjustment are highly materialist and driven by economic and narrowly political considerations. Culture and values play little part in the drama of reform. In theoretical terms (as Nelson herself admits), the methods employed by this school are an eclectic mixture of induction and deduction. Research findings or propositions about economics and politics are built up through an iterative, inductive process of sifting through many cases to identify a handful of conditions that seem to affect outcomes, but in often unpredictable ways. The timing of elections, the economic conditions at the start of reform, the role of labor in the ruling coalition, and the quality of public administration all affect national reform outcomes. But the interactive effects are so great that generalization is difficult. Identifying common factors is not the same as generating consistent propositions that one can then test in a rigorous fashion.

Adjustment is not the only approach to understanding reform. The single-case-study approach to economic reform is also useful, as found in the volumes by economists Padma Desai and Janos Kornai. Desai analyzes the Soviet Union, and Kornai focuses on Hungary. Both (but especially Kornai) extend their analysis to reform in other command economies. Both provide nuanced applications of political economy analyses. Beyond their substantive contributions, their work is especially interesting to political scientists because they demonstrate how much some economists have come to rely heavily on political reasoning of winners and losers to account for economic outcomes in reforming societies. Kornai intersperses his political analysis with the economic; Desai tends to group political analyses in separate chapters. Their "dependent variable" is economic growth and structural change, but they introduce political causality into the explanations. Still, their targets tend to be more microeconomic than the political scientists in the Nelson volume, who focus less frequently on firm-level behavior. For example, Desai criticizes the Soviet system because, even under Gorbachev's putative reforms, "Soviet firms and farms have little genuine autonomy and few incentives in matters such as deciding what to produce, which raw materials to procure and from where, how much to sell, what prices to charge, which capacities to scrap and which new machines to install, and which new technologies to develop or adopt" (p. 27). Excessive bureaucratic controls continue to block the path of reform, and Desai is quite pessimistic about the future trajectory of reform in the USSR.

Kornai is also interested in such economic outcomes as greater efficiency, savings, and market flexibility. He, too, analyzes possible economic outcomes in terms of the political and institutional context in which economic decision makers are so deeply embedded. Precisely his keen ability to convey to the reader the socialist system's meshing of economic, bureaucratic, and party elites into a single web and the political problems this web poses for effecting reform is one of the great strengths of this very good book. He demonstrates that the informal systemic pressures to continue past inefficient practices under this elite meshing are so overpowering that Hungary and other postsocialist societies require a clean break with the past. The new liberal governments must shoulder aside the old state and provide special, affirmative incentives to the nascent private sector. Radical steps are required to break the political stranglehold of the *nomenklatura* in order to permit new entrepreneurs to emerge and to bring in their train a more liberal political economic system. The choice for him is either stale socialism or creative capitalism. There is no "third way." Kornai exhorts his colleagues to push the socialist system to die a natural, if quick, death. He advocates stripping protection from the state economy to let the private economy flourish. In this, he differs somewhat from those who see economic salvation in rapid privatization of existing state enterprises. Desai reaches similar conclusions and remarks that the Soviet reforms as of 1989 were half measures likely to fail precisely because they ignore the simultaneous creation of private markets as the old command system disintegrates.

One of the most compelling implications of the arguments of these economists is that the reformers cannot simply aim to create new firms, institutions, and rules. Rather, reforms will take hold in postsocialist countries only where government policy fosters a new stratum of risk takers, economic innovators, and managers—in other words, a capitalist class.

These two case studies nicely capture the richness of close analyses of reform that are guided by a strong sense of history and a conviction that institutions and politics do matter a lot. Like all single cases, however, they have their weaknesses. They do not provide the broader, more inclusive perspective of the Nelson volume. When the author does, like Kornai, introduce materials on other countries, it is done in rather piecemeal, ad hoc fashion.

That the dead hand of the institutional past still holds the present in its grasp is one of the messages of the volume by economic historian Douglass North. He argues that even in periods of revolution when change appears quite discontinuous, many formal rules and informal norms are likely to change only incrementally, at the margin. Changes in some formal property rights and other institutions may occur quickly, but the informal constraints do not: "In consequence, there develops an ongoing tension between informal constraints and the new formal rules, as many are inconsistent with each other" (p. 89). This study of the intersection of institutions, economic structure, and economic performance—the latest by North on the subject—is a general work of comparative economic history that helps situate the specificities of the postsocialist transitions in a broader comparative and temporal perspective. He criticizes neoclassical economic theory for failing to make institutions truly endogamous. His own reasoning moves from broad structures or the "institutional framework" of basic laws and norms, which in turn induce the appearance of formal organizations, which pursue efforts to maximize their productivity. He advances his past work by giving greater consideration to political organizations and the ways that different structures induce agents (organizations) to behave in different ways.

North argues at several places throughout the book that he has abandoned his earlier notion that demographic shifts and changing relative prices are the main impetus to institutional change. Instead, he declares that political "self-interest" plays the larger role. However, after each declaration, he returns to his earlier, more economistic logic based on the economics of information and the central role of transaction costs in accounting for the kinds of changes we see in Eastern Europe. Unlike Kornai, his economist confrere, North lacks a convincing theory relating self-interest and the exercise of power. Perhaps because he still wears the blinkers of his profession, North cannot tell us much about the ways that social actors organize themselves collectively to rewrite institutional rules and regulations to reflect their own interests. Like Nelson, North admits that his efforts are still at the level of creating an analytic framework "but far from providing the kind of hypothesis testing that must ultimately be done." This remains a significant shortcoming throughout the study of economic reform. Clearly, the phenomenon of economic reform is so new that we are still trying to capture its reality in good descriptions and policy-oriented analyses. We have not yet seen volumes that seriously apply alternative theoretical perspectives directly to economic reform in order to explain observed outcomes. One would like to see sustained comparative analyses of reform through realist, liberal, and Marxist models of international relations or through statist and nonstatist accounts in comparative politics. What alternative formulations can each model generate to account for the emerging realities of Eastern Europe, Africa, and Latin America? If none successfully *predicted* the global perturbations, can some models at least "*retro*dict" reform better than others? Perhaps the best recent effort of this sort is John Freeman's superb *Democracy and Markets* (1989), which begins with propositions generated from a theoretical construct based on the intersection of certain kinds of political systems (corporatist vs. pluralist) and economic systems (private vs. mixed) and then marshals impressive cross-national and longitudinal data to confirm or disconfirm his propositions. This deductively driven cross-national comparative work is precisely what is needed in the study of the politics of economic reform.

The authors under review have made a good-faith and generally fruitful effort to provide a more complete understanding of the politics of economic reform. But the road is still open for more rigorous, explicit, and interdisciplinary models of global economic reform. A political economy approach systematically analyzing the links between social and political interests, the underlying economic dislocation, and the design and implementation of reform programs may be a useful way to begin.

Ernest J. Wilson III

University of Michigan

Scientific Management, Socialist Discipline, and Soviet Power. By Mark R. Beissinger. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1988. 363p. $30.00.

This is an extraordinarily interesting and important book. It explores, historically and theoretically, the consequences of the Soviet decision to establish "central planning as the basic principle of social organization within society" (p. 1). The result of this decision is "not simply bureaucratic government; it is *unlimited* bureaucratic government" (p. 3). And the outcome of unlimited bureaucratic government has been "the periodic rise of national crises of institutional effectiveness" (p. 6), for which the leadership's answer has been the repeated application of schemes of "scientific management" and disciplinary coercion.

Beissinger stresses the importance of the frequent, often very disruptive, changes of administrative policy in Soviet-style systems, the result of a "constant search for ways of restoring organizational coherence and vitality" and overcoming the consequences of bureaucratic rigidity (p. 7). What captures his interest is that despite sweeping changes in economy and society over the many decades of Soviet history, the fundamental structural problems remain and "similar administrative solutions to these problems have reappeared" (p. 7). Equally important is his emphasis on the underlying conflict between the claims of bureaucratic authority and those of specialist elites: "The discipline of hierarchy undermines the legitimacy of expertise by undermining its effectiveness" (p. 8). Finally, he stresses the recurrence of extremist policy responses to the problems of the bureaucratic system by frustrated communist leaders.

The main body of the book deals with the history of the application of various administrative strategies in the Soviet Union. The book divides into two parts: from the revolution to the late 1930s and from the death of Stalin to the mid-1980s. Despite the broad differences between the two periods, there is an impressive continuity of the basic problems and of the major remedies applied. As the author notes, the latter fall into six major categories: (1) limited decentralization, (2) managerial innovations, (3) mass mobilization campaigns, (4) campaigns to propagate social and work norms to encourage better production, (5) increased centralization, and (6) coercion.

Beissinger performs an enormous service for students of communist studies and of bureaucracy by providing a guide through the history of Soviet administrative policy. He provides important new insights into the administrative-structural problems underlying the political debates of the 1920s, the policies of the Stalin plan era, and the policies of the mature command economy of the Brezhnev era. Making use of a broad theoretical literature on organizational studies, he combines in a very original way the insights it provides in order to get at the fundamental problems of communist bureaucratic management.

The book is bound to be useful not only for the study of the past (it ends with the mid-1980s and the opening of the Gorbachev era) but of the contemporary scene. The reader is struck both by Gorbachev's eloquent analysis of the problems of the Soviet bureaucratic legacy and by his repetition—with the familiar failures—of many of the policy cures of the past. And though Gorbachev might agree with the author's conclusion that without "the discipline of markets . . . no amount of force and no degree of technique can provide communist leaders with the capacity to master the organizational revolution of the twentieth century" (p. 298), he has clearly not accepted the privatization and marketization that alone can provide that discipline. One hopes that this fine book will be widely read in the Soviet Union, as well as outside. It is an invaluable resource not only for the study of the Soviet Union and other communist systems but for the analysis of contemporary problems in their reform or dismantling.

HERBERT J. ELLISON

University of Washington

Russian Nationalism: Yesterday, Today, and Tomorrow. By Stephen K. Carter. New York: St. Martin's, 1990. 185p. $35.00.

Carter tries to accomplish several tasks in this book. First, he traces various strains of Russian nationalism from its roots in Orthodoxy, the Slavophile movement that began in opposition to the Petrine reforms, and the antiliberal Pan-Slavism movement of the nineteenth century. He depicts these movements as they entered the twentieth century and the revolution up to more recent vestiges as expressed by such figures as Solzhenitsyn, the village writers, and groups such as Pamiat' and Otechestvo. He accomplishes this task in the first two-thirds of the book, providing a coherent and digestible history of Russian nationalism.

Second, he tries to convince the reader that the Russian nationalist movement that has become visible with glasnost and perestroika is not a benign phenomenon that should be dismissed as a sideshow. He argues that Russian nationalism is a potent force, at least in part because of the passion of its adherents. To its believers, the movement is not a rational attempt to achieve a set of goals that would approximate progress in some way. Instead, it is an emotional, mystical allegiance to a set of ideals embodied in the soil and water of Russia (and in the Orthodox Church, at least for some groups). It is a mysticism that one must feel and that cannot be adequately expressed in words. The potency of Russian nationalism also exists because of the degree to which it can resonate among the Russian population, especially during tough economic times and attempts to achieve independence by non-Russian Soviet populations. He makes a convincing argument to that effect, drawing in part on literature of the Russian countryside.

But the most significant point he delivers regarding the potency of Russian nationalism is that it represents a political force that must not be ignored. Unlike those who shove Russian nationalist thought off to one end of the political spectrum and discounts its infiltration into mainstream politics, Carter argues that Russian nationalism can (and does) coexist nicely with other ideologies of opposition. He rejects the continuum of the political spectrum that ranges from Stalinism on the left, social democracy in the middle, and Russian nationalism on the far right (though it does underscore the latter's neofascist tendencies). He posits, instead, a range of ideologies that characterizes both the proreform groups and the various opposition groups. He then plots on a circle, thereby closing the continuum. Thus, he demonstrates that instead of being on opposite ends of the spectrum, the neo-Stalinists and the Russian nationalists share certain values. If one accepts his argument, one recognizes the possibility of a coalition of convenience among the neo-Stalinist ideologues who still believe in the directed society model, the hacks who staff the party bureaucracy, and the Russian nationalists. Stalinists and other conservative figures may be able to use Russian nationalism as a means to turn the population not only away from Gorbachev's quasi liberalism but back to the party as the guarantors of security and the repository of values. Herein lies its potency, which Carter advises us not to ignore.

Carter goes further in his analysis, offering a theoretical perspective as the potential viability of Russian nationalism. In plotting his circle of the ideologies that have either characterized some period in Soviet history or are evident in perestroika's turmoil, Carter comes up with an intriguing model (pp. 134–35). After naming the model after himself ("Carter's rotating sphere"), he likens it to a buoyant orange, the top third of which may be visible at any time. If the sphere (like the orange) pitches in one direction, nondominant ideologies become dominant (visible), and once-potent ideologies are sidelined. It is an intriguing model, and it implies more stability than we customarily accord Gorbachev's Soviet Union. In essence, it proposes that transversing great ideological distance will not be achieved in a short period of time and that one need be most aware of ideological positions to one side or another of those most dominant at the current time. He suggests that the sphere may tip in the direction of the most conservative Marxist-Leninists and—just beyond them on Carter's circle—the Russian nationalists.

The book is quite readable and contains several propositions that merit attention. While in the description of the history of Russian nationalism he proceeds along paths already charted by figures such as Andrej Walicki and John Dunlop, the model he develops is novel. Curiously, he devotes a chapter to "theories of Russian nationalism" that is taken entirely from papers presented at a recent Slavic studies conference. Nonetheless, the book's merits clearly outweigh any deficiencies.

JAMES BUTTERFIELD

Western Michigan University

Iranian Politics and Religious Modernism: The Liberation Movement of Iran under the Shah and Khomeini. By H. E. Chehabi. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1990. 342p. $49.95.

Liberal Nationalism in Iran: The Failure of a Movement. By Sussan Siavoshi. Boulder: Westview. 1990. 214p. $24.95 paper.

Iran and the World: Continuity in a Revolutionary Decade. By Shireen T. Hunter. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. 1990. 254p. $32.50 cloth, $14.50 paper.

The collapse of the Pahlavi dynasty in Iran and its replacement by an Islamic Republic under the charismatic leadership of Ayatollah Khomeini was a watershed in Iranian history. The Islamic Revolution of February 1979 altered the course of history in Iran, in the Persian Gulf region, and arguably even in the United States. An event of this magnitude has justifiably received considerable attention, and we must look into this historic event from as many vantage points as possible.

Chehabi's work is the first comprehensive account of a movement called the Liberation Movement of Iran (LMI). Much of the narrative of this book revolves around a finely drawn description of the LMI's ideology, leadership, and oppositional activities against the shah. Chehabi argues that the LMI "exemplifies the gradual displacement of secularism and the rise of religion in the Iranian polity" (p. 305). The most recognized personality in the LMI is Mehdi Bazargan, the first prime minister of revolutionary Iran. Known as a moderate, Bazargan found himself leading a revolutionary government clamoring for radical transformation. As Chehabi's narrative indicates, during his whole career, both before the revolution and after, Bazargan has strived toward a balanced pragmatic understanding of Shiism's contribution to politics. The important word to notice is *gradual*. The LMI's ideology of "Islamic" politics does not prescribe a radical, revolutionary transformation of society. On the contrary, the LMI's founders wanted "to offer Iran's youth an alternative to the communists, who seemed to have dynamics of history on their side" (p. 118). The need for an alternative based on a reformist interpretation of Islam was indispensible because the clergy were out of touch with existing situations in Iran and were unable to provide Iran's youth with a positive, constructive image of Islam. Chehabi contends that the LMI played a significant role in revitalizing religion and that "without their efforts, perhaps Khomeini would not have been able to adopt a style that could bring very different elements in Iranian society together" (p. 306). Since the LMI's reformist ideology appeals to a limited number of constituents in Iran, including the Western-educated technocrats, some of the bazaar merchants, and the university community, this contention is debatable.

Overall, Chehabi's work suffers from two weaknesses. The introductory section is too long, and the language too academic, limiting the audience to specialists or those who have some background in Iranian history. Second, even though the author admits that the postrevolutionary period "was of central importance to the LMI," major portions of the book are devoted to the prerevolutionary period. Moreover, in the postrevolutionary coverage, it would have been helpful to analyze the fundamentalists' perception of the LMI, its ideology, weaknesses, and so on. Nevertheless, Chehabi's book illuminates many aspects of a social democratic movement struggling to keep pace with the dynamics of revolutionary change in society.

The fortunes of the religiously oriented LMI have been by far better than their secular collegues in the Liberal Nationalist movement. The latter have been for all purposes inconsequential in the postrevolutionary politics. Siavoshi's book examines the causes for the ineffectiveness of liberal nationalists. According to her, several factors have contributed to the demise of liberalism in Iran: the emergence of Islam as a viable political force, the lack of a liberal constituency inside Iran (most of them have fled overseas), and the nature of the rentier state in Iran that "makes it very difficult for a functioning pluralism, and ultimately liberalism, to exist." Although Siavoshi has relied on original sources and interviews, the book raises more questions than it answers. The author maintains that Iranians can be both nationalist and Muslim and that secularism is not a necessary component of nationalism. The LMI is mentioned as a case in point. However, there is little exploration into how the LMI has formulated this oxymoronic position. Moreover, a short politicobiographical section on the leadership of the Liberal Nationalist movement does not show how their backgrounds have affected their perceptions of the Iranian polity. In this case, Chehabi's study makes clear linkage between these two elements in the case of the LMI. The conclusion one arrives at after reading these works is the fact that the liberal nationalists' disdain for "Islamic" politics does not include the version espoused by the LMI. Dealing mostly in generalities, Siavoshi does not discuss details that are crucial to her argument. For example, in attributing the causes of the resurgence of the liberal nationalists in the 1960s to "a reaction to the regime's policies and popular demand," rather than "a product of the liberalization policy" (p. 107), it would have been helpful to outline some of the regime's policies during this period. All in all, both books are a contribution to the understanding of the forces that helped overthrow the ancien régime, a testimony to the fact that revolutions are brought about when a mosaic of ideologically different forces unite in the pursuit of a common objective.

The monopolization of postrevolutionary politics by the fundamentalists in Iran was not just confined to internal challenges; it also brought about significant changes in Iran's foreign policy, the subject of Shireen Hunter's volume. The central objective of Hunter's book is to demonstrate how pragmatic considerations have influenced the course of revolutionary Iran's foreign policy. The prominence of ideology is questioned in most of the foreign policy positions adopted by the regime and the inclusion of other determinants, such as geography, historical experience, and resource constraint, is meant to show how these factors have not been inconsequential. By taking a global approach, Hunter has undertaken a mammoth task of testing her theory. For outside observers, the elements of continuity are not clearly demarcated; instead, primary emphasis is placed on an ideology that is intolerant of diversity and dissent: "Yet the requirements of survival, plus demands imposed by pressing economic and political needs, have forced most Iranian leaders to become political practitioners and statesmen rather than pure ideologues or idealists" (p. 43). Hence, Iran is gradually "coming to resemble other revolutionary countries, where ideological objectives are basically subordinated to state interests" (p. 45).

The author's ability to prove this thesis is undermined by analytic, as well as methodological, weaknesses. For example, the internal mechanism of power rivalry inside Iran is not sufficiently exposed to show how foreign policy objectives have affected the alignment of forces. Why and how did Rafsanjani become the carrier of pragmatic influence? Although, at the beginning of the book, the author criticizes the classification of internal politics inside Iran as "radicals" versus "moderates," she uses similar terminology throughout the book. Phrases like *the radicals gained ascendency* and *the radicals' vision for Iran's future* abound. Moreover, the degree of involvement by different factions is dependent on the prioritization of foreign policy objectives. For one group, steadfastness toward the Saudi regime and the issue of pilgrimage is more important than Iran's relation with international organizations. Methodologically, the book is inconsistent in terms of focus on different topics. The chapters on international organizations and the Third World are very short (only five- and four-pages long, respectively).

On the whole, all three books represent important additions to the literature on the Iranian Revolution and provide new insight on revolutionary transformation and the role of the state. They promise to stimulate a continued discussion about the ongoing manifestation of a revolution.

BAHMAN BAKTIARI

University of Maine

Power and the Ruling Classes in Northeast Brazil: Juazeiro and Petrolina in Transition. By Ronald H. Chilcote. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990. 385p. $64.50.

Every student of Brazil knows that there is a Northeast, where people are desperately poor, droughts recur, and traditional elites hardly ever fade away. But most political scientists have preferred of late to focus on macroeconomic and national-level political change. To the extent that local issues make it onto the research agenda, they are typically studied from the vantage points of the major cities of São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro. Few political scientists venture north to the *sertão*, and none write books about it.

Ronald Chilcote's *Power and the Ruling Classes in Northeast Brazil*, which contrasts the organization of local power and development in Juazeiro, Bahia and Petrolina, Pernambuco—two Northeast cities on opposite banks of the São Francisco River—is a welcome exception, filling a lacuna in our literature on Brazil. The book marshals an impressive wealth of evidence gathered during six field trips over a period of 15 years to support its claim that the organization of power in a community affects its prospects for, and patterns of, economic development. While both cities have been dominated by powerful families for most of this century, the extent to which these families were able to impose patriarchal rule has varied, with apparent consequences for economic growth and decline. The relative underdevelopment of Juazeiro is attributed to the division of its ruling class into two clanlike groups locked in an intense rivalry, and the "autonomous" capitalist development of Petrolina is credited to the concentration of power since the 1950s in the hands of a single family, the Coelhos.

Anyone who has attempted to research local power, political economy, and local-state-national linkages in the hinterlands of Brazil will appreciate deeply this meticulously researched work. "Who rules" was determined by position and by reputation, and the ruling classes in turn were interviewed to learn of their associability, political alliances, and ideology. *Power and the Ruling Classes in Northeast Brazil* thus provides us with an accurate chart of local power structures and the social lives, economic assets, and ideas of the ruling classes of these two cities. The text is as rich as it is detailed. We learn that the paternalistic ruling classes of Juazeiro and Petrolina concern themselves with the welfare of every member of their communities (they defend property rights but also believe that wealth should be redistributed) at the same time that they enter into partnerships with international capital. The book's value is enhanced by the author's visit to these communities 10 years after he had completed the original research. Exploiting an opportunity that few researchers are able or willing to create has enabled Chilcote to show us what has and has not changed in this part of Brazil in the course of two decades of economic growth and national political change. In 1982–83 he found a challenge to, but an incomplete transition from, traditional hegemony. Opposition to traditional rule surfaced beginning in 1976 (not surprisingly, military rule had curbed political participation). But *coronelism* (traditional political rule by local bosses) was adapted from rural to urban conditions, and Petrolina remained "Coelho country."

If the book's research agenda is laudable and its execution painstakingly careful, a question does remain about its analytical framework. The author cannot really distinguish which of his own explanations for why Petrolina developed to a greater extent than Juazeiro is superior to others. In a political system in which ruling classes sustain their dominance and augment their wealth by capturing and diverting state resources to their communities, the value of the political connections of municipal leaders to state and federal government is plausibly more important than whether or not the local dominant class is united or divided. Petrolina undoubtedly benefited from the rise of Nilo Coelho to the governorship of Pernambuco, just as surely as Juazeiro was "punished" when it was governed by a political faction opposed to incumbent governor Luiz Viana. Too often, moreover, Chilcote substitutes for his own analysis that of the opponents of traditional political and modern economic domination.

Most seriously, the research is imprisoned within the framework of scholarly debates and intellectual paradigms which have long since been critiqued, reformulated, and displaced. The research is not outdated; but its purpose is eroded because few political scientists today care whether or not traditional agriculture in this region is feudal or capitalist or whether development in these cities has been "dependent" or "autonomous." A new generation of scholars who will read this work have probably never read the community power studies that inspired the research design and have been exposed only to caricatured versions of the dependency theory through which the author interprets the world of Northeast Brazil. They will undoubtedly also muse about what would motivate a scholar to conduct a study that has little or no apparent predictive value and power.

Ronald Chilcote should be commended for contributing to our understanding of contemporary Brazil and to illuminating the oppressive political and economic structures under which the Nordestinos, one-third of the Brazilian population, live. Unfortunately, this book's shortcomings will probably be judged harshly; and its many virtues may go underappreciated.

FRANCES HAGOPIAN

Tufts University

Poland's Journalists: Professionalism and Politics. By Jane Leftwich Curry. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990. 302p. $54.50.

Since her graduate school days, Jane Leftwich Curry has been an acute observer of the media of mass communication. Her frequent visits to Poland and exceptional credibility among Polish writers place her in an ideal position to study the professional journalists of that country and how they function under communist rule. Unfortunately, the collapse of the communist regime in Poland, together with its accompanying liberalizing reforms, has deprived Curry's book of much of its contemporary meaning. As an historical study of the 1945–85 period, however, her book is still of great value.

Essentially, the author examines the roots of communist media control in post–World War II Poland. She then takes us through the collapse of classic Stalinism, the Gomulka years, the Glerek decade, and into the first five years of the 1980s. Her focus is on how journalists were trained, how they functioned as political actors, and the bureaucratic and political milieus in which they found themselves.

Curry buttresses her work with comments on the methodology she used to gather her data, plus a five-page select bibliography and a solid index. In short, what we have here is the only thorough study in English to date of 40 years of communist control over professional journalism in Poland. One would hope, however—now that Polish academics and journalists are finally free to do research like this themselves—that some Polish scholar, building on Curry's foundation, will soon take on a thorough and intensive study of the problem for Polish domestic consumption.

This book will be very useful for media scholars. Journalism students are also likely to find it to be of interest.

PAUL J. BEST

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Fiji: Coups in Paradise. By Victor Lal. Atlantic Heights, NJ: Humanities Press International, 1990. 268p. $33.50 cloth, $17.50 paper.

The simple image of easy living in the tropics was shattered on 14 May 1987, when Lieutenant Colonel Sitiveni Rabuka of the Royal Fijian Military Force overthrew the democratically elected government of Dr. Timoci Bavadra in Fiji. To that point, the only incidents of violence in the South Pacific had been minor skirmishes. Until Fiji, military intervention in the South Pacific had been unthinkable—a unique observation among developing nations.

Since the South Pacific had been a model of peaceful Third World development, it is important to understand how turmoil emerged in Fiji. Some books providing interpretations appeared shortly after the two coups. (The second occurred in September 1987, when Rabuka determined that the civilians whom he had returned to power were not meeting the objectives that, he said, necessitated the first coup.) These books were unsatisfactory mainly because they lacked objectivity.

It was hoped that academician and journalist Victor Lal's book would integrate more recent events with those of four years ago to provide more insightful interpretations. Unfortunately, this proved not to be the case. Coverage of Fijian politics virtually ceases around August 1988. Several important things, such as the creation of the new constitution and Rabuka's running for prime minister, are left unanalyzed in their relationship to the coups.

At a substantive level, Lal purports to explain why a coup could have been expected after the April 1987 elections. This election was crucial, since the Fijian Labor party, backed by the majority of Fijian Indians (whose ancestors came as imported laborers and who now make up almost half of the population), defeated for the first time the Alliance party, which was backed by a majority of native Fijians. Althugh Bavadra was Fijian, the majority of the Labor party's elites were Indian. Furthermore, the Alliance was the party that wished to maintain vestiges of the chief-system. Many of its elites' ancestors were chiefs who had wielded authoritarian powers more than a century ago. Its leader, Sir Ratu (Chief) Kamisese Mara, was one of three paramount chiefs in Fiji.

Lal points an accusatory finger at Mara. He believes the results of the election signaled to the chiefs that thereafter their power would be reduced, so something had to be done. Lal presents an array of circumstantial evidence that Mara, if not calling the coup's shots, allowed it to happen and then waited for Rabuka to ask him to step in to lead.

However, Lal mainly employs assertion to draw this conclusion. For example, he believes that Rabuka operated with the tacit consent of Australia and the United States when only slight circumstantial evidence suggests these nations knew of the coup beforehand. On the other hand, much clearer evidence exists of Libyan involvement in the South Pacific (one of Rabuka's reasons for the coup was that the Bavadra government would be susceptible to Libyan pressure); but this connection is discounted by Lal without explanation.

The book also suffers in that it reads like a history of Fijian politics up to the coup, with emphasis on the elections and events in the 1970s and early 1980s. Some such emphasis is needed, but much seems like padding—especially with an extended discussion of the 1982 election and many verbatim letters that are peripheral to the thesis. Again, one craves more analysis.

In fact, the case against Mara is just one of four suggested by commentators—lines of inquiry that Lal ignores at his peril, since they make his argument less compelling. If Mara was acting to preserve the power of the undemocratic Great Council of Chiefs, for three reasons, he would seem to be an unlikely coup author. First, more than anyone else, he was the author of the 1970 Constitution, which was overthrown in the coup. Second, the council still had considerable veto power over Parliament, so a coup would have been a severe overreaction on his part. Finally, Rabuka was just the third-ranking officer in the military. It was known that he was disappointed by having been passed over for the top spot by an apparently less qualified Epeli Nailatikau, Mara's son-in-law. Why would Mara operate through his son-in-law's disgruntled subordinate when he could use the top-ranking officer in Fiji?

Of the other three coup explanations, two can be quickly dismissed. One—evidence of outside involvement—is highly circumstantial. Also, the portrait of Rabuka as acting out of career frustration is blurred by his refusal to take power after the first coup, reluctantly taking power after the second and then quickly resigning, and finally only now is a candidate for prime minister.

The real explanation, likely, is that Rabuka took charge to quell violence by extremists on all sides and because he felt the Fijian way of life and the Christian religion (he is an ordained lay minister) were threatened by the new government. To some extent, Sir Ratu Penaia Ganilau (the existing governor general and, ironically, Rabuka's paramount chief)—and to a greater extent, Mara—took advantage of the situation presented (the latter has a history of political opportunism). Only now has Rabuka developed political ambition as shown by his recent bid to become Fiji's elected leader.

It was hoped that Lal could present the convincing argument explaining the coups. Such an understanding would aid in comprehending politics not only in Fiji but in other multiethnic developing nations (e.g., Malta, Malaysia, and even Northern Ireland)—other countries where distinct groups of people are forced by historical events to live together. Sadly, Lal's treatment indicates that the explanation will have to wait for another day.

JEFFREY D. SADOW

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The State and Economic Knowledge: The American and British Experiences. Edited by Mary O'Furner and Barry Supple. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990. 477p. $44.50.

This book, which grew out of a symposium held at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars in Washington, deals with how governments in Britain and the United States have obtained and used economic knowledge in formulating policy at various times in their histories. Each chapter deals with a single country in examining institutions, receptivity to new ideas, and the circumstances of the adoption of new policies; but because the issues dealt with are similar, the book provides the reader with excellent comparative analysis.

The coverage of the book is ambitious. The early chapters set the historical framework for the use of economic knowledge by governments in the two countries, focusing a good deal on the nineteenth century. These early chapters deal with the legacy of the great British economists of the period, what Donald Winch calls the "four synoptic gospels—Adam Smith, David Ricardo, Robert Malthus, and John Stuart Mill. Later chapters covering institution building and policy formulation in the twentieth century give much attention to the influence of Keynes on the British Treasury and on economic policy makers in the United States. Other chapters deal with how the U.S. government informed itself about labor, industrial, agricultural, and tax matters as the basis for setting policy and how Britain did this for social and population matters. These substantive chapters provide considerable detail on the personalities involved and how they shaped institutions and official operations. It would take up too much space to list the relevant literature with which the reader should be familiar to get the full benefit from this book, but it is extensive. The book has no general bibliography or even chapter bibliographies, but the individual chapters contain extensive notes.

For those interested in the main themes—how societies shape institutions, what individuals formulated policies, and how governments ingest economic thinking—this is certainly a book worth reading. The presentations are scholarly and also highly readable.

There is considerable detail in the discussion of specific issues, but this does not replace the need for the reader to have some prior knowledge of the circumstances and ideas of the times. Thus, the discussion of economic policy formulation in the Truman years requires that the reader have some background on what went into full-employment policy of the time (see Stephen K. Bailey's *Congress Makes a Law,* 1950).

Three overall themes that stuck with me were the interplay between the circumstances of a country and the utilization of economic knowledge, the importance of crisis in determining state actions, and just how recent it is that formally trained economists played a major role in government policy formulation. Barry Supple describes the context of industrial maturity under which "fundamental axioms," especially free trade, could be scrutinized and challenged. He gives a citation from 1904: "A Free Trader who inquires is in the perilous position of a lady who hesitates" (p. 329). Supple notes that protection for British manufacturing was advocated because of the need for fairness in competition with other countries, a theme much in vogue today in the United States. In their introduction, Furner and Supple ask, "Is knowledge policy-driven, or is policy knowledge-driven? Do people know in order to act or act in order to know?" (p. 11). The chapters give answers on both sides of each question.

The challenge to free trade in Britain in this century came at a time of threat to Britain's most important industries. Wartime mobilization forced changes in economic policy in both countries, as did the challenge of the Great Depression of the 1930s. There are numerous examples in the book of crisis-driven experiments in economic policy.

Peter Clarke notes that it was only in World War II that British economists entered into the structure of government on a large scale. George C. Peden states that the "old dogs" (the British Treasury mandarins) were open to the new tricks of the Keynesians only after World War II. Robert M. Collins cites Leon Keyserling, chairman of the Council of Economic Advisors under Truman: "While economists have long talked about prices and wages and profits in the refined atmosphere of theoretical techniques, we live in a world where prices and wages and profits are being *made*" (p. 156). President Truman was, if anything, even more antagonistic toward economic theory. Theory, of course, has its day in formulating economic policy but it may take time to penetrate, as Keynes has noted.

SIDNEY WEINTRAUB

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The Fruits of Fascism: Postwar Prosperity in Historical Perspective. By Simon Reich. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1990. 341p. $46.50 cloth, $15.95 paper.

Simon Reich's well-researched and fascinating book is an important contribution to the literature on the relationship between industrial development, liberalism, and fascism. Reich synthesizes a wealth of new archival research to reformulate and address a simple and important question: Why did a vigorous and prosperous auto industry develop in Germany after World War II, while Britain's auto industry failed to do the same? As he shows, the common neoclassical wisdom will not do here. In both countries, the automobile industry began under the same conditions with comparable players. The answer Reich provides is that liberalism determined the development of the automobile industry in Britain, while fascism shaped the automobile industry's development in Germany.

This study is also, even more importantly, a general effort in demystification. Liberalism by now is an integral part of our understanding of British history, politics, economy, and society. Fascism, for all the commotion that the subject elicits, still has not gained the same status in the German case. The preferred scholarly perspective on the relationship between fascism and German history, politics, economy, and society, has been one of backward mapping. The search for fascism's causes, however, as Reich nicely observes, has made us neglect fascism's consequences (p. 303). This has only fueled "the myth of the fresh start" that surrounds the Bonn Republic (a myth, to be sure, built and used by Allied powers and Germans alike in the aftermath of the war). But, as research is slowly pointing out, the four *ds* (*demilitarization, decartelization, decentralization, denazification*) did not fare well. The pragmatic concerns of feeding and housing the

German population, making the country economically self-sufficient, and finally placing the country on the Cold War map produced major compromises. Thus, Reich's insistence that 12 years of fascist rule created changes in Germany's political economy and that these changes, "in the absence of comprehensive structural reforms" after the war, were sustained in the Bonn Republic has to be taken very seriously.

Unfortunately, Reich at times remystifies what he has set out to demystify. His insistence on the success of fascism in establishing a discriminatory policy, contrastng it with the British state's policy of "national treatment," forces him in the end to remind the reader that "this book does not advocate fascism" (p. 327). Ultimately, fascism as a concrete regime is incidental to the general argument developed in the book. The general framework, rather, suggests a neomercantilist state-capacity argument. It views fascism as the power that enabled the German state to create and ruthlessly enforce a policy of discrimination according to its political ideals and plans. Foreign multinationals (Opel and Ford), as well as uncooperative German firms (Borgwart), were frozen out and consciously held back, while German ("Aryan") cooperative firms (Daimler-Benz, BMW, and, as the child of German manufacturers and the fascist state, Volkswagen) were granted special institutional relationships and privileges. Fascism, then, was the power that enabled the German state to create institutional linkages with domestic manufacturers and a national economic policy that in the end proved capable of delivering prosperity to Germany's domestic auto industry, which, in turn, created the postwar economic miracle. Reich's key contention is as simple as it is powerful: "All states intervene; what matters is *how* they intervene" (p. 3).

The British liberal state fumbled in this regard. Its policy of "national treatment" (nondiscrimination in its treatment of firms operating within its national boundaries) ended up favoring a foreign multinational, Ford, over a potential national champion, Austin. As a unit of a foreign multinational firm, British Ford possessed a number of structural advantages in competing with domestic firms. Official efforts to appear nondiscriminatory often resulted in British Ford's receiving preferential treatment, if only because the policy paradigm made the government especially vulnerable to manipulations by wily Ford managers. As Reich concludes the British case, "I do not prescribe *more* intervention but, if I did, it would be a *different form* of intervention that recognizes the state's pivotal role as an agent of change in managerial capitalism" (p. 204).

That fascist politicians realized the state's pivotal role in its most pure (i.e., political) manner accounts for the fascination and the horror Reich brings to his analysis of the German case. I highly recommend this study as a stimulating contribution to the long overdue debate on the consequences of fascism for Germany's postwar development.

FRANK PETER WAGNER

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A Political Economy of the Middle East: State, Class, and Economic Development. By Alan Richards and John Waterbury. Boulder: Westview, 1990. 439p. $45.00 cloth, $19.95 paper.

This book, by an economist and a political scientist, offers an invaluable contribution to our understanding of the political and economic dynamics of the Middle East and to processes relevant to those dynamics in the third world more generally. The authors focus on interactions among three variables: economic growth and structural change, state agencies that implement policies, and the social groups (particularly classes) that shape, and are shaped by, those policies. They look at how state policies have transformed the economy and, in turn, class structures; how classes and class coalitions favor certain economic strategies and color state policy; and how the economy constrains both policy makers and class actors. The scope is broad, drawing on the entire region. The analysis is thorough, careful, and impartial.

The chapters on economic transformation (economic growth and structural change, population, human capital, agriculture, urban political economy, and public- and private-sector-led growth) offer a breadth and depth unavailable elsewhere. The authors detail the material improvement of the region (both in overall and distributional terms) over the last 40 years and the factors (e.g., limited industrialization) that hinder future prospects.

The chapters on politics and the state examine both political constraints and political possibilities, big structures and small. States and state policies are analyzed in terms of the economic constraints that limit choices and the class interests that sometimes shape them. The authors conclude that regime stability has systematically occurred at the cost of political exclusion, prompting a widespread crisis in confidence. The chapters on regimes and regime change analyze patterns of variation based on both degree of state intervention in the economy and in people's political and personal lives. The conclusions are often counterintuitive, for example, that monarchs are more likely to encourage pluralism in order to prompt a competition for public patronage that only they can arbitrate (p. 318).

In the sections on class formation the authors analyze both urban and rural patterns. They show both how state policies that emerge relatively unconstrained by class interests can create classes that then come to capture the state and recast policy and how other classes (the urban bourgeoisie) may fail either to dominate or oppose the state because they remain dependent on it. This discussion might have been strengthened by a more explicit linkage to other group identities (communal, familial) examined elsewhere in the book. Although they discuss the formation, interests, and unifying elements of the emergent middle class (defined more by consumption, than production, patterns), they are not as thorough in explaining the circumstances in which this identification proves politically more durable than others from which people can choose.

There are, however, omissions in the book. The authors intentionally do not devote much attention to regional conflict, political personalities, or political culture. Cultural predispositions (e.g., the recurring hostility to economic strategies that rely on agricultural exports or external actors) are linked to their specific historical origins (here, the colonial experience with Britain and France), rather than to the conventional default explanation for all things, Islam. Although events have inevitably dated the book some (Yemen has unified, Kuwait has vanished and then reappeared), the book's framework for analyzing political and economic change has withstood the war remarkably well.

The authors' reputation assures that this book will be read by Middle Eastern scholars; the book *should*, however, be read by Third World specialists interested in broad processes of social, economic, and political change. While issues of particular regional importance (oil revenues, food dependence, military spending) are handled expertly, the focus is on patterns of comparative concern: the rise and retreat of the interventionist state, the move toward economic liberalization, the more tentative moves toward political liberalization. A central point and recurring theme is that the Middle East is very much like the rest of the Third World and that an understanding of its economic and political dynamics sheds light on those dynamics elsewhere.

JILL CRYSTAL

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The Political Economy of Public Sector Reform and Privatization. Edited by Ezra N. Suleiman and John Waterbury. Boulder: Westview, 1990. 388p. $47.50.

In the last decade national governments of nearly all regime and ideological types have undertaken substantial public sector reform. Privatization, liberalization, and deregulation are all parts of a strategy to utilize market allocation mechanisms more actively and to reduce reliance on public enterprise and centrally planned resource allocation. The purpose of this book is to understand why this shift has developed so dramatically and to analyze variance across nations in the degree of privatization, with a focus on level of development. To match a global phenomenon, the book covers an impressive scope of the world's national economies, including Brazil, Britain, Chile, China, Egypt, Greece, India, Japan, Mexico, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Portugal, Spain, and Turkey.

The book is organized into three parts: (1) a general context, (2) advanced industrial countries, and (3) developing countries. The first part includes an overview by the editors, a broad discussion of privatization by Paul Starr, an analysis of economic rationales for privatization by Carl Shapiro and Robert Willig, and an analysis of international policy learning by John Ikenberry.

The editors' introduction is a very helpful statement of the issues and theme of the book. Suleiman and Waterbury argue that there is no single cause of these market-oriented policies but that macroeconomic concerns, trade issues, international pressure from the International Monetary Fund and World Bank, political gains from breaking entrenched unions, need to reward supporters, spread of stock ownership, and the government's own coffers are all relevant to different degrees in different nations. The case studies in the book itself reveal great variance in the implementation of privatization. Chile and Britain probably have done the most; while in India, Brazil, Egypt, Nicaragua, and many African nations, the rhetoric far exceeds any actual policy change. The reader can only wish that the editors had also prepared a conclusion chapter to gather more lessons from the multiple case studies.

Paul Starr develops three useful distinctions in these programs: *institution building, balance shifting,* and *boundary blurring.* While this book succeeds more than many multiauthor works in integrating across chapters, Starr's distinctions are not used by any of the case study analysts. This is unfortunate because the cases vary in the extent to which they focus more narrowly on privatization (e.g., the government's selling off assets) or more broadly on economic liberalization strategies.

The economic chapter is useful because the question of whether private versus public ownership of key industrial firms matters is of fundamental importance. Shapiro and Willig present their economic contributions in a fairly accessible fashion for political scientists; but once again, the reader will not see their findings referred to elsewhere in the book.

Ikenberry's discussion of international policy learning, or "bandwagoning," is intriguing because it raises the question of domestic versus international sources of policy. The subsequent country case studies necessarily focus more on internal attributes than the spread of policy ideas. Here, the book would have been improved by including U.S. deregulation, since much has been written about the impact of economic market ideas across policy areas and at the level of the states and localities.

All of the case studies are analyzed well by country experts. I found the advanced industrial country (Western European and Japan) material less interesting than the Third World chapters if only because much more detailed studies have already been written on specific industries, such as telecommunications, banking, railways, and airlines. Kent Caldor's table (p. 164) comparing advanced countries' public enterprises in different industries is extremely helpful and could have been expanded in a conclusion chapter to help the reader keep straight the baseline for privatization in so many countries.

Highlights of the country studies include Jeffrey Herbst on African privatization (which analyzes the political incentives very clearly), Forrest Colburn on Nicaragua and Ben Ross Schneider on Brazil and Mexico (both chapters rich with original source material), and David Bachman on China. Generally, the point that many of these nations only recently built a strong national enterprise system and are partially returning it to the private sector is an important one.

There are a few other minor problems. The complete lack of coverage of Eastern Europe and of some nations that have privatized substantially, like New Zealand, is disappointing, compared to perhaps an overemphasis on Africa and Latin America. The three separate chapters that focus on African nations could have been better coordinated.

Generally, such an impressive global scope shows what a diverse faculty can offer when they focus collectively on a single important policy issue. One wishes that the group had been able to push even one step further, by integrating the contributions. Still, compared to the other comparative literature on privatization, Suleiman and Waterbury take a very large step forward.

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INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Nationalism and National Integration. By Anthony H. Birch. London: Unwin Hyman, 1989. 253p. $49.95 cloth, $15.95 paper.

Nationalism and International Society. By James Mayall. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990. 175p. $34.50 cloth, $11.95 paper.

Ethnic Conflict and International Relations. By Stephen Ryan. Brookfield, VT: Gower, 1990. 200p. $49.95.

Recent events have left analysts and policy makers alike wishing they knew more about ethnicity and nationalism. After years of neglect, an accelerated multidisciplinary effort to reconsider national and ethnic phenomena in light of current transformations is under way. One hopes that the political disciplines will contribute their share to this long overdue imperative of catching up with emerging realities.

These three books leave room for optimism in this respect. They depart from the premise that attempts to theorize the shape of political things to come (in both domestic and international arenas) that fail to take into account the power of nationhood and the desire for ethnic survival are not seriously coping with the issues and challenges at hand. "Nationalism" says Birch "is the most successful ideology in human history" (p. 3). Mayall agrees, adding that "there is no immediate prospect of transcending the national idea, either as the principle of legitimisation or as the basis of political organization of the modern state" (p. 145). And yet, as Ryan insists (Birch and Mayall would certainly concur), "realistic analysis . . . has to start with the realisation that multi-ethnic states [as opposed to nation-states] are likely to continue to be a feature of politics both within and between sovereign states" (p. 174).

Within this common framework, the authors approach their subject with different, yet complementary, empirical and theoretical concerns. At the empirical level, Mayall opts for an open, illustrative approach; and Birch's meticulous case studies of the United Kingdom, Australia, and Canada provide a counterpoint to Ryan's selective concern with deeply divided politics such as Cyprus, Lebanon, Palestine, Northern Ireland, and Sri Lanka. At the theoretical level, Birch's methodical reexamination of the problematic nexus between nationalism and national integration and Mayall's innovative effort to bring together the concepts of nationalism and international society result in exclusive preoccupations with the domestic and international settings, respectively. Although accenting the international dimension, Ryan's more eclectic thoretical approach to the problem of ethnic conflict resolution highlights the need to transcend intrastate versus interstate distinctions when exploring contemporary ethnic and national dynamics.

Each of these books presents and defends an interesting thesis with significant policy implications. Acknowledging the magnitude of the challenge posed by minority nationalist movements, Birch nonetheless posits that the nation-state is not seriously threatened by either secessionist movements or supranational organizations. "The fact is"—says Birch in a statement that seems conspicuously less than factual today—"that in the contemporary world the great majority of national governments are too powerful for minority nationalist movements to have much real chance of success" (p. 229). Moreover, the nation-state is recognized as an institution that "has brought great benefits to mankind" (p. 221). On account of both practical and normative considerations, national integration is hence identified as a viable, if problematic, strategy for governments facing serious problems of system maintenance.

Mayall's thesis, which addresses the international society dimension, is largely consistent with Birch's basic arguments, situating them in broader historical and theoretical context. Without minimizing the magnitude and impact of the challenge posed by the "national idea" to the idea of international (i.e., interstate) society as codified at Westphalia in 1648, Mayall submits that the traditional model proved much stronger than the forces of nationalism arrayed against it. Nationalists, says Mayall, "were more often forced to accommodate their own plans to the existing structure, than they were able to rebuild the international system in their own image" (p. 27). Echoing Birch's position, Mayall concludes, however, that "the nation-state (or the would-be nation-state) remains the basic political unit" (p. 152).

In presenting these prudent views, both Birch and Mayall resort to the typical realist rhetorical move of locating such problems as nationalism, "in the world as it is, rather than the world as it might be" (Birch, 34; Mayall, 152). It is, however, precisely the willingness to venture down the speculative road of "the world as it might be" that renders Ryan's thesis particularly intriguing. Like the other two authors, Ryan has no illusions about the prospects of departing from "statist approaches to ethnic issues in a world that is still dominated by states" (p. 178). Yet, in notable distinction from his colleagues, he insists that "a move away from the concept of the nation state in favor of separation of the nation and the state and . . . a combination of the denationalization of the state and the deinternationalization of ethnic conflict do seem to offer the best hope for the creation of peaceful . . . multi-ethnic societies, and therefore a more stable . . . international system" (p. 181).

In summing, these are three welcome contributions to the revitalized social science dialogue on ethnicity and nationalism. Birch lucidly covers mostly familiar territory to remind us of the theoretical promise still held by the increasingly besieged concept of national integration. Ryan, in a study deliberately intended to be provocative rather than definitive, energetically starts the urgent task of reversing the bizarre and intolerable neglect of ethnicity and nationalism by mainstream international relations theory. Finally, Mayall makes, in my view, a seminal contribution to international relations theory by convincingly situating nationalism within the purview of ever more sophisticated inquiries of international society.

At minimum, these volumes hint at the major contribution that the political fields may make by further elucidating how current transformations could not only change the political map of the world but also alter our notions of sovereignty and nationhood. They certainly reflect a growing recognition among political analysts of the need to move from ethnicity-and-nationalism-free to ethnicity-and-nationalism-characterized versions of modernity.

YOSEF LAPID

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Three-Way Street: Strategic Reciprocity in World Politics. By Joshua S. Goldstein and John R. Freeman. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990. 239p. $29.95 cloth, $11.95 paper.

Triads reign supreme in this analysis of three bilateral relationships involving three countries—the United States, the Soviet Union, and the People's Republic of China—since 1948. Goldstein and Freeman synthesize game-theoretic, psychological, and quantitative-empirical approaches. Methodologically, they rely on an integration of statistical analysis, a simulation, and case studies. They utilize three data sets of events: Conflict and Peace Data Bank (COPDAB), the World events Interaction Survey (WEIS), and data generated by Richard Ashley for his *Political Economy of War and Peace* (1980). The authors offer (fittingly) three major concluding policy recommendations. Policy makers should (1) use sustainable cooperative initiatives, (2) try to respond in kind to every cooperative initiative, and (3) seek to change harmful psychological images and negative expectations.

Goldstein and Freeman point out that game-theoretic approaches (especially in Axelrod), psychological approaches (especially the graduated reciprocation in tension reduction strategy as presented by Osgood), and quantitative-empirical approaches as exemplified by Richardsonian arms race models all emphasize the dangers of escalating hostilities and the benefits of cooperative foreign policy initiatives. Goldstein and Freeman urge not only surprise cooperative initiatives but sustained cooperative behavior even in the face of substantial, sustained hostility in order to overcome bureaucratic inertia. The book's major thesis, then, advocates a kind of golden rule of foreign policy making: Do unto others as you would have them do unto you and keep on doing it even if they do not respond in kind—even for quite a while.

The persuasive power of this thesis is diminished by some flaws revealed in the course of its development. Goldstein and Freeman generate monthly indexes of net cooperation based on their three data sets and find that only one of the correlations involving the United States is above .70, and 7 out of 12 are below .50. The authors argue that these low correlations indicate that the data sets are not redundant. But surely three measures of the same phenomenon would ideally produce more similar results. Also, statistical analyses by Goldstein and Freeman reveal only relatively brief periods of stable results, which are different (and not necessarily overlapping) for each data set. The authors make the generally valid point that data of low quality are likely to mask relationships that actually exist, rather than produce invalid positive results. But does that generally valid point hold up in the face of a flexible, powerful statistical tool like vector autoregression, as well as the flexibility and room for experimentation resulting from the authors' utilization of different time lags for each of the data sets? A skeptic might suspect that vector autoregression, applied with numerous lags to carefully selected time periods of flexible length could generate "stable" and "significant" results with almost any data set.

There is a roughly analogous problem with the case studies presented by Goldstein and Freeman. In general, I think careful analysis of single cases to complement aggregate data analyses is a good idea. Yet it is clear that most cases can be made to appear to conform to Goldstein and Freeman's rather general models rather easily with a judicious selection and weighting of events and time periods.

Even so, it is unlikely that the relationships reported in this book are statistical artifacts. Each of the three countries analyzed has probably been more likely to be the target of cooperative acts during and shortly after times when it has acted in a cooperative manner than at other times. But have cooperative initiatives caused cooperative responses, or have periods of reciprocal cooperation been brought about primarily by changes in the structure of the relationships or in the international systemic environment (e.g., the death of Stalin) or by increased hostility from some third party?

Policy makers may find *Three-Way Street* too accepting of the assumption that cooperation in general is often a high priority goal. Unilateral, unreciprocated persistent cooperation may well eventually be rewarded with cooperative responses; but policy makers may well wonder *cooperation with what?* When the Chinese crack down on Tiananmen Square or the Soviets threaten the Baltics (or Iraq threatens Kuwait), is a surprising, unilateral cooperative move the best strategy? Cooperative responses might be forthcoming but might also be irrelevant to the problem at hand.

Nevertheless, *Three-Way Street* is a conscientious imaginative effort to synthesize diverse theoretical, methodological, and epistemological approaches in a comprehensive analysis of relationships between three of the most important states in the world today. It should be of interest to students, as well as to policy-oriented and academic professionals.

JAMES LEE RAY

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Saving the Mediterranean: The Politics of International Environmental Cooperation. By Peter M. Haas. New York: Columbia University Press, 1990. 303p. $42.00.

Concern over international environmental problems has grown dramatically in recent years as scientists warn of the potentially disastrous consequences of human-induced "global environmental change," in particular those related to depletion of the stratospheric ozone layer, global climate change, and deforestation in tropical areas. Addressing these problems that transcend international boundaries and involve open-access common resources, such as the oceans and atmosphere, will require a high level of cooperation among nation-states that all too frequently have asserted their prerogatives of sovereignty on environmental matters.

Peter Haas's book is a significant recent addition to a burgeoning scholarly literature on the politics of international environmental cooperation. It contributes to the field in several roles—as a case study of the Mediterranean Action Plan (the Med Plan), one of the more interesting and successful examples of regional environmental cooperation; as a test of several theoretical approaches for explaining the creation and success of international regimes; as a study of the role of scientific communities in the development and implementation of international public policy; and, finally, as a discussion of the larger issue of whether a new "international public order for the environment" is evolving that can effectively address the even more challenging global environmental predicament that humankind faces.

The Med Plan, which was facilitated by the United Nations Environment Programme, is an intriguing case study in international environmental cooperation because of the obstacles that had to be overcome. The 16 states that became parties include highly industrialized European countries with markedly different priorities from those of less developed African states. Several states had long histories of hostile relationships, such as Greece and Turkey, as well as Israel and its Arab neighbors. Furthermore, the waters of the Mediterranean have been contaminated by a wide array of pollutants from a variety of sources, most notably dumping from oil tankers and other vessels, municipal sewage, agricultural run-off, and industrial effluents. Haas presents a detailed history of the Med Plan from the emergence of concern about the deteriorating condition of the Mediterranean, through the negotiations on the framework Barcelona Convention of 1975 and supplemental protocols, to the implementation of the agreement by the participating states.

Haas compares the capacity of three theories of international cooperation to explain the development of the Med Plan. He concludes that neither realist-neorealist theory nor historical materialism offers very plausible explanation for the success the Mediterranean countries have had in reaching agreement on how to stem pollution of their common body of water. He instead attributes the accomplishment of the Med Plan primarily to the fact that it was "deftly masterminded and guided" by an international group of scientific knowledge-brokers he refers to as an *epistemic community* (p. 216). An epistemic community is comprised of professionals from both inside and outside of government who share common beliefs about cause-and-effect relationships, as well as similar value orientations, leading them to draw similar conclusions about the appropriate policy responses to the problems that concern them.

The book is perhaps most notable for calling attention to the role the scientific community can play in international policy processes. Among other recent books on this subject are E. B. Haas's *When Knowledge Is Power* (1990) and Steinar Andresen and Willy Østreng's edited *International Resource Management* (1989). While Peter Haas is not the originator of the term *epistemic community*, his writings are largely responsible for its recent rise to prominence in the lexicon of theory and research on international organization. In *Saving the Mediterranean*, he not only elaborates further on the meaning of the concept but also offers numerous insights on factors that contributed to the impact of the community on the process of developing the Med Plan.

While Haas is quite persuasive in documenting his conclusions regarding the critical impact of the epistemic community in the case of the Med Plan, he is less convincing in appraising the implications of the Mediterranean case study for international cooperation on other environmental problems. With any case study, the question arises whether it is typical of the universe of potential cases or interested the researcher because of its unusual or unique features. The value of Haas's book would have been greater had he done more to compare the Mediterranean case to other international problems, with an eye to factors that might have a bearing on the roles that epistemic communities will be able to play. It would be interesting to contrast the Med Plan with one or more cases in which there was no operative epistemic community.

Haas's study of the Med Plan is commendable for the extensiveness of the primary research. More than 90 interviews were conducted with scientists and officials of national governments and international organizations. This type of qualitative, case study research has become increasingly fashionable in the study of international regimes. Richard E. Benedick's *Ozone Diplomacy* (1991) is another example, albeit one written by a key diplomatic participant in the negotiations. Open-ended elite interviews are a valuable technique for gaining insights into "what really happened" and "why it happened," but some will question the objectivity and replicability of the observations and conclusions that result.

In the future, Haas's readable book may be widely regarded as a seminal work on the subject of science and international public policy. Even in the year since publication, the book has provoked considerable discussion, mostly on the usefulness of the concept *epistemic community.* It will be remembered more as a concept-introducing and issue-raising work than as a definitive study on the impact of epistemic communities. Haas's writings on epistemic communities will undoubtedly spawn other case studies that look at the role of scientists in facilitating international cooperation. It remains to be seen, however, whether the epistemic community concept will continue to shape inquiry on this subject or be set aside as lacking meaning and explanatory power in other contexts.

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Deadly Dilemmas: Deterrence in U.S. Nuclear Strategy. By James H. Lebovic. New York: Columbia University Press, 1990. 252p. $38.00.

Analyzing Strategic Nuclear Policy. By Charles L. Glaser. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990. 378p. $45.00 cloth, $16.95 paper.

Both of these thoughtful books are vitally concerned with investigating the central security dilemma of post–World War II U.S. foreign policy, *strategic nuclear deterrence.* While each approaches the subject differently, each is imposing in its critique.

The volume by Lebovic is reminiscent of earlier sturdy polemics, such as Philip Green's *Deadly Logic* (1966) and Robert Jervis's *Illogic of American Nuclear Strategy* (1984). Through an impressive examination of postwar strategic nuclear literature, Lebovic takes aim at what he contends is the "failure" of U.S. nuclear strategy, that is, the "disjuncture between strategy and practice" (p. 1). Calling upon insights into foreign policy goal formation that flow from studies in cognitive psychology, Lebovic argues that the concrete has dominated the abstract in the making of strategic policy, often leaving such policy unclear, inconsistent, and incoherent. Indeed, he levels these charges against all three major "schools" of strategic thought (as he identifies them): assured destruction, pure war-fighting, and political war-fighting.

The central portion of Lebovic's book is dedicated to a detailed analysis of each of these intellectual approaches against four principal elements of strategic thought: strategic capability measurement, action aspects of strategic thought, strategic objectives and concepts of intent, and rational and nonrational processes of nuclear deterrence. While one or another of these strategic nuclear schools sometimes suffers more profoundly from his rigorous analysis, none escapes his ultimate criticisms.

The "debilitating intellectual tensions" that each of these schools exhibit, writes Lebovic, cannot provide a consistently logical guide for national policy makers (p. 186). This assertion is not merely a depressing thought; it is also fraught with apocalyptic dangers when one considers the potential failure of deterrence. The lack of a consistently logical abstract framework means that policy makers necessarily cling to concrete realities, such as military capabilities. Yet such an intellectual embrace elevates technology to a point where it becomes an end in itself.

As one might expect, Lebovic finds it easier to criticize current policy than to find a logical substitute. Yet, to be fair to the author, his is not to establish a guide for present policy but to point out its shortcomings and to provide what he terms "crude guidelines" for policy makers (p. 196). His major concern is that policy makers not "mistake the tidy world of strategy for the real world" (p. 196).

The Glaser book calls itself "a comprehensive analysis of the basic issues of American nuclear strategy and force requirements" (p. 3) and is organized into three major parts. First, he examines what he calls the "questions behind the questions," or the underlying intellectual bases, of policy differences. It is Glaser's contention that strategic nuclear policies abound in disputes because basic premises differ. While policy disagreements appear to be found in the policy options presented, Glaser argues that the actual disagreements are more deep-seated, rooted in fundamental beliefs and principles.

Second, Glaser reviews "alternative nuclear worlds," that is, alternatives to mutual assured destruction (MAD). He finds each of them less desirable than MAD itself, arguing that such possibilities as arms competition, crisis instability, and the potential for war are more to be feared in these alternative visions than in MAD.

Finally, Glaser examines "decisions in MAD," that is, policy choices within MAD itself (based on the author's contention that MAD is a condition, not a strategy). His conclusions are principally two: that the United States should not attempt to escape from MAD and even reject attempts to do so and that the United States should then commit itself to renouncing counterforce nuclear strategies because these, rather than make deterrence more sturdy, would undermine it. Thus, he counsels the United States to reject the notion of perfect ballistic missile defense, as well as such obvious counterforce systems as highly accurate ballistic missiles.

Some readers may observe that the Glaser book exhibits a few of the tendencies so aptly critiqued in the Lebovic book. Yet Glaser is clearly aware of the underlying structures of arguments that produce differences in preferred policies. Glaser's preferences are obvious—he is unabashedly an assured destructionist. Lebovic cannot be so easily pigeonholed.

Both of these volumes contribute importantly to a serious subject and deserve to be read widely. Glaser's contribution is to illuminate current debates surrounding the issue of a defense-based nuclear policy versus an offense-based approach. Lebovic's contribution is to force one to think more rigorously about the logic of deterrence itself. For this reason, the latter volume makes a more important theoretical contribution.

GARY J. BUCKLEY

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Reconstructing Consensus: American Foreign Policy since the Vietnam War. By Richard A. Melanson. New York: St. Martin's, 1990. 248p. $59.95 cloth, $13.00 paper.

Faces of Internationalism: Public Opinion and American Foreign Policy. By Eugene R. Wittkopf. Durham: Duke University Press, 1990. 391p. $75.00 cloth, $24.95 paper.

The breakdown of consensus on U.S. foreign policy after the Vietnam War is the starting point for both of these books. Moreover, both Melanson and Wittkopf accept the same ideological interpretation of fissure in foreign policy beliefs since the Vietnam War. This interpretation, first developed by Mandelbaum and Schneider in Oye, Rothshild, and Lieber's edited *Eagle Entangled* (1979), holds that the war, in conjunction with other events, caused traditional internationalism to split into a more conservative, Republican, competitive internationalism and a more liberal, Democratic, cooperative internationalism. *Faces of Internationalism* examines the empirical evidence for this bifurcation and its implications for our understanding of public opinion and foreign policy; *Reconstructing Consensus* explores the efforts of the post-Vietnam presidents to overcome this ideological split and build public support for their foreign policies.

The Wittkopf book examines in detail the quadrennial public surveys and elite interviews conducted for the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations (CCFR) from 1974 to 1986. In a series of brief, well-organized chapters, Wittkopf skillfully presents the evidence for bifurcation in both mass and elite attitudes since the Vietnam War. Although Wittkopf has already published a number of articles on this data, the book develops its thesis in a new and engaging way. The author derives four faces or types of internationalism from his *militant* and *cooperative* internationalism dimensions. Each face represents individuals who share a unique combination of beliefs on his two dimensions. Wittkopf's central theme is that the ideological split on the *militant* dimension in both the mass and elite populations has left the nation badly divided over *how* we ought to conduct foreign policy. At the same time, he indicates that the *cooperative* dimension (which measures *whether* we ought to be actively involved in international affairs and on which there was supposedly a wide consensus before the Vietnam War) is more widely shared by elites than it is by the masses.

The Wittkopf book is exceptionally well written, and his empirical findings are carefully linked to important questions of theory and practice. Wittkopf's thorough documentation of his empirical work does not interrupt the flow of his arguments; it is located in one hundred pages of appendices. In the closing chapters and an epilogue Wittkopf supplements his analysis of the CCFR data with other data. He bolsters his thesis by comparing similarly worded questions in public opinion polls taken since World War II and includes research he conducted with James M. McCormick on the breakdown in bipartisan voting in the Congress from 1947 through 1986. He also examines the 1987–88 data from 12 public opinion surveys conducted by the Americans Talk Security project.

The main problem with the book is that the factors he develops do not accurately reflect either the individual questions asked respondents or the descriptions associated with dimensions later in the analysis. For this reason the factors take on different meanings throughout the narrative. One could argue, for example, that his *cooperative* internationalism dimension is a better measure of cooperation and multilateralism than of internationalism (cf. Figures 3.1 and 3.5). Yet, Wittkopf mentions this *cooperative* dimension repeatedly when referring to internationalism-isolationism and uses the second, *militant* internationalism dimension to measure accommodation.

Although Wittkopf's methods of analysis contribute to this confusion, they are not the main culprit, because others, using different techniques, have made similar errors (e.g., Mandelbaum and Schneider 1979; and Holsti and Rosenau's *American Leadership and World Affairs* [1984]). In my view, the main problem lies in the fact that these studies are data-driven, rather than rooted in some concept of the basic questions of foreign policy. The most important, general findings of the book, however—namely, that the beliefs of both mass and elite populations are highly structured and that these beliefs, in turn, are significantly related to individuals' policy preferences and performance evaluations—are still valid.

The Melanson book is less concerned with documenting the lack of public consensus on foreign policy than with explaining how successive presidents sought to overcome it. Indeed, one possible shortcoming is that it does not address the question of what efforts presidents make to define this lack of consensus. For example, there is no discussion on what use, if any, various administrations may have made of public opinion polls to help them in this regard (see Graham, "The Politics of Failure" 1989). This omission does not detract, however, from the primary purpose of the book, which is to explain the public diplomacy of presidents seeking broader support for their foreign policies.

Melanson contends that "domestic priorities" and "perceived problems of governance" determine what grand designs, strategic objectives, and tactics presidents employ to legitimize their foreign policies. Using a common framework, Melanson first describes the public diplomacy of each president and then assesses the success or failure of each in achieving substantive, cultural, and procedural consensus. The Melanson book, too, is very well written and effectively recreates the domestic and international setting in which these strategies are developed. The author relies primarily on the public record (especially presidential speeches) to show how each president tries to build public support for his foreign policies. He seems to treat each of the presidents covered fairly, although most attention is devoted to Nixon, Carter, and Reagan.

One of the strengths of the Melanson book is the extent to which he relies on public rhetoric to substantiate his interpretation of each president's foreign policy. The fact that he has conducted interviews with those who should know the intents and purposes of the presidents they served adds credibility to these interpretations. Melanson does not offer alternative interpretations, however, so we are left wondering what other explications might account for some of the same facts. This weakness can be turned into a strength for those who are interested in using this book as a text. Students can first use Melanson's framework to study the cases covered in the book and then either develop different interpretations of the Nixon, Carter, and Reagan administrations—or develop their own interpretations of the Ford and Bush administrations'—foreign policies.

WILLIAM O. CHITTICK

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Controlling the Sword: The Democratic Governance of National Security. By Bruce Russett. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1990. 201p. $22.50.

Bruce Russett has written an interesting and challenging short book on the relationship between public opinion and national security policy, continuing and enriching a long debate about the role of public opinion in a democracy going back at least as far as Walter Lippman's *Public Opinion* (1922). Russett correctly characterizes *Controlling the Sword* as an "interpretive essay" (p. 3); and he manages to weave a modest amount of empirical data throughout his interpretation of the many issues concerning the role and effect of public opinion on a nation's foreign policy.

Russett clearly takes the position that public opinion is frequently important and vital and attempts to debunk three common myths about its role: that the public is too confused and ignorant about national security issues truly to play a role; that it is easily manipulated; and that it is volatile, swinging back and forth between "indifference and hysteria" (p. 2).

He covers the standard subjects about the relation between the economy and public opinion and the fact that the public tends usually toward a "centrist" attitude (he makes the interesting argument that this "rewards leaders for taking actions, within that spectrum, that were not to be anticipated from those leaders' earlier words and acts," p. 19) and focuses extensively on the peaceful and/or bellicose tendencies of democracies and whether greater "democratization" in the world might make the international system less prone to violence and war.

Debunking the myth of volatility, Russett contends that the public is interested in foreign issues when it has "the greatest potential for affecting them and have sensibly turned their major interest to other matters . . . whose impact on their well-being was greater during periods of relative international quiet" (p. 91). While he cites several studies indicating, on the whole, relative stability in broad-based surveys with numerous questions, we also know that in the short term some specific and at times important items undergo radical shifts. Attitudes in 1980 and 1981, for instance, shifted markedly as a result of the Afghanistan invasion and the Iranian hostage situation. Perhaps the most recent example is what appears to be a sudden shift in major attitudes as a result of the Persian Gulf crisis in mid-1990.

Russett spends a great deal of time on the link between democracy and war, a subject of great recent interest in the major journals; but his results are a bit confusing, though this might be a function of confusion concerning which dependent variable is being considered. In chapter 2, for instance, he notes that his discussion should not be read as indicating that democracies are more likely to engage in either war or lesser forms of conflict than nondemocracies and asserts that the type of political system is generally unrelated (citing only R. J. Rummel as a dissenter). In chapter 5 he produces slightly different conclusions; but he argues there that periods of peace within the system as a whole tend to coincide with periods when democratic rule reigned.

Russett admits that there are some "disturbing implications about the difficulties of conducting national security policy in a democracy" (p. 49). The fact that the timing of international disputes is related to both domestic economic conditions and to the election cycle presents perhaps the most serious situation because it is at those times, he argues, that the interest of the elites, rather than the so-called "national interests," may be the driving force behind national security policy. It is perhaps at this point that Russett's positive view about public opinion becomes most problematic, for he admits that the elites have a clear interest in keeping themselves in power. While the underlying tone of the book, therefore, is that public opinion drives policy—and evidence exists to support that—Russett also admits the possibility of the counterargument that policy makers (i.e., candidates) purposely ascertain the desires of the public and pander to them, resulting in public opinion that then supports the policies. If this is true and if it is more likely to be true so in the modern era of sophisticated polling, the role of "public opinion" takes on a quite different cast.

A small number of methodological issues are troublesome. For instance, several figures on public opinion show multiyear gaps in the data (especially in chapter 3) simply because the questions were not asked consistently. Suggesting trends, patterns, or shifts from such data is problematic. Second, some confusion arises in terms of the "fickleness" question. Russett contends that the "mood theory" was in essence destroyed by Caspary, Shapiro, and Page and that opinion stability is the rule. Yet several figures (especially Figure 4.1 on the percentage identifying foreign affairs as the most important problem), suggest clear shifts in "moods" that more or less match similar shifts suggested by Frank Klingberg over the years and supported by other data.

Russett also argues that China and the Soviet Union "appear to constitute a case in which attitude changes [toward them] generally follow major policy shifts" (p. 101). Yet survey data between 1950 and 1972 show that while citizens by and large opposed China's admission to the United Nations, more and more citizens slowly shifted in favor of it, with the crossover occurring one month before President Nixon's announcement in 1971 about his trip to China in the following year.

Despite these problems, Russett has certainly presented a concise and very readable synopsis—with interesting data—concerning the role of public opinion in formulating national security policy and outlined very clearly not only the dangers of public opinion in a democracy but also the real positive possibilities. He has not ended the debate, but he has added to it in a clear and concise fashion. The book should be required reading in any course on public opinion.

MICHAEL P. SULLIVAN

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More Than Altruism: The Politics of Private Foreign Aid. By Brian H. Smith. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990. 352p. $37.50.

Brian Smith has written a fascinating book on an underresearched topic. With a clear design and solid empirical base, he explores the nature of the complex networks that channel private voluntary aid from the United States, Europe, and Canada to developing countries. Although much of his fieldwork on the recipient end was undertaken in Latin America (especially Colombia), the author obviously expects his conclusions to have broader applicability. Be that as it may, they will indeed interest a wide-ranging audience from policy makers and others involved in those networks to scholars in various disciplines (e.g., development studies, sociology of contemporary religion, comparative politics, public policy, and international relations).

Six major sets of participants, mostly nonunitary actors, comprise the nonofficial foreign aid networks described and analyzed in this book: (1) private donors, (2) home governments, (3) nonprofit agencies, (4) agencies inside recipient countries, (5) host governments, and (6) grass-roots beneficiaries. Having concentrated his examination on established nonprofit agencies, some of which are generally associated with left-of-center social agendas emphasizing human rights, wealth redistribution, and the like, the author highlights the tensions, or "paradoxes" (p. 7), that arise when those agencies attempt to move beyond a simple intermediary role. The vivid portrait he paints in this regard depicts the managers of those agencies walking very fine lines between the sensitivities of donors, the foreign policies of home governments, the idealism of agency staffs, the sovereign prerogatives and ambivalent objectives of host governments, and the short- and long-term needs of ultimate recipients.

At the core of the book lies the argument that agenda differences among network participants, though very real, have not usually been transparent enough to outweigh shared or overlapping interests. The delicacy of the balance between those agendas, however, renders private aid networks unstable (pp. 21, 281). For example, many "private" agencies in fact now depend on significant amounts of funding from home governments that in turn have come to rely on those agencies for efficient distribution and effective targeting—reducing which dependence would risk reducing already-limited aid flows. At the same time, efforts by home governments to maximize the potential influence implied by public subsidies run the risk of compromising subtle policy aims. Inside recipient countries, moreover, attempts by agencies to promote "latent" agendas of social reform risk alienating those governments that control access to ultimate beneficiaries, while decisions not to confront structural factors in some fashion may prevent aid from getting at root problems. In the end, the author contends, an "underlying rationality" and a necessary vagueness of purpose keep the private networks in operation (p. 279).

Beyond tracing the historical context of the consequent dilemmas facing nonprofit agencies and offering sophisticated theoretical hypotheses to explain their changing contemporary functions, Smith assesses differences in the home environments and strategic emphases of nonprofit agencies, with U.S. agencies concentrating on traditional relief operations and European and Canadian agencies moving increasingly into various forms of technical assistance and institution building within host countries (pp. 24, 111, 148). Such comparisons—and a survey of their possible causes and effects—also lead the author to probe the larger theoretical question of the impact of private aid networks on the conventional understanding of the sovereignty of states. On this score, his Latin American data provide little support for the view that private aid flows—even from latently reformist agencies—present a serious threat to established political and economic orders within recipient countries. (Ironically, the evidence is quite to the contrary.) Nor do they provide support for the assertion that the principle of state sovereignty is eroding within donor countries (pp. 25, 276).

The durability and future growth of private aid networks depends, the author concludes, on the willingness of agencies to follow "tacit rules" that restrain latent agendas. The major threat to their future, he believes, comes not from insecure governments within recipient countries but from potentially devastating attacks by politically powerful groups threatened by those agendas within donor countries (p. 282). Throughout the book, the author refers obliquely to the increasingly prominent activities of such groups, especially in the United States—sometimes including the establishment of alternative networks for channeling private funds and opposing agendas abroad. He explicitly declines to attempt in this study to extend the analysis to cover these. This task, as well as a comparative examination of the case of Japan, could usefully be undertaken by scholars able to bring the same rigor, sensitivity, and objectivity to bear that Smith demonstrates in this first-rate volume.

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The Limits of Alliance: NATO Out-of-Area Problems since 1949. By Douglas Stuart and William Tow. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1990. 383p. $42.50.

Many studies finished before the momentous changes in the Soviet bloc that occurred in 1990 will end up being judged by their ability to take account of events outside their original purview. Douglas Stuart and William Tow's analysis of NATO out-of-area disputes since 1949 falls into this category. Although the huge changes that have occurred recently were not foreseen by the authors, the usefulness of the book will hinge not only on its analysis of the past but also on its ability to make sense of the problems NATO faces today. Stuart and Tow's argument in this book forces them to join the pessimists about the potential for stability in the post–Cold War world.

In *The Limits of Alliance*, Stuart and Tow explore the ability of the NATO structure to respond to out-of-area disputes. The authors rest their assumptions on Glenn Snyder's analysis of alliances ("The Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics," *World Politics* 1984), which argues that alliance members bring both general interests (based on the structure of the international system and the geographical position of the state) and particular interests (which reflect the unique historical, ideological, and geostrategic circumstances) to bear on alliance behavior. The stability of the alliance depends on the factors that determine the general interests of the alliance. In the case of NATO, the tight bipolar system and clear common threat from the Soviet Union would be expected to lead to stability in the alliance as a whole. Conflict within the alliance would most likely occur over idiosyncratic particular interests.

The authors demonstrate that although a much wider formulation of NATO purpose was considered, the construction of the treaty reflected the general interest Snyder predicts. Everyone could agree on the necessity of deterring Soviet aggression in Europe, and this became the central feature of the NATO agreement. The possibility of countering aggression in areas outside Europe, often in the particular interests of some countries, was more ad hoc. The degree to which NATO countries have participated in the resolution of out-of-area threats has been more dependent on idiosyncratic political circumstances that have influenced attempts at cooperation. Often, out-of-area problems that could not elicit cooperation have been resolved through unilateral action by the affected country or countries.

The book examines the history of out-of-area disputes in sections on the United States, Britain, France, and other NATO members, respectively. It provides a general overview of the major out-of-area problems in the last three decades, particularly the Suez Crisis, the French in Algeria, and the United States in Vietnam. The lack of detail on these cases may confuse readers who have no background in these affairs, but there are ample notes for those willing to do more reading.

In recommending strategies for NATO's agenda in the 1990s, Stuart and Tow advise against widening NATO's areas of concern. Of course, this recommendation was given before the recent events in the Soviet bloc that promise to make the traditional core of NATO concern less relevant. Thus, despite the author's advice, we will probably see more and more NATO action pertaining to out-of-area problems. Under these circumstances, Stuart and Tow's argument would predict less staying power for the alliance.

The degree of cooperation witnessed in the Persian Gulf War would seem to be an anomalous case for Stuart and Tow. They would have to argue that the cooperative effort in the Persian Gulf was a product of particular political circumstances that enhanced the possibilities for unity. Without similar political circumstances, Stuart and Tow would have to expect future cooperative efforts within NATO over problems of this sort to prove more difficult.

This argument places Stuart and Tow on the pessimistic side of the debate over stability in the post-Cold War world, assuming, of course, that NATO stability is important for international stability (see Mearsheimer's *International Security* 14 [1990] and the responses by Hoffmann, Keohane, Russett, and Risse-Kappen in the Fall and Winter editions). The next decade should provide an ample test of their conclusions. Meanwhile, the book provides a general overview for those interested in out-of-area problems since 1949.

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The World in Their Minds: Information Processing, Cognition, and Perception in Foreign Policy Decisionmaking. By Yaacov Y. I. Vertzberger. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1990. 464p. $42.50.

Over the past two decades a great deal of research has been focused on the systematic characteristics of human error. These studies, largely concentrated in psychology and organizational behavior, treat humans not as omniscient and calculating rational actors but, rather, as beings with limited information-processing capability, possessed of an uncanny ability to make unjustified inferences in disastrously inopportune circumstances and beset by a variety of historical, emotional, cognitive, and organizational blinders. This picture of decision making, while less flattering to humankind than the earlier Progressive image of the perfectible political actor, explains a great deal of historical misfortune as the result of simple stupidity, rather than dishonesty or evil intention.

Vertzberger's *World in Their Minds* is an ambitious and virtually encyclopedic survey of this literature. The book systematically reviews the cognitive and information-processing literature at levels ranging from individual cognition and psychology to organizational and small-group effects to the broad influences of culture, language, and history. In undertaking this task, Vertzberger explicitly rejects what he considers "unidimensional" explanations, such as Lebow's emphasis on misperception in crisis or George's emphasis on the individual. Instead, the entire range of individual and organizational information processing is considered, as well as the decision-making milieu.

This comprehensive approach is both the primary strength and weakness of the book. The book is virtually exhaustive in scope and provides extensive bibliographic references, so it is an excellent review of the problems encountered in human decision making. The weakness of such an approach, however, lies in the inability of the human mind to cope with such a large amount of information: Vertzberger does not provide the focus found, for example, in Janis's *Groupthink* (1982) or Allison's *Essence of Decision* (1971). Similarly, the final chapter on practical policy implications is less satisfying than the earlier catalog of potential problems.

Two historical examples of flawed decision making are used throughout the book to illustrate the relevant points—the United States intervention in Vietnam and the failure of Israel to anticipate the joint attack by Egypt and Syria in October 1973. These cases are supplemented by a variety of additional examples such as Operation Barbarossa, Korea, the Sino-Indian conflict in 1962, the Cuban Missile Crisis, and Nasser's miscalculations in 1967. While the Vietnam material will be largely familiar to U.S. readers, the 1973 Israeli situation is less well studied; and Vertzberger's analysis, using Israeli source material, provides some interesting insights.

The penultimate chapter, on the use of history by foreign policy decision makers acting as "practical-intuitive historians," is in many ways the most original part of the book, since it is less dependent on the existing psychological and organizational literature. Vertzberger reaches many of the same conclusions as Neustadt and May's *Thinking in Time* (1986), though the two works were written independently; Vertzberger's treatment is also both shorter and more theoretical than Neustadt and May.

Any book of this breadth will overreach in a few places, and this one is no exception. For example, a rather extensive analysis of the cognitive problems induced by aging (pp. 183–85) seems less well supported than some other observations, though it does briefly note the possibility that these have social, rather than physiological, sources. The apparent cognitive inflexibility of older individuals must be balanced against their greater store of experience: whatever problems age may have contributed to the decision making of Lyndon Johnson or Ronald Reagan, the youthful enthusiasm of Kennedy's "Whiz Kids" and the naïveté of Oliver North also left a bit to be desired in a foreign policy setting.

In summary, Vertzberger has presented a comprehensive survey of the existing psychological and organizational information-processing literature as it applies to foreign policy decision making and has illustrated this amply with historical examples. For those unfamiliar with this literature, it would make a splendid introduction; for those who are familiar with it, the book provides a useful review and reference.

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INDEX TO VOLUME 85

INDEX TO VOLUME 85

Aberbach, Joel D. *Keeping a Watchful Eye: The Politics of Congressional Oversight.* Reviewed by Diana Evans. 628
Abramowitz, Alan I., *see* Rapoport, Ronald B. 193
Abramson, Jeffrey B., F. Christopher Arterton, and Gary R. Orren. *The Electronic Commonwealth: The Impact of New Media Technologies on Democratic Politics.* Reviewed by Jong O. Ra. 291
Abramson, Paul R., and Charles W. Ostrom, Jr. "Macropartisanship: An Empirical Reassessment." 181
Adams, Ian. *The Logic of Political Belief: A Philosophical Analysis of Ideology.* Reviewed by Timothy V. Kaufman-Osborn. 989
Adams, Valerie. *Chemical Warfare, Chemical Disarmament.* Reviewed by Michael M. Gunter. 679
Aho, C. Michael, and Marc Levinson. *After Reagan: Confronting the Changed World Economy.* Reviewed by Robert Ayres. 1070
Alford, C. Fred. *Melanie Klein and Critical Social Theory: An Account of Politics, Art, and Reason Based on Her Psychoanalytic Theory.* Reviewed by William R. Caspary. 257
Allard, C. Kenneth. *Command, Control, and the Common Defense.* Reviewed by Martin Edmonds. 1013
Almond, Gabriel A. *A Discipline Divided: Schools and Sects in Political Science.* Reviewed by Ada W. Finifter. 990
Almquist, Peter. *Red Forge: Soviet Military Industry since 1965.* Reviewed by Matthew Evangelista. 1433
Alvarez, R. Michael, Geoffrey Garrett, and Peter Lange. "Government Partisanship, Labor Organization, and Macroeconomic Performance." 539
Amjad, Mohammed. *Iran: From Royal Dictatorship to Theocracy.* Reviewed by Abbas Navabi. 659
Arkes, Hadley. *Beyond the Constitution.* Reviewed by Gary J. Jacobsohn. 1456
Arterton, F. Christopher, *see* Abramson, Jeffrey B. 291
Aughey, Arthur. *Under Siege: Ulster Unionism and the Anglo-Irish Agreement.* Reviewed by Charles Townshend. 324
Austen-Smith, David, and Jeffrey Banks. "Monotonicity in Electoral Systems." 531
Baker, Tod A., Charles D. Hadley, Robert P. Steed, and Laurence W. Moreland, eds. *Political Parties in the Southern States: Party Activists in Partisan Coalitions.* Reviewed by L. Sandy Maisel 1469
Baker, Tod A., *see* Steed, Robert P. 645
Ball, Terence. *Transforming Political Discourse: Political Theory and Conceptual History.* Reviewed by Tracy B. Strong. 1437
Ball, Terence, and J. G. A. Pocock, eds. *Conceptual Change and the Constitution.* Reviewed by Tracy B. Strong. 1437
Ball, Terence, James Farr, and Russell L. Hanson, eds. *Political Innovation and Conceptual Change.* Reviewed by Tracy B. Strong. 1437
Banks, Jeffrey, *see* Austen-Smith, David. 531
Baron, David P. "A Spatial Bargaining Theory of Government Formation in Parliamentary Systems." 137
Baron, Dennis. *The English-Only Question.* Reviewed by Jonathan Pool. 636
Barrow, Clyde W. *Universities and the Capitalist State: Corporate Liberalism and the Reconstruction of American Higher Education, 1894–1928.* Reviewed by Steven D. Ealy. 629
Bartels, Larry M. "Constituency Opinion and Congressional Policy Making: The Reagan Defense Buildup." 457
Bean, David R., *see* Conlon, Timothy. 280
Beissinger, Mark R. *Scientific Management, Socialist Discipline, and Soviet Power.* Reviewed by Herbert J. Ellison. 1480
Beitz, Charles R. *Political Equality: An Essay in Democratic Theory.* Reviewed by Arthur DiQuattro. 992
Bellush, Jewel, and Dick Netzer, eds. *Urban Politics: New York Style.* Reviewed by Peter J. Steinberger. 1457
Bennett, Linda L. M., and Stephen Earl Bennett. *Living with Leviathan: Americans Coming to Terms with Big Government.* Reviewed by William D. Berry. 1458
Bennett, Stephen Earl, *see* Bennett, Linda L. M. 1458
Berry, Frances Stokes, *see* Frant, Howard. 571
Berry, William, *see* Frant, Howard. 571
Beyle, Thad L., ed. *Gubernatorial Transitions: The 1983 and 1984 Elections.* Reviewed by Paul L. Hain. 279
Bialecki, Ireneusz, *see* Heyns, Barbara. 351

AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW
VOLUME 85 NO. 4 DECEMBER 1991

Bianchi, Robert. *Unruly Corporatism: Associational Life in Twentieth-Century Egypt.* Reviewed by Laurie Mylroie. 304
Birch, Anthony H. *Nationalism and National Integration.* Reviewed by Yosef Lapid. .. 1492
Bisnow, Mark. *In the Shadow of the Dome: Chronicles of a Capitol Hill Aide.* Reviewed by Jim Gimpel. 630
Blank, Robert H. *Regulating Reproduction.* Reviewed by Raymond Tatalovich. 1439
Bloom, William. *Personal Identity, National Identity, and International Relations.* Reviewed by Frederick C. Turner. 1075
Blumberg, Louis, and Robert Gottlieb. *War on Waste: Can America Win Its Battle with Garbage?* Reviewed by Christopher J. Bosso. 1014
Bolland, John, *see* Kuklinski, James H. 1341
Bond, Jon R., and Richard Fleisher. *The President in the Legislative Arena.* Reviewed by Richard A. Brody. 631
Booth, William James. "The New Household Economy." 59
Bork, Robert H. *The Tempting of America: The Political Seduction of the Law.* Reviewed by Gregory A. Caldeira. 984
Botwinick, Aryeh. *Skepticism and Political Participation.* Reviewed by Fabio B. Dasilva. 606
Boutwell, Jeffrey. *The German Nuclear Dilemma.* Reviewed by Wolfram F. Hanrieder. 1073
Bowers, James R. *Regulating the Regulators: An Introduction to the Legislative Oversight of Administrative Rulemaking.* Reviewed by Morris S. Ogul. 633
Bowman, Ann O., *see* Goggin, Malcolm L. 267
Bradshaw, Leah. *Acting and Thinking: The Political Thought of Hannah Arendt.* Reviewed by Mary G. Dietz. 259
Bremer, Stuart A., and Barry B. Hughes. *Disarmament and Development: A Design for the Future?* Reviewed by Richard J. Stoll. 681
Bremer, Stuart A., ed. *The* GLOBUS *Model: Computer Simulation of Worldwide Political and Economic Developments.* Reviewed by Richard J. Stoll. 681
Bronner, Ethan. *Battle for Justice: How the Bork Nomination Shook America.* Reviewed by Gregory A. Caldeira. 984
Bronner, Stephen Eric. *Socialism Unbound.* Reviewed by John Ehrenberg. 1042
Brown, Archie, ed. *Political Leadership in the Soviet Union.* Reviewed by John P. Willerton. 1427
Brown, Margery Hunter, *see* Lopach, James J. 294
Brown, Nathan J. *Peasant Politics in Modern Egypt: The Struggle against the State.* Reviewed by Robert Bianchi. 305
Brown, Phil, and Edwin J. Mikkelsen. *No Safe Place: Toxic Waste, Leukemia, and Community Action.* Reviewed by Charles E. Davis. 1015
Bruce, John M., John A. Clark, and John H. Kessel. "Advocacy Politics in Presidential Parties." 1089
Burns, James MacGregor, with L. Marvin Overby. *Cobblestone Leadership: Majority Rule, Minority Power.* Reviewed by Roger H. Davidson. 1459
Burton, Charles. *Political and Social Change in China since 1978.* Reviewed by David Zweig. 657

Canak, William L., ed. *Lost Promises, Debt, Austerity, and Development in Latin America.* Reviewed by Charles Lipson. 1080
Canon, David T. *Actors, Athletes, and Astronauts: Political Amateurs in the United States Congress.* Reviewed by Ross K. Baker. 1017
Carter, Stephen K. *Russian Nationalism: Yesterday, Today, and Tomorrow.* Reviewed by James Butterfield. 1481
Castles, Francis G., ed. *The Comparative History of Public Policy.* Reviewed by John Bendix. 306
Ceaser, James W. *Liberal Democracy and Political Science.* Reviewed by Thomas A. Spragens, Jr. 1440
Chalk, Frank, and Kurt Jonassohn. *The History and Sociology of Genocide: Analyses and Case Studies.* Reviewed by Roger W. Smith. 260
Charlton, Michael. *The Last Colony in Africa: Diplomacy and the Independence of Rhodesia.* Reviewed by William Cyrus Reed. 1051
Chehabi, H. E. *Iranian Politics and Religious Modernism: The Liberation Movement of Iran under the Shah and Khomeini.* Reviewed by Bahman Baktiari. 1482
Cheng, Chu-yuan. *Behind the Tiananmen Massacre: Social, Political, and Economic Ferment in China.* Reviewed by Michael D. Swaine. 663
Chilcote, Ronald H. *Power and the Ruling Classes in Northeast Brazil: Juazeiro and Petrolina in Transition.* Reviewed by Frances Hagopian. 1484
Chodak, Szymon. *The New State: Etatization of Western Societies.* Reviewed by J. Nicholas Ziegler. 308
Chubb, John E., and Terry M. Moe. *Politics, Markets, and America's Schools.* Reviewed by N. Joseph Cayer. 1034
Cimbala, Stephen J. *Uncertainty and Control: Future Soviet and American Stra-*

Index to Volume 85

tegy. Reviewed by Vaughn Altemus. 682
Clark, John A., *see* Bruce, John M. 1089
Clark, Susan L., *see* Laird, Robbin F. 658
Clark, William A. *Soviet Regional Elite Mobility after Khrushchev.* Reviewed by John P. Willerton. 1427
Clarke, Harold D., and Nitish Dutt. "Measuring Value Change in Western Industrialized Societies: The Impact of Unemployment." 905
Clarke, Harold D., Marianne C. Stewart, and Gary Zuk, eds. *Economic Decline and Political Change: Canada, Great Britain, the United States.* Reviewed by Daniel R. Pearson. 312
Clarke, James W. *On Being Mad or Merely Angry: John W. Hinkley, Jr. and Other Dangerous People.* Reviewed by David A. Rothstein. 1461
Clegg, Stewart R. *Frameworks of Power.* Reviewed by Sanford F. Schram. 262
Clemens, Walter C., Jr. *Can Russia Change? The USSR Confronts Global Interdependence.* Reviewed by Russell Bova. 658
Clinton, Robert Lowry. *Marbury v. Madison and Judicial Review.* Reviewed by Sotirios A. Barber. 634
Clow, Richmond L., see Lopach, James J. 294
Coats, A. W., *see* Colander, David. 999
Cohen, Jeffrey E., Michael A. Krassa, and John Hamman. "The Impact of Presidential Campaigning on Midterm U.S. Senate Elections." 165
Cohen, Raymond. *Culture and Conflict in Egyptian-Israeli Relations: A Dialogue of the Deaf.* Reviewed by F. Gregory Gause III. 1043
Cohn, Theodore H. *The International Politics of Agricultural Trade: Canadian-American Relations in a Global Agricultural Context.* Reviewed by H. Wayne Moyer. 332
Colander, David, and A. W. Coats, eds. *The Spread of Economic Ideas.* Reviewed by Ronald Rogowski. 999
Colburn, Forrest D. *Managing the Commanding Heights: Nicaragua's State Enterprises.* Reviewed by Matthew S. Shugart. 309
Coleman, James S. *Foundations of Social Theory.* Reviewed by J. Donald Moon. 263
Colomer, Josep M. "Transitions by Agreement: Modeling the Spanish Way." 1283
Conlon, Timothy J., Margaret T. Wrightson, and David R. Bean. *Taxing Choices: The Politics of Tax Reform.* Reviewed by James B. Greene, Jr. 280
Conover, Pamela Johnston, *see* Lodge, Milton. 1357
Conroy, W. J. *Challenging the Boundaries of Reform: Socialism in Burlington.* Reviewed by Michael Margolis. 1018
Cooper, Barry. *The Restoration of Political Science and the Crisis of Modernity.* Reviewed by Blaine Garvin. 607
Cooper, Leo. *The Political Economy of Soviet Military Power.* Reviewed by Matthew Evangelista. 1433
Cooper, Robert L. *Language Planning and Social Change.* Reviewed by Jonathan Pool. 636
Craig, Stephen C., *see* Niemi, Richard G. 1407
Crimmins, James E. *Secular Utilitarianism: Social Science and the Critique of Religion in the Thought of Jeremy Bentham.* Reviewed by Robert A. Fenn. 993
Cronin, Thomas E. *Direct Democracy: The Politics of Initiative, Referendum, and Recall.* Reviewed by Robert Benedict. 281
Curry, Jane Leftwich. *Poland's Journalists: Professionalism and Politics.* Reviewed by Paul J. Best. 1485
Cuthbertson, Ian M., and David Robertson. *Enhancing European Security: Living in a Less Nuclear World.* Reviewed by Wolfram F. Hanreider. 1073

Davidson, Chandler. *Race and Class in Texas Politics.* Reviewed by Gerry Riposa. 1019
Dawes, Robyn M., *see* McLean, Iain. 1417
Dawes, Robyn M., *see* Orbell, John. 515
Derthick, Martha. *Agency under Stress: The Social Security Administration in American Government.* Reviewed by Martin Shapiro. 1020
Desai, Padma. *Perestroika in Perspective: The Design and Dilemmas of Soviet Reform.* Reviewed by Ernest J. Wilson III. 1477
Dietz, Henry A., *see* Muller, Edward N. 1261
Dodson, Michael, and Laura Nuzzi O'Shaughnessy. *Nicaragua's Other Revolution: Religious Faith and Political Struggle.* Reviewed by Scott Mainwaring. 310
Dogan, Mattei, and Robert Pahre. *Creative Marginality: Innovation at the Intersections of Social Sciences.* Reviewed by Steven R. Brown. 994
Dorraj, Manochehr. *From Zarathustra to Khomeini: Populism and Dissent in Modern Iran.* Reviewed by Abbas Navabi. 659
Dossa, Shiraz. *The Public Realm and the Public Self: The Political Theory of Hannah Arendt.* Reviewed by Mary G. Dietz. 259
Douglass, R. Bruce, Gerald R. Mara, and Henry S. Richardson, eds. *Liberalism and the Good.* Reviewed by Daryl H. Rice. 1448

Downs, Donald Alexander. *The New Politics of Pornography.* Reviewed by Susan Gluck Mezey. 254
Dreze, Jean, and Amartya Sen. *Hunger and Public Action.* Reviewed by Howard Tolley, Jr. 1044
Dryzek, John D. *Discursive Democracy: Politics, Policy, and Political Science.* Reviewed by Douglas J. Amy. 1441
Dunn, John, ed. *The Economic Limits to Modern Politics.* Reviewed by Michael Cain. 265
Dutt, Nitish, *see* Clarke, Harold D. 905
Dye, Thomas R. *American Federalism: Competition among Governments.* Reviewed by Thomas J. Anton. 637

Edmonds, Martin. *Armed Services and Society.* Reviewed by Chris C. Demchak. . . . 282
Eisenstein, James, Roy B. Flemming, and Peter F. Nardulli. *The Contours of Justice: Communities and Their Courts.* Reviewed by G. Alan Tarr. 1462
Eisenstein, James, *see* Nardulli, Peter F. 299
Eisinger, Peter K. *The Rise of the Entrepreneurial State: State and Local Economic Development Policies in the United States.* Reviewed by Mark Schneider. . . . 638
Ellis, Richard, *see* Thompson, Michael. 1008
Enelow, James M., and Melvin J. Hinich, eds. *Advances in the Spatial Theory of Voting.* Reviewed by Joon-pyo Jung. 1463
England, Robert E., *see* Meier, Kenneth J. . . . 1034
Enloe, Cynthia. *Bananas, Beaches, and Bases: Making Feminist Sense of International Politics.* Reviewed by Anne Sisson Runyan. 333
Entman, Robert M. *Democracy Without Citizens: Media and the Decay of American Politics.* Reviewed by Doris A. Graber. 1443
Epstein, Lee, and C. K. Rowland. "Debunking the Myth of Interest Group Invincibility in the Courts." 205
Erskine, Andrew. *The Hellenistic Stoa: Political Thought and Action.* Reviewed by Walter Nicgorski. 996
Euben, J. Peter. *The Tragedy of Political Theory: The Road Not Taken.* Reviewed by Joel D. Schwartz. 1002
Ewing, K. D., and C. A. Gearty. *Freedom under Thatcher: Civil Liberties in Modern Britain.* Reviewed by Layne Hoppe. 1045

Farazmand, Ali. *The State, Bureaucracy, and Revolution in Modern Iran: Agrarian Reform and Regime Politics.* Reviewed by Abbas Navabi. 659
Farr, James, *see* Ball, Terence. 1437
Feldman, Martha S. *Order Without Design: Information Production and Policy Making.* Reviewed by Dennis J. Palumbo. . . . 284
Feldman, Stanley, *see* Lodge, Milton. 1357
Ferry, Luc. *Rights: The New Quarrel between the Ancients and the Moderns.* Reviewed by Gordon J. Tolle. 608
Ferry, Luc, and Alain Renaut. *Heidegger and Modernity.* Reviewed by Gregory Bruce Smith. 616
Finkel, Steven E., *see* Muller, Edward N. . . . 1261
Fischer, Frank. *Technocracy and the Politics of Expertise.* Reviewed by James L. Curtis. 266
Fleisher, Richard, *see* Bond, Jon R. 631
Flemming, Roy B., *see* Eisenstein, James. . . . 1462
Flemming, Roy B., *see* Nardulli, Peter F. 299
Foote, Joe S. *Television Access and Political Power: The Networks, the Presidency, and the "Loyal Opposition."* Reviewed by Robert M. Entman. 1022
Forde, Steven. *The Ambition to Rule: Alcibiades and the Politics of Imperialism in Thucydides.* Reviewed by David Lewis Schaefer. 1444
Foweraker, Joe. *Making Democracy in Spain: Grass-roots Struggle in the South, 1955–1975.* Reviewed by Thomas D. Lancaster. 1046
Franklin, Charles H. "Eschewing Obfuscation? Campaigns and the Perception of U.S. Senate Incumbents." 1193
Frant, Howard, Frances Stokes Berry, and William Berry. "Specifying a Model of State Policy Innovation." 571
Freeman, John R., *see* Goldstein, Joshua S. 17
Freeman, John R., *see* Goldstein, Joshua S. 1493
Fried, Lewis F. *Makers of the City.* Reviewed by Charles E. Ellison. 285
Friedenberg, Robert V. *Rhetorical Studies of National Political Debates: 1960–1988.* Reviewed by Michael Pfau. 1023
Foroohar, Manzar. *The Catholic Church and Social Change in Nicaragua.* Reviewed by Scott Mainwaring. 310
Fuechtmann, Thomas G. *Steeples and Stacks: Religion and Steel Crisis in Youngstown.* Reviewed by Bruce Nesmith. 286

Garrett, Geoffrey, *see* Alvarez, R. Michael. 539
Gause, F. Gregory, III. *Saudi–Yemeni Relations: Domestic Structures and Foreign Influence.* Reviewed by Fred Halliday. . . 683
Gearty, C. A., *see* Ewing, K. D. 1045
Geddes, Barbara. "A Game Theoretic Model of Reform in Latin American Democracies." 371
Gerner, Deborah J. *One Land, Two Peoples: The Conflict over Palestine.* Reviewed by Amal Kawar. 1049
Gertcher, Frank L., and William J. Weida. *Beyond Deterrence: The Political Economy of Nuclear Weapons.* Reviewed by

Index to Volume 85

Paul R. Viotti. 335
Gilbert, Alan. *Democratic Individuality.* Reviewed by Michael Goldfield. 609
Ginsberg, Benjamin, and Martin Shefter. *Politics by Other Means: The Declining Importance of Elections in America.* Reviewed by David R. Mayhew. 1464
Glaser, Charles L. *Analyzing Strategic Nuclear Policy.* Reviewed by Gary J. Buckley. 1496
Glennon, Michael J. *Constitutional Diplomacy.* Reviewed by Howard Tolley, Jr. 640
Goeckel, Robert F. *The Lutheran Church and the East German State.* Reviewed by Gerard F. Rutan. 1050
Goggin, Malcolm L., Ann O. Bowman, James P. Lester, and Laurence J. O'Toole, Jr. *Implementation Theory and Practice: Toward a Third Generation.* Reviewed by Charles M. Lamb. 267
Goldfarb, Jeffrey C. *Beyond Glasnost: The Post-Totalitarian Mind.* Reviewed by Charles F. Elliott. 336
Goldstein, Joshua S., and John R. Freeman. "U.S.-Soviet-Chinese Relations: Routine, Reciprocity, or Rational Expectations? . . 17
Goldstein, Joshua S., and John R. Freeman. *Three-Way Street: Strategic Reciprocity in World Politics.* Reviewed by James Lee Ray. 1493
Goldstein, Robert Justin. *Political Censorship of the Arts and the Press in Nineteenth-Century Europe and Censorship of Political Caricature in Nineteenth-Century France.* Reviewed by Steven R. Lefevre. 269
Goldwin, Robert A., and Robert A. Licht, eds. *The Spirit of the Constitution: Five Conversations.* Reviewed by George W. Carey. 997
Gordon, Margaret S. *Social Security Policies in Industrial Countries: A Comparative Analysis.* Reviewed by Tim Tilton. 662
Gottlieb, Robert, *see* Blumberg, Louis. 1014
Granberg, Donald, and Soren Holmberg. *The Political System Matters: Social Psychology and Voting Behavior in Sweden and the United States.* Reviewed by Sven Steinmo. 311
Grant, Wyn. *Government and Industry: A Comparative Analysis of the U.S., Canada, and the U.K.* Reviewed by Daniel R. Pearson. 312
Gray, Colin S. *War, Peace, and Victory: Strategy and Statecraft for the Next Century.* Reviewed by John P. Lovell. 1084
Green, Leslie. *The Authority of the State.* Reviewed by Alan Ryan. 613
Green, William C., and Theodore Karasik, eds. *Gorbachev and His Generals: The Reform of Soviet Military Doctrine.* Reviewed by Matthew Evangelista. 1433
Greenberg, Martin H., *see* Norton, Augustus Richard. 341
Greene, Kathanne. *Affirmative Action and Principles of Justice.* Reviewed by Diane E. Wall. 256
Grofman, Bernard, and Donald Wittman, eds. *The Federalist Papers and the New Institutionalism.* Reviewed by George W. Carey. 997
Guillén, Mauro F., *see* Perrow, Charles. 1471
Gurin, Patricia, Shirley Hatchett, and James S. Jackson. *Hope and Independence: Blacks' Response to Electoral and Party Politics.* Reviewed by Dianne M. Pinderhughes. 1465
Gustafson, Thane. *Crisis amid Plenty: The Politics of Soviet Energy under Brezhnev and Gorbachev.* Reviewed by Barbara Ann Chotiner. 314

Haas, Ernst B. *When Knowledge Is Power: Three Models of Change in International Organizations.* Reviewed by Oran R. Young. 611
Haas, Peter M. *Saving the Mediterranean: The Politics of International Environmental Cooperation.* Reviewed by Marvin S. Soroos. 1494
Haass, Richard N. *Conflicts Unending: The United States and Regional Disputes.* Reviewed by Bruce W. Jentleson. 337
Hadden, Susan G. *A Citizen's Right to Know: Risk Communication and Public Policy.* Reviewed by R. Christopher Perry. 641
Hadley, Charles D., *see* Baker, Tod A. 1469
Halevy, David, *see* Livingstone, Neil C. 341
Hall, Peter A., ed. *The Political Power of Economic Ideas: Keynesianism across Nations.* Reviewed by Ronald Rogowski. . . 999
Hamman, John, *see* Cohen, Jeffrey E. 165
Hamrin, Carol Lee. *China and the Challenge of the Future: Changing Political Patterns.* Reviewed by Michael D. Swaine. 663
Hancock, Ralph C. *Calvin and the Foundations of Modern Politics.* Reviewed by Gary D. Glenn. 612
Hannum, Hurst. *Autonomy, Sovereignty, and Self-Determination: The Accommodation of Conflicting Rights.* Reviewed by Bruce E. Moon. 684
Hanson, Russell L., *see* Ball, Terence. 1437
Harkavy, Robert E. *Bases Abroad: The Global Foreign Military Presence.* Reviewed by Lloyd Jensen. 1072
Hartigan, Richard Shelly. *The Future Remembered: An Essay in Biopolitics.* Reviewed by Samuel M. Hines, Jr. 1445
Hartz, Louis. *The Necessity of Choice: Nine-*

teenth-Century Political Thought. Reviewed by Alfonso J. Damico. 1000
Harvey, Philip. *Securing the Right to Employment: Social Welfare Policy and the Unemployed in the United States.* Reviewed by Richard M. Coughlin. 296
Harvey, Philip L., *see* Marmor, Theodore R. 1033
Haslam, Jonathan. *The Soviet Union and the Politics of Nuclear Weapons in Europe, 1969–1987.* Reviewed by Wolfram F. Hanreider. 1073
Hatcher, Patrick Lloyd. *The Suicide of an Elite: American Internationalists in Vietnam.* Reviewed by James N. Rosenau. 287
Hatchett, Shirley, *see* Gurin, Patricia. 1465
Hawkins, Gordon, and Franklin K. Zimring. *Pornography in a Free Society.* Reviewed by Susan Gluck Mezey. 254
Hazan, Baruch A. *Gorbachev and His Enemies: The Struggle for Perestroika.* Reviewed by John P. Willerton. 1427
Headrick, Barbara, *see* Scholz, John T. 829
Heiberg, Marianne. *The Making of the Basque Nation.* Reviewed by Thomas D. Lancaster. 1046
Hellemans, Staf, *see* Kitschelt, Herbert. 1054
Hendrickson, David C., *see* Tucker, Robert W. 1009
Hennessy, Peter. *Whitehall.* Reviewed by Don K. Price. 315
Henning, Daniel H., and William R. Mangun. *Managing the Environmental Crisis: Incorporating Competing Values in Natural Resources Administration.* Reviewed by Norman J. Vig. 288
Herbst, Jeffrey. *State Politics in Zimbabwe.* Reviewed by William Cyrus Reed. 1051
Herspring, Dale R. *The Soviet High Command, 1967–1989: Personalities and Politics.* Reviewed by Matthew Evangelista. 1433
Herzog, Don. *Happy Slaves: A Critique of Consent Theory.* Reviewed by Alan Ryan. 613
Heydebrand, Wolf, and Carroll Seron. *Rationalizing Justice: The Political Economy of Federal District Courts.* Reviewed by Henry R. Glick. 1025
Heyns, Barbara, and Ireneusz Bialecki. "Solidarność: Reluctant Vanguard or Makeshift Coalition?" 351
Hibbing, John R. "Contours of the Modern Congressional Career." 405
Hildreth, W. Bartley, *see* Rabin, Jack. 1467
Himmelstein, Jerome L. *To the Right: The Transformation of American Conservatism.* Reviewed by Mark J. Rozell. 643
Hinckley, Barbara. *The Symbolic Presidency: How Presidents Portray Themselves.* Reviewed by Norman C. Thomas. 1026
Hinich, Melvin J., *see* Enelow, James M. 1463
Hintzen, Percy C. *The Costs of Regime Survival: Racial Mobilization, Elite Domination, and Control of the State in Guyana and Trinidad.* Reviewed by Evelyne Huber. 317
Hird, John A. "The Political Economy of Pork: Project Selection at the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers." 429
Hirschmann, Nancy J., *see* Sinopoli, Richard C. 221
Hobsbawm, E. J. *Nations and Nationalism, since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality.* Reviewed by Frederick C. Turner. 1075
Hoffmann, Steven A. *India and the China Crisis.* Reviewed by Sudershan Chawla. 318
Holmberg, Soren, *see* Granberg, Donald. 311
Honig, B. "Declarations of Independence: Arendt and Derrida on the Problem of Founding a Republic." 97
Hopf, Ted. "Polarity, the Offense–Defense Balance, and War." 475
Hughes, Barry B., *see* Bremer, Stuart A. 681
Huitt, Ralph K. *Working within the System.* Reviewed by Steven S. Smith. 1027
Hull, Elizabeth. *Taking Liberties: National Barriers to the Free Flow of Ideas.* Reviewed by L. Brett Lockwood. 615
Hunter, Shireen T. *Iran and the World: Continuity in a Revolutionary Decade.* Reviewed by Bahman Baktiari. 1482

Inglehart, Ronald. *Culture Shift in Advanced Industrial Society.* Reviewed by Howard Handelman. 664
Ippolito, Dennis S. *Uncertain Legacies: Federal Budget Policy from Roosevelt through Reagan.* Reviewed by James D. Savage. 1466

Jackson, James S., *see* Gurin, Patricia. 1465
Jacob, Gerald. *Site Unseen: The Politics of Siting a Nuclear Waste Repository.* Reviewed by Charles E. Davis. 1015
Jacob, Herbert. *Silent Revolution: The Transformation of Divorce Law in the United States.* Reviewed by Barbara Atwood. 289
Jamieson, Kathleen Hall. *Eloquence in an Electronic Age: The Transformation of Political Speechmaking.* Reviewed by Jong O. Ra. 291
Jasper, James M. *Nuclear Politics: Energy and the State in the United States, Sweden, and France.* Reviewed by Robert M. Lawrence. 1053
Jerome, Robert W. *U.S. Senate Decision-Making: The Trade Agreements Act of 1979.* Reviewed by John J. Kornacki. 644
Jewell, Malcolm E., *see* Miller, Penny M. 1467
Johnson, Curtis N. *Aristotle's Theory of the*

Index to Volume 85

State. Reviewed by Thomas C. Brickhouse. 1446

Johnson, J. Scott, and Leslie Paul Thiele. "Reading Nietzsche and Foucault: A Hermeneutics of Suspicion?" 581

Johnson, William C. *The Politics of Urban Planning.* Reviewed by Andrew Kirby. 292

Jonassohn, Kurt, *see* Chalk, Frank. 260

Jones, Robert A. *The Soviet Concept of 'Limited Sovereignty' from Lenin to Gorbachev: The Brezhnev Doctrine.* Reviewed by Daniel McIntosh. 666

Kapstein, Ethan B. *The Insecure Alliance: Energy Crises and Western Politics since 1944.* Reviewed by David E. Spiro. 1076

Karasik, Theodore, *see* Green, William C. 1433

Katz, Claudio J. *From Feudalism to Capitalism: Marxian Theories of Class Struggle and Social Change.* Reviewed by David A. Duquette. 270

Kaufman, Natalie Hevener. *Human Rights Treaties and the Senate: A History of Opposition.* Reviewed by David P. Forsythe. 1077

Kaufman, Robert Gordon. *Arms Control during the Pre-Nuclear Era: The United States and Naval Limitations between the Two World Wars.* Reviewed by David S. Sorenson. 338

Kaufman, Robert, *see* Stallings, Barbara. 1080

Kegley, Charles W., Jr., and Gregory A. Raymond. *When Trust Breaks Down: Alliance Norms and World Politics.* Reviewed by Janice E. Thompson. 685

Kenski, Henry C. *Saving the Hidden Treasure: The Evolution of Groundwater Policy.* Reviewed by Zachary Smith. 293

Kessel, John H., *see* Bruce, John M. 1089

King, Anthony, ed. *The New American Political System.* Reviewed by Thomas E. Mann. 1028

Kitschelt, Herbert, and Staf Hellemans. *Beyond the European Left: Ideology and Political Action in the Belgian Ecology Parties.* Reviewed by Hans-Georg Betz. 1054

Knoke, David. *Political Networks: The Structural Perspective.* Reviewed by Matthew J. Burbank. 1447

Koford, Kenneth, *see* Poole, Keith T. 955

Kornacki, John J., ed. *Leading Congress: New Styles, New Strategies.* Reviewed by David T. Canon. 1029

Kornai, Janos. *The Road to a Free Economy: Shifting from a Socialist System: The Case of Hungary.* Reviewed by Ernest J. Wilson III. 1477

Koskenniemi, Marti. *From Apology to Utopia: The Structure of International Legal Argument.* Reviewed by Lea Brilmayer. 687

Krassa, Michael A., *see* Cohen, Jeffrey E. 165

Kreutz, Andrej. *Vatican Policy on the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict: The Struggle for the Holy Land.* Reviewed by Fred J. Khouri. 688

Krueger, Anne O., Constantine Michalopoulos, and Vernon W. Ruttan. *Aid and Development.* Reviewed by Carol Lancaster. 689

Kuklinski, James H., Robert C. Luskin, and John Bolland. "Where Is the Schema? Going Beyond the 'S' Word in Political Psychology." 1341

Kurtz, Michael L., and Morgan D. Peoples. *Earl K. Long: The Saga of Uncle Earl and Louisiana Politics.* Reviewed by Diane D. Blair. 645

Lacoue-Labarthe, Philipe. *Heidegger, Art, and Politics.* Reviewed by Gregory Bruce Smith. 616

Laird, Robbin F., and Susan L. Clark. *The USSR and the Western Alliance.* Reviewed by Russell Bova. 658

Lal, Victor. *Fiji: Coups in Paradise.* Reviewed by Jeffrey D. Sadow. 1486

Lange, Peter, *see* Alvarez, R. Michael. 539

Laufer, Romain, and Catherine Paradeise. *Marketing Democracy: Public Opinion and Media Formation in Democratic Societies.* Reviewed by Diana C. Mutz. 1055

Lebovic, James H. *Deadly Dilemmas: Deterrence in U.S. Nuclear Strategy.* Reviewed by Gary J. Buckley. 1496

Lee, Su-hoon. *State-Building in the Contemporary Third World.* Reviewed by Paul Orogun. 669

Lentz, Richard. *Symbols, the News Magazines, and Martin Luther King.* Reviewed by Herbert Waltzer. 1031

Lester, James P., ed. *Environmental Politics and Policy: Theories and Evidence.* Reviewed by Christopher J. Bosso. 647

Lester, James P., *see* Goggin, Malcolm L. 267

Levine, Marc V. *The Reconquest of Montreal: Language Policy and Social Change in a Bilingual City.* Reviewed by Clarence N. Stone. 603

Levinson, Marc, *see* Aho, C. Michael. 1070

Lewis, Paul H. *The Crisis of Argentine Capitalism.* Reviewed by Peter Ranis. 1056

Libecap, Gary D. *Contracting for Property Rights.* Reviewed by David Schultz. 648

Licht, Robert A., *see* Goldwin, Robert A. 997

Lifton, Robert Jay, and Eric Markusen. *The Genocidal Mentality: Nazi Holocaust and Nuclear Threat.* Reviewed by Roger W. Smith. 260

Lindsay, Thomas. "James Madison on Re-

ligion and Politics: Rhetoric and Reality." 1321
Lipset, Seymour Martin. *Continental Divide: The Values and Institutions of the United States and Canada.* Reviewed by David V. J. Bell. 667
Listhaug, Ola, *see* Macdonald, Stuart Elaine. 1107
Little, Daniel. *Understanding Peasant China: Case Studies in the Philosophy of Science.* Reviewed by Marc Blecher. 668
Livingstone, Neil C., and David Halevy. *Inside the PLO: Covert Units, Secret Funds, and the War against Israel and the United States.* Reviewed by Mehran Tamadonfar. 341
Lockhart, Charles. *Gaining Ground: Tailoring Social Programs to American Values.* Reviewed by Richard M. Coughlin. 296
Lodge, Milton, Kathleen M. McGraw, Pamela Johnston Conover, Stanley Feldman, and Arthur H. Miller. "Where Is the Schema? Critiques." 1357
Long, William J. *U.S. Export Control Policy: Executive Autonomy Versus Congressional Reform.* Reviewed by Kimberly A. Elliott. 690
Lopach, James J., Margery Hunter Brown, and Richmond L. Clow. *Tribal Government Today: Politics on Montana Indian Reservations.* Reviewed by Anne Merline McCulloch. 294
Loss, Richard. *The Modern Theory of Presidential Power: Alexander Hamilton and the Corwin Thesis.* Reviewed by Michael A. Genovese. 1032
Lucas, Michael R. *The Western Alliance after INF: Redefining U.S. Policy toward Europe and the Soviet Union.* Reviewed by Joyce P. Kaufman. 695
Luskin, Robert C., *see* Kuklinski, James H. 1341
Lynn, Naomi B., and Aaron Wildavsky, eds. *Public Administration: The State of the Discipline.* Reviewed by Deil S. Wright. 1467

Macdonald, Stuart Elaine, Ola Listhaug, and George Rabinowitz. "Issue Strategy in Multiparty Systems." 1107
Maddock, R. T. *The Political Economy of Soviet Defence Spending.* Reviewed by Matthew Evangelista. 1433
Magleby, David B., and Candice J. Nelson. *The Money Chase: Congressional Campaign Finance Reform.* Reviewed by Kenneth Godwin. 651
Majone, Giandomenico, ed. *Deregulation or Reregulation? Regulatory Reform in Europe and the United States.* Reviewed by Raymond W. Lawton. 319
Mangun, William R., *see* Henning, Daniel H. 288
Manicas, Peter T. *War and Democracy.* Reviewed by Martin O. Heisler. 1078
Mansbridge, Jane J., ed. *Beyond Self-Interest.* Reviewed by Randall L. Calvert. 272
Manville, Philip Brook. *The Origins of Citizenship in Ancient Athens.* Reviewed by Joel D. Schwartz. 1002
Mara, Gerald R., *see* Douglass, R. Bruce. 1448
Marichal, Carlos. *A Century of Debt Crises in Latin America: From Independence to the Great Depression.* Reviewed by Charles Lipson. 1080
Markusen, Eric, *see* Lifton, Robert Jay. 260
Marmor, Theodore R., Jerry L. Mashaw, and Philip L. Harvey. *America's Misunderstood Welfare State: Persistent Myths, Enduring Realities.* Reviewed by Charles Noble. 1033
Marra, Robin F., *see* Simon, Dennis M. 1177
Martin, Randy. *Performance As a Political Act: The Embodied Self.* Reviewed by Timothy J. Lukes. 274
Martin, Ross M. *Trade Unionism: Purposes and Forms.* Reviewed by Peter Swenson. 320
Mashaw, Jerry L., *see* Marmor, Theodore R. 1033
Mathiopoulos, Margarita. *History and Progress: In Search of the European and American Mind.* Reviewed by Bruce P. Frohnen. 273
Mattei, Franco, *see* Niemi, Richard G. 1407
Mayall, James. *Nationalism and International Society.* Reviewed by Yosef Lapid. 1492
McAllister, Ian, *see* Rose, Richard. 1473
McCormick, Barrett L. *Political Reform in Post-Mao China: Democracy and Bureaucracy in a Leninist State.* Reviewed by Melanie Manion. 1057
McGovern, Arthur F. *Liberation Theology and Its Critics: Toward an Assessment.* Reviewed by Paul E. Sigmund. 619
McGraw, Kathleen M. "Managing Blame: An Experimental Test of the Effects of Political Accounts." 1133
McGraw, Kathleen M., *see* Lodge, Milton. 1357
McGuigan, Patrick B., and Dawn M. Weyrich. *Ninth Justice: The Fight for Bork.* Reviewed by Gregory A. Caldeira. 984
McGuigan, Patrick B., and Jeffrey P. O'Connell, eds. *The Judges War.* Reviewed by Gregory A. Caldeira. 984
McIntosh, Wayne V. *The Appeal of Civil Law: A Political-Economic Analysis of Litigation.* Reviewed by C. K. Rowland. 649
McLean, Iain, John M. Orbell, and Robyn M. Dawes. "What Should Rational Cognitive Misers Do?" 1417
McLennan, Gregor. *Marxism, Pluralism, and Beyond: Classic Debates and New Departures.* Reviewed by Nancy S. Love. 1003
Meier, Christian. *The Greek Discovery of Politics.* Reviewed by Joel D. Schwartz. 1002
Meier, Kenneth J., Joseph Stewart, Jr., and

Index to Volume 85

Robert E. England. *Race, Class, and Education: The Politics of Second-Generation Discrimination.* Reviewed by N. Joseph Cayer. 1034
Melanson, Richard A. *Reconstructing Consensus: American Foreign Policy since the Vietnam War.* Reviewed by William O. Chittick. 1497
Meléndez, Edgardo. *Puerto Rico's Statehood Movement.* Reviewed by Emilio Pantojas-Garcia. 322
Metsner, Arnold J. *Rules for Rulers: The Politics of Advice.* Reviewed by Marc Landy. 295
Melzer, Arthur M. *The Natural Goodness of Man: On the System of Rousseau's Thought.* Reviewed by Daryl H. Rice. . . . 1448
Messina, Anthony M. *Race and Party Competition in Britain.* Reviewed by Jessica R. Adolino. 323
Meyer, David S. *"A Winter of Discontent": The Nuclear Freeze and American Politics.* Reviewed by James A. Rhodes. 691
Michalopoulos, Constantine, *see* Krueger, Anne O. 689
Migdal, Joel S. *Strong Societies and Weak States: State-Society Relations and State Capabilities in the Third World.* Reviewed by Paul Orogun. 669
Mikkelsen, Edwin J., *see* Brown, Phil. 1015
Miles, William F. S., and David Rochefort. "Nationalism Versus Ethnic Identity in Sub-Saharan Africa." 393
Miller, Arthur H., *see* Lodge, Milton. 1357
Miller, Gerald J., *see* Rabin, Jack. 1467
Miller, Penny M., and Malcolm E. Jewell. *Political Parties and Primaries in Kentucky.* Reviewed by L. Sandy Maisel. . . . 1467
Miller, Warren E. "Party Identification, Realignment, and Party Voting: Back to the Basics." 557
Millican, Edward. *One United People: The Federalist Papers and the National Idea.* Reviewed by George W. Carey. 997
Miranda, Carlos R. *The Stroessner Era: Authoritarian Rule in Paraguay.* Reviewed by Paul C. Sondrol. 674
Mitchell, Timothy. "The Limits of the State: Beyond Statist Approaches and Their Critics." 77
Moe, Terry M., *see* Chubb, John E. 1034
Molinar, Juan. "Counting the Number of Parties: An Alternative Index." 1383
Moreland, Laurence W., *see* Baker, Tod A. 1469
Moreland, Laurence W., *see* Steed, Robert P. 645
Morone, James A. *The Democratic Wish: Popular Participation and the Limits of American Government.* Reviewed by John S. Dryzek. 1036
Morrow, James D., Barry L. Price, and Roslyn Simowitz. "Conceptual Problems in Theorizing About International Conflict." 923
Muller, Edward N., Henry A. Dietz, and Steven E. Finkel. "Discontent and the Expected Utility of Rebellion: The Case of Peru." 1261
Munzer, Stephen R. *A Theory of Property.* Reviewed by David Schultz. 648
Murray, Charles. *In Pursuit: Of Happiness and Good Government.* Reviewed by Richard M. Coughlin. 296
Nacos, Brigitte Lebens. *The Press, Presidents, and Crises.* Reviewed by Fred I. Greenstein. 298
Nagler, Jonathan. "The Effect of Registration Laws and Education on U.S. Voter Turnout." 1393
Nardulli, Peter F., James Eisenstein, and Roy B. Flemming. *The Tenor of Justice: Criminal Courts and the Guilty Plea Process.* Reviewed by Adelaide H. Villmoare. 299
Nardulli, Peter F., *see* Eisenstein, James. 1462
Nathan, Andrew J. *China's Crisis: Dilemmas of Reform and Prospects for Democracy.* Reviewed by Michael D. Swaine. 663
Negri, Antonio. *The Politics of Subversion: A Manifesto for the Twenty-first Century.* Reviewed by Nancy S. Love. 1003
Nelson, Candice J., *see* Magleby, David B. 651
Nelson, Joan, ed. *Fragile Coalitions: The Politics of Economic Adjustment.* Reviewed by Ernest J. Wilson III. 1477
Nelson, Joan, ed. *Economic Crisis and Policy Choice: The Politics of Adjustment in the Third World.* Reviewed by Ernest J. Wilson III. 1477
Netzer, Dick, *see* Bellush, Jewel. 1457
Niemi, Richard G., Stephen C. Craig, and Franco Mattei. "Measuring International Political Efficacy in the 1988 National Election Study." 1407
Nolan, Janne E. *Guardians of the Arsenal: The Politics of Nuclear Strategy.* Reviewed by John Spanier. 339
North, Douglass C. *Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Performance.* Reviewed by Ernest J. Wilson III. 1477
Norton, Augustus Richard, and Martin H. Greenberg, eds. *The International Relations of the Palestine Liberation Organization.* Reviewed by Mehran Tamadonfar. 341

Oi, Jean C. *State and Peasant in Contemporary China: The Political Economy of Village Government.* Reviewed by Edward Friedman. 605
Oldfield, Adrian. *Citizenship and Community: Civic Republicanism and the*

Modern World. Reviewed by Alan Wertheimer. 1450
Orbell, John, and Robyn M. Dawes. "A 'Cognitive Miser' Theory of Cooperators' Advantage." 515
Orbell, John M., *see* McLean, Iain. 1417
Orman, John. *Presidential Accountability: New and Recurring Problems.* Reviewed by Louis W. Koenig. 1036
Orren, Gary R., *see* Abramson, Jeffrey B. 291
Osherenko, Gail, and Oran R. Young. *The Age of the Arctic: Hot Conflicts and Cold Realities.* Reviewed by Martin Ira Glassner. 342
Ost, David. *Solidarity and the Politics of Anti-Politics: Opposition and Reform in Poland since 1968.* Reviewed by Mark Cichock. 1058
Ostrom, Charles W., Jr., *see* Abramson, Paul R. 181
Ostrom, Charles W., Jr., *see* Simon, Dennis M. 1177
Ostrom, Elinor. "Rational Choice Theory and Institutional Analysis: Toward Complementarity." 237
Overby, L. Marvin, *see* Burns, James MacGregor. 1459
O'Connell, Jeffrey P., *see* McGuigan, Patrick B. 984
O'Furner, Mary, and Barry Supple, eds. *The State and Economic Knowledge: The American and British Experiences.* Reviewed by Sidney Weintraub. 1487
O'Malley, Padraig. *Biting at the Grave: The Irish Hunger Strikes and the Politics of Despair.* Reviewed by Charles Townshend. 324
O'Shaughnessy, Laura Nuzzi, *see* Dodson, Michael. 310
O'Toole, Laurence J., Jr., *see* Goggin, Malcolm L. 267

Pahre, Robert, *see* Dogan, Mattei. 994
Paradeise, Catherine, *see* Laufer, Romain. 1055
Paris, David C. "Moral Education and the 'Tie That Binds' in Liberal Political Theory." 875
Pasour, E. C., Jr. *Agriculture and the State: Market Processes and Bureaucracy.* Reviewed by Ross Talbot. 300
Patton, Cindy. *Inventing AIDS.* Reviewed by Christopher H. Foreman, Jr. 1471
Pearce, Frank. *The Radical Durkheim.* Reviewed by Gary L. Jones. 275
Peoples, Morgan D., *see* Kurtz, Michael L. 645
Peretz, Don. *Intifada: The Palestinian Uprising.* Reviewed by Deborah J. Gerner. 672
Perrow, Charles, and Mauro F. Guillén. *The AIDS Disaster: The Failure of Organizations in New York and the Nation.* Reviewed by Christopher H. Foreman, Jr. 1471
Perry, James L., ed. *Handbook of Public Administration.* Reviewed by Deil S. Wright. 1467
Pertschuk, Michael, and Wendy Schaetzel. *The People Rising: The Campaign against the Bork Nomination.* Reviewed by Gregory A. Caldeira. 984
Peters, B. Guy. *European Politics Reconsidered.* Reviewed by Robert H. Cox. 1060
Peters, Ronald M., Jr. *The American Speakership: The Office in Historical Perspective.* Reviewed by Barbara Sinclair. 1038
Peterson, Erik R. *The Gulf Cooperation Council: Search for Unity in a Dynamic Region.* Reviewed by Roger Rieber. 343
Peterson, J. E. *The Arab Gulf States: Steps toward Political Participation.* Reviewed by Roger Rieber. 343
Peterson, Mark A. *Legislating Together: The White House and Capitol Hill from Eisenhower to Reagan.* Reviewed by Richard A. Brody. 631
Pharr, Susan J. *Losing Face: Status Politics in Japan.* Reviewed by Bernard S. Silberman. 599
Pinkney, Robert. *Right-Wing Military Government.* Reviewed by Michael Gold. 1061
Pocock, J. G. A., *see* Ball, Terence. 1437
Pontuso, James F. *Solzhenitsyn's Political Thought.* Reviewed by Stephen K. Carter. 1451
Pool, Jonathan. "The Official Language Problem." 495
Poole, Keith T., Howard Rosenthal, and Kenneth Koford. "On Dimensionalizing Roll Call Votes in the U.S. Congress." 955
Porter, Rosalie Pedalino. *Forked Tongue: The Politics of Bilingual Education.* Reviewed by Jonathan Pool. 636
Portz, John. *The Politics of Plant Closings.* Reviewed by Mark Schneider. 638
Pottenger, John R. *The Political Theory of Liberation Theology: Toward a Reconvergence of Social Values and Social Science.* Reviewed by Paul E. Sigmund. 619
Powell, Robert. "Absolute and Relative Gains in International Relations Theory." 1303
Price, Barry L., *see* Morrow, James D. 923

Quinn, Dennis P., and Robert Y. Shapiro. "Business Political Power: The Case of Taxation." 851

Rabin, Jack, W. Bartley Hildreth, and Gerald J. Miller, eds. *Handbook of Public Administration.* Reviewed by Deil S. Wright. 1467
Rabinowitz, George, *see* Macdonald, Stuart Elaine. 1107
Ramet, Pedro, ed. *Catholicism and Politics*

Index to Volume 85

in Communist Societies. Reviewed by Gerard F. Rutan. 1050

Randall, Laura. *The Political Economy of Mexican Oil.* Reviewed by Mary Ann Tetreault. 1063

Randall, Richard S. *Freedom and Taboo: Pornography and the Politics of a Self Divided.* Reviewed by Susan Gluck Mezey. 254

Rapoport, Ronald B., Walter J. Stone, and Alan I. Abramowitz. "Do Endorsements Matter? Group Influence in the 1984 Democratic Caucuses." 193

Raymond, Gregory A., *see* Kegley, Charles W., Jr. 685

Reich, Simon. *The Fruits of Fascism: Postwar Prosperity in Historical Perspective.* Reviewed by Frank Peter Wagner. 1488

Reid, John Phillip. *The Concept of Representation in the Age of the American Revolution.* Reviewed by Peter Dennis Bathory. 1472

Reiman, Jeffrey. *Justice and Modern Moral Philosophy.* Reviewed by Debra Satz. . . . 620

Reiser, Stewart. *The Israeli Arms Industry: Foreign Policy, Arms Transfers, and Military Doctrine of a Small State.* Reviewed by Scott D. Johnston. 1064

Remmer, Karen L. "The Political Impact of Economic Crisis in Latin America in the 1980s." 777

Renaut, Alain, *see* Ferry, Luc. 616

Resnick, Philip. *The Masks of Proteus: Canadian Reflections on the State.* Reviewed by Martin Lubin. 622

Richards, Alan, and John Waterbury. *A Political Economy of the Middle East: State, Class, and Economic Development.* Reviewed by Jill Crystal. 1489

Richardson, Bradley M. "European Party Loyalties Revisited." 751

Richardson, Henry S., *see* Douglass, R. Bruce. 1448

Richelson, Jeffrey T. *America's Secret Eyes in Space: The U.S. Keyhole Spy Satellite Program.* Reviewed by Robert A. Hoover. 692

Robertson, David, *see* Cuthbertson, Ian M. 1073

Robertson, Myles L. C. *Soviet Policy towards Japan: An Analysis of Trends in the 1970s and 1980s.* Reviewed by Peter Berton. 326

Rochefort, David, *see* Miles, William F. S. . . 393

Rock, Stephen R. *Why Peace Breaks Out: Great Power Rapprochement in Historical Perspective.* Reviewed by Deborah Welch Larson. 693

Rogowski, Ronald. *Commerce and Coalitions: How Trade Affects Domestic Political Alignments.* Reviewed by Kimberly A. Elliott. 690

Roosevelt, Grace G. *Reading Rousseau in the Nuclear Age.* Reviewed by Susan Shell. 1010

Rose, Leo E., *see* Sisson, Richard. 327

Rose, Richard, and Ian McAllister. The Loyalties of Voters: A Lifetime Learning Model. Reviewed by Helmut Norpoth. . . 1473

Rosenau, James N. *Turbulence in World Politics: A Theory of Change and Continuity.* Reviewed by Charles F. Hermann. 1081

Rosenthal, Howard, *see* Poole, Keith T. 955

Ross, Dorothy. *The Origins of American Social Science.* Reviewed by James Farr. 1452

Rowland, C. K., *see* Epstein, Lee. 205

Rowney, Don K. *Transition to Technocracy: The Structural Origins of the Soviet Administrative State.* Reviewed by Donald R. Kelley. 673

Ruffin, Patricia. *Capitalism and Socialism in Cuba: A Study of Dependency, Development, and Underdevelopment.* Reviewed by Paul C. Sondrol. 674

Rumer, Boris Z. *Soviet Steel: The Challenge of Industrial Modernization in the USSR.* Reviewed by Barbara Ann Chotiner. 314

Russell, Greg. *Hans J. Morgenthau and the Ethics of American Statecraft.* Reviewed by Lois W. Sayrs. 1083

Russell, Louise B. *Medicare's New Hospital Payment System: Is It Working?* Reviewed by Lawton R. Burns. 1475

Russett, Bruce. *Controlling the Sword: The Democratic Governance of National Security.* Reviewed by Michael P. Sullivan. 1498

Ruttan, Vernon W., *see* Krueger, Anne O. . . 689

Ryan, Stephen. *Ethnic Conflict and International Relations.* Reviewed by Yosef Lapid. 1492

Sandoz, Ellis. *A Government of Laws: Political Theory, Religion, and the American Founding.* Reviewed by J. Christopher Soper. 1005

Sa'adah, Anne. *The Shaping of Liberal Politics in Revolutionary France: A Comparative Perspective.* Reviewed by Alfonso J. Damico. 1000

Schaeffer, Robert. *Warpaths: The Politics of Partition.* Reviewed by Raju G. C. Thomas. 327

Schaetzel, Wendy, *see* Pertschuk, Michael. 984

Schick, Allen. *The Capacity to Budget.* Reviewed by Lance T. LeLoup. 652

Schmidt, David S. *Citizen Lawmakers: The Ballot Initiative Revolution.* Reviewed by Robert Benedict. 281

Schneider, Anne L. *Deterrence and Juvenile Crime: Results from a National Policy Experiment.* Reviewed by Michael R. Gottfredson. 653

Scholz, John T. "Cooperative Regulatory Enforcement and the Politics of Administrative Effectiveness." 115
Scholz, John T., Jim Twombly, and Barbara Headrick. "Street-Level Political Controls over Federal Bureaucracy." 829
Schonhardt-Bailey, Cheryl. "Lobbying for Free Trade in 19th-Century Britain: To Concentrate or Not." 37
Schwartz, Herman. *Packing the Courts: The Conservative Campaign to Rewrite the Constitution.* Reviewed by Gregory A. Caldeira. 984
Schwartz, Mildred A. *The Party Network: The Robust Organization of the Illinois Republicans.* Reviewed by Thomas A. Flinn. 654
Scott, Ian. *Political Change and the Crisis of Legitimacy in Hong Kong.* Reviewed by Alan P. L. Liu. 329
Scott, James C. *Domination and the Arts of Resistance: Hidden Transcripts.* Reviewed by Timothy J. Lukes. 1454
Searing, Donald D. "Roles, Rules, and Rationality in the New Institutionalism." . . . 1239
Seery, John Evan. *Political Returns: Irony in Politics and Theory from Plato to the Antinuclear Movement.* Reviewed by Todd O. Lutes. 1006
Segal, Gerald. *Rethinking the Pacific.* Reviewed by Michael Haas. 676
Sen, Amartya, *see* Dreze, Jean. 1044
Seron, Carroll, *see* Heydebrand, Wolf. 1025
Shapiro, Robert Y., *see* Quinn, Dennis P. . . . 851
Shefter, Martin, *see* Ginsberg, Benjamin. . . . 1464
Sherover, Charles M. *Time, Freedom, and the Common Good: An Essay in Public Philosophy.* Reviewed by Daniela Gobetti. 623
Sherwood, Elizabeth D. *Allies in Crisis: Meeting Global Challenges to Western Security.* Reviewed by Joyce P. Kaufman. 695
Shiffrin, Steve H. *The First Amendment, Democracy, and Romance.* Reviewed by Paul N. Goldstene. 1039
Shklar, Judith N. "Redeeming American Political Theory." 3
Shulman, George M. *Radicalism and Reverence: The Political Thought of Gerrard Winstanley.* Reviewed by David Wootton. 1455
Siavoshi, Sussan. *Liberal Nationalism in Iran: The Failure of a Movement.* Reviewed by Bahman Baktiari. 1482
Sigmund, Paul E. *Liberation Theology at the Crossroads: Democracy or Revolution?* Reviewed by Anne Motley Hallum. 625
Simon, Dennis M., Charles W. Ostrom, Jr., and Robin F. Marra. "The President, Referendum Voting, and Subnational Elections in the United States." 1177
Simowitz, Roslyn, *see* Morrow, James D. . . . 923
Sinopoli, Richard C., and Nancy J. Hirschmann. "Feminism and Liberal Theory." 221
Sisson, Richard, and Leo E. Rose. *War and Secession: Pakistan, India, and the Creation of Bangladesh.* Reviewed by Raju G. C. Thomas. 327
Slater, David. *Territory and State Power in Latin America: The Peruvian Case.* Reviewed by Cynthia McClintock. 330
Smith, Brian H. *More Than Altruism: The Politics of Private Foreign Aid.* Reviewed by Louis W. Pauly. 1500
Smith, Carolyn. *Presidential Press Conferences: A Critical Approach.* Reviewed by James A. Davis. 1476
Smoller, Frederic T. *The Six O'Clock Presidency: A Theory of Presidential Press Relations in the Age of Television.* Reviewed by Michael Pfau. 1023
Snidal, Duncan. "Relative Gains and the Pattern of International Cooperation." . . 701
Snowiss, Sylvia. *Judicial Review and the Law of the Constitution.* Reviewed by Donna E. Childers. 983
Sosin, J. M. *The Aristocracy of the Long Robe: The Origins of Judicial Review in America.* Reviewed by Wayne V. McIntosh. 253
Sowell, Thomas. *Preferential Policies: An International Perspective.* Reviewed by Abigail Thernstrom. 600
Spar, Debora, *see* Vernon, Raymond. 1070
Spiers, Edward M. *Chemical Weaponry: A Continuing Challenge.* Reviewed by Michael M. Gunter. 679
Stallings, Barbara, and Robert Kaufman, eds. *Debt and Democracy in Latin America.* Reviewed by Charles Lipson. 1080
Stavrakis, Peter J. *Moscow and Greek Communism, 1944–1949.* Reviewed by Constance H. Cole. 331
Steed, Robert P., Laurence W. Moreland, and Tod A. Baker, eds. *The Disappearing South? Studies in Regional Change and Continuity.* Reviewed by Diane D. Blair. 645
Steed, Robert P., *see* Baker, Tod A. 1469
Stephens, John D., and Michael Wallerstein. "Industrial Concentration, Country Size, and Trade Union Membership." 941
Stewart, Joseph Jr., *see* Meier, Kenneth J. . . . 1034
Stewart, Marianne C., *see* Clarke, Harold D. 312
Stoll, Richard J. *U.S. National Security Policy and the Soviet Union: Persistent Regularities and Extreme Contingencies.* Robert B. McCalla. 345
Stone, Walter J., *see* Rapoport, Ronald B. . . 193
Staaver, John A. *The Colorado General Assembly.* Reviewed by Alan Rosenthal. 656
Strahan, Randall. *New Ways and Means: Reform and Change in a Congressional*

Index to Volume 85

Committee. Reviewed by John F. Manley. 302
Strom, Gerald S. *The Logic of Lawmaking: A Spatial Theory Approach.* Reviewed by James M. Enelow. 1041
Strom, Kaare. *Minority Government and Majority Rule.* Reviewed by Anthony Mughan. 1065
Stuart, Douglas, and William Tow. *The Limits of Alliance: NATO Out-of-Area Problems since 1949.* Reviewed by Deborah Avant. 1501
Suleiman, Ezra N., and John Waterbury, eds. *The Political Economy of Public Sector Reform and Privatization.* Reviewed by Paul Teske. 1490
Supple, Barry, *see* O'Furner, Mary. 1487
Sutter, Valerie O'Connor. *The Indochinese Refugee Dilemma.* Reviewed by Norman L. Zucker. 677
Swanson, Wayne R. *The Christ Child Goes to Court.* Reviewed by John Brigham. 252

Taras, Raymond C., ed. *Leadership Change in Communist States.* Reviewed by John P. Willerton. 1427
Tate, Katherine. "Black Political Participation in the 1984 and 1988 Presidential Elections." 1159
Thiele, Leslie Paul, *see* Johnson, J. Scott. 581
Thompson, Michael, Richard Ellis, and Aaron Wildavsky. *Cultural Theory.* Reviewed by John D. Martz. 1008
Tiefer, Charles. *Congressional Practice and Procedure: A Reference, Research, and Legislative Guide.* Reviewed by John Wilkerson. 303
Tinder, Glenn. *The Political Meaning of Christianity: An Interpretation.* Reviewed by Thomas J. Hoffman. 626
Tow, William, *see* Stuart, Douglas. 1501
Tucker, Robert W., and David C. Hendrickson. *Empire of Liberty: The Statecraft of Thomas Jefferson.* Reviewed by Joyotpaul Chaudhuri. 1009
Tulloch, Gail. *Mill and Sexual Equality.* Reviewed by Emily R. Gill. 276
Twombly, Jim, *see* Scholz, John T. 829

Urban, Michael E. *More Power to the Soviets: The Democratic Revolution in the USSR.* Reviewed by Valerie Bunce. 1066
Urban, Michael E. *An Algebra of Soviet Power: Elite Circulation in the Belorussian Republic, 1966–1986.* Reviewed by John P. Willerton. 1427

Vernon, Raymond, and Debora Spar. *Beyond Globalism: Remaking American Foreign Economic Policy.* Reviewed by Robert Ayres. 1070
Vertzberger, Yaacov Y. I. *The World in Their Minds: Information Processing, Cognition, and Perception in Foreign Policy Decisionmaking.* Reviewed by Philip A. Schrodt. 1502
Viroli, Maurizio. *Jean-Jacques Rousseau and the "Well-Ordered Society."* Reviewed by Susan Shell. 1010
von Vorys, Karl. *American National Interest: Virtue and Power in Foreign Policy.* Reviewed by John P. Lovell. 1084

Wagner, R. Harrison. "Nuclear Deterrence, Counterforce Strategies, and the Incentive to Strike First." 727
Walker, Samuel. *In Defense of American Liberties—A History of the ACLU.* Reviewed by Lee Epstein. 251
Wallach, Lise, *see* Wallach, Michael A. 1448
Wallach, Michael A., and Lise Wallach. *Rethinking Goodness.* Reviewed by Daryl H. Rice. 1448
Wallerstein, Michael, *see* Stephens, John D. 941
Ware, Alan. *Between Profit and State: Intermediate Organizations in Britain and the United States.* Reviewed by Leonard Freedman. 1067
Warwick, Paul V. *Culture, Structure, or Choice? Essays in the Interpretation of the British Experience.* Reviewed by Howard Handelman. 664
Waterbury, John, *see* Richards, Alan. 1489
Waterbury, John, *see* Suleiman, Ezra N. 1490
Waterman, Richard W., *see* Wood, B. Dan. 801
Weida, William J., *see* Gertcher, Frank L. 335
Weyrich, Dawn M., *see* McGuigan, Patrick B. 984
Whelan, James R. *Out of the Ashes: Life, Death, and Transfiguration of Democracy in Chile, 1833–1988.* Reviewed by Michael A. Morris. 678
White, Stephen. *Gorbachev in Power.* Reviewed by John P. Willerton. 1427
Whiting, Allen. *China Eyes Japan.* Reviewed by Robert S. Ross. 696
Wildavsky, Aaron, *see* Lynn, Naomi. 1467
Wildavsky, Aaron, *see* Thompson, Michael. 1008
Willborn, Steven L. *A Secretary and a Cook: Challenging Women's Wages in the Courts of the United States and Great Britain.* Reviewed by Gayle Binion. 601
Williams, Douglas E. *Truth, Hope, and Power: The Thought of Karl Popper.* Reviewed by Dick W. Olufs. 278
Wiseman, John A. *Democracy in Black Africa: Survival and Revival.* Reviewed by August H. Nimtz. 1068
Wittkopf, Eugene R. *Faces of Internationalism: Public Opinion and American For-*

eign Policy. Reviewed by William O. Chittick. 1497
Wittman, Donald, *see* Grofman, Bernard. .. 997
Wood, B. Dan, and Richard W. Waterman. "The Dynamics of Political Control of the Bureaucracy." 801
Wrightson, Margaret T., *see* Conlon, Timothy. 280

Xenos, Nicholas. *Scarcity and Modernity*. Reviewed by Peter Breiner. 1011

Young, Oran R., *see* Osherenko, Gail. 342

Zaller, John. "Information, Values, and Opinion." 1215
Zimring, Franklin K., *see* Hawkins, Gordon. 254
Zuk, Gary, *see* Clarke, Harold D. 312

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

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

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

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

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

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

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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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
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

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

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

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

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

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

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



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

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

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

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

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

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CONTENTS

ARTICLES

Advocacy Politics in Presidential Parties
John M. Bruce, John A. Clark & John H. Kessel 1089

Issues and Party Support in Multiparty Systems
Stuart Elaine Macdonald, Ola Listhaug & George Rabinowitz 1107

Managing Blame: An Experimental Test of the Effects of Political Accounts
Kathleen M. McGraw 1133

Black Political Participation in the 1984 and 1988 Presidential Elections
Katherine Tate 1159

The President, Referendum Voting, and Subnational Elections in the United States
Dennis M. Simon, Charles W. Ostrom, Jr. & Robin F. Marra 1177

Eschewing Obfuscation? Campaigns and the Perception of U.S. Senate Incumbents
Charles H. Franklin 1193

Information, Values, and Opinion
John Zaller 1215

Roles, Rules, and Rationality in the New Institutionalism
Donald D. Searing 1239

Discontent and the Expected Utility of Rebellion: The Case of Peru
Edward N. Muller, Henry A. Dietz & Steven E. Finkel 1261

Transitions by Agreement: Modeling the Spanish Way
Josep M. Colomer 1283

Absolute and Relative Gains in International Relations Theory
Robert Powell 1303

James Madison on Religion and Politics: Rhetoric and Reality
Thomas Lindsay 1321

SYMPOSIUM

Where Is the Schema? Going Beyond the "S" Word in Political Psychology
James H. Kuklinski, Robert C. Luskin & John Bolland 1341

Where Is the Schema? Critiques
Milton Lodge, Kathleen M. McGraw, Pamela Johnston Conover, Stanley Feldman & Arthur H. Miller 1357

RESEARCH NOTES

Counting the Number of Parties: An Alternative Index
Juan Molinar 1383

The Effect of Registration Laws and Education on U.S. Voter Turnout
Jonathan Nagler 1393

Measuring Internal Political Efficacy in the 1988 National Election Study
Richard G. Niemi, Stephen C. Craig & Franco Mattei 1407

CONTROVERSY

What Should Rational Cognitive Misers Do?
Iain McLean, John M. Orbell & Robyn M. Dawes 1417

BOOK REVIEWS

New Politics in the Soviet Union 1427
Political Theory 1437
American Politics 1456
Comparative Politics 1477
International Relations 1492

INDEX TO VOL. 85 1505